Craig Responds to Dawkins

[Cobalt]

I think the 'who designed the designer' argument is going past the point that the universe was designed in the first place.
Most rebuttals of the DA deal directly with the claims that the universe exhibits evidence of design (and that doesn't appear to be what this thread is about - in case you're asserting here that the universe is designed). 'Who designed the designer' is one rebuttal that does not. It instead undermines the assumption that such a (hypothetical) designer gets a free pass from the scope of the DA.

[seanc]

1. The fine-tuning of the universe is due to either physical necessity, chance, or design.
2. It is not due to physical necessity or chance.
3. Therefore, it is due to design.

Where do you get 2? How do you know the fine-tuning isn't due to physical necessity or chance?

[ConservativeAtheist]

I find it amazingly funny and ridiculous that Dr. Craig would even dare to say that an archeologist would be satisfied to find some broke pots and arrow heads, say that they were designed by an advanced intelligent civilization, and leave it at that, without knowing anything at all about that civilization. Archeologists do not stop at that kind of explanation...if they did they would be like christians...and we would not truly know anything about the history of human-kind.

:banghead: :banghead: :banghead:

Craig is not saying that we should leave it at that. :rolleyes: He said that we would not be required to explain the advanced intelligent civilization if we are to conclude those artifacts are the product of an advanced intelligent civilization.

This is so elementary I wonder if people are not intentionally missing the point.

Why would we not be required to explain the advanced civilization? What sense does that make? He is then saying that it is perfectly fine to be satisfied with being ignorant simply because you don't wish to learn anything beyond a point that satisfies a ludicrous, non-scientific theory about a diety. That is elementary...but not in a good way.

[ConservativeAtheist]

The problem is that Dawkins doesn't bother to address the issue; he simply asserts - without justification - that God must be extremely complex.


Sort of like Deists simply assert that there is a god...without justification or proof of any kind...only ignorant, blind faith.

[Doug Shaver]

he simply asserts . . . that God must be extremely complex.
And you can't think of any reason at all to suspect that he's almost certainly correct?

[thentian]

- Ernest exists.
-Alice is Ernest's mother.

-we do not know who Alice's mother is.

-but Alice is still the best explanation for Ernest.

compare with:

-the universe is designed
-God designed the universe
-we do not know who designed God.
-but God is still the best explanation for the universe

Its only logical now that the contention should boil down to whether the universe is designed or not.If its designed,then could it be by chance.thats all Craig is saying.

Compare yourself!

"Alice" is an uncontroversial idea. Noone denies that there are "Alices" about, and it would surprise noone to learn that she is Ernest's mother. The assertion "Alice is Ernest's mother" is a trite and everyday assertion that raises no further questions.

However, "God" is not an uncontroversial idea. There are even people who deny that any such being exists. (Surprise! :Cheeky: ) It is also remarkable that this "God" is usually claimed to have no "mother" himself, since it is contrary to experience that beings don't.

Therefore it is a bad analogy to say that God is the best explanation for the Universe just as Alice is the best explanation for Ernest. There are many controversial aspects of the God/Universe explanation, but none with the Alice/Ernest explanation. It may or may not be true that God is the best explanation for the Universe, but this is a bad analogy in any event.

Cheers! :)

[thedistillers]

he simply asserts . . . that God must be extremely complex.
And you can't think of any reason at all to suspect that he's almost certainly correct?

Of course, but considering how important the issue is for his conclusion, I would expect him to elaborate on the issue. Starting with: what is complexity? The problem is: when you start defining complexity, it is not that obvious that God must be complex, even if intuitively it seems it is.

[thedistillers]

The problem is that Dawkins doesn't bother to address the issue; he simply asserts - without justification - that God must be extremely complex.


Sort of like Deists simply assert that there is a god...without justification or proof of any kind...only ignorant, blind faith.

I'm not sure to see your point. Are you saying that because deists do it, it becomes acceptable when Dawkins does it?

Why are so many people very defensive about Dawkins book and don't want to see anything bad about it, when it's really just the atheistic equivalent of what Josh Mcdowell or Lee Strobel produce? It seems that he gets a free pass because he's in "the right camp".

[thentian]

The problem is that Dawkins doesn't bother to address the issue; he simply asserts - without justification - that God must be extremely complex.

As I remember it, Dawkins asserted that complex designed objects require even more complex designers, and that therefore any designer of the Universe would need to be more complex than it.

[thedistillers]

The problem is that Dawkins doesn't bother to address the issue; he simply asserts - without justification - that God must be extremely complex.

As I remember it, Dawkins asserted that complex designed objects require even more complex designers, and that therefore any designer of the Universe would need to be more complex than it.

Yes but why does he think that? Why do complex designed objects require even more complex designers? That is what Dawkins needs to elaborate on. Again, this is absolutely central to his conclusion.

Swinburne, for example, answered by mentionning that a mind is a very simple thing, so according to him if God is a mind but at the same time is not material, then he is simple. Even if he has all power and all knowledge, his knowledge is not "stored" anywhere in a complex thing like a brain. So God remains simple, despite his huge power and knowledge.

Now, I'm not saying that I agree with Swinburne, but the point is, things are really not as intuitive and obvious as dawkins makes them to be.

[Sapho]

As I remember it, Dawkins asserted that complex designed objects require even more complex designers, and that therefore any designer of the Universe would need to be more complex than it.

Yes but why does he think that? Why do complex designed objects require even more complex designers? That is what Dawkins needs to elaborate on. Again, this is absolutely central to his conclusion.

Swinburne, for example, answered by mentionning that a mind is a very simple thing, so according to him if God is a mind but at the same time is not material, then he is simple. Even if he has all power and all knowledge, his knowledge is not "stored" anywhere in a complex thing like a brain. So God remains simple, despite his huge power and knowledge.

Now, I'm not saying that I agree with Swinburne, but the point is, things are really not as intuitive and obvious as dawkins makes them to be.

He thinks that, because every example of a complex designed object that we have observed, has been made by something more complex then that which was designed. If fact every designed object that we know to be designed, has been designed by humans.

[thedistillers]

He thinks that, because every example of a complex designed object that we have observed, has been made by something more complex then that which was designed. If fact every designed object that we know to be designed, has been designed by humans.

I don't remember if Dawkins mentions that in his book, but what is the reasoning to make a generality out of our limited observations? That's fallacious. If you tell a mathematician you can make generalizations based on a limited number of calculations, he will rightfully shake his head.

[Sapho]

He thinks that, because every example of a complex designed object that we have observed, has been made by something more complex then that which was designed. If fact every designed object that we know to be designed, has been designed by humans.

I don't remember if Dawkins mentions that in his book, but what is the reasoning to make a generality out of our limited observations? That's fallacious. If you tell a mathematician you can make generalizations based on a limited number of calculations, he will rightfully shake his head.

A limited number of observations? unfortunatly we dont have the time for an infinite number of observations, so the billions of actual observations we do have of humans designing things will have to do.

do you have even one obsevation of something simple designing something more complex than itself?

Just one.

[thentian]

As I remember it, Dawkins asserted that complex designed objects require even more complex designers, and that therefore any designer of the Universe would need to be more complex than it.

Yes but why does he think that? Why do complex designed objects require even more complex designers? That is what Dawkins needs to elaborate on. Again, this is absolutely central to his conclusion.

Swinburne, for example, answered by mentionning that a mind is a very simple thing, so according to him if God is a mind but at the same time is not material, then he is simple. Even if he has all power and all knowledge, his knowledge is not "stored" anywhere in a complex thing like a brain. So God remains simple, despite his huge power and knowledge.

Now, I'm not saying that I agree with Swinburne, but the point is, things are really not as intuitive and obvious as dawkins makes them to be.

As Sapho wrote above, and I would like to add that this is an argument from our (humanity's) experience as designers. A simple thing like a stone axe can be created by a simple stone-age "smith", while the more complex designs of later times require more complex "smiths". A bronze-age axe, for example, required miners of both copper and tin, in addition to the smith himself, as well as an "inventor" to figure out beforehand the formula for bronze. Something as complex as the new big Hadron Collider requires a big organization as well as numerous scientists that have gone before to figure out the science making it all possible.

As with all arguments from experience, we need to exercise some caution, of course, but as long as there are no counter-evidence the argument is strenghtened by every observation that supports it.

[Illusio]

Craig seems to be extremly confused. If that was a left hook, it didn't connect.

When you find stone tools it is reasonable to consider them designed by humans if you can trace human existence and toolmaking history back to the time the stone tools were dated at. If you can do this, you have "explained" the origin of the tools by using known causes.

Stone tools from the pre-cambrian period can not be explained by human designers and simply saying that they were designed by Iumans, of which we have no evidence, does not offer any new knowledge of a cause and is therefore not an explanation. So the basic premise that any statement like "X caused Y" is a statement that explains Y is simply wrong.
Furthermore, if X is an impossible being, such as "The two sisters who are simultaneously taller than eachother" the statement is also false.

Dawkins argument is either that infinite regress qualifies God's membership in the impossible being club or that infinite regress means you haven't actually defined X and that it is a non-explanation.

If you do terminate the infinite regress by special pleading, you still end up with your non-explanation. "God" could be anything, including nature. Any origin event that is allowed to be uncaused could have created the universe and we have no good reason to select one over another. For example: The big bang is the uncaused, omnipresent, omnipotent and infinitly good creator of the universe.

It's also worth menitoning that we actually have a perfectly good explanation for the apparent "design" in organic life. It's called evolutionary theory and shows how emergent complexity can arise in nature. Not only that, the DNA of living organisms show clear evidence of an unintelligent and gradual design process.(Such as large parts of our DNA being parasitic retroviral DNA) Craig simply ignores this explanation, which gives us actual knowledge about nature and decides to go for the non-explanation "God did it" instead. Which can be applied at ANY point in the history of the universe, including 5 minutes ago(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Omphalos_(theology)), and is an intellectual dead end.


Craig's counter argument about infinite regress on explanations is simply silly. It's fine to terminate explanation at a certain point where you have a known cause. It is not fine to terminate explanation at a point where you haven't established the existence of the last cause in your causality chain. This is the difference between "The big bang caused the universe"/"The beaver caused the dam" and "God caused the universe". The two first ones are clearly useful partial explanations as the observed causes have attributes that mean something to us(Kill beavers to avoid dams, The universe is expanding), but the last one explains nothing when we have never observed God. All we have is hearsay.

[Doug Shaver]

it is not that obvious that God must be complex, even if intuitively it seems it is.
Excuse me? It seems obvious, but it is not obvious? I can't make sense of that. That which is not obvious is not going to seem obvious.

