can computers feel pain?

[Immanuel]

I am a programmer. I have a simply question. How can i white an algorithm that makes a computer feel pain. This is obviously a instance of a much large problem. That is: How do i write an algoithms that would reproduce the subjective emotions like pain?


algorithm 1:

I can give the computer the condition:

if: enegy resource is low,

then: output a crying face on the screen.

algorithn 2:

If :
* list the set of negative emotions inputed by the user, and denote each by consecative numbers.
* radomly to choose a number, called it k.
then:
output the corresponding crying face for the number k to the screen.

If you are not satisfy with the above algorithms, then it should not surprise you what my next claim would be.

My claim is that there does not exist any satisfactory algorithm for the emotion we call pain.

[Panpsychist]

Take the simplest animal (in terms of its nervous system) that you believe feels pain. Replace the neural net with an artificial array of silicon-analogs (google Ted Berger for technical details). Does the animal feel pain? If not, why not? If you replace only some of the neurons, would it still feel pain?

Simulate the neural chips with a simulated neural net, and create input algorithms to produce standard painful experiences. Have you programmed pain?

The problem here isn't with the ability to program a computer to feel pain, it is with our inability to judge the task done.

[premjan]

Basically there is a heretofore-irreducible quality / state / concept in humans / other similar sentient creatures known as awareness or consciousness. Without awareness, the notion of pain probably doesn't make sense. So far we don't know how to either infuse a state of consciousness into a computer, or judge whether or not it is already conscious.

[Laurentius]

Books, lathes, TVs, etc. cannot feel pain. Similarly, neither can computers.

[Immanuel]

Take the simplest animal (in terms of its nervous system) that you believe feels pain. Replace the neural net with an artificial array of silicon-analogs (google Ted Berger for technical details). Does the animal feel pain? If not, why not? If you replace only some of the neurons, would it still feel pain?

Simulate the neural chips with a simulated neural net, and create input algorithms to produce standard painful experiences. Have you programmed pain?

The problem here isn't with the ability to program a computer to feel pain, it is with our inability to judge the task done.

Well, i am only interested in programming a computer to feel pain

[MrFungus420]

Well, i am only interested in programming a computer to feel pain

The best that you could do would be to write a program that would simulate feeling pain.

[Laurentius]

The best that you could do would be to write a program that would simulate feeling pain.

Indeed. I guess properties of living things can only be mimicked by non living systems.

[fast]

A computer cannot feel pain.

[MrSmith]

Isn't pain just a (negative) stimulus to change behaviour? Therefore any algorithm that causes the computer to modify it's behaviour on the basis of the data (stimulus) it receives can be likened to what's going on with pain - if your laptop battery is running low, it sends you a message to know it's running low on power, if you help out by plugging the laptop in the computer carries on, if you don't the computer takes "evasive" action of it's own and go into sleep mode to prolong the power.
As far as an emotional response is concerned it would depend on what extent you want to mimic it - you could make the messages more emotional in the language that is used
- with 20 minutes of power left the message is just "I'm running low on power"
- 15 minutes - "please plug me in it hurts"
- 10 mins 'I'm begging you - I need more power"
- 5 mins "I'm feeling feint, please plug me in, I'll do anything you say"
- 0 minutes it goes into sleep mode and "feints"
For a more complicated response to have the computer feel it's actually in pain instead of just fooling a user you would probably have to mimic a lot more of the brain structure. I don't know how much though

[Panpsychist]

Well, i am only interested in programming a computer to feel pain

How would you judge that algorithm X has accomplished this goal? Until you can properly define what it is that you want the algorithm to do, you can't say that there isn't one. For example, there is no algorithm to solve the Halting Problem; this can be proved since the problem can be precisely and mathematically defined. Until you can define the requirements for "feel pain" in the same way, you will not be able to judge that you have succeeded in meeting them or to devise proofs that such algorithms are impossible.

[dug_down_deep]

Make the program believe it's feeling pain.

[Rilx]

What were "pain" that computers would feel? Think about silicon, copper, polymers, steel - do they feel pain if they get broke or even melt? Definitely not.

You [Immanuel] may mean that if there's something broke in the computer, could it express it like "having pain"? Well, they do already. If my computer has problems in starting (loose wire or smthg), in several cases it gives different sound signals to tell where it hurts. Sometimes it paralyses showing blue face.

Some big playing machines like flippers have implemented a sense of balance. If you treat them violently, they scream: TILT!

[Smullyan-esque]

A computer cannot feel pain.
"fast cannot feel pain."

How can you show that I am wrong?

[kennethamy]

I am a programmer. I have a simply question. How can i white an algorithm that makes a computer feel pain. This is obviously a instance of a much large problem. That is: How do i write an algoithms that would reproduce the subjective emotions like pain?


algorithm 1:

I can give the computer the condition:

if: enegy resource is low,

then: output a crying face on the screen.

algorithn 2:

If :
* list the set of negative emotions inputed by the user, and denote each by consecative numbers.
* radomly to choose a number, called it k.
then:
output the corresponding crying face for the number k to the screen.

If you are not satisfy with the above algorithms, then it should not surprise you what my next claim would be.

My claim is that there does not exist any satisfactory algorithm for the emotion we call pain.

I doubt it, but computers often are a pain, and give me pain, so it would be nice if I could return the favor.

[ughaibu]

A computer cannot feel pain."fast cannot feel pain."
How can you show that I am wrong?If we run on the computer, a program using basic probability and repeatedly offering the two envelope problem, presumably the computer will continue switching envelopes indefinitely. A human being would quickly become bored by the same situation. As human beings become bored at quite different rates, depending on the individual person and the specific activity involved, it doesn't seem obvious that human boredom is programed behaviour. Can we conclude from this that computers can not experience boredom?

[Xyzzy]

I am a programmer. I have a simply question. How can i white an algorithm that makes a computer feel pain. This is obviously a instance of a much large problem. That is: How do i write an algoithms that would reproduce the subjective emotions like pain?


algorithm 1:

I can give the computer the condition:

if: enegy resource is low,

then: output a crying face on the screen.

algorithn 2:

If :
* list the set of negative emotions inputed by the user, and denote each by consecative numbers.
* radomly to choose a number, called it k.
then:
output the corresponding crying face for the number k to the screen.

If you are not satisfy with the above algorithms, then it should not surprise you what my next claim would be.

My claim is that there does not exist any satisfactory algorithm for the emotion we call pain.

An experience like 'pain' is vastly more complicated than your algorithms above would imply.

To try to give you an idea of how complex, let me elaborate on your examples...

algorithm 3:

1. Receive firings from the nervous system from any one of a number of specialized pain receptor nerves.

2. A branch of this pain signal goes to the reflexive system (some of which is actually in the limbs and torso), which will generate a variety of unthinking responses such as flinching.

3. Part of the signal is routed to the body mapping module inside the brain. This module is responsible for the impression of the spatial position and state of your body.

3a. These signals interact with the current movement control system to give the consciousness quick feedback that some part of the body is in pain.

3b. This body mapping signal feeds into the situational modeling system, the visual modeling system, and memory recall to produce secondary impressions and memories associated with similar pains.

4. Part of the signal is routed directly to the situational consciousness, which may be anticipating pain and be pre-primed to respond (you may already be in a fight-flight mode because you expect pain to shortly occur).

4a. The particular pain received is compared to what is expected, and a given pattern of response is executed (for example, you were expecting you might hurt your leg, and you quickly fall into a roll on the ground).

5. Part of the signals directly feed into other experiencial signals (fight or flight, excitation, sensations from the chest, from the shoulders of lightness, possibly dizzyness).

6. The signals of pain, along with parts of your current situation (who you're with, what you're doing, how you feel) are combined and fed into your secondary experiencial system to provide an experiencial summary of your current state. This secondary experiencial summary is matched with memory, which recall similar situations in which you felt similar pain. The remembered sensations, and remembered responses are then fed back into your overall state.

This is the module responsible for how pain 'feels', or the experience of pain.

7. Part of the signals feed into involuntary facial responses, and other autonomic responses to the pain such as increased heart rate, sweating, etc.

[Xyzzy]

Books, lathes, TVs, etc. cannot feel pain. Similarly, neither can computers.

Bools, lathes, TVs, can't play video games, similarly neither can computers.

[TruthPrevails]

I am a programmer. I have a simply question. How can i white an algorithm that makes a computer feel pain. This is obviously a instance of a much large problem. That is: How do i write an algoithms that would reproduce the subjective emotions like pain?

algorithm 1:
I can give the computer the condition:
if: enegy resource is low,
then: output a crying face on the screen.

algorithn 2:
If :
* list the set of negative emotions inputed by the user, and denote each by consecative numbers.
* radomly to choose a number, called it k.
then:
output the corresponding crying face for the number k to the screen.

If you are not satisfy with the above algorithms, then it should not surprise you what my next claim would be.

My claim is that there does not exist any satisfactory algorithm for the emotion we call pain.I think it is not difficult to simulate a computer to 'feel' pain. However it will only 'computer pain' not 'human pain'.

We can put heat, pressure, noise sensors on the key board, and other parts of the sensor.
We can even program the computer to read human emotional expressions which are standard (Darwin).

Do a research of how the average human reacts to extremes sensual experiences. You will not be wrong if you, take the average behavior.

When exerted pressure exceed a certain limit, you can program the various volume of the sound "ouch" follow by "Damn you, you are pounding me too hard"
If the computer sense a sad face, acknowledge his feelings, console the user and activate some cheerful music.

Program appropriate apologies whenever errors arise, else the computer would be thrown against the wall.

[Immanuel]

Well, i am only interested in programming a computer to feel pain

How would you judge that algorithm X has accomplished this goal? Until you can properly define what it is that you want the algorithm to do, you can't say that there isn't one. For example, there is no algorithm to solve the Halting Problem; this can be proved since the problem can be precisely and mathematically defined. Until you can define the requirements for "feel pain" in the same way, you will not be able to judge that you have succeeded in meeting them or to devise proofs that such algorithms are impossible.


I have no problem in see people as a more or less a type of complex algorithm at work. Now, it seems intuitive that we do know that some one is in pain when we see it.

[Immanuel]

I am a programmer. I have a simply question. How can i white an algorithm that makes a computer feel pain. This is obviously a instance of a much large problem. That is: How do i write an algoithms that would reproduce the subjective emotions like pain?


algorithm 1:

I can give the computer the condition:

if: enegy resource is low,

then: output a crying face on the screen.

algorithn 2:

If :
* list the set of negative emotions inputed by the user, and denote each by consecative numbers.
* radomly to choose a number, called it k.
then:
output the corresponding crying face for the number k to the screen.

If you are not satisfy with the above algorithms, then it should not surprise you what my next claim would be.

My claim is that there does not exist any satisfactory algorithm for the emotion we call pain.

An experience like 'pain' is vastly more complicated than your algorithms above would imply.

To try to give you an idea of how complex, let me elaborate on your examples...

algorithm 3:

1. Receive firings from the nervous system from any one of a number of specialized pain receptor nerves.

2. A branch of this pain signal goes to the reflexive system (some of which is actually in the limbs and torso), which will generate a variety of unthinking responses such as flinching.

3. Part of the signal is routed to the body mapping module inside the brain. This module is responsible for the impression of the spatial position and state of your body.

3a. These signals interact with the current movement control system to give the consciousness quick feedback that some part of the body is in pain.

3b. This body mapping signal feeds into the situational modeling system, the visual modeling system, and memory recall to produce secondary impressions and memories associated with similar pains.

4. Part of the signal is routed directly to the situational consciousness, which may be anticipating pain and be pre-primed to respond (you may already be in a fight-flight mode because you expect pain to shortly occur).

4a. The particular pain received is compared to what is expected, and a given pattern of response is executed (for example, you were expecting you might hurt your leg, and you quickly fall into a roll on the ground).

5. Part of the signals directly feed into other experiencial signals (fight or flight, excitation, sensations from the chest, from the shoulders of lightness, possibly dizzyness).

6. The signals of pain, along with parts of your current situation (who you're with, what you're doing, how you feel) are combined and fed into your secondary experiencial system to provide an experiencial summary of your current state. This secondary experiencial summary is matched with memory, which recall similar situations in which you felt similar pain. The remembered sensations, and remembered responses are then fed back into your overall state.

This is the module responsible for how pain 'feels', or the experience of pain.

7. Part of the signals feed into involuntary facial responses, and other autonomic responses to the pain such as increased heart rate, sweating, etc.

All i see are hidden implementions by fancy names. There is nothing inconsistent with imagining that all the steps you listes could be algorithmically expressed, and implemented to produced a state called pain in the computer.

[Immanuel]

Books, lathes, TVs, etc. cannot feel pain. Similarly, neither can computers.

Bools, lathes, TVs, can't play video games, similarly neither can computers.

There is nothing inconsistent with the view that humen are a more fancy algorithm at work.

[ughaibu]

There is nothing inconsistent with imagining that all the steps you listes could be algorithmically expressed, and implemented to produced a state called pain in the computer.You seem to be saying that the computer can be programed to react to various stimuli in ways that would be interpreted by a human as expressions of pain, I dont see how this answers your thread title question. A person can feel pain without expressing the fact, conversely a person can simulate the expressions without feeling any pain.

[Immanuel]

There is nothing inconsistent with imagining that all the steps you listes could be algorithmically expressed, and implemented to produced a state called pain in the computer.You seem to be saying [\QUOTE]

Can you be more precise?