As for intuition, I think that as a generality, we are justified in believing whatever is intuitively so just as long as nobody has demonstrated that notwithstanding our intuition, it is either certainly or probably not so. So, pending a cogent argument for God's simplicity, it is reasonable to believe that if God exists, then he is complex.

[thedistillers]

it is not that obvious that God must be complex, even if intuitively it seems it is.
Excuse me? It seems obvious, but it is not obvious? I can't make sense of that. That which is not obvious is not going to seem obvious.

There are plenty of things that prima facie seem obvious, but actually aren't. Like if said, if Dawkins would have at least started to define complexity, then right away he would have seen that his assertion that God must be complex requires additional explanation.

As for intuition, I think that as a generality, we are justified in believing whatever is intuitively so just as long as nobody has demonstrated that notwithstanding our intuition, it is either certainly or probably not so. So, pending a cogent argument for God's simplicity, it is reasonable to believe that if God exists, then he is complex.

Maybe we do that in our everyday life, but this is certainly not a rigorous way to make arguments and form conclusions. If you tell people their belief in God is a delusion, you need something stronger than a personal intuition.

[Katastrophikus]

Dawkins' argument does not exist in a vacuum. His arguments do not stand by themselves. They are responses to Christian claims. That particular argument is in response to the Christian claim that the universe is too complex to exist by itself.

The Christian argument falters for the very same reasons you state (not defining complexity and making statements based on intuition).

In showing that Dawkin's argument fails, you show that the Christian argument for complexity fails too. They are the one and the same.

[Cobalt]

Why do complex designed objects require even more complex designers?
Because the information coming from a designer is less than or equal to the information content of the designer.

[thedistillers]

Why do complex designed objects require even more complex designers?
Because the information coming from a designer is less than or equal to the information content of the designer.

The question was referring to what Dawkins needed to elaborate on his book, I'm not looking for answers.

[thedistillers]

Dawkins' argument does not exist in a vacuum. His arguments do not stand by themselves. They are responses to Christian claims. That particular argument is in response to the Christian claim that the universe is too complex to exist by itself.

The Christian argument falters for the very same reasons you state (not defining complexity and making statements based on intuition).

In showing that Dawkin's argument fails, you show that the Christian argument for complexity fails too. They are the one and the same.

People come up very often with that excuse, but I'm afraid this is not true.

Dawkins argument is not merely an answer to specific Christian claims, it is an argument that is supposed to show that God almost certainly does not exist. The argument should certainly stand by itself if Dawkins wants to say that belief in God is a delusion.

The claim that the universe is too complex to exist by itself is not what Christians usually say. The argument from design says that God is the best explanation for complexity, NOT that the universe is too complex to exist by itself. This is a straw man of the design argument.

Also, as Craig himself pointed out, maybe people believe in God for other reasons, so simply because Dawkins thinks he has refuted the design argument (I don't think he has, but anyway...) does not allow him to claim that belief in God is a delusion.

[DaMan121]

he argument from design says that God is the best explanation for complexity, NOT that the universe is too complex to exist by itself. This is a straw man of the design argument.

So that means you DO NOT contend that the universe is too complex to exist by itself, correct? Than how on earth is 'god' the best explanation of complexity given that there is plenty of evidence the universe exists but none for this god character?

[Doug Shaver]

There are plenty of things that prima facie seem obvious, but actually aren't.
May I see an example?

[rizdek]

I think Craig caught Dawkins with a mean left hook with this point:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Qsymb6UxWM0

But as I watched it, I wondered, where did Craig get the idea of a god?

[Katastrophikus]

People come up very often with that excuse, but I'm afraid this is not true.

Dawkins argument is not merely an answer to specific Christian claims, it is an argument that is supposed to show that God almost certainly does not exist. The argument should certainly stand by itself if Dawkins wants to say that belief in God is a delusion.
You are right. He does not merely argue against Christian claims, and he does prop up a case for "why there almost certainly is no God." Nevertheless, reading "The Ultimate Boing 747" (p113), you can clearly see that he raises that argument specifically in response to the argument from complexity. On page 115, he states: "The argument from improbability states that complex things could not have come about by chance. But many people define 'come about by chance' as a synonym for 'come about in the absence of deliberate design.'

The claim that the universe is too complex to exist by itself is not what Christians usually say. The argument from design says that God is the best explanation for complexity, NOT that the universe is too complex to exist by itself. This is a straw man of the design argument.
OK. I will retract my statement. The theist claim, then is not that the universe is to complex to exist by itself. The theist claim is, then, that God is the best explanation for complexity.

How do you define best? And how can we measure it?

Because, scientifically at least, where best is generally taken to mean "explains the most data as parsimoniously as possible," God is not the best explanation.

Also, as Craig himself pointed out, maybe people believe in God for other reasons, so simply because Dawkins thinks he has refuted the design argument (I don't think he has, but anyway...) does not allow him to claim that belief in God is a delusion.
I am very sure that people believe God for many, many different reasons. Dawkins mentions just a few in his book, and there are as many, many others that he has left untouched. But you misrepresent his case, he does not claim that God is a delusion for that argument alone. It is one piece of evidence which may, or may not be convincing.

[thedistillers]

Craig on Dawkins' argument, again.

http://www.reasonablefaith.org/site/PageServer?pagename=q_and_a

[traques]

If we don't need to explain the explanation why do we attach god to creation? Couldn't it just go unexplained, like how Craig would have the designer go unexplained? Take the simplest solution, no?

[Steven Carr]

If we don't need to explain the explanation why do we attach god to creation? Couldn't it just go unexplained, like how Craig would have the designer go unexplained? Take the simplest solution, no?

Craig, of course, writes very long articles to explain why his alleged god created this particular world, rather than , say, a world with no Holocaust in it.

So his reticence to explain the explanation is very limited.

And arbitrary.

[Prof]

If we don't need to explain the explanation why do we attach god to creation? Couldn't it just go unexplained, like how Craig would have the designer go unexplained? Take the simplest solution, no?

I definitely do not see that as an appropriate response to Craig (or this issue in general). That's like leaving yourself only with observations, never explanations: "Why bother looking for explanations for what we see?"

I dislike Craig but respect certain things about him to be sure. He comes at debate with atheists by making very specific claims and being dogged on details (his details, anyway). Which is actually the opposite of so many non-evangelical or "liberal" theists who debate via obfuscation and abstraction of the biblical text...as a way of escaping the inconvenient claims made literally in the bible.

Anyway, I find Craig to be making a sound point about not needing an "explanation for the explanation" and the infinite regress this causes. And insofar as any atheist is making such a mistake in the way they critique the Designer claims...he's right. (And some do make these mistakes).

The proper rebuttal of a theistic designer claim depends on the form of the claim. And some theistic arguments do merit a "Then who designed the designer?" response. Others don't.

Dawkins argument is not merely a rebuttal to the "Improbable complexity requires a designer" argument, with a resulting "then who designed the designer?"

Rather, his main point seems to me to be about what makes for a good explanation over a poor one. "Sky Hooks vs Cranes." The evolution explanation for improbable looking complexity is a good form of explanation (in how it handles the details, in it's testable implications, in how it fits in with other big field's of natural knowledge, in it's fecundity for it's application and it's tendency to open new informative fields of inquiry etc).

"God did it" is a bad form of explanation, for what should be pretty obvious reasons in comparison.

I believe someone like Craig would be right to point out if we found a certain type of alien artifact we could presume alien intelligence as forging the artifact. It's not a full explanation...but it could be a reasonable inference.

But if someone started claiming that the artifacts were made by magic, by magical beings...hello "sky hook." That would be (in all likelihood) unwarranted and not really serve as an "explanation,"...it'd just be a poor inference. And it would be positing a mystery to "explain" a mystery.

Dawkins would point out that even if it were warranted to ascribe artifacts - or the beginning of life - to an alien agency, in trying to explain the aliens he wouldn't go question-begging and say "they just are"...he'd try to find a good explanation for the aliens and the best he knows of for how complex beings can arise is an evolutionary explanation, from simpler natural precursors. (And that even for abiogenesis, a naturalistic explanation is at least more promising than "magic.").

Prof.

[Steven Carr]

I believe someone like Craig would be right to point out if we found a certain type of alien artifact we could presume alien intelligence as forging the artifact.

Why?

Why does Craig not even consider the idea that his alleged god creates artefacts?

Why does Craig have naturalist presuppositions when it comes to alien-looking artefacts?

And why then attack other people for having naturalists presuppositions?

[Hamlet]

Why does Craig not even consider the idea that his alleged god creates artefacts?

He does think God is a creator, but only humans create artifacts.

Why does Craig have naturalist presuppositions when it comes to alien-looking artefacts?

Craig, and hopefully everyone else, would offer a naturalist explanation because the object in question is alien-looking.

[Prof]

I believe someone like Craig would be right to point out if we found a certain type of alien artifact we could presume alien intelligence as forging the artifact.

Why?

Why does Craig not even consider the idea that his alleged god creates artefacts?

Why does Craig have naturalist presuppositions when it comes to alien-looking artefacts?

And why then attack other people for having naturalists presuppositions?

Those may be legit questions, but they miss the point of the alien-artifact analogy. The alien-artifact example meant to counter the logic that you must have an explanation for the explanation. That you can make a reasonable inference for a cause without having to have an "explanation" or natural history for the cause.

If we got to Mars and found an incredibly advanced mechanical/electrical device that appeared to be, I dunno, drilling for something or terraforming the planet, it would not be unreasonable to decide this was the created by some advanced intelligence, likely alien. It's not a full explanation (doesn't tell us exactly why it's there or how it was made, or exactly who/what made it) but it's a reasonable general inference from such a state of affairs.

You don't need to have an explanation of where the advanced intelligence came from in order to make the inference of Intelligent Design (ouch!) reasonable in such a case.

Craig is just pointing this out and saying "Insofar as you accept that reasoning, quit pestering us with this "we won't accept your Intelligent Creator" inference unless you can tell us where the Creator came from!"

I think it's a fair point, in terms of not having to have an explanation for every explanation. But Craig's "explanation" - A Magic Creator - is still a mighty poor excuse for an explanation for various reasons.

Prof.

[Antiplastic]

Why?

Why does Craig not even consider the idea that his alleged god creates artefacts?

Why does Craig have naturalist presuppositions when it comes to alien-looking artefacts?

And why then attack other people for having naturalists presuppositions?

Those may be legit questions, but they miss the point of the alien-artifact analogy. The alien-artifact example meant to counter the logic that you must have an explanation for the explanation.

Who in the argument is advancing the logic that any explanation must have an explanation of the explanation?

It is the theist who argues, "any complex improbable thing implies a more complex improbable thing as its explanation." Dawkins is simply pointing out the consequences of this argument.

[Steven Carr]

Why does Craig not even consider the idea that his alleged god creates artefacts?

He does think God is a creator, but only humans create artifacts.



How does Craig know his alleged god did not create these hypothetical artefacts, before Craig has ever seen any of them?

Simply because he does not believe in a god who creates machines?

Therefore, no machine can be assumed to be created by any god, because Craig just does not believe in a god who creates machines.

Therefore, all alien looking artefacts were created by aliens.




Why does Craig have naturalist presuppositions when it comes to alien-looking artefacts?

Craig, and hopefully everyone else, would offer a naturalist explanation because the object in question is alien-looking.

And if the object in question is an eye, or a woodpecker?

[Steven Carr]

If we got to Mars and found an incredibly advanced mechanical/electrical device that appeared to be, I dunno, drilling for something or terraforming the planet, it would not be unreasonable to decide this was the created by some advanced intelligence, likely alien. It's not a full explanation (doesn't tell us exactly why it's there or how it was made, or exactly who/what made it) but it's a reasonable general inference from such a state of affairs.

You don't need to have an explanation of where the advanced intelligence came from in order to make the inference of Intelligent Design (ouch!) reasonable in such a case.

So you would be laughed to scorn by Craig if you claimed these aliens were contingent beings which began to exist and had to have a cause for them to begin to exist, and that it would , in principle, be possible to find an explanation of how these aliens came to exist?

'These aliens don't need any explanation', Craig would say 'Any attempt to ask for an explanation of how these aliens came to begin to exist is an invalid question, as invalid as asking who desgned God'

[thedistillers]

Who in the argument is advancing the logic that any explanation must have an explanation of the explanation?

Dawkins. He claims positing a God doesn't explain anything, because it immediately raises the question of who designed the designer. In other words, he rejects God as an explanation because we don't have an explanation for God. Ie, he rejects an explanation on the basis that we don't have the explanation for the explanation.

It is the theist who argues, "any complex improbable thing implies a more complex improbable thing as its explanation."

I've never heard a theist formulating the design argument that way.

[Antiplastic]

Who in the argument is advancing the logic that any explanation must have an explanation of the explanation?

Dawkins. He claims positing a God doesn't explain anything, because it immediately raises the question of who designed the designer.

Does he actually say this? Does he say that intelligence doesn't proximately explain 747s? Or does he say that it can't ultimately explain anything?

It is the theist who argues, "any complex improbable thing implies a more complex improbable thing as its explanation."

I've never heard a theist formulating the design argument that way.

I've never heard it formulated any other way. We must hang out in different bars.

[Prof]

So you would be laughed to scorn by Craig if you claimed these aliens were contingent beings which began to exist and had to have a cause for them to begin to exist, and that it would , in principle, be possible to find an explanation of how these aliens came to exist?

'These aliens don't need any explanation', Craig would say 'Any attempt to ask for an explanation of how these aliens came to begin to exist is an invalid question, as invalid as asking who desgned God'

I may be having a senior moment, but I don't see how you draw that either from what Craig says or what I wrote. I think Craig would say, and I would say, the opposite of what you just wrote.

:huh:

Craig is making a point about the sort of naive assertion that you can't explain something as 'designed' without an explanation for the designer. He is correct and unfortunately I have seen quite a number of atheists make this type of "naive" rebuttal to Designer arguments. The amount of times I've seen atheists (not necessarily on this board so much, but on others) retort "Ok, if you say God designed everything, WHO designed God?" as a virtual reflex retort is annoying. The atheist would in all likilhood accept certain types of artifacts as designed by aliens, without having to know exactly who or what the aliens were or how they came to be, but suddenly demands a more extensive design history when it comes to claims of a Designer Of The Universe or whatever. I see this often enough myself to think Craig's making a worthwhile point. (And as I said the "who designed the Designer?" rebuttal IS pertinent in some arguments...just not all of them, reflexively).

THAT SAID, as I mentioned, I think it's something of a straw man insofar as he is trying to rebut Dawkins, because as I wrote I don't think Dawkins' argument is merely "Then who designed the designer?" I find Dawkins' argument is derived from his position concerning what makes for actual good explanations over poor ones. God being a poor type of explanation (skyhook) vs evolution being a good type of explanation (crane).

Prof

[Steven Carr]

So you would be laughed to scorn by Craig if you claimed these aliens were contingent beings which began to exist and had to have a cause for them to begin to exist, and that it would , in principle, be possible to find an explanation of how these aliens came to exist?

'These aliens don't need any explanation', Craig would say 'Any attempt to ask for an explanation of how these aliens came to begin to exist is an invalid question, as invalid as asking who desgned God'

I may be having a senior moment, but I don't see how you draw that either from what Craig says or what I wrote. I think Craig would say, and I would say, the opposite of what you just wrote.

:huh:

Craig is making a point about the sort of naive assertion that you can't explain something as 'designed' without an explanation for the designer. He is correct and unfortunately I have seen quite a number of atheists make this type of "naive" rebuttal to Designer arguments. The amount of times I've seen atheists (not necessarily on this board so much, but on others) retort "Ok, if you say God designed everything, WHO designed God?" as a virtual reflex retort is annoying. The atheist would in all likilhood accept certain types of artifacts as designed by aliens, without having to know exactly who or what the aliens were or how they came to be, but suddenly demands a more extensive design history when it comes to claims of a Designer Of The Universe or whatever. I see this often enough myself to think Craig's making a worthwhile point. (And as I said the "who designed the Designer?" rebuttal IS pertinent in some arguments...just not all of them, reflexively).





SO Craig thinks aliens should be explained, because they are contingent beings,

While Craig thinks his alleged god needs no explanation.

And the explanations 'God designed X' and 'Aliens designed X' are both satisfactory, because neither needs further explanation (although aliens do , because they began to exist)

And Craig cannot say whether or not God or aliens designed some hypothetical artefacts that we may find, but Craig claims 'Aliens designed it' is a really good explanation that Dawkins must accept without questioning, although it may be totally false, as God can also design artefacts.

Even by Craig's standards,that is inconsistent.

[Prof]

It is the theist who argues, "any complex improbable thing implies a more complex improbable thing as its explanation."





I've never heard a theist formulating the design argument that way.



I've never heard it formulated any other way. We must hang out in different bars.

thedistillers is right I think: You provided a formulation most theists would not use; rather you substituted your characterization of what you believe they are stuck claiming. Much like atheists like to boil down the whole Jesus sacrifice thing to "God sacrificed himself to himself to save us from himself." Even if the propositions of Christianity imply this logic, that is not how you'll find The Sacrifice formulated or presented by Christians.

Nor would most formulate the design argument as you just did.

Typically, theists see not simply "improbable complexity" as you've left it, but they see "Design" that they believe implies intention. (Dembski having built it into his idea of "Specified Complexity."

As well, you have theists (Swinburne being one) arguing God is not "" a more complex improbable thing as its explanation," but rather that God is a "simple" being.

It's not that your arguments against the theist are the issue; just that thedistillers is correct in pointing out you have supplied a formulation that does not in fact represent how a number of theists actually formulate the Design argument.

Prof

[Prof]

SO Craig thinks aliens should be explained, because they are contingent beings,

While Craig thinks his alleged god needs no explanation.

No. I'm confused as to why you keep repeating that mistake. The whole point of the alien-inference analogy is Craig would say the Aliens...like his God would not need an explanation, in order to use the aliens as an explanation for the artifacts.

That is: one could infer from certain types of artifacts that they were the product of Superior Intelligence without having to know exactly who the aliens were, how they came to be etc.

Craig wishes to say this is true of the Supreme Designer inference as well. I don't think his Supreme Designer is a good inference for many reasons. But let's at least not misrepresent what Craig is arguing.

Prof

[thedistillers]

I find Dawkins' argument is derived from his position concerning what makes for actual good explanations over poor ones. God being a poor type of explanation (skyhook) vs evolution being a good type of explanation (crane).

Prof

As I've already said many times, "The God Delusion" would have benefited so much with a better structure and more detailed argument. Maybe some attacks on his argument are straw man, but straw man are easier to make when the argument is poorly presented.

Dawkins argument is really just: God is a bad explanation. That's what most atheists think.

But it doesn't follow from that that God doesn't exist. Or almost does not exist, whatever. I hate to agree with Alister McGrath, but like he says, what ultimately matters to people is not how likely or unlikely God is, or how good or bad of an explanation God is. Afterall, unlikely things happen. Sometimes the bad explanation ends up being the correct one. What matters to people is if he exists or not, and Dawkins cannot give any answer to the question. So as far as Dawkins wishing that people end up being atheists after reading his book, I can't see that happening, unless people already have doubts before reading it.

[ben052483]

I find Dawkins' argument is derived from his position concerning what makes for actual good explanations over poor ones. God being a poor type of explanation (skyhook) vs evolution being a good type of explanation (crane).

Prof

As I've already said many times, "The God Delusion" would have benefited so much with a better structure and more detailed argument. Maybe some attacks on his argument are straw man, but straw man are easier to make when the argument is poorly presented.

Dawkins argument is really just: God is a bad explanation. That's what most atheists think.

But it doesn't follow from that that God doesn't exist. Or almost does not exist, whatever. I hate to agree with Alister McGrath, but like he says, what ultimately matters to people is not how likely or unlikely God is, or how good or bad of an explanation God is. Afterall, unlikely things happen. Sometimes the bad explanation ends up being the correct one. What matters to people is if he exists or not, and Dawkins cannot give any answer to the question. So as far as Dawkins wishing that people end up being atheists after reading his book, I can't see that happening, unless people already have doubts before reading it.


You are completely misreading Dawkins. He doesn't have to prove that god doesn't exist. All he has to do and has done is show that the arguments for god don't actually get you to god. The design argument, however you want to formulate it, starts with the circular assumption that something looks designed because it looks designed, and then goes to the conclusion that therefore it must be designed by a god maybe. If it is a valid inference of course you don't need to explain the explanation, but the problem is SPECIAL PLEADING because you can't solve a problem of design by just stopping at god arbitrarily. It is no different than the cosmological arguments. If god can be eternal without explanation, then so can the universe. If god doesn't need an explanation, then neither does the universe.
In other words, he succeeds greatly in proving that the reasons for believing in god are not sound, but of course belief in god is not based on sound reasoning so I guess he would fail to convince people who could not possibly be convinced.