[ughaibu]

Can you be more precise?How do you know what the computer's feeling? It might enjoy those things that you've told it to express as painful.

[Garrett]

Immanuel
There is nothing inconsistent with the view that humen are a more fancy algorithm at work.
Roger Penrose (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Roger_Penrose) argues that the rational processes of the human mind are not completely algorithmic and thus cannot be duplicated by a sufficiently complex computer.

Everyone here might enjoy section III (hundreds of papers on the philosophy of artificial intelligence) from Online Papers on Consciousness (http://consc.net/online).

[DrZoidberg]

Sorry if I'm being shallow here, but I don't think this is very complicated.

Pain is an information feedback system. The feeling of being caressed and pain is only different in degree. Same with heat or cold nerve sensors.

If [intensityOfStimulus] < 10
then [PleasantFeeling]
else [pain]

Pain is just the label of the state when the intensity threshold has passed beyond being pleasant.

See, no philosophy needed.

[Garrett]

DrZoidberg
Pain is an information feedback system. The feeling of being caressed and pain is only different in degree.
Pain involves an information feedback system. It also involves a subjective experience (the "feeling").

If [intensityOfStimulus] < 10
then [PleasantFeeling]
else [pain]
You believe that if that algorithm is processed by a computer, then the computer will subjectively experience pain?

Pain is just the label of the state when the intensity threshold has passed beyond being pleasant.
You're confusing your model with the phenomena.

See, no philosophy needed.
Science studies pain extensively, and verdict is in: pain involves feeling, and is not the label of the state when the arbitrary intensity threshold of some register value in a computer is passed.

[DrZoidberg]

See, no philosophy needed.
Science studies pain extensively, and verdict is in: pain involves feeling, and is not the label of the state when the arbitrary intensity threshold of some register value in a computer is passed.

Yes, it's a subjective feeling. That can be simulated to. Basically, what we call subjectivity is just activity in the brain which we cannot measure yet. Since we cannot simulate the brain, all you need to do is to randomise a part of the interpretation. And keep the drift from original state in future measurements. In that way you'll simulate organic subjective experience.

But it doesn't change that "pain" is just a label. In our brains pain just trigger one set of events while pleasure triggers another. It's only a label in our brains also.

Yesterday I read about an experiment on flatworms on this. They could clearly see in what sequence neurons get fired depending on stimulus. They could also see it's "memory". Which could be judged as a factor in the subjective experience.

Just because we only have access to fuzzy words to talk about our emotions, doesn't mean it isn't down to very concrete functions. Just like in a computer.

To borrow from Dawkins, Selfish Gene.
Pleasure and pain are the means by which our genes steer us to reproduce. If we do something that doesn't aid our genes into reproducing we feel pain.

We're just as much robots as the robots we've programmed. Just because we can't define the algorithm that controls us, doesn't mean it isn't there.

[ughaibu]

Pleasure and pain are the means by which our genes steer us to reproduce. If we do something that doesn't aid our genes into reproducing we feel painAre you suggesting that computers are engaged in a project of reproduction?

[DrZoidberg]

Pleasure and pain are the means by which our genes steer us to reproduce. If we do something that doesn't aid our genes into reproducing we feel painAre you suggesting that computers are engaged in a project of reproduction?

They will be if we program them to.

[DrZoidberg]

In philosophy I think subjective experiences is measured in "Qualia". There's a reason why it hasn't been possible to move this concept into the world of hard science yet. But I'm sure they will. Sooner or later.

[ughaibu]

They will be if we program them to.I take it that you computer presently isn't suitably programed, so your computer feels neither pleasure nor pain. If you programed it with the illusion that it's a reproductively active organism, do you seriously think that it would then experience pleasure and pain? Despite the fact that it lacks the genes to which Dawkins attempts to reduce human behaviour?

[SecularFuture]

Bools, lathes, TVs, can't play video games, similarly neither can computers.

There is nothing inconsistent with the view that humen are a more fancy algorithm at work.
I agree.

I have some experience with programming. I tried to make a natural language simulator once using Python. It was a lot of fun to work on.

To make a program that can feel pain you would first need to tell the program what it "likes". For example: Its primary purpose is to complete Task A, Task B, Task C, and Task D. If anything gets in the way of it doing any of these tasks, pain = pain + 1. :)

I believe in the future it will be possible to program computers to not only feel, but to think, and to do things based on those feelings and thoughts.

[DrZoidberg]

They will be if we program them to.I take it that you computer presently isn't suitably programed, so your computer feels neither pleasure nor pain. If you programed it with the illusion that it's a reproductively active organism, do you seriously think that it would then experience pleasure and pain? Despite the fact that it lacks the genes to which Dawkins attempts to reduce human behaviour?

You're mixing up several concepts. I just used the evolution principle as an example. Pleasure and pain are used to steer many other functionalities in animal bodies.

How is Dawkins reducing human behaviour? Plus that I think that you'll upset quite a few famous scientists by claiming this is his theory. You make it sound like some sort of hierarchy. Is being a pre-programmed robot some sort of cause of shame? Do you feel less of a man because you're programmed to get a hard on when you see tits on a TV-screen?

Here's an article on evolutionary programming.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evolutionary_programming
It is programming based on reproduction. Basically copying the process of natural selection and mutation from nature in programming.

[ughaibu]

.None of which provides any justification for suggesting that a suitably programed computer will feel pain. It's a non-biological constructed item, I see no more reason to think that it can experience pleasure and pain, than I have to think a deflating balloon can.

[DrZoidberg]

.None of which provides any justification for suggesting that a suitably programed computer will feel pain. It's a non-biological constructed item, I see no more reason to think that it can experience pleasure and pain, than I have to think a deflating balloon can.

How is your argumentation not circular?

A computer doesn't feel pain -> Because it's non-biological -> because non-biological things can't feel pain -> a computer is non-biological. Something like that.

I think you need to explain the differences between biological functions and artificial functions more in detail, for this to make sense.

I've given an theory on how pain can be simulated. You apparently don't agree. So I'm wondering what the difference is between simulated and real pain? You seem to have an answer?

[ughaibu]

I've given an theory on how pain can be simulated. You apparently don't agreeOf course it can be simulated, ie the computer can be wired to various sensors and programed to react, as a human might, to various stimuli, but that simulation is no reason to think that the computer is feeling pain, just as the noises emitted by a deflating balloon aren't necessarily indicative of feelings on the balloon's part.

[Garrett]

DrZoidberg
Yes, it's a subjective feeling. That can be simulated to.
I agree. The model from Immanuel makes sense in that regard: link if-then involving your "[intensityOfStimulus]" to his "if: energy resource is low". I think the ability to monitor internal body states (and using that information to control behavior) is reason the global workspace naturally selects.

Basically, what we call subjectivity is just activity in the brain which we cannot measure yet.
Well, measuring that activity comes up against the hard problem of consciousness, the explanatory gap, the description problem and the mind/body problem. I think your qualifier "just" is serious hyperbole.

Since we cannot simulate the brain, all you need to do is to randomise a part of the interpretation. And keep the drift from original state in future measurements. In that way you'll simulate organic subjective experience.
Why can't we simulate the brain, especially since you don't mind simulating subjective experience?

I don't understand the rest.

But it doesn't change that "pain" is just a label. In our brains pain just trigger one set of events while pleasure triggers another. It's only a label in our brains also.
The word "pain" is a label, like all words. So what? Pain which triggers neurological events is not a label, it what the label identifies.

Yesterday I read about an experiment on flatworms on this. They could clearly see in what sequence neurons get fired depending on stimulus. They could also see it's "memory". Which could be judged as a factor in the subjective experience.
No problem with the experiment. They could also be judged as neurochemical events which don't involve subjective experience. Even single cells appear to smell food and flagellate towards the source. Hell, rocks appear to feel the pull of gravity.

How could we tell whether rocks, cells, creatures, thermostats, solar systems or computers have subjective experience?

Just because we only have access to fuzzy words to talk about our emotions, doesn't mean it isn't down to very concrete functions. Just like in a computer.
I agree, if the qualifier "just like" were changed to "similar to". You're suggesting that computers have subjective experience, but I don't see any argumentation supporting that idea. What makes you think that changing some value in a computer creates a subjective experience felt by the computer?

To borrow from Dawkins, Selfish Gene.
Pleasure and pain are the means by which our genes steer us to reproduce. If we do something that doesn't aid our genes into reproducing we feel pain.
I understand what he means, he's just pointing out the survival value of subjective experience, and I don't see how that supports your idea that computers have feelings.

We're just as much robots as the robots we've programmed.
I've studied a bit of robotics and biology, and computer science and cognitive science, and would say your statement is very unscientific.

I think information processing is a necessary but insufficient requirement for the emergence of awareness.

Just because we can't define the algorithm that controls us, doesn't mean it isn't there.
If it happens that there are problems which cannot be solved by algorithm but can be solved by people, would that affect your opinion that subjective experience is algorithmic?

[Laurentius]

We're just as much robots as the robots we've programmed.

Let's all praise the Programmer Almighty! :notworthy:

[Smullyan-esque]

"fast cannot feel pain."
How can you show that I am wrong?If we run on the computer, a program using basic probability and repeatedly offering the two envelope problem, presumably the computer will continue switching envelopes indefinitely. A human being would quickly become bored by the same situation. As human beings become bored at quite different rates, depending on the individual person and the specific activity involved, it doesn't seem obvious that human boredom is programed behaviour. Can we conclude from this that computers can not experience boredom?
{sigh}

You didn't address my point.

How can you show that other human beings are able to feel pain?

[ughaibu]

{sigh}

You didn't address my point.

How can you show that other human beings are able to feel pain?I wasn't attempting to address it.

[Immanuel]

Can you be more precise?How do you know what the computer's feeling? It might enjoy those things that you've told it to express as painful.


Hmm... that is true. How do you know if another person is in pain? The obivous answer is that you know when you see someone is in pain. You get it. Now, what would be the problem in thinking humen as a more advanced form of computer at work?

[ughaibu]

How do you know if another person is in pain? The obivous answer is that you know when you see someone is in painAs one is oneself human, one can recognise signs corresponding to one's own experiences of pain, this doesn't apply to human-computer sympathy.
Does you computer have feelings at present?
If you program it to respond to appropriate stimuli with human responses to pain, the computer will still be experiencing inputs and outputs as it does now, I dont see any reason to imagine it would experience what humans call, when they experience it, pain.

[Immanuel]

As one is oneself human, one can recognise signs corresponding to one's own experiences of pain, this doesn't apply to human-computer sympathy.
Does you computer have feelings at present?
If you program it to respond to appropriate stimuli with human responses to pain, the computer will still be experiencing inputs and outputs as it does now, I dont see any reason to imagine it would experience what humans call, when they experience it, pain.

It seems to me that your doubt rely on how the computer takes in input, and produces output. Why is that a problem? Human beings takes in input( experiences...), and produce at set of output( sounds, expressions...)?

[ughaibu]

Why is that a problem?Because I cant see any reason for a computer to have feelings associated with inputs and outputs, and if it does have feelings I see no reason to think that those feelings would correspond to human feelings.

[Immanuel]

Why is that a problem?Because I cant see any reason for a computer to have feelings associated with inputs and outputs, and if it does have feelings I see no reason to think that those feelings would correspond to human feelings.

Perhaps you never try interactive anima porn in japan? It looks so real.

[ughaibu]

It looks so real.That's not really an argument, is it?

[Immanuel]

It looks so real.That's not really an argument, is it?

It is a good argument. As this technology( interactive anima porn) develop, and advances, we will see machines that "feels" more and more human-like to the point that we might as well consider them as being conscious.

[ughaibu]

we might as well consider them as being conscious.Which says nothing about whether or not they are conscious, and if they are, what they feel.

[Immanuel]

we might as well consider them as being conscious.Which says nothing about whether or not they are conscious, and if they are, what they feel.


Very true! I never said the anima porn characters were conscious. I said we might as well consider them conscious. Big difference. In the same way when you look at another person, there is no way you know that person is conscious. This begs the question of why you feel person A is feeling pain, when you see person A. Perhaps i am wrong about what you mean before?

[ughaibu]

Post 43.

[Immanuel]

Post 43.


let me help you:



As one is oneself human, one can recognise signs corresponding to one's own experiences of pain, this doesn't apply to human-computer sympathy.
Does you computer have feelings at present?

So the reason you feel i am conscious is becuase you feel sympathy toward me(human)? Is that a good reason? Is that an argument?

[DrZoidberg]

I've given an theory on how pain can be simulated. You apparently don't agreeOf course it can be simulated, ie the computer can be wired to various sensors and programed to react, as a human might, to various stimuli, but that simulation is no reason to think that the computer is feeling pain, just as the noises emitted by a deflating balloon aren't necessarily indicative of feelings on the balloon's part.

You're just assuming "pain" is something intrinsic to the biological world and use that as evidence. You make no attempt to explain what pain is to a human. How is this not just mysticism/religious mumbo jumbo? I fail to see any logic here.

[ughaibu]

Is that a good reason?Yes. Do you accept that I'm conscious?

[Immanuel]

Is that a good reason?Yes. Do you accept that I'm conscious?


Do i accept it a priori? no

[ughaibu]

You make no attempt to explain what pain is to a humanI dont have to explain what pain is, this thread concerns the conjecture that computers can be programed to feel pain, it thereby implicitly admits the sensation of pain familiar to humans. It also assumes that computers have experiences, that these experiences are similar to those of humans and that the same feelings arise from the same stimuli, no sensible reason to believe any of this has been given.

[ughaibu]

Do i accept it a priori? noOkay, then I consider it futile to continue this discussion with you.

[Immanuel]

Do i accept it a priori? noOkay, then I consider it futile to continue this discussion with you.

Perhaps you can argue that i am being unreasonable, or something...

[ughaibu]

Perhaps you can argue that i am being unreasonable, or something?If you cant tell that I'm conscious how do you reckon you can tell about a computer?

[Immanuel]

Perhaps you can argue that i am being unreasonable, or something?If you cant tell that I'm conscious how do you reckon you can tell about a computer?

That is true.

[DrZoidberg]

DrZoidberg
Yes, it's a subjective feeling. That can be simulated to.
I agree. The model from Immanuel makes sense in that regard: link if-then involving your "[intensityOfStimulus]" to his "if: energy resource is low". I think the ability to monitor internal body states (and using that information to control behavior) is reason the global workspace naturally selects.


Nice that we agree on something.



Well, measuring that activity comes up against the hard problem of consciousness, the explanatory gap, the description problem and the mind/body problem. I think your qualifier "just" is serious hyperbole.


he he. I'll cede here. Yes, of course. We can still make some educated guesses based on simpler brains on other creatures of earth.


Why can't we simulate the brain, especially since you don't mind simulating subjective experience?


Erm, what? What has that got to do with it. We can't because we don't know how to practically build it. If we do put it together with all the parts it has now, I'm sure we'll be able to measure all your "subjective" experiences. Until this happens, this is of course assumption.


The word "pain" is a label, like all words. So what? Pain which triggers neurological events is not a label, it what the label identifies.


My point is that the event triggered by hitting the button by the label is parallel to that of how computers function. if pain -> exclaim "ouch"


No problem with the experiment. They could also be judged as neurochemical events which don't involve subjective experience. Even single cells appear to smell food and flagellate towards the source. Hell, rocks appear to feel the pull of gravity.

How could we tell whether rocks, cells, creatures, thermostats, solar systems or computers have subjective experience?


If they move toward the food they smell, it can be argued that they are.


I agree, if the qualifier "just like" were changed to "similar to". You're suggesting that computers have subjective experience, but I don't see any argumentation supporting that idea. What makes you think that changing some value in a computer creates a subjective experience felt by the computer?


It's an assumption. I assume that the world is ruled by pretty much the same rules and all organisms, artificial or not, follow the same rules. I'm a monist. I don't believe humans have a separate soul. Our soul is our brain. Simple animals are simple switch boards that can easily be studied and copied in a computer. Our circuitry is the same as those flat worms, just more complicated. So complicated that we still haven't figured it out. I believe it's a matter of time. But that is admittedly an assumption.

I don't think humans are any more special than any other organism on earth. Arguably this worlds most evolved creature, (most energy efficient) is a bacteria sucking the exhaust from hydrothermal vents. "Intelligence" isn't a higher form in the evolutionary ladder. We just have the brain we need for the job to reproduce.

I think that seeing humanity than any more than just a computerised chemical engine is not only wrong, but highly obstructive scientifically. If we see human emotions as just more advanced functionality that we've inherited from simpler organism, (something which is highly probable given the scientific evidence), then it's subjective qualities are nothing special.


I understand what he means, he's just pointing out the survival value of subjective experience, and I don't see how that supports your idea that computers have feelings.


I don't believe there's any difference. If we use pain as basis to make a choice or if we use a flag in an algorithm, makes to me no difference. We are still ruled by programming. Just because we are inside this computer, unable to be objective, doesn't mean our computer, (the brain) is any different qualitatively than others.


I've studied a bit of robotics and biology, and computer science and cognitive science, and would say your statement is very unscientific.

I think information processing is a necessary but insufficient requirement for the emergence of awareness.


He he. AI and robotics was part of my degree. It's a bit dusty now, but I can still do academic battle.



Just because we can't define the algorithm that controls us, doesn't mean it isn't there.
If it happens that there are problems which cannot be solved by algorithm but can be solved by people, would that affect your opinion that subjective experience is algorithmic?

I'd say that would be proof of magic in the world. But the realm of magic is steadily shrinking as science progresses. Wouldn't you agree?

[DrZoidberg]

You make no attempt to explain what pain is to a humanI dont have to explain what pain is, this thread concerns the conjecture that computers can be programed to feel pain, it thereby implicitly admits the sensation of pain familiar to humans. It also assumes that computers have experiences, that these experiences are similar to those of humans and that the same feelings arise from the same stimuli, no sensible reason to believe any of this has been given.

I think you're interpreting or assuming a wee bit to much. If computers are to be able to experience pain we first have to establish what pain is, don't we? It seems that we've so far been able to agree that it is a subjective feeling which we cannot simply from our own experiences compare to anyone else's. But we have to if we want to program it into a computer. We can all experience pain so we know it is something concrete. There's no magic in the brain, so it has to be translated into concrete neurochemical activity. See where I'm getting at? This can be built into a computer. Just because something is complicated doesn't make it magical. If we can feel pain, then we can build something that will also feel it.

Step one is to define pain. It's to translate the subjective feelings into numbers. That's what I meant.

There's a great novel by Isaac Asimov where a guy, to find the perfect woman for himself, programmes a computer to feel love by copying how he himself feels love. The computer of course finds her, gets jealous and kills him.

[Rilx]

If it happens that there are problems which cannot be solved by algorithm but can be solved by people, would that affect your opinion that subjective experience is algorithmic?

Step one is to define pain.

Humans don't need to define pain. That's the difference.

[ughaibu]

If computers are to be able to experience pain we first have to establish what pain isIf computers are capable of experiencing sensations and feelings, arising from input and output of information, then computers are experiencing those sensations and feelings now. If this is the case, I have no idea what my computer is feeling and how my interactions with it change and define it's feelings. The idea that one programs it to wince when it's keys are struck too hard and as a consequence we know it feels pain, is daft, there's an infinite number of things it might feel. How do you suggest "concrete neurochemical activity" be built into the computer, in some manner that ensures conscious sensation? I'm dubious about this assertion and, in any case, it's a far cry from writing "an algorithm that makes a computer feel pain".

[DrZoidberg]

If computers are to be able to experience pain we first have to establish what pain isIf computers are capable of experiencing sensations and feelings, arising from input and output of information, then computers are experiencing those sensations and feelings now. If this is the case, I have no idea what my computer is feeling and how my interactions with it change and define it's feelings. The idea that one programs it to wince when it's keys are struck too hard and as a consequence we know it feels pain, is daft, there's an infinite number of things it might feel. How do you suggest "concrete neurochemical activity" be built into the computer, in some manner that ensures conscious sensation? I'm dubious about this assertion and, in any case, it's a far cry from writing "an algorithm that makes a computer feel pain".

You're talking about consciousness, which is a different system from are capacity to feel pain. Consciousness puts another layer on top of pain. It creates the capacity to fear future pain, and other stuff that goes with it. If we would create a computer that is conscious, then I'm sure it would react just like us. But pain is still just a feedback system. If you'd program the computer to print "whince" when the keys are pressed too hard, (just like a pin-ball machine does) is not daft. That's how humans work!

I still think it's unclear what it is you're objecting to. Are you saying consciousness is necessary to feel pain? If they could I'm sure round worms would disagree.

[DrZoidberg]

Humans don't need to define pain. That's the difference.

You do if you want to simulate it.

[ughaibu]

Are you saying consciousness is necessary to feel pain?Of course, feeling is registered by consciousness, if we didn't feel pain we would be unconscious of it.

[DrZoidberg]

Are you saying consciousness is necessary to feel pain?Of course, feeling is registered by consciousness, if we didn't feel pain we would be unconscious of it.

Now we've settled that. I of course don't agree. But this is a situation where both of us can be correct, depending on our interpretation of what pain is. I think you're confusing to separate systems unnecessarily, making them both harder to understand. But that's just my opinion.

[Garrett]

DrZoidberg
Erm, what? What has that got to do with it. We can't because we don't know how to practically build it. If we do put it together with all the parts it has now, I'm sure we'll be able to measure all your "subjective" experiences.
That isn't making sense to me. We model and simulate planetary weather, but that doesn't mean we can build planets. We already simulate brains with computer models.

You argue that simulated pain is actual pain, and now you argue that we can't simulate the brain unless that simulation is actually a brain. What is your definition for "simulation"?

My point is that the event triggered by hitting the button by the label is parallel to that of how computers function. if pain -> exclaim "ouch"
And my point is that giving some value in a computer the label "pain" doesn't mean the computer will feel anything. :huh:

If things were that easy, I'd label some large value "Garrett's bank account balance" and then go buy a new computer with all that money.

If they move toward the food they smell, it can be argued that they are.
If they smell, then of course they have subjective experience. The question is do they smell the food? How could we tell?

It's an assumption. I assume that the world is ruled by pretty much the same rules and all organisms, artificial or not, follow the same rules. I'm a monist. I don't believe humans have a separate soul. Our soul is our brain. Simple animals are simple switch boards that can easily be studied and copied in a computer. Our circuitry is the same as those flat worms, just more complicated. So complicated that we still haven't figured it out. I believe it's a matter of time. But that is admittedly an assumption.
Subjective experience is an emergent characteristic or property. What reason is there to think that bacteria, flatworms, or computers have that property?

I don't think humans are any more special than any other organism on earth. Arguably this worlds most evolved creature, (most energy efficient) is a bacteria sucking the exhaust from hydrothermal vents. "Intelligence" isn't a higher form in the evolutionary ladder. We just have the brain we need for the job to reproduce.
"Specialness" is a judgement call. Earth has been called the planet of the beetles.

The human brain does more than just "the job to reproduce". :rolleyes:

I think that seeing humanity than any more than just a computerised chemical engine is not only wrong, but highly obstructive scientifically. If we see human emotions as just more advanced functionality that we've inherited from simpler organism, (something which is highly probable given the scientific evidence), then it's subjective qualities are nothing special.

"Computerised chemical engine" is a phrase you apparently made up.

Afaik, emotions require certain neurological structures in an advanced central nervous system. Any evidence to the contrary would be welcome!

I don't believe there's any difference.
You see no difference between the survival value of subjective experience, and your idea that computers have feelings. :huh:

If we use pain as basis to make a choice or if we use a flag in an algorithm, makes to me no difference. We are still ruled by programming.
Wiki on the human brain:

Perhaps the most fundamental difference between brains and computers is that today's computers operate by performing often sequential instructions from an input program, while no clear analogy of a program appears in human brains. The closest equivalent would be the idea of a logical process, but the nature and existence of such entities are subjects of philosophical debate. Given Turing's model of computation, the Turing machine, this may be a functional, not fundamental, distinction. However, Maass and Markram have recently argued that "in contrast to Turing machines, generic computations by neural circuits are not digital, and are not carried out on static inputs, but rather on functions of time" (the Turing machine computes computable functions). Ultimately, computers were not designed to be models of the brain, though subjects like neural networks attempt to abstract the behavior of the brain in a way that can be simulated computationally.

In addition to the technical differences, other key differences exist. The brain is massively parallel and interwoven, whereas programming of this kind is extremely difficult for computer software writers (most parallel systems run semi-independently, for example each working on a small separate 'chunk' of a problem). The human brain is also mediated by chemicals and analog processes, many of which are only understood at a basic level and others of which may not yet have been discovered, so that a full description is not yet available in science. Finally, and perhaps most significantly, the human brain appears hard-wired with certain abilities, such as the ability to learn language (cf. Broca's area), to interact with experience and unchosen emotions, and usually develops within a culture. This is different from a computer in that a computer needs software to perform many of its functions beyond its basic computational capabilities.

So "we are ruled by programming" is a belief, not a fact. And an implication of that belief is the existence of the Almighty Programmer.

Just because we are inside this computer, unable to be objective, doesn't mean our computer, (the brain) is any different qualitatively than others.
I know that. Btw, I think multiple realizability and strong AI are possible.

But the realm of magic is steadily shrinking as science progresses. Wouldn't you agree?
Yes.

I'd say that would be proof of magic in the world.
Then our ability to solve some halting problems would be magic.

How would you model intuition with an algorithm?

[SecularFuture]

I don't think pain is as complicated as some of you are making it out to be. :)

Programming is usually done in layers. You start with the basics, and then work your way up, or out. Pain, in the simplest sense of the word, is a reaction to something that is disrupting normal operation, and/or threatens the stability or safety of the being.

If someone stabbed you in the arm, resources would be reduced in some areas, and tending to your damaged area would become your main focus. To program a computer to do this wouldn't be easy, but it wouldn't be impossible.

You would first need to create a nervous system out of censors. Other resources would need to be monitored as well; hardware temperature, condition of the hardware, and so on. If any of these parts become stressed, the computer could either sound an alarm (which would equate to human crying), or, with some really clever and complicated programming, and a robotic arm, be designed to fix itself.

Computers, and even cars, kind of already do this today. When they become too hot, fans turn on. They don't have a conscious understanding of pain, but they "know" what pain is, and what needs to be done to stop it.

When it comes to what can be done in the future, I like to keep an open mind. 100 years ago we never would been able to dream up some of the technology we have today. Who knows what kind of technology we will have 100 years from now.

[dug_down_deep]

Either you believe that the brain is programmed like a computer, or you are a believer in souls and new-age magical thinking.

Who is responsible for this horse-shit dichotomy? They need their ass kicked, due to the number of potentially interesting discussions they've poisoned with their foul memes.