[Hamlet]

As I've already said many times, "The God Delusion" would have benefited so much with a better structure and more detailed argument. Maybe some attacks on his argument are straw man, but straw man are easier to make when the argument is poorly presented.

Dawkins argument is really just: God is a bad explanation. That's what most atheists think.

But it doesn't follow from that that God doesn't exist. Or almost does not exist, whatever. I hate to agree with Alister McGrath, but like he says, what ultimately matters to people is not how likely or unlikely God is, or how good or bad of an explanation God is. Afterall, unlikely things happen. Sometimes the bad explanation ends up being the correct one. What matters to people is if he exists or not, and Dawkins cannot give any answer to the question. So as far as Dawkins wishing that people end up being atheists after reading his book, I can't see that happening, unless people already have doubts before reading it.


You are completely misreading Dawkins. He doesn't have to prove that god doesn't exist. All he has to do and has done is show that the arguments for god don't actually get you to god. The design argument, however you want to formulate it, starts with the circular assumption that something looks designed because it looks designed, and then goes to the conclusion that therefore it must be designed by a god maybe. If it is a valid inference of course you don't need to explain the explanation, but the problem is SPECIAL PLEADING because you can't solve a problem of design by just stopping at god arbitrarily. It is no different than the cosmological arguments. If god can be eternal without explanation, then so can the universe. If god doesn't need an explanation, then neither does the universe.
In other words, he succeeds greatly in proving that the reasons for believing in god are not sound, but of course belief in god is not based on sound reasoning so I guess he would fail to convince people who could not possibly be convinced.

Dawkins is the one who said his conclusion of that chapter is that God almost certainly does not exist. His "argument" is clearly invalid (i.e., the conclusion does not follow from the premises).

[thedistillers]

You are completely misreading Dawkins. He doesn't have to prove that god doesn't exist. All he has to do and has done is show that the arguments for god don't actually get you to god.

The only argument he attemps to debunk is the design argument. He barely touches other arguments (without any word on their modern versions) with only a couple of lines. So if you're going to argue that Dawkins debunks every argument for God's existence, I'm afraid we haven't read the same book.

But, even if he did that, I think most people who believe in God don't rely in any specific argument. It's more an intuitive or properly basic belief, which is not dependant on arguments or evidence. So Dawkins would ALSO have to show that belief in God is not properly basic. He hasn't done that as well.

but the problem is SPECIAL PLEADING because you can't solve a problem of design by just stopping at god arbitrarily.

What is arbitrary about stopping with an eternal first cause?

[Steven Carr]

That is: one could infer from certain types of artifacts that they were the product of Superior Intelligence without having to know exactly who the aliens were, how they came to be etc.


SO if somebody like Craig asked how these aliens came to begin to exist, Craig would simply rebuff them by pointing out that we don't need to ask that question?

And if Craig said these aliens must have been designed, Craig would claim this was invalid reasoning, because you don't need to know where the aliens came from to say that they design things.

I designed this posting. I'm sure you can accept that explanation of this post without having to know where my birthplace was.

Therefore, it is invalid of Dawkins to say that there must be an evolutionary explanation of how Homo sapiens evolved.

All Dawkins needs to know is that human beings design things.

Craig is simply throwing out red herrings.

His claim is that if there is a thing which cannot arise by nature, it must have been designed.

Dawkins simply points out that the principle must apply to Craig's alleged god.

Craig's point has nothing whatever to do with Dawkins argument.

[Prof]

SO if somebody like Craig asked how these aliens came to begin to exist, Craig would simply rebuff them by pointing out that we don't need to ask that question?

And if Craig said these aliens must have been designed, Craig would claim this was invalid reasoning, because you don't need to know where the aliens came from to say that they design things.

Whoa...I agree with a lot of what you keep writing in terms of criticising Craig's position. However, you are in such a hurry to question "the designer" that you keep shuffling right past the point I've been talking about, re Craig. I'm talking about artifacts and whether we can reasonably infer design without having to know the identity or history of the designer. Once that is settled THEN certainly one can move on to questions about the designer too. But whether you move on to questions about the designer it STILL doesn't change the fact you can infer design without knowing the designer or how exactly the designers came to be (alien artifacts being an example).

THAT BEING ESTABLISHED, sure you can go on to ask questions about the alien designers, and I think Dawkins is on the right track and is consistent (positing an evolutionary explanation) whereas Craig's answers are crappy and special-pleading for his God-as-designer. But I'm just trying to focus on the one point on which I agree with Craig, which is that you can in some cases infer design before having a sound case for exactly who the designer(s) is or how the designer came to be.

If that still doesn't make clear enough what I'm trying to get across I'll have to assume we are talking past one another, because you keep writing things that I would agree with, except that they seem to miss the point I'm making.

(And I already said I feel Craig's argument is a strawman as it pertains to Dawkins' argument).

[rizdek]

What is arbitrary about stopping with an eternal first cause?

Well, it might not be that one "arbitrarily" stops with an eternal first cause since by definition one must stop there. The arbitraryness, if that is a word, is to posit the existence of such an entity and then proceed to give this unpreceiveable entity all sorts of characteristics/ features that somehow all fit with the preconceived notion that this entity is the ultimate first cause.

1. We need a being that is powerful...voila, omnipotent
2. Well, it must be really intelligent... there you have it, omniscience
3. It must be outside of time and space...well, it exists in the timeless spirit world.
4. It cannot have had a beginning because we would then need to explain how it began...so it is an eternal first cause.
5....are there some other useful/necessary features I forgot? If so, add them at your whim, no one can contradict you.

[robheus]

Without watching the video, I'll bet that he uses some sort of argument which somehow "proves" that God is, in fact, eternal, and does not, in fact, require a designer.

That what mr. Lane Craig practices is "one sided" logic, since clearly he arguments (using invalid qualities of the infinite) to reason against infinity, but that same logic would dissolve his idea of the infinite/eternal creator also.

[robheus]

What is arbitrary about stopping with an eternal first cause?

Well, it might not be that one "arbitrarily" stops with an eternal first cause since by definition one must stop there. The arbitraryness, if that is a word, is to posit the existence of such an entity and then proceed to give this unpreceiveable entity all sorts of characteristics/ features that somehow all fit with the preconceived notion that this entity is the ultimate first cause.

1. We need a being that is powerful...voila, omnipotent
2. Well, it must be really intelligent... there you have it, omniscience
3. It must be outside of time and space...well, it exists in the timeless spirit world.
4. It cannot have had a beginning because we would then need to explain how it began...so it is an eternal first cause.
5....are there some other useful/necessary features I forgot? If so, add them at your whim, no one can contradict you.

Just that this imagined being - once he started reasoning about the world - either has to be a solipsists (having the idea that reality is all inside the mind) or would conclude (in the same way as I can conclude myself) that such an idea is an absurdity, and then quite naturally dissolves itself.

[thentian]

I think the alien artifact analogy is bad because the two conclusions reached are of very different types.

That the artifact must have been made by aliens is something we arrive at after observation and deduction. The conclusion could not contradict the premises from which the conclusion was reached, nor could trying to find out where the aliens came from lead to an infinite regress.

That the universe must have been made by God is a conclusion that is reached after some logical argument. Such arguments must always withstand the test that the conclusion is not contradicting it's premises, and tests to see if the conclusion is somehow absurd.

[robheus]

Without watching the video, I'll bet that he uses some sort of argument which somehow "proves" that God is, in fact, eternal, and does not, in fact, require a designer.

It's along those lines.

He provides what he says is a quote from Mr. Dawkins, as follows: “The temptation to attribute the appearance of design to a designer is a false one because the designer hypothesis immediately raises the larger problem of who designed the designer.”

Craig argues with this point saying that: "In order to recognize an explanation as the best, you don’t have to have an explanation to explain the explanation."

Well, the problem here, obviously, is that theists are not providing an explanation. They're employing a form of reasoning, a form of reasoning that they claim is no longer valid when applied to a similar scenario.

The point is that if a theist wants to imply that complexity denotes design, then the theist must also use that same reasoning to say that God, who is surely far more complex than what we see in the universe, would also have to have a designer.

In my opinion, this is just another example of Christians wanting to have things both ways. They want to be allowed to reason in a certain way. However, they object to using the same reasoning to draw a conclusion that would contradict their beliefs and claims. This type of reasoning is ONLY acceptable as long as it is used to "prove" that their claims and beliefs are valid. It just seems dishonest to me.

True. Theism/theists and particulare Mr. Craig suffers from "one sided" logic.

Like Mr. Craig "proofs" us time can not possibly be infinite since an infinite amount of time elapsed (since when? where did he place the begin point if no such point exist on an infinite time line?) is impossible, but the same time of argument is never applied to the attributed infiniteness of the creator.

[thentian]

Like Mr. Craig "proofs" us time can not possibly be infinite since an infinite amount of time elapsed (since when? where did he place the begin point if no such point exist on an infinite time line?) is impossible, but the same time of argument is never applied to the attributed infiniteness of the creator.

Why does he go on about that? I'm an atheist, but I don't argue that time must stretch infinitely back in the past. As far as I know, the current scientific theory is that time started with the Big Bang. :huh:

[thedistillers]

I'm an atheist, but I don't argue that time must stretch infinitely back in the past.

Okay, but you're not the only atheist on earth. Some do argue that time stretch infinitely back in the past.

[thentian]

I'm an atheist, but I don't argue that time must stretch infinitely back in the past.

Okay, but you're not the only atheist on earth. Some do argue that time stretch infinitely back in the past.

I guess he must have heard one atheist argue it, so now he beleives atheism somehow becomes untenable if he can prove the opposite. :rolleyes:

[robheus]

Like Mr. Craig "proofs" us time can not possibly be infinite since an infinite amount of time elapsed (since when? where did he place the begin point if no such point exist on an infinite time line?) is impossible, but the same time of argument is never applied to the attributed infiniteness of the creator.

Why does he go on about that? I'm an atheist, but I don't argue that time must stretch infinitely back in the past. As far as I know, the current scientific theory is that time started with the Big Bang. :huh:

Nope.

Please go read some more cosmology.

The singularity in GR is not a real point in time, neither as it is under Newton's law of gravity (bring to point masses together and get an infinite force, but that never happens).

[robheus]

Okay, but you're not the only atheist on earth. Some do argue that time stretch infinitely back in the past.

I guess he must have heard one atheist argue it, so now he beleives atheism somehow becomes untenable if he can prove the opposite. :rolleyes:

No. He stole the argument directly from Kant, who by the way also proved the opposite (that the universe could not have begun in time).