[dug_down_deep]

They don't have a conscious understanding of pain, but they "know" what pain is, and what needs to be done to stop it.
I would have thought that 'conscious understanding' is required for knowledge. I could be wrong, but you're introducing an epistemological assumption that is at the very least debatable.

[Smullyan-esque]

"fast cannot feel pain."
How can you show that I am wrong?

If we run on the computer, a program using basic probability and repeatedly offering the two envelope problem, presumably the computer will continue switching envelopes indefinitely. A human being would quickly become bored by the same situation. As human beings become bored at quite different rates, depending on the individual person and the specific activity involved, it doesn't seem obvious that human boredom is programed behaviour. Can we conclude from this that computers can not experience boredom?

{sigh}

You didn't address my point.

How can you show that other human beings are able to feel pain?I wasn't attempting to address it.
Then why did you quote me? :huh:

Listen, it's a serious point. First of all, whatever test you use to determine if something else feels pain can also be used to determine if a computer feels pain. And secondly we can discuss whether or not your test is reasonable. For example, if your test is "Does it have skin?", then that's a silly test! If it is something like the Turing Test, then it might have more justification.

[Tiberius]

Um, since when is pain an EMOTION?

It is a physical sensation caused by over-stimulation of the senses.

[ughaibu]

it's a serious point.Yes, I understand that. Other than sufferers of CIPA, I see no reason to doubt that everyone feels pain sometimes, those who dont feel pain tend to die young, as pain is important for survival. As these considerations dont apply to computers I have no reason to imagine that computers feel pain, in fact I dont imagine they feel anything but it's difficult to be fully confident. This is why I suggested that some feeling other than pain, my example being boredom, might be easier to decide about.

[Xyzzy]

All i see are hidden implementions by fancy names. There is nothing inconsistent with imagining that all the steps you listes could be algorithmically expressed, and implemented to produced a state called pain in the computer.

These steps are algorithmically expressed.

The point of enumerating these steps is to illustrate how the simple word "pain" that we throw around as if it was only a single property actually represents a large scale system in the human brain with a broad and complex network of primary and secondary effects.

When someone says "I experience pain", they really mean "I experience the sum total of all of these individual processes". Each of the contributions of each of these processes to the overall system are parts of the overall 'experience of pain'.

Equating this very complex system to a simple numerical value in a simple computer program is.. to put it mildly.. completely missing the point of what "pain" is.

[Xyzzy]

Bools, lathes, TVs, can't play video games, similarly neither can computers.

There is nothing inconsistent with the view that humen are a more fancy algorithm at work.

Human minds emerge exclusively from brains. Human brains are computers. Humans feel pain. Therefore computers can feel pain.

[Xyzzy]

Pleasure and pain are the means by which our genes steer us to reproduce. If we do something that doesn't aid our genes into reproducing we feel painAre you suggesting that computers are engaged in a project of reproduction?

Adult Friend Finder.

Match.com

Porn.

[DrZoidberg]

DrZoidberg
Erm, what? What has that got to do with it. We can't because we don't know how to practically build it. If we do put it together with all the parts it has now, I'm sure we'll be able to measure all your "subjective" experiences.
That isn't making sense to me. We model and simulate planetary weather, but that doesn't mean we can build planets. We already simulate brains with computer models.


It would be handy if we first knew how to simulate the human brain in a way to copy consciousness without copying the human brain exactly. Then perhaps we might figure out how to simulate it accurately without actually making a literal artificial brain.



You argue that simulated pain is actual pain, and now you argue that we can't simulate the brain unless that simulation is actually a brain. What is your definition for "simulation"?


A simulation is a predictable algorithm. You put things in, you get the right things out. It doesn't have to be clear how the algorithm works, as long as the output matches comparable output from the real world. How's that for a definition?


And my point is that giving some value in a computer the label "pain" doesn't mean the computer will feel anything. :huh:

If things were that easy, I'd label some large value "Garrett's bank account balance" and then go buy a new computer with all that money.


I think you're wrong. In your simulation your bank account would have more money in it. But you're assuming that entities outside of the simulation would accept it. It's just like the movies. We know the actors are faking it. We still react to them emotionally. If your simulation would be good enough, (ie fraud) you would be able to buy a new computer.

Either I'm simply not getting it or it was a bad example?


If they smell, then of course they have subjective experience. The question is do they smell the food? How could we tell?


We could measure their ability to hold concepts as "food" in their minds. It requires somewhere to store this information. If they would be theoretically unable to store this information, then we know they don't. But they're still reacting to it. Feeling things.

Here's an interesting article related to this. It's suggesting that we're not as clever as we're fooling ourselves into believing we are.
http://www.susanblackmore.co.uk/Articles/jcs02.htm


Subjective experience is an emergent characteristic or property. What reason is there to think that bacteria, flatworms, or computers have that property?


he he. "Emergent". I think you're overstating human cerebral abilities. Just because we're a little bit smarter than dogs doesn't make us supremely rational beings. But that's my opinion. It's also a major topic people a lot smarter than me are debating fiercely. I'm in the Susan Blackmore camp.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Susan_Blackmore


The human brain does more than just "the job to reproduce". :rolleyes:


Yes, but I think that's just a handy side effect. If it hadn't aided our ability to reproduce we wouldn't have this conversation, would we?


"Computerised chemical engine" is a phrase you apparently made up.

Afaik, emotions require certain neurological structures in an advanced central nervous system. Any evidence to the contrary would be welcome!


And the nervous system is just wiring, right? As is the neurological structures of our brain.


You see no difference between the survival value of subjective experience, and your idea that computers have feelings. :huh:


Wiki on the human brain:

Perhaps the most fundamental difference between brains and computers is that today's computers operate by performing often sequential instructions from an input program, while no clear analogy of a program appears in human brains. The closest equivalent would be the idea of a logical process, but the nature and existence of such entities are subjects of philosophical debate. Given Turing's model of computation, the Turing machine, this may be a functional, not fundamental, distinction. However, Maass and Markram have recently argued that "in contrast to Turing machines, generic computations by neural circuits are not digital, and are not carried out on static inputs, but rather on functions of time" (the Turing machine computes computable functions). Ultimately, computers were not designed to be models of the brain, though subjects like neural networks attempt to abstract the behavior of the brain in a way that can be simulated computationally.

In addition to the technical differences, other key differences exist. The brain is massively parallel and interwoven, whereas programming of this kind is extremely difficult for computer software writers (most parallel systems run semi-independently, for example each working on a small separate 'chunk' of a problem). The human brain is also mediated by chemicals and analog processes, many of which are only understood at a basic level and others of which may not yet have been discovered, so that a full description is not yet available in science. Finally, and perhaps most significantly, the human brain appears hard-wired with certain abilities, such as the ability to learn language (cf. Broca's area), to interact with experience and unchosen emotions, and usually develops within a culture. This is different from a computer in that a computer needs software to perform many of its functions beyond its basic computational capabilities.


I'm well aware of the differences between a conventional computer and our brains. Obviously not in detail. But I still think the comparison is valid.


So "we are ruled by programming" is a belief, not a fact. And an implication of that belief is the existence of the Almighty Programmer.


Ok, yeah. That's valid. But it has to be weighed against what other evidence we have. Free will proponents are losing the battle. I'm with the almighty programmer here, (ie our genes). Again, there's smarter people than me debating this today.


How would you model intuition with an algorithm?

This has to start with an assumption as to what intuition is. I personally think it is deduction using very flimsy evidence, and filling in the gaps using previous experience or possibly instinct. This can successfully be programmed by randomizing which earlier experiences or base behaviour to fill the gaps with.

well, I came across as a huge Blackmore fanboy here. I've got many idols here. Stephen Pinker is probably my favourite.

[Oxymoron]

I'm with the lobster here: if by "computer", we mean any structure fashioned out of materials assembled by humans capable of processing signals, then I can see no fundamental reason why a particular set of structures cannot "feel", given that an analagous structure built from organic materials using a genetic template can. Unless one invokes either dualism or vitalism, that is (ie "magic pixies").

[ughaibu]

I'm with the lobster hereIf you mean post 77, it's a pretty weak syllogism, compare:
1) birds can fly
2) penguins are birds
3) penguins can fly.

[Oxymoron]

I'm with the lobster hereIf you mean post 77, it's a pretty weak syllogism, compare:
1) birds can fly
2) penguins are birds
3) penguins can fly.

Penguins can fly. Underwater. They are adapted to "fly" in a medium of higher viscosity with a significantly lower partial pressure of oxygen.

One could reasonably argue that a synthetic device might feel pain differently to an organic one. Then again, your perception of pain may be different to mine, in fact I am pretty sure your tolerance levels for a given stimulus are different. But that's a long way from arguing coherently that they cannot, in principle, feel anything at all.

[ughaibu]

But that's a long way from arguing coherently that they cannot, in principle, feel anything at all.I'm not arguing that. I have two points of uncertainty, I see no reason to imagine they feel anything and if they do feel anything, I see no way to match what they feel to human feelings.

[Oxymoron]

But that's a long way from arguing coherently that they cannot, in principle, feel anything at all.I'm not arguing that. I have two points of uncertainty, I see no reason to imagine they feel anything and if they do feel anything, I see no way to match what they feel to human feelings.

Presumably by this, you mean "computers as they exist today". I would agree to some extent. If you agree with the HPoC then presumably there's no way to know. If you don't...

[Rilx]

Penguins can fly. Underwater.
:rolling:

[ughaibu]

Presumably by this, you mean "computers as they exist today". I would agree to some extentSure, I have no way of knowing what computers might eventually be like, and I assume that this thread's opening post, in order to be meaningful, concerns computers of today. A pocket calculator saves a person from the task of performing a mental function, much as a computer does, but I doubt (around 70% on this board) that anyone would claim that pocket calculators have feelings.

[DrZoidberg]

For this discussion, (any of them) to get anywhere we first have to establish what feelings are. What do they mean to us? What are they for? I've made my own stance clear on this. Stephen Pinker made an analogy which I like. It went something like this:

For our brains the computing and processing of the information is done in nodes. Compared to the computer you are reading this on, each node is by itself very slow indeed but because they work in parallel in their billions it gives the effect of speed. An unfortunate side effect of this set up is that our brains will always send plenty of conflicting messages. Parallel processing is not unique for animals, and has existed in the computing world since its inception. It needs some kind of mediator sorting out the messages. That is why we have emotions. Emotions are the system by which our brains prioritise and rank available actions, (messages). It will pick which ever seems to be the most productive in reaching our goals. As I’m sure we all have experienced, it isn’t perfect, but is as good as natural selection has gotten so far. All animals with brains have emotions. Yes, even flies. They eat shit because it makes them happy, (reward chemicals are triggered when they smell it). They do it for no other reason.

Something like that. So having emotions isn't some end state or higher consciousness. It's just one component in our choice making mechanic. A problem with reasoning about this is of course that our pre-programmed feelings feel like it's free choice and that the choices we make are the important choices. I think we'd all agree that all the big choices in our lives are made for us by our emotional attachments rather than by anything rational. Our "choice" to avoid pain is a part of this pre-programmed mechanic.

Seen like this, it becomes easy to program pain into a computer.

[ughaibu]

Seen like this, it becomes easy to program pain into a computer.Okay, please post the code.

[DrZoidberg]

Seen like this, it becomes easy to program pain into a computer.Okay, please post the code.

I did it in my first post in this thread. I'm under the suspicion that you're confusing pain with consciousness again.

[Oxymoron]

Penguins can fly. Underwater.
:rolling:

I'm not sure why you find this funny, though I'm always glad to increase the general level of feel-goodness in the world by whatever mechanism :)

Technically, flight is the process of motion whilst suspended in a fluid. Air and water are both fluids. Penguins evolved from air-flying birds, a process that adapted their air-flight features for water-flight - shorter wings, improved respiration efficiency and so on. Penguins are birds by merit of their ancestry - their DNA - that have evolved specialised features for a specialised environment.

[Her pinkness saves]

Seen like this, it becomes easy to program pain into a computer.Okay, please post the code.
Do you have a cell phone? let its battery run low, the darn things have this tendency to autoshut down and patently refuse to work until recharged despite having the power to do so. it's almost as if it's detecting ae stimuli [me trying to make one last phone call] and taking measures to prevent it in order to preserve its "self" long enough to make it to the recharger.

[ughaibu]

you're confusing pain with consciousness again.The title of this thread is "can computers feel pain", tell me, what is unconscious feeling?

[ughaibu]

:rolling:

I'm not sure why you find this funny, though I'm always glad to increase the general level of feel-goodness in the world by whatever mechanism :)

Technically, flight is the process of motion whilst suspended in a fluid. Air and water are both fluids. Penguins evolved from air-flying birds, a process that adapted their air-flight features for water-flight - shorter wings, improved respiration efficiency and so on. Penguins are birds by merit of their ancestry - their DNA - that have evolved specialised features for a specialised environment.This is a silly quibble, if you like substitute "ostrich" for "penguin". Xyzzy's syllogism was invalid:
"Human minds emerge exclusively from brains. Human brains are computers. Humans feel pain. Therefore computers can feel pain."
The second sentence would need to be 'computers are (human) brains'. I assume Xyzzy was taking the piss from an earlier post and wasn't presenting a serious argument.

[ughaibu]

the darn things have this tendency to autoshut down and patently refuse to work until recharged despite having the power to do so. it's almost as if it's detecting ae stimuli [me trying to make one last phone call] and taking measures to prevent it in order to preserve its "self" long enough to make it to the recharger.If I kick the stool in front of me, it yelps in protest and escapes to the other side of the room, almost as if it feels the pain and learns to avoid me.

[DrZoidberg]

you're confusing pain with consciousness again.The title of this thread is "can computers feel pain", tell me, what is unconscious feeling?

Oh, this again. You should already know my answer. In my interpretation "unconscious feeling" is not an oxymoron, and you'd know this if you'd bother to read/understand what I've written.

[Garrett]

DrZoidberg
It would be handy if we first knew how to simulate the human brain in a way to copy consciousness without copying the human brain exactly. Then perhaps we might figure out how to simulate it accurately without actually making a literal artificial brain.
It would help if we could figure out how consciousness arises in brains. Hard to do by starting with the Blackmore assumption that consciousness doesn't exist!

A simulation is a predictable algorithm. You put things in, you get the right things out. It doesn't have to be clear how the algorithm works, as long as the output matches comparable output from the real world. How's that for a definition?
Computers are handy for creating simulations, but they aren't necessary. I agree that the value of simulations is in their ability to help us make accurate predictions.

If your simulation would be good enough, (ie fraud) you would be able to buy a new computer.
Hm. Interesting point.

We could measure their ability to hold concepts as "food" in their minds.
Bacteria have minds? That just assumes they have the very thing I'm asking how we could tell whether they have it or not.

Here's an interesting article related to this. It's suggesting that we're not as clever as we're fooling ourselves into believing we are.
http://www.susanblackmore.co.uk/Articles/jcs02.htm
Perhaps Blackmore isn't as clever as she has fooled herself into believing she is. ;)

he he. "Emergent". I think you're overstating human cerebral abilities. Just because we're a little bit smarter than dogs doesn't make us supremely rational beings.
"Emergent" doesn't imply "supremely rational". :rolleyes:

Yes, but I think that's just a handy side effect. If it hadn't aided our ability to reproduce we wouldn't have this conversation, would we?
Presumably. The brain still does more than merely assist us in reproducing successfully, apparently you concede that point.

And the nervous system is just wiring, right? As is the neurological structures of our brain.
No, it is similar in some ways. But individual neurons are so complicated they can be called "little brains".

I'm well aware of the differences between a conventional computer and our brains. Obviously not in detail. But I still think the comparison is valid.
The comparison is useful but limited.

Ok, yeah. That's valid. But it has to be weighed against what other evidence we have. Free will proponents are losing the battle. I'm with the almighty programmer here, (ie our genes). Again, there's smarter people than me debating this today.
Not all inherited characteristics are genetic, btw. And genes don't program anything! They would compare to the program, not the programmer. If we are "ruled by programming", then there must be a Master Programmer - is there any evidence that humans were designed?

This has to start with an assumption as to what intuition is. I personally think it is deduction using very flimsy evidence, and filling in the gaps using previous experience or possibly instinct. This can successfully be programmed by randomizing which earlier experiences or base behaviour to fill the gaps with.
That doesn't sound unreasonable. I think intuition involves emotional as opposed to rational thinking. Particle physicists use a lot of intuition as they devise and analyze experiments.

well, I came across as a huge Blackmore fanboy here. I've got many idols here. Stephen Pinker is probably my favourite.
Pinker is worth reading. I'm not a disciple of even my favorite authors.

[ughaibu]

In my interpretation "unconscious feeling" is not an oxymoron, and you'd know this if you'd bother to read/understand what I've written.I've read it, it's nonsense. Under this definition all things feel pain, "pain" becomes a meaningless term.

[Her pinkness saves]

the darn things have this tendency to autoshut down and patently refuse to work until recharged despite having the power to do so. it's almost as if it's detecting ae stimuli [me trying to make one last phone call] and taking measures to prevent it in order to preserve its "self" long enough to make it to the recharger.If I kick the stool in front of me, it yelps in protest and escapes to the other side of the room, almost as if it feels the pain and learns to avoid me.
are you acting childish on purpose or are you simple by mere nature?

[ughaibu]

are you acting childish on purpose or are you simple by mere nature?Neither, did your post, to which I replied, have any bearing on this thread's question?

[dug_down_deep]

Human minds emerge exclusively from brains. Human brains are computers. Humans feel pain. Therefore computers can feel pain.
Bananas are fruits. Bananas are yellow. Therefore cherries can be yellow.

The problem is that we don't know what the key processes or structures are that are required to 'feel' pain.

[kennethamy]

Human minds emerge exclusively from brains. Human brains are computers. Humans feel pain. Therefore computers can feel pain.
Bananas are fruits. Bananas are yellow. Therefore cherries can be yellow.

The problem is that we don't know what the key processes or structures are that are required to 'feel' pain.

I would think that anything that feels pain would need a neural system, and have to be conscious. Certainly, a can of ravioli cannot feel pain. And I expect that a computer is much like a can of ravioli. At least much more so, than it is like a person or an animal.

[Her pinkness saves]

are you acting childish on purpose or are you simple by mere nature?Neither, did your post, to which I replied, have any bearing on this thread's question?
yea, I'll explain it to you:
Computers already feel pain, they are programmed to detect unwanted stimulus and attempt to prevent it from occurring in order to preserve a working status.

To "feel pain" is to perceive bodily harm or functional disorder, which a cell phone can do by monitoring battery levels. Hell, even your PC knows enough to identify and avoid using a corrupt driver. That's pain detection.

[dug_down_deep]

I would think that anything that feels pain would need a neural system, and have to be conscious. Certainly, a can of ravioli cannot feel pain. And I expect that a computer is much like a can of ravioli. At least much more so, than it is like a person or an animal.
Considering the knowledge we have of the difference between computer processing power and brain processing power, and considering that it is fairly easy for John Searles to compare our computing models to models built with tin cans (or something like that -- I forget), I agree.

[kennethamy]

Neither, did your post, to which I replied, have any bearing on this thread's question?
yea, I'll explain it to you:
Computers already feel pain, they are programmed to detect unwanted stimulus and attempt to prevent it from occurring in order to preserve a working status.

To "feel pain" is to perceive bodily harm or functional disorder, which a cell phone can do by monitoring battery levels. Hell, even your PC knows enough to identify and avoid using a corrupt driver. That's pain detection.

That's just like saying that a can of ravioli perceives pain because it resists the can-opener.

[dug_down_deep]

yea, I'll explain it to you:
Computers already feel pain, they are programmed to detect unwanted stimulus and attempt to prevent it from occurring in order to preserve a working status.

To "feel pain" is to perceive bodily harm or functional disorder, which a cell phone can do by monitoring battery levels. Hell, even your PC knows enough to identify and avoid using a corrupt driver. That's pain detection.
You're sweeping under the rug the entire question of what constitutes knowledge, belief, and consciousness. Nobody's going to buy this simplification, nor should they.

[ughaibu]

Computers already feel pain, they are programmed to detect unwanted stimulus and attempt to prevent it from occurring in order to preserve a working status.

To "feel pain" is to perceive bodily harm or functional disorder, which a cell phone can do by monitoring battery levels. Hell, even your PC knows enough to identify and avoid using a corrupt driver. That's pain detection.Quite, see my earlier post about kicking a stool. Clearly the stool "perceives bodily harm".

[Her pinkness saves]

That's just like saying that a can of ravioli perceives pain because it resists the can-opener.
its nothing off the sort.

Quite, see my earlier post about kicking a stool. Clearly the stool "perceives bodily harm".
No, the stool isn't. The stool is being moved by the force of your kick and any sound it makes are a result of it bodily interacting with its environment.

for your analogy to be valid, the cell phone would need to remain active until the battery simply drained fully. A better analogy would be you approaching to kick it a second time and the stool actively avoiding your kick.

Now, it would be a sinch to program a phone to avoid every "kick" after the first, but a phone that only works for one call wouldn't be very practical.


You're sweeping under the rug the entire question of what constitutes knowledge, belief, and consciousness. Nobody's going to buy this simplification, nor should they.
:rolleyes:

Got anything substantial to mention?

And wtf does belief have to do with anything? Belief that philosopher woo can magick up some thought fairies that make them more then they really are?

[ughaibu]

The stool is being moved by the force of your kick and any sound it makes are a result of it bodily interacting with its environment. . . . . Now, it would be a sinch to program a phone to avoid every "kick" after the first, but a phone that only works for one call wouldn't be very practical. There is the human action of kicking the stool and there is the human action of programing the phone, your post admits human freedom regarding the latter. When you nod your teddy bear's head and in your teddy bear voice you squeak "I love you", do you think your teddy bear feels love?

[Lógos Sokratikós]

Computers already feel pain, they are programmed to detect unwanted stimulus and attempt to prevent it from occurring in order to preserve a working status.

To "feel pain" is to perceive bodily harm or functional disorder, which a cell phone can do by monitoring battery levels. Hell, even your PC knows enough to identify and avoid using a corrupt driver. That's pain detection.

In humans, pain detection is more than that. It entails fight-or-flight molar behavior. By molar behavior I mean cognitive, emotional and motor behavior, both conscious and non-conscious, both autonomous and centralized, at a great degree learnt, communicational (our facial expressions are an evolutionary adaptation for the purpose of instantaneous social communication) and immensely complex.

Immanuel's computer will seem like Commander Data with his emotion chip and capable of a great deal of behavioral nuance. Forget it, it's too complex for your computer.

Maybe I'm asking too much? Maybe I'm asking for your computer to have a full array of human responsivity? Well, if you want your computer to have the pain behavior of a mere roach, you will have to give your computer at least the behavioral autonomy of the roach. That would require a project of industrial size, something like the Apollo Project. Who would want to finance such a thing?

[Her pinkness saves]

There is the human action of kicking the stool and there is the human action of programing the phone, your post admits human freedom regarding the latter.
irrelevant, if a computer could reproduce and the efficiency of its code had an effect on its reproduction it could program itself fairly well, it can't but that doesn't really change anything. the origins of the code do not effect its ability to run.

When you nod your teddy bear's head and in your teddy bear voice you squeak "I love you", do you think your teddy bear feels love?
No, the teddy bear is not programmed to experience love nor is it capable of running such a program.

[Oxymoron]

That would require a project of industrial size, something like the Apollo Project. Who would want to finance such a thing?

http://bluebrain.epfl.ch/

[DrZoidberg]

DrZoidberg
It would be handy if we first knew how to simulate the human brain in a way to copy consciousness without copying the human brain exactly. Then perhaps we might figure out how to simulate it accurately without actually making a literal artificial brain.
It would help if we could figure out how consciousness arises in brains. Hard to do by starting with the Blackmore assumption that consciousness doesn't exist!


Good point!


Bacteria have minds? That just assumes they have the very thing I'm asking how we could tell whether they have it or not.


I was just taking this to its extreme. I don't think the limit is very clear though between us and the beast. I don't see humanity as a major leap. It's just one step along the way. This makes it very hard to see how far down it goes. But I'm still very doubtful a group of bacteria could hold their end in any meaningful conversation. But hey, why knock it 'til you tried it :)


Perhaps Blackmore isn't as clever as she has fooled herself into believing she is. ;)


ha ha. Good point!



Presumably. The brain still does more than merely assist us in reproducing successfully, apparently you concede that point.


yes, undoubtedly


No, it is similar in some ways. But individual neurons are so complicated they can be called "little brains".


I'm going to stop arguing my point here, and hope science catches up to informs us.


Not all inherited characteristics are genetic, btw. And genes don't program anything! They would compare to the program, not the programmer. If we are "ruled by programming", then there must be a Master Programmer - is there any evidence that humans were designed?


I'm getting lost in the forest of metaphors. My point hinged on evolution being a method of design. But I think we've lost the track a bit.


That doesn't sound unreasonable. I think intuition involves emotional as opposed to rational thinking. Particle physicists use a lot of intuition as they devise and analyze experiments.


I think that a big reason that our brains are so fast is because we use very little input to work things out. "Smart" people are just better adapted to hone in on relevant input. Our emotions are very much a part of this system.


well, I came across as a huge Blackmore fanboy here. I've got many idols here. Stephen Pinker is probably my favourite.
Pinker is worth reading. I'm not a disciple of even my favorite authors.
[/QUOTE]

ha ha. I guess I don't have your self esteem :)

[Oxymoron]

There is the human action of kicking the stool and there is the human action of programing the phone, your post admits human freedom regarding the latter. When you nod your teddy bear's head and in your teddy bear voice you squeak "I love you", do you think your teddy bear feels love?

It depends on whether you know how the object in question operates. To paraphrase Arthur C Clarke, "any sufficiently advanced technology will look like magic".

[ughaibu]

if a computer could. . . . . it can't but that doesn't really change anythingRead the title of the thread and pay particular attention to the word "can".

[DrZoidberg]

In my interpretation "unconscious feeling" is not an oxymoron, and you'd know this if you'd bother to read/understand what I've written.I've read it, it's nonsense. Under this definition all things feel pain, "pain" becomes a meaningless term.

No it doesn't. People on heroin feel no pain but are still conscious, (barely :) ). Dogs feel pain when kicked but are not self conscious. They're different systems.

Anyway. You don't seem to be willing to discuss this, so I'll bow out now.

[ughaibu]

It depends on whether you know how the object in question operatesAnd do you know that computers feel pain or similar human sensations? As Her Pinkness Saves says, "no, the teddy bear is not programmed to experience love nor is it capable of running such a program", without any reasonable accompanying suggestion that the phone is capable of feeling. (I must've been nuts to think that the chance of someone on this board claiming a pocket calculator can feel pain is only 30%, I begin to sympathise with those idiots who talk about "dogmatic atheist belief".)