[thedistillers]

Okay, but you're not the only atheist on earth. Some do argue that time stretch infinitely back in the past.

I guess he must have heard one atheist argue it, so now he beleives atheism somehow becomes untenable if he can prove the opposite. :rolleyes:

No. Maybe you should get familiar with his defense of the Kalam cosmological argument. It seems you're arguing in the dark. :confused:

[robheus]

I guess he must have heard one atheist argue it, so now he beleives atheism somehow becomes untenable if he can prove the opposite. :rolleyes:

No. Maybe you should get familiar with his defense of the Kalam cosmological argument. It seems you're arguing in the dark. :confused:

The "Kalam cosmological argument" IS a stolen argument from Kant.
Kant also proved that it is impossible for the world to have begun.

See a discussion about it here (http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1877/anti-duhring/ch03.htm)

[thentian]

Why does he go on about that? I'm an atheist, but I don't argue that time must stretch infinitely back in the past. As far as I know, the current scientific theory is that time started with the Big Bang. :huh:

Nope.

Please go read some more cosmology.

The singularity in GR is not a real point in time, neither as it is under Newton's law of gravity (bring to point masses together and get an infinite force, but that never happens).

Not to worry! I keep reading as much as I can about the nature of time, because that´s become something of a special interest of mine! If you can suggest some books that you think are particularly good I´ll be happy to hear about it. :)

We had a good topic about it not so long ago, in case you haven´t read it:

http://iidb.infidels.org/vbb/showthread.php?t=243393

Here´s a post from there that I thought was particularly good. It explains the nature of time as a hyperbola:

http://iidb.infidels.org/vbb/showpost.php?p=5335947&postcount=38


Cheers!

[thentian]

I guess he must have heard one atheist argue it, so now he beleives atheism somehow becomes untenable if he can prove the opposite. :rolleyes:

No. Maybe you should get familiar with his defense of the Kalam cosmological argument. It seems you're arguing in the dark. :confused:


I was only wondering, you know. Why is this fellow going on about how time can´t go infinitely back? And you supplied the answer: Because he is arguing the Kalam cosmological argument. That explains it, then! Thanks!

:)

[Morgana]

In order to recognize that an explanation is the best, you don't have to have an explanation of the explanation. In order to recognize that an explanation is the best, you don't have to be able to explain the explanation.

Isn't this patently false? An unexplained explanation is no explanation at all.

He goes on to give a hypothetical situation where archaeologists find arrowheads, and proceeds from there into lunacy. If scientists decide to hypothesize that arrowheads are created by metamorphic processes, they have to explain why they think that and how it happened.

[BlessNot]

I think Craig caught Dawkins with a mean left hook with this point:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Qsymb6UxWM0

I couldn't watch this video past 30 seconds. If I would have watched it further, I would have had to reach for my bottle of Pepto Bismo.

It's just your typical apologetics bullshit all dressed up in a different suit.

Who does this guy think he's kidding anyway? Sorry but he didn't catch Dawkins with a "mean left hook" as you would like to think he did.

[K]

All languages were passed down from one person who knew them all and I can prove it.

A person can only learn a language when taught by another person who knows the language. Every person who has ever known a language was taught by another person. There was a time when there were no languages, but now there are. Therefore, language had to originate with the "Language Giver" - the person who knew all the languages and taught them to others.

You might be tempted to ask, "Who taught the Language Giver?" But if you do, you'll be blatantly unscientific because you'll be asking for an explanation of an explanation.

[dmm]

I watched the video but his examples do require an explanation and the explanation is there.

[ben052483]

All languages were passed down from one person who knew them all and I can prove it.

A person can only learn a language when taught by another person who knows the language. Every person who has ever known a language was taught by another person. There was a time when there were no languages, but now there are. Therefore, language had to originate with the "Language Giver" - the person who knew all the languages and taught them to others.

You might be tempted to ask, "Who taught the Language Giver?" But if you do, you'll be blatantly unscientific because you'll be asking for an explanation of an explanation.

That's a good analogy. Another important point is that if you offer the language giver as an explanation, then how do you know that the language giver is a good explanation unless you can explain the language giver.

[rizdek]

Dr Craig uses arrow heads and machinery examples to show that positing that these must have been by "design" can be done without an explanation of the explanation. (I think I am wording that correctly) But I think we would posit an explanation of primitive people chipping and carving arrow heads because we have observed carved and chipped arrow heads associated with settlements of primitive people and because generally, in our experience carved and chipped stone suggests a form of manufacturing. As does the machinery example. We would posit that some sort of manufacturing society placed the machinery on the moon because machinery has a milled manufactured appearance that we associate with the kinds of things we mill and manufacture, not just because it appears "designed."

What if we found on the far side of the moon exactly 100 perfectly spherical pieces of material that is common in our solar system but that are lined up in a perfect line, all at an equal distance apart? When I say perfect, I mean as precisely spherical as can be determined by human measuring devices. And the distribution is exactly straight and the distance between them is exactly the same down to whatever measurement scale we were able to apply. If we know humans didn't place them there, would we automatically assume an alien civilization, a "god," or some sort of unusual natural cause?

[The Dagda]

That's a very good point, and I agree that "Goddidit" is not an explanation at all.

Craig's point rests on his unsubstantiated claim that a designer is "recognized as the best explanation."

Polytheism was also recognized in ancient times as the "best explanation" until monotheism came along. Now polytheism is, mostly, forgotten. :Cheeky:

I don't think monotheism was ever a better explanation but then my name is The Dagda. ;)

It's easy to see where maths and the term infinity get confused reading this thread. If something is simply all there is with no bounds, ie nothing to have a boundary to, then it is said to be infinite. Thus you could argue that the Universes size is finite but it is infinite without contradicting yourself. I don't think I explained that very well but there you go.

[dimbulb]

I think Craig caught Dawkins with a mean left hook with this point:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Qsymb6UxWM0

God did it and I don't have to explain it.

Horseshit.

[Lógos Sokratikós]

:notworthy:


An excellent summary of the theist position and the only answer it really deserves. Dimbulb, I salute you.

[dimbulb]

:notworthy:


An excellent summary of the theist position and the only answer it really deserves. Dimbulb, I salute you.

This Craig guy is a twit.

"I found an arrowhead, must have been made by a primitive hunter."

Agreed. We can make those ourselves with a little practice and have numerous reports and documentation of similar tool making even in quite recent times by stone age cultures actually visited by modern scientists.

"I found a Universe, must have been made by god."

I think I'm going to need a further explanation.

"No fair, you agreed about the arrowhead without a followup explanation."

Don't step in it.

[Lógos Sokratikós]

Let's say the universe is a complex artifact. Let's put it in the same category of Hume's watch, just to keep the good boys and girls happy.

Now...

Cosmologists have been "reverse engineering" this universe for quite some time. What have they found? It develops, that is, creates its own self stage after stage into the first three minutes we have inquired. Chances are, after carefully mapping out billions of years up to today's -still expanding- frontier, we will continue seeing an independent universe developing on its own. Oh no, wait! Craig comes, plants his sign "God intervenes HERE" in our scientists' way. Shall we knock the sign down and continue inquiring, or shall we wallow happily in the morass of our own satisfied ignorance, as humanity already did uneventfully in the middle ages?

Thanks, but no thanks.



Reading The Portable Atheist (http://www.amazon.com/Portable-Atheist-Essential-Readings-Nonbeliever/dp/0306816083) one can see from the pens of the witnesses themselves, how this is not new. Theists have been planting their "Insert miracle here" road signs at every phase of modern science. But science has not stopped. It goes ahead, unimpressed by the witch doctors of the day.

[rizdek]

Like I and others have alluded to elsewhere, Dr Craig is a gifted debater and a paid evangelist. Nothing more or less. Many evangelists have their "hooks" that make them marketable...IOW people will pay to hear them speak. Dr Craig's hook is arguments for the existence of specifically the christian god and the diety of jesus and his audience are christians who feel themselves threatened by atheism and any intellectual anti-christian arguments/positions. In debates, Dr Craig is tenacious, quick to find the opening and launch the attack, he knows his arguments and applies them eloquently and effectively. He also knows the rebuttals to his arguments and knows defenses against them. To his credit, he does not appear to attack people personally while attacking their positions.

[Anduin]

Just to show this to those claiming that the universe is fine tuned:

Stars Ablaze in Other Skies (http://www.sciencenews.org/view/generic/id/35363/title/Stars_ablaze_in_other_skies)

Study shows that changing several constants still produce stars.

[Lykil]

It seems obvious to me, that both theists and atheists must agree on one thing: if anything at all exists, there must be something preceding it that always existed, whether that be spacetime and/or the laws of physics, or it is the eternal powerful spirit known to us as God, or something quite different. So I'm inclined to think that the question: "who created God?" is a bit naive. As for God's complexity, this question assumes that God is similar to the universe in that God is made up of parts - like we are made up of atoms and molecules. God is a spirit (a very non-scientific term), and therefore, any discussion of God's complexity is a non-scientific discussion (philosophical perhaps?), and it doesn't obviously follow from "the universe/life is complex" that "God is complex."

[thentian]

It seems obvious to me, that both theists and atheists must agree on one thing: if anything at all exists, there must be something preceding it that always existed, whether that be spacetime and/or the laws of physics, or it is the eternal powerful spirit known to us as God, or something quite different. So I'm inclined to think that the question: "who created God?" is a bit naive. As for God's complexity, this question assumes that God is similar to the universe in that God is made up of parts - like we are made up of atoms and molecules. God is a spirit (a very non-scientific term), and therefore, any discussion of God's complexity is a non-scientific discussion (philosophical perhaps?), and it doesn't obviously follow from "the universe/life is complex" that "God is complex."

"Always"? If time is a property of the universe, then how can there have been something pre-ceding it? On the contrary, I'd say that nothing at all could possibly have preceded it, for to precede something is to be prior to it in time. Nor could anything have been the cause of the universe, because it is axiomatic that a cause must precede the effect (in time). Therefore, the only possibility is that the universe is uncaused.

[Hamlet]

It seems obvious to me, that both theists and atheists must agree on one thing: if anything at all exists, there must be something preceding it that always existed, whether that be spacetime and/or the laws of physics, or it is the eternal powerful spirit known to us as God, or something quite different. So I'm inclined to think that the question: "who created God?" is a bit naive. As for God's complexity, this question assumes that God is similar to the universe in that God is made up of parts - like we are made up of atoms and molecules. God is a spirit (a very non-scientific term), and therefore, any discussion of God's complexity is a non-scientific discussion (philosophical perhaps?), and it doesn't obviously follow from "the universe/life is complex" that "God is complex."