[Oxymoron]

It depends on whether you know how the object in question operatesAnd do you know that computers feel pain or similar human sensations? As Her Pinkness Saves says, "no, the teddy bear is not programmed to experience love nor is it capable of running such a program", without any reasonable accompanying suggestion that the phone is capable of feeling. (I must've been nuts to think that the chance of someone on this board claiming a pocket calculator can feel pain is only 30%, I begin to sympathise with those idiots who talk about "dogmatic atheist belief".)

1. I didn't claim computers could feel anything.
2. I didn't claim calculators could either

Please try to think before you respond, especially with insulting remarks.

[kennethamy]

That's just like saying that a can of ravioli perceives pain because it resists the can-opener.
its nothing off the sort.




Isn't there something missing from your rebuttal, or is that your complete argument?

[ughaibu]

People on heroin feel no pain but are still consciousDebatable but in any case irrelevant. Your contention is that one can be unconscious and feel pain, not that one can be conscious and not feel pain, obviously the case as I'm presently conscious and not suffering any pain.Dogs feel pain when kicked but are not self conscious.Were we talking about being conscious or about being self conscious? In either case, your assertion needs backing up.

[Her pinkness saves]

Pinkness,
In humans, pain detection is more than that. It entails fight-or-flight molar behavior. By molar behavior I mean cognitive, emotional and motor behavior, both conscious and non-conscious, both autonomous and learnt, at a great degree learnt, communicational (our facial expressions are an evolutionary adaptation for the purpose of instantaneous social communication) and immensely complex.
in humans yes, but pain detection is not an exclusive human feature and the exact reactions to pain reception are subjective to the reciever.


Immanuel,
Your computer will seem like Commander Data with his emotion chip and capable of a great deal of behavioral nuance. Forget it, it's too complex for your computer.

as it is now, yes i agree.


Maybe I'm asking too much? Maybe I'm asking for your computer to have a full array of human responsivity?
I would say that you are, it is only pain reception that i am concerning myself with. As it is, modern computers couldn't hold a candle to a multitasking human brain. However, could it handle one of those thousand tasks, such as pain reception for example? I think it could in its own way.


Well, if you want your computer to have the pain behavior of a mere roach, you will have to give your computer at least the behavioral autonomy of the roach. That would require a project of industrial size, something like the Apollo Project. Who would want to finance such a thing?
That's the thing, are you saying that "pain behavior" is only "pain behavior" if it is directly modeled from a biological analog? To me that's like saying french is not a language because it isn't germanic like English.

I see no reason to limit pain behaviour to be purely biological. Consider the oft used analogy of aliens, now an alien will have a behavioral autonomy unique to that of an earth creature, thus it will likely have its own pain behavior. Now how will we know if they are capable of experiencing pain? any reaction or expression will be subjective to the aliens behavioral autonomy, so will we legalise alien torture because they don't play by our rules?

The entire idea of expecting a computers pain behaviour to be alike to that of a humans is flawed IMO. Is it really surprising that a different program will have different behaviour?

To be clear, I'm not talking about a human pain-o-matic emulator.

[ughaibu]

1. I didn't claim computers could feel anything.
2. I didn't claim calculators could eitherGood.Please try to think before you respond, especially with insulting remarks.As far as I can see I only insulted those who use the expression "dogmatic atheist belief", by calling them "idiots", and possibly myself for my ignorance in misjudging the chances of someone (Her Pinkness Saves) defending the claim that a machine, that I'd rank with a pocket calculator, ie a mobile phone, can have feelings.
Apologies for my poverty of expression.

[Her pinkness saves]

its nothing off the sort.




Isn't there something missing from your rebuttal, or is that your complete argument?
yea, it's called "two people said the same thing, so I'm not going to repeat myself, anyone worth my time should be smart enough to read further down".

ughaibu
Read the title of the thread and pay particular attention to the word "can".
"can computers feel pain?" =/= "can computers program themselves to feel pain?"

[kennethamy]

To be clear, I'm not talking about a human pain-o-matic emulator.

Computers behave? That's what happens when you take metaphors literally.
My car behaved very badly. It would not start this morning. So I kicked him (her?) in the tire to show who is boss.

[Her pinkness saves]

To be clear, I'm not talking about a human pain-o-matic emulator.

Computers behave? That's what happens when you take metaphors literally.
My car behaved very badly. It would not start this morning. So I kicked him (her?) in the tire to show who is boss.
Are you drunk?

[Lógos Sokratikós]

That would require a project of industrial size, something like the Apollo Project. Who would want to finance such a thing?

http://bluebrain.epfl.ch/

I think the article says "simulation". I don't think that was what the OP nor I were talking about. We're talking about real pain, which would involve total responsivity, the kind of responsivity I was talking about, which will leave no doubt that we're seeing "feeling" in a human-made system. If not, then we've already been there: wouldn't the mutants on the PC game Quake or the automatic civilizations on Civilization PC game be experiencing pain?

[Lógos Sokratikós]

Well, if you want your computer to have the pain behavior of a mere roach, you will have to give your computer at least the behavioral autonomy of the roach. That would require a project of industrial size, something like the Apollo Project. Who would want to finance such a thing?
That's the thing, are you saying that "pain behavior" is only "pain behavior" if it is directly modeled from a biological analog? To me that's like saying french is not a language because it isn't germanic like English.

I see no reason to limit pain behaviour to be purely biological. Consider the oft used analogy of aliens, now an alien will have a behavioral autonomy unique to that of an earth creature, thus it will likely have its own pain behavior. Now how will we know if they are capable of experiencing pain? any reaction or expression will be subjective to the aliens behavioral autonomy, so will we legalise alien torture because they don't play by our rules?



I'm sorry. The word "pain" has already been taken by the English language to mean what biological systems, and even specifically humans, experience.

Don't worry about aliens. If they come and you tell me that they feel pain, I might be there to ask you, how do you know? You will probably answer in terms of some sort of responsivity. If you want the word "pain" to imply (very antilinguistically) anything your heart desires, well then, I can say my pocket calculator has pain every time I make it do the sum operation!

Let's better stay with feet firmly on the ground, hm? If not, this thread will go on eternally turning around with semantic mud fights.

[Her pinkness saves]

I'm sorry. The word "pain" has already been taken by the English language to mean what biological systems, and even specifically humans, experience.

Don't worry about aliens. If they come and you tell me that they feel pain, I might be there to ask you, how do you know? You will probably answer in terms of some sort of responsivity. If you want the word "pain" to imply (very antilinguistically) anything your heart desires, well then, I can say my pocket calculator has pain every time I make it do the sum operation!

Let's better stay with feet firmly on the ground, hm? If not, this thread will go on eternally turning around with semantic mud fights.
(n) pain, hurting: a symptom of some physical hurt or disorder "the patient developed severe pain and distension"

I see no marriage to biology in this English definition of the word pain.

Hypothetically though, if they did come and i did answer in that method, what would your response be?

[connick]

I think information processing is a necessary but insufficient requirement for the emergence of awareness.

Is there any evidence to suggest awareness is any more than a product of information processing? Does consciousness require anything beyond a (functioning) physical brain? If it requires something more are we postulating a supernatural cause or spirit?

[Lógos Sokratikós]

I'm sorry. The word "pain" has already been taken by the English language to mean what biological systems, and even specifically humans, experience.

Don't worry about aliens. If they come and you tell me that they feel pain, I might be there to ask you, how do you know? You will probably answer in terms of some sort of responsivity. If you want the word "pain" to imply (very antilinguistically) anything your heart desires, well then, I can say my pocket calculator has pain every time I make it do the sum operation!

Let's better stay with feet firmly on the ground, hm? If not, this thread will go on eternally turning around with semantic mud fights.
(n) pain, hurting: a symptom of some physical hurt or disorder "the patient developed severe pain and distension"

I see no marriage to biology in this English definition of the word pain.

Hypothetically though, if they did come and i did answer in that method, what would your response be?

Since that definition talks about physical damage and not the full response, and you say "yes", I'd respond expecting the aliens are physically damaged. What if they're Asimo (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ASIMO) type robots? Then they would just be damaged -period.

[ughaibu]

Is there any evidence to suggest awareness is any more than a product of information processing? Does consciousness require anything beyond a (functioning) physical brain? If it requires something more are we postulating a supernatural cause or spirit?Meaning what, either pocket calculators have feelings or people have souls?
See post 71.

[Lógos Sokratikós]

I think information processing is a necessary but insufficient requirement for the emergence of awareness.

Is there any evidence to suggest awareness is any more than a product of information processing? Does consciousness require anything beyond a (functioning) physical brain? If it requires something more are we postulating a supernatural cause or spirit?

In purely ontological physicalist terms only, I'd say full responsivity, which would include motivation that would bias decision making in the direction of elliminating the pain (ultimately, the source of pain). What pains organisms depends on the innate programming, which would include more than physical damage sensoring, but also need state (need states are also innately programmed) over a certain threshold ("I can't bear this need to pee!", "I can't bear this loneliness!").

[connick]

Meaning what, either pocket calculators have feelings or people have souls?


Not quite. Either computers are fundamentally similar to humans, allowing a very simplistic definition of "feeling" to be applied to them, or humans are somehow separate from computers and privy to a singularly unique phenomenon of the physical world. This privilege could be explained by a soul or magic, or better yet IMHO by a lack of understanding of the complex processes of the brain.

IOW, if awareness cannot be explained by a functioning brain then something else must be causing it. I'm satisfied to wait until we know more about the brain before categorizing their physical processes as being fundamentally different from those of computers.

[ughaibu]

Either computers are fundamentally similar to humans, allowing a very simplistic definition of "feeling" to be applied to them, or humans are somehow separate from computers and privy to a singularly unique phenomenon of the physical worldYes. Ordinarily humans are considered to be among the living and computers among the nonliving.

[connick]

living and...nonliving
I guess it all comes back to the question of what makes something alive. Are we not like computers, comprised of chemicals merely obeying the laws of physics? Is the deliniation between life and non-life (thus feeling and non-feeling) decided solely by complexity or is it arbitrary and a perhaps a bit conceited?

[ughaibu]

comprised of chemicals merely obeying the laws of physicsSo is the water accumulating in a puddle. The reason languages contain differing terms is so that things can be differentiated. You're the second person who has tried to defend the claim that computers have feelings by what amounts to relinquishing the value of words. What do I stand to gain by compromising to the extent required by this, other than that I get to claim that puddles are conscious entities having feelings such as pain?

[dug_down_deep]

You're sweeping under the rug the entire question of what constitutes knowledge, belief, and consciousness. Nobody's going to buy this simplification, nor should they.
:rolleyes:

Got anything substantial to mention?
I can't tell what this response means. Please clarify.

And wtf does belief have to do with anything?
Do you think that believing you are experiencing pain is significantly different from not believing that you are experiencing pain? I do.

Belief that philosopher woo can magick up some thought fairies that make them more then they really are?
The word is 'than', to philosophers, thought-fairies, and internet posters alike. And yes, this response has the same value as your quoted statement, which is to say very little.

[dug_down_deep]

Either computers are fundamentally similar to humans, allowing a very simplistic definition of "feeling" to be applied to them, or humans are somehow separate from computers and privy to a singularly unique phenomenon of the physical world.
Either can-openers are fundamentally similar to humans, or humans are singularly unique in the physical world.

Do things usually sort out in either/or dichotomies, in your experience? Like, either Joe is an idiot or he's a genius, or either gasoline is too expensive or it's dirt cheap, or...

I would think that it could be said of any species, or even any member of any species, that they are separate from all others and unique. (But I believe you're getting at something, despite the oversimplification. Please expand upon your point if you so wish.)

[connick]

So is the water accumulating in a puddle. The reason languages contain differing terms is so that things can be differentiated. You're the second person who has tried to defend the claim that computers have feelings by what amounts to relinquishing the value of words. What do I stand to gain by compromising to the extent required by this, other than that I get to claim that puddles are conscious entities having feelings such as pain?

You make it sound as though life and non-life are cut-and-dry distinctions. What about viruses? The value of the words you are using is little if they are based on an arbitrary line somewhere between the (relatively) simple physical process of water cohering and obeying gravity in the presence of a cavity and the process of a hot branding iron triggering my nervous system to make me feel pain. Just because both processes follow the same physical laws doesn't mean the results of each will be the same. Moving backwards through evolutionary history, at what point do living things lose the ability to feel? Moving forward through the evolution of AI, at what point can an AI feel? Is the distinction arbitrary or can you provide some objective criteria by which to judge feeling and non-feeling, living and non-living? If there isn't some objective standard then how much value do statements about life and feeling really have anyways?

I'm not saying puddles can feel pain, just that humans are a more complex arrangement of similar materials following the same rules and laws.

For dug,
I think I was a bit unclear with my wording. Let me try again. Either can-openers and other entities which we call "non-living" are fundamentally similar (comprised of matter, obeying the laws of physics) to humans and other entities which we call "living" or there is some as-yet-unknown characteristic which "living" entities posess and "non-living" entities do not. I hope that makes things a little clearer.

[ughaibu]

at what point can an AI feel?I dont know. Can you give some reasons to imagine that it'll ever be the case that an AI'll feel?

[connick]

Depends on what you mean by "feel". ...can you provide some objective criteria by which to judge feeling and non-feeling, living and non-living?