"Always"? If time is a property of the universe, then how can there have been something pre-ceding it? On the contrary, I'd say that nothing at all could possibly have preceded it, for to precede something is to be prior to it in time. Nor could anything have been the cause of the universe, because it is axiomatic that a cause must precede the effect (in time). Therefore, the only possibility is that the universe is uncaused.

Did it just come from nothing then? (nothing being "not anything" and not "a special sort of something.")

[mester74]

Did it just come from nothing then? (nothing being "not anything" and not "a special sort of something.")

Well, you just answered your own question. Or rather, you just showed that the question makes no sense, for it presupposes that "nothing" is something, someplace, sometime.

[Lykil]

It seems obvious to me, that both theists and atheists must agree on one thing: if anything at all exists, there must be something preceding it that always existed, whether that be spacetime and/or the laws of physics, or it is the eternal powerful spirit known to us as God, or something quite different. So I'm inclined to think that the question: "who created God?" is a bit naive. As for God's complexity, this question assumes that God is similar to the universe in that God is made up of parts - like we are made up of atoms and molecules. God is a spirit (a very non-scientific term), and therefore, any discussion of God's complexity is a non-scientific discussion (philosophical perhaps?), and it doesn't obviously follow from "the universe/life is complex" that "God is complex."

"Always"? If time is a property of the universe, then how can there have been something pre-ceding it? On the contrary, I'd say that nothing at all could possibly have preceded it, for to precede something is to be prior to it in time. Nor could anything have been the cause of the universe, because it is axiomatic that a cause must precede the effect (in time). Therefore, the only possibility is that the universe is uncaused.

It is difficult for temporal beings to speak of a-temporal matters without referring to the way we experience the world on a day to day basis. That does not mean however, that we cannot speculate or have ideas about these things.

When I used the word always, I simply meant something eternal. 'Eternal' might mean "reaching infinitely into the past and the future" or we might take it to mean a-temporal. From a temporal perspective, something a-temporal would appear to reach infinitely into the past and into the future. Let us look at logic as an example: it is conceivable that logic is just a by-product of the physical universe, but assuming for a minute that it is more fundamental - more even than space-time - one could rightly say that logic is both without time and eternal.

You seem to have used the definition of the word "caused" to show that the universe is uncaused. Am I wrong in assuming this?

[Hamlet]

Did it just come from nothing then? (nothing being "not anything" and not "a special sort of something.")

Well, you just answered your own question. Or rather, you just showed that the question makes no sense, for it presupposes that "nothing" is something, someplace, sometime.

But wait, you don't deny the standard big bang model, do you?

[The Dagda]

"Always"? If time is a property of the universe, then how can there have been something pre-ceding it? On the contrary, I'd say that nothing at all could possibly have preceded it, for to precede something is to be prior to it in time. Nor could anything have been the cause of the universe, because it is axiomatic that a cause must precede the effect (in time). Therefore, the only possibility is that the universe is uncaused.

It is difficult for temporal beings to speak of a-temporal matters without referring to the way we experience the world on a day to day basis. That does not mean however, that we cannot speculate or have ideas about these things.

When I used the word always, I simply meant something eternal. 'Eternal' might mean "reaching infinitely into the past and the future" or we might take it to mean a-temporal. From a temporal perspective, something a-temporal would appear to reach infinitely into the past and into the future. Let us look at logic as an example: it is conceivable that logic is just a by-product of the physical universe, but assuming for a minute that it is more fundamental - more even than space-time - one could rightly say that logic is both without time and eternal.

You seem to have used the definition of the word "caused" to show that the universe is uncaused. Am I wrong in assuming this?

How could logic exist without time? It would be meaningless? There would have to be a time flow in order to deduce a conclusion from a premise, otherwise the answer and question and all deductions in between would either exist all at once or not at all, forgoing the need to ask a question or for it to have any existence in the first place.

EDIT:

Mind you saying time existed all at once would then provide a seemingly insoluble way of making time discrete and causal too, as any cause would be indivisible from it's consequence, therefore any attempt to make time flow would still result in time happening all at once.

[Lykil]

It is difficult for temporal beings to speak of a-temporal matters without referring to the way we experience the world on a day to day basis. That does not mean however, that we cannot speculate or have ideas about these things.

When I used the word always, I simply meant something eternal. 'Eternal' might mean "reaching infinitely into the past and the future" or we might take it to mean a-temporal. From a temporal perspective, something a-temporal would appear to reach infinitely into the past and into the future. Let us look at logic as an example: it is conceivable that logic is just a by-product of the physical universe, but assuming for a minute that it is more fundamental - more even than space-time - one could rightly say that logic is both without time and eternal.

You seem to have used the definition of the word "caused" to show that the universe is uncaused. Am I wrong in assuming this?

How could logic exist without time? It would be meaningless? There would have to be a time flow in order to deduce a conclusion from a premise, otherwise the answer and question and all deductions in between would either exist all at once or not at all, forgoing the need to ask a question or for it to have any existence in the first place.

Whether or not anyone asks a question has no bearing on the meaningfulness of that question. Time flow is only needed for a human to analyze a logical question; the relationship between the question and the answer is not in any way affected by the movement of the world through time. What makes you think that time has any more bearing on a purely logical question and answer, any more than space, or the existence of sentient beings has?

Likewise, two equally true conclusions could easily exist all at once. There is no need to put one before the other.

[The Dagda]

How could logic exist without time? It would be meaningless? There would have to be a time flow in order to deduce a conclusion from a premise, otherwise the answer and question and all deductions in between would either exist all at once or not at all, forgoing the need to ask a question or for it to have any existence in the first place.

Whether or not anyone asks a question has no bearing on the meaningfulness of that question. Time flow is only needed for a human to analyze a logical question; the relationship between the question and the answer is not in any way affected by the movement of the world through time. What makes you think that time has any more bearing on a purely logical question and answer, any more than space, or the existence of sentient beings has?

Likewise, two equally true conclusions could easily exist all at once. There is no need to put one before the other.

No it goes further all conclusions would exist all at once, forgoing the need to make any distinction, that distinction is the process of logic.

[Lykil]

Whether or not anyone asks a question has no bearing on the meaningfulness of that question. Time flow is only needed for a human to analyze a logical question; the relationship between the question and the answer is not in any way affected by the movement of the world through time. What makes you think that time has any more bearing on a purely logical question and answer, any more than space, or the existence of sentient beings has?

Likewise, two equally true conclusions could easily exist all at once. There is no need to put one before the other.

No it goes further all conclusions would exist all at once, forgoing the need to make any distinction, that distinction is the process of logic.

So what? We can speak of many truthful conclusions, utterly without temporal reference, they will not change over time, and I see no reason why they couldn't also exist in a timeless universe. Why can't truths exist "all at once"?

[mester74]

Well, you just answered your own question. Or rather, you just showed that the question makes no sense, for it presupposes that "nothing" is something, someplace, sometime.

But wait, you don't deny the standard big bang model, do you?

No, I don't :huh:

[Hamlet]

But wait, you don't deny the standard big bang model, do you?

No, I don't :huh:

So then you agree to the finitude of the past. And you apparently agree (from your earlier post) that ex nihilo nihil fit. So how do you explain the origin of the universe?

[mester74]

So then you agree to the finitude of the past.

Not necessarily.

And you apparently agree (from your earlier post) that ex nihilo nihil fit.

I said that "the question makes no sense."

So how do you explain the origin of the universe?

I don't.

[Dante Alighieri]

No, I don't :huh:

So then you agree to the finitude of the past. And you apparently agree (from your earlier post) that ex nihilo nihil fit. So how do you explain the origin of the universe?

Didn't I e-mail you 17 pages detailing why that line of reasoning is fallacious? Anyway, here's an excerpt from a rough sketch of my mine on a critique of the Kalam Cosmological Argument, devoted to the idea of the beginning of the universe necessitates that it came from nothing, if uncaused.
The Kalam Cosmological Argument


1. Causation

The first premise of the Kalam Cosmological Argument (henceforth KCA) discusses the notion of a causal principle. I intend to examine it, as well as the intersection of causation and physics. Strangely enough, this particular premise is rarely objected. The only three prominent philosophers I have known in the literature to write about this subject are Wesley Morriston, Adolf Grunbaum, and Quentin Smith. In my opinion, they miss a number of crucial points, points I wish to address below.

1.1. Time

The first crucial notion that we must discuss the notion of causation that W.L. Craig employs. Let us consider the causal principle (henceforth CAP) that Craig sets out:


Whatever begins to exist has a cause of its existence.


Craig offers three general lines of argument to support this thesis, namely that (1) it is constantly confirmed empirically (2) it is supported by the axiom ex nihilo nihil fit and (3) Johnathan Edward's argument shows that it is inexplicable that everything does not come to exist uncaused if uncaused events can occur.

Also, crucial to note is the definition of "begins to exist." Craig typically takes it to mean "x begins to exist iff (i) x exists at an interval t (ii) there are no intervals of time t' such that x exists at t' and (iii) t'> t." Of course, this leads to a few questions.

Under Craig's relativistic cosmology, time had a beginning (or at least a first interval) at the Big Bang Singularity. Now, if God existed at the first moment of time, since there are no times prior to which God exists (because there are no prior times), it follows that God begins to exist. This is problematic for Craig for this entails that God has a cause of His existence.

So, Craig amends the definition to "x begins to exist iff (i) x exists at an interval t (ii) there are no intervals of time t' such that x exists at t' (iii) t'> t and (iv) there are no timeless states of affairs involving x's existence." Since Craig argues for a timeless God, this frees God from beginning to exist.

Moreover, since Craig regards time itself to have a beginning, and hence a cause of its existence, He supports timeless causation. More importantly, he supports simultaneous causation, in which cause and effect occur at the same time.

With these definitions in hand, we can now proceed to examine the problems with this CAP.

The problem with the CAP is that it is simply incoherent. Note that by the definition of "begins to exist" a topology of time involving a first interval of time would "begin to exist" and require a cause i.e. it would require that timeless causation is coherent. Moreover, Craig supports the idea of simultaneous causation.

Now, the question is whether or not either of these is really coherent. Let us examine the latter first. Now, what is time? Typically speaking, time is defined as, or at least entails, an ordered sequence of states of affairs by the dyadic relata before, simultaneous with, and after, along with the monadic irreducible properties past, present, and future. Craig agrees with this understanding of time as he is a relationist i.e. he believes that the first moment of time was the first event of time. So, we have in effect an event sequence.