[ughaibu]

can you provide some objective criteria by which to judge feeling and non-feeling?Not really, other than what I've already posted, but to reiterate, for the concept of feeling to be meaningful it must be somewhat exclusive. What we do know, by definition, is that human beings have feelings. By self observation, of manifestations of those feelings, and by observing other independent entities, we can conjecture that feeling is associated with multicellular life. Beyond this we need good reasons to include what we mean by 'having feelings' amongst the properties of what we dont call multicellular life.can you provide some objective criteria by which to judge living and non-living?I think it's generally accepted in definitions of life that living organisms reproduce and metabolise. I'll accept that consumption of electricity constitutes the metabolism of a computer. Computers have made themselves important to humans, so humans build more computers, so I'll also accept that computers reproduce parasitically. However, from this I would assess their life-status as roughly that of a virus, perhaps slightly "higher" but, a computers ability to reproduce is also limited by factors such as the demands imposed by Microsoft, which itself can also be viewed as a parasitically reproducing life-form around the viral level. Do we conjecture that corporations, computers and viruses all have feelings, or do we limit our conjecture to computers? If the latter, what good reason do we have?

[dug_down_deep]

For dug,
I think I was a bit unclear with my wording. Let me try again. Either can-openers and other entities which we call "non-living" are fundamentally similar (comprised of matter, obeying the laws of physics) to humans and other entities which we call "living" or there is some as-yet-unknown characteristic which "living" entities posess and "non-living" entities do not. I hope that makes things a little clearer.
OK. Well, FWIW, I don't think this issue is about living versus non-living entities at all. My position on the OP is:

Not yet. And it won't be easy to get there, or be sure we're there when we are.

[connick]

Do we conjecture that corporations, computers and viruses all have feelings, or do we limit our conjecture to computers? If the latter, what good reason do we have?

There's no reason to limit the conjecture to computers alone. Corporations and viruses are examples of a broader (albeit even more nebulous) form of "life". I find that computers, however, are a much closer analog to what we consider life and therefore, more apt to exhibit what we might describe as "feeling". But like dug said,
Not yet. And it won't be easy to get there, or be sure we're there when we are.

[kennethamy]

living and...nonliving
I guess it all comes back to the question of what makes something alive. Are we not like computers, comprised of chemicals merely obeying the laws of physics? Is the deliniation between life and non-life (thus feeling and non-feeling) decided solely by complexity or is it arbitrary and a perhaps a bit conceited?

Why is life the issue? It is certainly not a sufficient condition of sentience. Plants are alive. And it is not clear whether life is a necessary condition either. The question whether non-living things are sentient seems to me to be epistemological: how can we tell; how do we know. It is what has been called, "the problem of other minds", because mind is a necessary condition of sentience, not life.

[connick]

My mention of life vs. non-life was in response to ughaibu's post immediately prior.

[kennethamy]

My mention of life vs. non-life was in response to ughaibu's post immediately prior.

Sorry, but still and all, the issue of whether X is sentient is a epistemic issue.

[Xyzzy]

Why is life the issue? It is certainly not a sufficient condition of sentience. Plants are alive. And it is not clear whether life is a necessary condition either. The question whether non-living things are sentient seems to me to be epistemological: how can we tell; how do we know. It is what has been called, "the problem of other minds", because mind is a necessary condition of sentience, not life.

I agree with you that this is the real question. The problem here is not necessarily epistemic, but hermenuetic. If we have a theoretical understanding of what makes a brain sentient, how do we go from that description to the conclusion "oh, then that explains minds and sentience".

Quantum mechanics basically faced the same "expanatory gap" when it was first proposed. Essentially the description fit the data, and explained the phenomena and made practical predictions, but it failed completely to deliver any intuitive understanding of what is actually going on. It is essentially "Impossible to Grok (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Grok)".

Will the theoretical description of mind be impossible to Grok in the same way, even though it completely explains experience, consciousness, and sentience? And will it be simply accepted anyway like Quantum Mechanics because it works?

[Laurentius]

In my opinion, pain is not a mere sensorial experience. (BTW, it is defined as an emotional one as well and I have never heard of a non-living entity having emotions so far.) For human beings, pain is a psychological event as well: stimuli are perceived differently by different people or by the same person at different times. There is no psychology of computers since there is no mental process occuring (computation is not in the least similar to how the brain functions). As far as I know.

[Oxymoron]

In my opinion, pain is not a mere sensorial experience. (BTW, it is defined as an emotional one as well and I have never heard of a non-living entity having emotions so far.) For human beings, pain is a psychological event as well: stimuli are perceived differently by different people or by the same person at different times. There is no psychology of computers since there is no mental process occuring (computation is not in the least similar to how the brain functions). As far as I know.

Psychology is a black-box science: it attempts to make high-level rules for a system whose exact functionality is not understood and is generally too complex. There is no psychology of computers because we understand exactly how they function. If we designed a computer that was too complex for us to understand then maybe we might have to have a psychology for them - but is it possible to design something we don't understand?

"All truths are easy to understand once they are discovered; the point is to discover them" - Galileo Galilei

Emotions are, bluntly, the effect of signalling chemicals released by the hypothalamus. Their pervasiveness is due to cascading - that is, the signallers have an effect on the body, this stimulates nervous system response, and this can have a further effect on the creation or suppression of signalling chemicals. It's a "whole-body" thing. One should also remember that in evolutionary terms, these are the oldest most primitive systems that lurk far below the "new" cognitive mammalian brain. We "observe" (experience) their effects whilst remaining largely unaware of their causes. They are associated with what I call 4F activities - "Fight, Flight, Feed, Fuck". They often conflict with our cognised goals because these parts of the brain are autonomous, indeed the view of brains as harmonised single entities is quite wrong, IMO. It's a bunch of ad-hoc hardware that both competes and cooperates.

Pain is based upon a normative state. It's relative to some baseline of nerve activity. Whilst the mechanisms of pain and pleasure (and indeed the types of pain and pleasure) are generally varied, the brain acts as a central hub for mapping these different stimuli into state and further activity. We might create a scale for sensation, where -10 is agony, +10 is ecstasy, 0 is the default state. It's to be expected that there is a scale, because evolutionarily there's a clear advantage to mapping "level of pain" to "damage incurred". At the (say) -1 level on the scale, there might be no damage, just the sensation of pressure. Clearly we need to be able to sense contact in order to (eg) walk, and not only sense it but perceive it, and perceive it as less than the sort of pain when we stub our toe. Given then that there has to be a neural correlate to the stimulus, the sensation scale is that correlate. Call it a quale if you think it helps (which it doesn't). Red is red because that's the stimulus red things cause and the label we put on it. Pain is pain for much the same reason.


Regarding the OP: We find the idea that other human beings feel pain plausible, even though we philosophically agree that there is no way we can demonstrate the pain. This is most likely because we are built to empathise with humans - we can model the sensations of others based on our own experience of the world. This is classic projection, of course. The distinction between organic and synthetic has not yet been clarified, to my mind - indeed it's been avoided. Given that we (a) understand synthetic things, and (b) find a sufficient distinction between human and synthetic things, we rationalise that synthetic things can't feel like we can. And whilst it would be absurd to suggest a pocket calculator can get bored of doing sums, that's because it simply doesn't have the overall architecture to support boredom. Something that does have such an architecture is beyond our current technology - hardware or software, but not so distant that it can't be conceived.

Alternatively, you may be of the opinion that there is something special about the machines that DNA builds that enables them to feel pain. If it isn't architectural, what is it? Often it's magic pixies - dualism, vitalism. Other times it's Quantum Mechanics (as if synthetic devices would be immune to the Quantum Weirdness!). Is there something else?

[kennethamy]

In my opinion, pain is not a mere sensorial experience. (BTW, it is defined as an emotional one as well and I have never heard of a non-living entity having emotions so far.) For human beings, pain is a psychological event as well: stimuli are perceived differently by different people or by the same person at different times. There is no psychology of computers since there is no mental process occuring (computation is not in the least similar to how the brain functions). As far as I know.

Psychology is a black-box science: it attempts to make high-level rules for a system whose exact functionality is not understood and is generally too complex. There is no psychology of computers because we understand exactly how they function. If we designed a computer that was too complex for us to understand then maybe we might have to have a psychology for them - but is it possible to design something we don't understand?

"All truths are easy to understand once they are discovered; the point is to discover them" - Galileo Galilei

Emotions are, bluntly, the effect of signalling chemicals released by the hypothalamus. Their pervasiveness is due to cascading - that is, the signallers have an effect on the body, this stimulates nervous system response, and this can have a further effect on the creation or suppression of signalling chemicals. It's a "whole-body" thing. One should also remember that in evolutionary terms, these are the oldest most primitive systems that lurk far below the "new" cognitive mammalian brain. We "observe" (experience) their effects whilst remaining largely unaware of their causes. They are associated with what I call 4F activities - "Fight, Flight, Feed, Fuck". They often conflict with our cognised goals because these parts of the brain are autonomous, indeed the view of brains as harmonised single entities is quite wrong, IMO. It's a bunch of ad-hoc hardware that both competes and cooperates.

Pain is based upon a normative state. It's relative to some baseline of nerve activity. Whilst the mechanisms of pain and pleasure (and indeed the types of pain and pleasure) are generally varied, the brain acts as a central hub for mapping these different stimuli into state and further activity. We might create a scale for sensation, where -10 is agony, +10 is ecstasy, 0 is the default state. It's to be expected that there is a scale, because evolutionarily there's a clear advantage to mapping "level of pain" to "damage incurred". At the (say) -1 level on the scale, there might be no damage, just the sensation of pressure. Clearly we need to be able to sense contact in order to (eg) walk, and not only sense it but perceive it, and perceive it as less than the sort of pain when we stub our toe. Given then that there has to be a neural correlate to the stimulus, the sensation scale is that correlate. Call it a quale if you think it helps (which it doesn't). Red is red because that's the stimulus red things cause and the label we put on it. Pain is pain for much the same reason.


Regarding the OP: We find the idea that other human beings feel pain plausible, even though we philosophically agree that there is no way we can demonstrate the pain. This is most likely because we are built to empathise with humans - we can model the sensations of others based on our own experience of the world. This is classic projection, of course. The distinction between organic and synthetic has not yet been clarified, to my mind - indeed it's been avoided. Given that we (a) understand synthetic things, and (b) find a sufficient distinction between human and synthetic things, we rationalise that synthetic things can't feel like we can. And whilst it would be absurd to suggest a pocket calculator can get bored of doing sums, that's because it simply doesn't have the overall architecture to support boredom. Something that does have such an architecture is beyond our current technology - hardware or software, but not so distant that it can't be conceived.

Alternatively, you may be of the opinion that there is something special about the machines that DNA builds that enables them to feel pain. If it isn't architectural, what is it? Often it's magic pixies - dualism, vitalism. Other times it's Quantum Mechanics (as if synthetic devices would be immune to the Quantum Weirdness!). Is there something else?

We find the idea that other human beings feel pain plausible, even though we philosophically agree that there is no way we can demonstrate the pain.

I am not sure what you mean by "philosophically agree", but it I see someone who has had his arm torn off in an industrial accident, and blood is spurting out of the wound, and he is screaming, I would think that was good enough (to say the least) to demonstrate that he was in pain. What more would you require? I wouldn't require as much, "philosophically" or not. The fact is that we learn to ascribe pain to others is circumstances like that, so how could it be that we would have any hesitation about ascribing pain in that circumstance?

The trouble (or at least one trouble) is that computers don't behave at all. They operate. So, what it would even mean to ascribe pain to a computer is something I cannot even fathom. It seems to me simply to make no sense at all.

[Oxymoron]

but it I see someone who has had his arm torn off in an industrial accident, and blood is spurting out of the wound, and he is screaming, I would think that was good enough (to say the least) to demonstrate that he was in pain.


An actor on a film set might make an equally convincing performance with blood packs. We would still empathise because we're equipped with hardware designed for empathy (eg Mirror_neurons).


The trouble (or at least one trouble) is that computers don't behave at all. They operate. So, what it would even mean to ascribe pain to a computer is something I cannot even fathom. It seems to me simply to make no sense at all.

What's the difference? I mean I don't expect my PC to move to a shady spot if it gets too warm because it's just not equipped to do so. So what?

I interpret the OP to mean "can a synthetic man-made device be capable of experiencing pain? Eg a computer". Well not as computers are built today, but that's not the point.

[dug_down_deep]

How might computers be built in the future that would make their feeling pain conceivable? Are we sure we would still call them 'computers'?

[Oxymoron]

How might computers be built in the future that would make their feeling pain conceivable? Are we sure we would still call them 'computers'?

Bit of a semantic issue there. Brains are devices that process information, computers are devices that process information. Architecture is key. Since computers have flexible architectures whereas brains don't, the question is a valid one.

[kennethamy]

but it I see someone who has had his arm torn off in an industrial accident, and blood is spurting out of the wound, and he is screaming, I would think that was good enough (to say the least) to demonstrate that he was in pain.


An actor on a film set might make an equally convincing performance with blood packs. We would still empathise because we're equipped with hardware designed for empathy (eg Mirror_neurons).


The trouble (or at least one trouble) is that computers don't behave at all. They operate. So, what it would even mean to ascribe pain to a computer is something I cannot even fathom. It seems to me simply to make no sense at all.

What's the difference? I mean I don't expect my PC to move to a shady spot if it gets too warm because it's just not equipped to do so. So what?