Now, a number of points arise. First, Craig cannot coherently support the idea of simultaneous causation with a timeless cause (God), because simultaneity is an explicitly temporal relation. Now, simultaneous causation is impossible due to the nature of causation. First, causation explicitly involves the notion of priority and asymmetry, although Craig denies that the priority and asymmetry is necessarily temporal. Let us operate under that assumption; and it is certainly true that the priority and asymmetry of causation is at least ontic.

Now, causes are ontically prior to their effects. That is to say that causes bring about their effects; the effects come into existence. In other words, the effect does not exist and then exists due to the cause, because the cause brings it about or actualizes the effect. So, cause and effect are related as such: At the causal position, the effect does not exist, but the cause exists. At the effectual position, the effect exists. In other words: {C&~E, E}. So, we have an ontic ordering as such. So, causation explicitly involves the notion of change, of moving (if we wish to speak Thomistically) from potentiality to actuality.

Now, this cannot occur in the space of a single moment of time, for that would mean that the causal position (CP) and effectual position (EP) are simultaneous. But, the causal position and effectual positions are incompatible: in the former, the effect does not exist, and in the latter, the effect does. So, we are left with the contradiction (E & ~E). In other words, change cannot occur in a single moment.

So, simultaneous causation is impossible. This is true by definition since time involves, as we said earlier, sequenced states of affairs. So, by definition, the ontic priority of the cause is temporally prior, since it too involves a sequence of states of affairs. So, simultaneous causation cannot occur.

Craig's examples of simultaneous causation betray this confusion. For instance, balancing a pencil on one's hand does not constitute simultaneous causation due to that each state is continuously changing to the next state; and that the impression is brought about in the open interval succeeding the balancing of the pen. There is an interaction of particles here, one that cannot be simultaneous, because that would require a change in a single moment of time. If time is continuous and the cause happened at t and the effect concluded at t', it may be said that the effect occurs from the interval (t, t'].

Moreover, actually timeless causation is impossible too. If God created the universe, and time itself, then the act of creation was timeless. For God's creating the universe is causally prior to the universe and time itself; therefore, the act of creation was timeless. First, by definition, time involves the event-sequence as we pointed out and since causes involve such event-sequences, causation is by definition temporal. Moreover, since the causal and effectual positions are incompatible, neither could ever be timeless. If one was timeless and the other temporal, or even both timeless, nonetheless, both would be actual and there would be a contradiction. Suppose that the EP was temporal. Corresponding to the existence of either the EP is the proposition expressing its actuality, p. Now, if the EP is temporal, then it exists in a specific interval or space of time. The proposition expressed by this state of affairs is, "For t, p." Now, suppose that the CP is timeless. Timeless states of affairs always exist, so propositions expressing their existence are always true (but they don't have truthmakers in time). So, since the CP is incompatible with the EP, corresponding to the CP is "For all t, ~p." Now, since something that is true for all times is also true for a specific moment or interval of time, it follows that "For all t, ~p" entails "For t, ~p."

But, given the propositions for the CP and EP, we get, "For t, (p & ~p)." So, timeless causation entails a contradiction and hence cannot occur.

At the end, note that Craig's definition of "begins to exist" entails that time itself is caused; which entails either simultaneous or timeless causation. But, since both are impossible (and time itself cannot be caused), it follows that the CAP is actually false and the KCA is not a cogent argument.

What would actually be a causal principle for a coherent theistic creation scenario, and a less objectionable principle, would be the notion that whatever "comes into existence" has a cause. For in "begins to exist," it entails that time itself is caused, because there are no prior moments of time at the beginning of time. But, in "coming into existence" it explicitly involves the notion of there existing prior moments at which the object did not exist i.e. it moved from potentiality to actuality. So, then, all things that "come into existence" could be caused (in a modal sense), and the theist might argue that they actually are caused.

Unfortunately, the universe did not come into existence, under Craig's relativistic cosmology, because time had a beginning at the beginning of the universe. So, if Craig's cosmology is correct, the universe is uncaused and God could not have created the universe. Since the definition of "God" involves the notion of "creating the universe," it follows that that the KCA strictly disproves the existence of God.

A timeless entity cannot interact causally for causal interaction explicitly involves change, which a timeless entity cannot do. For instance, a timeless entity must move from a state of not acting to acting. Even if we suppose that it was always acting, this raises the same problem as mentioned earlier. For its action brings about an effect, and when the effect is brought about, it ceases to bring about the effect. So, in effect, any causal entity must move necessarily from acting to not acting when producing its effect. So, when the effect is brought about, there is a proposition expressing its existence such that "For t, it is true that the cause is not acting"; but, if the act is timeless, then it follows that "For all t, it is true that the cause is acting." This entails that "For t, it is true that the cause is acting." But, this conjunction of facts entails that " For t, it is true that the cause is acting and not acting." So, timeless action entails a contradiction identical to the one we examined earlier. Clearly, causal structures change in interaction, as this illustrates.

This also demonstrates the untenability of Craig's strange idea of "relative" timelessness. Craig believes that God was timeless sans the universe; ontically prior to the universe, God was timeless. But, upon the universe's creation, God became temporal. Craig offers this strange doctrine in an attempt to reconcile his views on the KCA and relativistic Big Bang cosmology (which require timeless causation) and his views on time, particularly A-theoretic presentist frameworks (which require God to be a changing entity; for instance, God's knowledge of tensed facts continually changes). Of course, this is nonsensical. A timeless entity cannot change. If God became temporal, that means He changed from being timeless to temporal. But, a changeless entity cannot change; the moment we have a proposition of the form "it is true that x is timeless" it follows that "For all t, it is true x is timeless." A timeless entity always exists, so propositions expressing its existence and timelessness are omnitemporally true. The point is that we have object that has this property timelessly. Obviously enough, a timeless entity is timeless timelessly. Therefore, this entails the proposition that "For all t, it is true that x is timeless." So, God can never be temporal if He is ever timeless. (Of course, God can't be timeless either for the reasons stated above). Since timelessness is the lack of event-sequences and hence, the lack of change, it follows that timeless entities cannot change; so a timeless entity can never be temporal or place themselves in time. Craig's doctrine of relative timelessness is incoherent.

Of course, perhaps our interlocutor may object that it is not the case that God may never become temporal, for "never" is used in an explicitly temporal sense. Yet, God was initially timeless, so perhaps this move is unwarranted.

This objection is multiply confused. First, to state propositions of the form "For t, p" is to not state the truthmaker of the proposition is temporal. For instance, the following proposition is true: "For t, it is true that numbers exist." And yet, the truthmaker of the proposition is timeless (if we accept Platonism). What the proposition expresses is not that the object is temporal, but when a proposition is true. So, such explications are talking about the truth-value of a proposition. Moreover, recall that timelessness entails changelessness. Our interlocutor has failed to sufficiently answer that objection. Moreover, if our interlocutor insists nonetheless, the above objection can be restated in terms of ontic sequencing. And, in any case, an ontic sequence is a temporal sequence (because of the arguments above). Propositions about timeless entities are going to be true or false at a time, and indeed, for all times.

So, we may conclude that the intersection of the causal principle as interpreted by Craig (which involves the notion of "beginning to exist" rather than "coming into existence") and relativistic cosmology (which is necessary to conclude that this section of space-time had a first interval of time) entails timeless causation. Since timeless causation is impossible and the conjunction of the CAP and relativistic cosmology is necessary for the cogency of the KCA, it follows that the KCA is not a cogent argument. It is unfortunate that this line of reasoning is not found in critiques of the KCA typically speaking.

1.2. Support for the causal principle

Although we have already shown the KCA to not be cogent, I wish to go for "overkill", so to speak, to show just how many egregious errors Craig has made.

So, let us examine the three lines of evidence Craig supplies for the CAP.

...

1.2.2. (http://1.2.2./) Axiomatic confirmation

According to Craig, the axiom ex nihilo nihil fit confirms the causal principle's necessity. In English, this translates to "From nothing, nothing comes." Presumably this is taken to support the causal principle.

But, this is contestable. First of all, it is obscure as to how the axiom supports the CAP. How are we to interpret the axiom in a manner such that a denial entails an impossibility?

Ultimately, this line of support largely amounts to handwaving. Apparently, the reasoning goes as thus: There was nothing prior to the universe. Originally, there was absolutely nothing: no states of affairs whatsoever. Afterwards, the universe came about. Clearly, this is absurd, so we are justified in foregoing an elaborate defense of the causal principle.

This is confused. Note the terminology used here. Namely, that there was some original state in which nothing at all existed. Afterwards, the Big Bang occurred. So, we have an event-sequence of nothing followed by the Big Bang. This is mistaken. First of all, to say that there was nothing prior to the Big Bang does not mean that there was some esoteric state of absolute nothingness prior to the Big Bang, but that the Big Bang is the first moment of time; there were literally no earlier moments of time or anything at all. Moreover, absolutely nothing does not even contain time; so how could it originally be a state and then change? Furthermore, absolutely nothing is not a state of affairs and hence there could never have been an ontic point or a time at which nothing existed. So, the entire scenario Craig draws simply does not exist and does not support the causal principle. This doesn't even apply to temporally embedded events, for such events, by definition, are preceded by other events. So, prior to such uncaused events, there is not "absolute nothingness" from which to come from. Uncaused events simply lack sufficient causal conditions for their existence, not a state of prior "nothingness." Even if we take "nothing" to signify "no concrete objects whatsoever", "nothing" could still not be a moment of time, since temporal states of affairs are concrete, insofar as they involve change. But, if no concrete objects exist, then there are no states of affairs to be sequenced; hence, "nothing" under this definition could not ever be a moment in time. In any case, while "nothing" under this definition is possible, "absolute nothingness" is clearly impossible, for there would not even be Platonic abstracta, true or false propositions, or anything at all.

And clearly, this interpretation of ex nihilo nihil fit is what Craig takes to be correct. And yet, this does not support the CAP. Now, suppose we interpret the axiom tenselessly, even though Craig does not make this move. We could express it such that "If nothing existed, then nothing could exist." However, "could" expresses a modality, presuming a necessity. But, what is the scope of necessity operator? On the wide scope interpretation, the resulting proposition is that "Necessarily, if nothing exists, then nothing exists." But, this is a trivial analytic truth and would be true even if uncaused events existed. On the narrow scope interpretation: "If nothing exists, then necessarily nothing exists." But, this is hardly true. If nothing actually exists, then it is not the case that nothing exists in all possible worlds. Furthermore, if we take "nothing" to signify "absolutely nothing," it is arguable that "absolutely nothing" is impossible (as per above); but if so, any conditional such that "nothing" is the antecedent is a counterpossible, and from an impossibility, anything at all is derived. (This is due to the principle of explosion). Also, "nothing" is not a condition on anything; it is not some strange sort of something that can prevent things or make things occur.

So, what interpretation of the axiom could promote the CAP? Perhaps this: "If nothing has a cause, then nothing begins to exist." This does entail the CAP, but that is because this is the mere contrapositive of the CP and trivially entails it. So, it is a mere assertion of the CAP. So, we find that the axiom does not actually support the CAP at all.

...

4.2. The universe came from nothing?

Craig also argues that the universe literally came from nothing. He offers two arguments to this effect. First, he argues that, under standard GTR-cosmology, the universe was initially shrunk down to a single point, an infinitely dense point of spacetime; the singularity. According to Craig, there cannot ever be an object with infinite density, for any object, if it has a size at all, has a non-zero density. Therefore, an object with infinite density is synonymous with nothing, hence, the earliest state of the universe was nothing at all; therefore, the universe came from nothing.

This is very confused. First of all, the singularity is not an object in the sense of being a particle or any of that. Rather, a singularity is a state that occurs when the curvature of spacetime is infinitely dense. Secondly, Craig is equivocating here when he says "nothing." Earlier, and throughout, Craig refers to "nothing" to mean "absolutely nothing at all"; no space, no time, nothing whatsoever. This sort of nothingness is incoherent and cannot have any properties. And yet, a singularity possesses a number of properties, namely, infinite density, being a curvature of spacetime, and so and so forth. So, by no means is the singularity "nothing at all." Moreover, although a respectable number of physicists nowadays would accept the idea of there being no object with infinite density, Craig misunderstands what this tends to entail. What this entails is that, since there can be no such object, there was never such a state in the universe's history. For if there can be no such object, then the singularity never really existed, but is at best a limit of the universe's past history. The universe, therefore, would strictly lack an earliest time. In any instance, as I said above, few physicists nowadays believe in such initial singularities.

Craig's second argument involves the notion of there being "nothing prior to the singularity," a notion I answered in 1.2.2. (http://1.2.2./)

...

5. Intuition

It may be worth pointing out that Craig's general argument against the actual infinite and his support of the CAP is largely intuitive. I wish to examine the role of intuitive support in the KCA.

5.1. The reliability of intuition

Intuitions about abstract matters, or more accurately, matters sufficiently removed from our immediate human perspective, more often than not, tend to be wildly wrong. Consider the various intuitions that humanity has shown wrong: (a) velocities are additive (b) there is an "absolute" time (c) space is Euclidean (d) time and space are separate entities (e) matter and energy are separate entities and so on. All of these intuitions, which seem very reasonable to us and counter-intuitive, if not "absurd" to deny, are entirely wrong. Special and general relativity alone have falsified all of the above intuitions. So, it may well be insufficient to cite intuitive generalization of this type.

The point is that, in our upbringing, we have found various "rules of thumb" that work in the cosmos of our collective human experience. They include intuitions such as (a) through (e), that all things have a cause, that all things have a beginning, and so on. These certainly work in the macroscopic realm we occupy on this Earth. But, this hardly indicates that these generalizations are really more than crude, pragmatic "rules of thumb", the reality being far stranger and far more wonderful than we would merit. The entire history of quantum mechanics is an interplay of such tensions and, if anything, this indicates how cautiously we must apply our intuitions to matters sufficiently removed from our experience. So, the KCA, in using such intuition, appears to make the same methodological mistake, and we cannot grant much evidentiary value to them, insofar as they portend to express uniform principles of the universe that are also necessary.

5.2. The conflicts of intuition

It is also clear that our intuitions often conflict, which raises even more doubt as to their total evidentiary value in matters as abstract as these.

Consider the intuition that we have that every event we find is preceded by another event that brings it about. This is effectively determinism or the totality of the CAP. Now, we also have strong intuitions regarding libertarian free will. The reasoning goes as thus: we have a Principle of Alternate Possibilities, where we argue that someone cannot be free with respect to an action unless they could have done otherwise. What libertarians argue is that, given the antecedent conditions, I still could have done otherwise. In other words, the antecedent conditions do not determine my actions. But, that is to say that the state of affairs consisting of me acting has no cause. So, libertarian free will and universal causation are mutually incompatible. So, here, we have two strong intuitions that nonetheless conflict.

Or, consider Euclidean space versus the counter-intuitive nature of actual infinites. Now, non-Euclidean space is very counter-intuitive; for instance, in a Riemannian space, parallel lines always meet, whereas in a hyperbolic space, parallel lines get further and further apart. So, our intuitions favor a Euclidean universe. And yet, a Euclidean universe is infinite in extent. So, it appears that our intuitions regarding Euclidean space and actual infinites are conflicting. Moreover, we have a pretty clear intuition that beyond any point of space, there is another. But, it seems absurd to think of an "end" to space, because that would invite the question what lay beyond it. Well, nothing at all; it is the end of all space. And yet, if we deny an end to space, we accept an infinite extent. But, even with an infinite extent, we tend to think of the universe as a contained "whole"; and yet, if the universe is infinite in extent, it would appear that the universe is not really contained. It wouldn't really make sense to discuss an infinite universe in that aspect. And yet, if we deny that, we move back to a finite space.

Or, consider discrete time versus continuous time. On one hand, discrete time seems very counter-intuitive, because it seem absurd that time "jumps" and does not actually flow naturally from past to present in a continuous inexorable fashion. So, between any two moments, there would seem to be another moment. And yet, this implies an actual infinity, since an infinity of moments would be between each moment. And yet, a continuous time defies the notion of there being a "next" state. For example, consider causality. If each event brings about the "next" event, since time is continuous, then it follows that there really is no next event, but that there is a continuous progression of events. But, for there to not be a "next" moment like there being a next segment would also seem counter-intuitive as well. And yet, to deny that would be to accept a discrete time.

Or, consider an infinite duration of time versus a beginning of time. The former seems incoherent because it invites the question of how time ever arrived at the present. So, it would appear that we would have to accept a past with a beginning. And yet, it would seem plausible to believe in the inexorable flow of time, where each moment comes into existence and then passes, each moment of time preceded by another. And yet, this view of time entails an infinite past. So, the idea of a past with a beginning is repugnant to us. And, yet so it is without one!

This doesn't mean that any of the above intuitions in this section are really reasonable. Indeed, I wince at the egregious lack of understanding in many of them, some of which we have already detailed as being confused. But, the point is that these are natural intuitions, intuitions that we strongly believe in, and yet intuitions that violently conflict with each other. If our intuitions are all over the place and contradict one another in the abstract, how can one reasonably assign strong evidentiary value for such intuitions for abstract metaphysical principles? The point is that you cannot, and hence, Craig's appeals to intuitions are largely unfounded.

What's interesting to note is Craig's selectivity of what intuitions to accept. He freely dismisses uncaused events and infinities as "absurd", and yet he has no problem with timeless entities, when our intuitions (and logic) tell us that time is required for causality, and disembodied minds, when our intuitions tell us that minds that interact have material brains and that the nonphysical cannot affect the physical. This sort of egregious selectivity amounts to little more than special pleading on Craig's part. If strong intuitions about causality and time indicate a caused origin of the universe, then what about strong intuitions regarding timeless, disembodied minds?

[The Dagda]

No it goes further all conclusions would exist all at once, forgoing the need to make any distinction, that distinction is the process of logic.

So what? We can speak of many truthful conclusions, utterly without temporal reference, they will not change over time, and I see no reason why they couldn't also exist in a timeless universe. Why can't truths exist "all at once"?

You are talking about truth not logic, logic is the process by which we distinguish the true from the false, by which we arrive at a logical conclusion, even the terminology suggests it must have some basis in time, premise, arguments, if a then b if not then x, a>b, conclusions. Put it this way without the process of determining "truth" in the first place then the term logic would be useless. The process requires time so as to make its tenets distinguishable one from another. Either your talking about truth not logic or you are equating a logical conclusion to be the only part of logic either that or the problem is you're not thinking about how the universe would be if everything you experience happens all at once, no cause no effect no, a leads to conclusion b, nothing just all at once, no logical progression at all (yet another expression that involves time) they all require discrete increments, or stages, without such differences there is no means to think progressively, and no need for the term logic. Unless by logic you mean fundamental truth then those need no thought, no mind, no progression and no discrete time.

Suffice to say I don't think logic means truth, nor is it confined to a conclusion.

Would the definition of logic make sense in a Universe that existed all at once? Would the following definition make sense or even be necessary without progressive time?

logic
1. A branch of philosophy and mathematics that deals with the formal principles, methods and criteria of validity of inference, reasoning and knowledge.
Logic is concerned with what is true and how we can know whether something is true. This involves the formalisation of logical arguments and proofs in terms of symbols representing propositions and logical connectives. The meanings of these logical connectives are expressed by a set of rules which are assumed to be self-evident.
Boolean algebra deals with the basic operations of truth values: AND, OR, NOT and combinations thereof. Predicate logic extends this with existential and universal quantifiers and symbols standing for predicates which may depend on variables. The rules of natural deduction describe how we may proceed from valid premises to valid conclusions, where the premises and conclusions are expressions in predicate logic.
Symbolic logic uses a meta-language concerned with truth, which may or may not have a corresponding expression in the world of objects called existance. In symbolic logic, arguments and proofs are made in terms of symbols representing propositions and logical connectives. The meanings of these begin with a set of rules or primitives which are assumed to be self-evident. Fortunately, even from vague primitives, functions can be defined with precise meaning.
Boolean logic deals with the basic operations of truth values: AND, OR, NOT and combinations thereof. Predicate logic extends this with existential quantifiers and universal quantifiers which introduce bound variables ranging over finite sets; the predicate itself takes on only the values true and false. Deduction describes how we may proceed from valid premises to valid conclusions, where these are expressions in predicate logic.
Carnap used the phrase "rational reconstruction" to describe the logical analysis of thought. Thus logic is less concerned with how thought does proceed, which is considered the realm of psychology, and more with how it should proceed to discover truth. It is the touchstone of the results of thinking, but neither its regulator nor a motive for its practice.
See also fuzzy logic, logic programming, arithmetic and logic unit, first-order logic,
See also Boolean logic, fuzzy logic, logic programming, first-order logic, logic bomb, combinatory logic, higher-order logic, intuitionistic logic, equational logic, modal logic, linear logic, paradox.
2. Boolean logic circuits.