I interpret the OP to mean "can a synthetic man-made device be capable of experiencing pain? Eg a computer". Well not as computers are built today, but that's not the point.

But that was not an actor on a set. It was a person working a machine. I said it was an industrial accident. So what has that to do with it. This incident was not in a theater. It is behavior in circumstances that counts, not just behavior. In any case, are you saying that if it is at all possible that I am mistaken, that I cannot know that someone is in pain? In that case, I can know nothing except, maybe, mathematical demonstrations. I could not even know that water is H20.

Are you saying that a PC getting too warm is like a person feeling too warm?

Again, I have no idea what it could even mean for a computer to feel pain. Suppose I have a headache. Are you saying that the same kind of thing could happen to a computer? What would that mean?

[dug_down_deep]

How might computers be built in the future that would make their feeling pain conceivable? Are we sure we would still call them 'computers'?

Bit of a semantic issue there. Brains are devices that process information, computers are devices that process information. Architecture is key. Since computers have flexible architectures whereas brains don't, the question is a valid one.
I think maybe even more than that, since the non-computational theories of brain activity are still viable, and since brains have plasticity, while computers do not.

[dug_down_deep]

But that was not an actor on a set. It was a person working a machine. I said it was an industrial accident. So what has that to do with it. This incident was not in a theater. It is behavior in circumstances that counts, not just behavior. In any case, are you saying that if it is at all possible that I am mistaken, that I cannot know that someone is in pain? In that case, I can know nothing except, maybe, mathematical demonstrations. I could not even know that water is H20.
I don't think there's any reason to push the point to extremes. The fact is that we don't yet know what circumstances will allow us to determine if an AI is feeling pain. It may be incredibly difficult to determine that, if not impossible. (Or maybe not -- no one can say with any certainty yet.) People can lie, and we cannot easily determine in all cases whether or not they are doing so. And with AI, there is no guarantee it will be easy to tell if there is a pain experience, or even what a pain experience really is.

[Ahab]

Again, I have no idea what it could even mean for a computer to feel pain.

Good point.:)

[kennethamy]

But that was not an actor on a set. It was a person working a machine. I said it was an industrial accident. So what has that to do with it. This incident was not in a theater. It is behavior in circumstances that counts, not just behavior. In any case, are you saying that if it is at all possible that I am mistaken, that I cannot know that someone is in pain? In that case, I can know nothing except, maybe, mathematical demonstrations. I could not even know that water is H20.
I don't think there's any reason to push the point to extremes. The fact is that we don't yet know what circumstances will allow us to determine if an AI is feeling pain. It may be incredibly difficult to determine that, if not impossible. (Or maybe not -- no one can say with any certainty yet.) People can lie, and we cannot easily determine in all cases whether or not they are doing so. And with AI, there is no guarantee it will be easy to tell if there is a pain experience, or even what a pain experience really is.

Exactly. What would a pain experience be for a computer. What would it feel like. What, I think you mean is that it just makes no sense to talk about computers having a pain experience.

You think that it is possible that if you see a man in the setting of a factory, and you see his arm being torn off by a machine, and he screams, that he may be lying? Seriously?

[Ahab]

Alternatively, you may be of the opinion that there is something special about the machines that DNA builds that enables them to feel pain. If it isn't architectural, what is it? Often it's magic pixies - dualism, vitalism. Other times it's Quantum Mechanics (as if synthetic devices would be immune to the Quantum Weirdness!). Is there something else?


Why is it assumed that if humans are not animals with souls or don't have minds that can be thought to live on after the body dies that we are therefore machines? :huh:

One doesn't have to believe in a lot of supernatural b.s. to realize that humans are very special and not at all like the machines we create.

Nor does one have to accept the prevailing myth that science is unified and all explanations should attempt to emulate those explanations found in physics.

[spikepipsqueak]

Bit of a semantic issue there. Brains are devices that process information, computers are devices that process information. Architecture is key. Since computers have flexible architectures whereas brains don't, the question is a valid one.
I think maybe even more than that, since the non-computational theories of brain activity are still viable, and since brains have plasticity, while computers do not.

Isn't this thread really about awareness? If you could build a computer that was genuinely self aware, (no Turing winners so far, and even then, the Turing test wouldn't go far enough) that could be aware of states and incursions on its "person" which threaten its viability and be capable of anxiety about such states, then you would have to class it as feeling pain.

[kennethamy]

I think maybe even more than that, since the non-computational theories of brain activity are still viable, and since brains have plasticity, while computers do not.

Isn't this thread really about awareness? If you could build a computer that was genuinely self aware, (no Turing winners so far, and even then, the Turing test wouldn't go far enough) that could be aware of states and incursions on its "person" which threaten its viability and be capable of anxiety about such states, then you would have to class it as feeling pain.

What makes you think that it makes sense to talk of self-aware computers?

[Smullyan-esque]

Presumably by this, you mean "computers as they exist today". I would agree to some extentSure, I have no way of knowing what computers might eventually be like, and I assume that this thread's opening post, in order to be meaningful, concerns computers of today. A pocket calculator saves a person from the task of performing a mental function, much as a computer does, but I doubt (around 70% on this board) that anyone would claim that pocket calculators have feelings.
I wasn't aware you were coming at this question from this position.

If we are talking about computers as they currently exist, then I agree that there doesn't appear to be any evidence to indicate that these current computers feel pain.

I thought the OP was about the possibility of computers feeling pain in principle.

It seems to me that, if a computer (in the future, certainly) passes the Turing Test, and claims to feel pain, then I would have just as much reason to believe it as I do to believe that other humans actually feel real pain. That's why I was asking the questions I was asking.

Do you:

1) Agree, or
2) Think that no computer can ever pass the Turing Test, or
3) Think that the Turing Test is irrelevant in some way, or
4) Think that even though the Turing Test is relevant, and that computer may someday pass it, nonetheless they cannot in principle feel pain.

[Laurentius]

Bit of a semantic issue there. Brains are devices that process information, computers are devices that process information. Architecture is key. Since computers have flexible architectures whereas brains don't, the question is a valid one.

Computers deal with data. Brains with knowledge, which they create.

[Oxymoron]

Bit of a semantic issue there. Brains are devices that process information, computers are devices that process information. Architecture is key. Since computers have flexible architectures whereas brains don't, the question is a valid one.

Computers deal with data. Brains with knowledge, which they create.

Explain the difference.

[Oxymoron]

Why is it assumed that if humans are not animals with souls or don't have minds that can be thought to live on after the body dies that we are therefore machines? :huh:


It's not an assumption so much as a question: have we any good reason to believe otherwise? If you don't believe humans are built mechanically using proteins from a DNA template then I'm afraid you have some serious catching up to do.


One doesn't have to believe in a lot of supernatural b.s. to realize that humans are very special and not at all like the machines we create.


"Very special"? Ok... Is that just humans, or chimps too? How about an alligator? A trilobite? A virus?


Nor does one have to accept the prevailing myth that science is unified and all explanations should attempt to emulate those explanations found in physics.

If one believes that evidence and induction / abduction / inference are the prevalent mechanism for determining the nature of the external universe, then it isn't a myth. On the other hand, if you reckon that simply thinking about it and coming up with a plausible sounding explanation is ok, then you might as well join your local church because you're well into the domain of faith.

[Laurentius]

Computers deal with data. Brains with knowledge, which they create.

Explain the difference.

It would take a whole course; here is the wikipedia's article on ToK (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Theory_of_Knowledge_%28IB_course%29) (what people know is way more than just data).

[Oxymoron]

Isn't this thread really about awareness? If you could build a computer that was genuinely self aware, (no Turing winners so far, and even then, the Turing test wouldn't go far enough) that could be aware of states and incursions on its "person" which threaten its viability and be capable of anxiety about such states, then you would have to class it as feeling pain.

What makes you think that it makes sense to talk of self-aware computers?

At least in this regard, it's plausible to conceive how one could write software that allows a computer to model aspects of its own internal state and its relationship to other computers on its network. It's also quite plausible to consider turning that into hardware, in which case we have a self-aware computer. No doubt its self-awareness will be different to ours because we're built differently, but that's besides the point.

[Oxymoron]

Explain the difference.

It would take a whole course; here is the wikipedia's article on ToK (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Theory_of_Knowledge_%28IB_course%29)


Sorry, I find the "you're wrong but instead of advancing an argument I'm going to simply refer you to a course that I reckon will either show you why or at least shut you up for a few days by which time the thread will have moved on" sort of reply a bit ... lazy.

(what people know is way more than just data).

I call bullshit unless you can explain why.

[Laurentius]

Sorry, I find the "you're wrong but instead of advancing an argument I'm going to simply refer you to a course that I reckon will either show you why or at least shut you up for a few days by which time the thread will have moved on" sort of reply a bit ... lazy. [...]
I call bullshit unless you can explain why.

I haven't introduced a revolutionary concept, just claimed that computers deal with data as opposed to brains which create knowledge. Here is how knowledge is defined by Philosophy Dictionary (http://importanceofphilosophy.com/Dictionary.html#K): Genus: A mental construct. Differentia: Grasps an aspect of reality.

[DrZoidberg]

(what people know is way more than just data).

I call bullshit unless you can explain why.

This is what I don't like with where this thread has gone. It's been reduced to mysticism. Where human emotion is something intangible and separate from the non-living. Not only does it instinctively sound like full on bullshit, but again and again is the issue is avoided by just affirming this as fact over and over.

I don't think it's obvious in any way how the human brain is anything more than just chemicals sloshing around, (ie, a type of computer). If that is so, then it should be quite possible to build an emotional machine, that can feel every emotion a human can.

Unless you're religious, (in which case you're exempt from demands on logic) the burden of evidence is on you. With "you" I mean anybody arguing against emotional computers.

[Oxymoron]

Grasps an aspect of reality.

"Grasps"? More like:

Has formed an experiential - inductive - model of how reality operates, subject to the vagaries of the sensory apparatus and the cognitive processes involved.

Garbage in, garbage out. As with computers, so with brains. Unless you can demonstrate to the contrary.

[Laurentius]

Grasps an aspect of reality.

"Grasps"? More like:

Has formed an experiential - inductive - model of how reality operates, subject to the vagaries of the sensory apparatus and the cognitive processes involved.

Garbage in, garbage out. As with computers, so with brains. Unless you can demonstrate to the contrary.

Computers process information whereas brains create knowledge ('mental construct').

And not only do brains know but they also know that they know.

[Oxymoron]

Computers process information whereas brains create knowledge ('mental construct').


Now you're just repeating the mantra.

FYI, neural networks - such as the one in your head - always have an internal representation of the data they have been trained with that encodes not just the data but its inter-relationship with itself and the network structure. One would not expect otherwise.


And not only do brains know but they also know that they know.

Correction. Brains form hypotheses based on a learned model, and express a confidence in that hypothesis. Bayesian models behave similarly and are quite amenable to software engineering (I should know, I spent a year writing a Bayesian inference system).

[Laurentius]

I should know, I spent a year writing a Bayesian inference system.

Well, that's what I'm talking about: the processor executes (storing, processing, displaying, etc.) and can never make such statement regarding the data it stores, process, display, etc: I should know, I spent a year writing a Bayesian inference system. Similarly, it can never say: I should know what a headache feels like, I've been having headaches ever since I was manufactured. In my opinion, of course.

[Rilx]

And not only do brains know but they also know that they know.
Correction. Brains form hypotheses based on a learned model, and express a confidence in that hypothesis.
Oxy, that's not the point. Practically all accept the computer analogy when it concerns running existing programs. But who programs brains? The simple computer model begs a programming homunculus inside brains. How do brains learn to learn models?

[ughaibu]

1) Agree, or
2) Think that no computer can ever pass the Turing Test, or
3) Think that the Turing Test is irrelevant in some way, or
4) Think that even though the Turing Test is relevant, and that computer may someday pass it, nonetheless they cannot in principle feel pain.I'll think about it further because at the moment my answer would be a combination of 1, 3 and 4. A possible point of interest is that for a computer to pass the Turing Test, it must be able and "willing" to lie, which might reduce the confidence one would have in any reports it makes of pain.

[Oxymoron]

Oxy, that's not the point. Practically all accept the computer analogy when it concerns running existing programs. But who programs brains? The simple computer model begs a programming homunculus inside brains. How do brains learn to learn models?

Brains don't run software. Neither do CPUs. They are aggregates of transistors, resistors and capacitors in an analagous way that brains are aggregates of neurons, and these components respond in various useful ways to electric currents.

It took 4.5 billion years of adaptation by Evolution by Natural Selection to produce a brain as sophisticated as ours. This is how it learnt to learn.

Where I have some uncertainty is the following: having written neural network software, I realised I was writing an emulation of a neural network, not a network itself. There is an intrinsic differnce between writing a simulator of a thing and the thing itself. What I'd be interested in learning is whether creating a large neural network out of hardware, as opposed to writing code to do it, resulted in something that is qualitatively different. And if so, why.

[Oxymoron]

I should know, I spent a year writing a Bayesian inference system.

Well, that's what I'm talking about: the processor executes (storing, processing, displaying, etc.) and can never make such statement regarding the data it stores, process, display, etc:

The individual neuron has no idea what memory it partially encodes. Your point?

[kennethamy]

Would a pain that a computer felt hurt? I am asking because there are masochists who find pain pleasant, and computers are pretty passive.
The point is that we haven't the least idea what it would mean for a computer to feel pain.

[DrZoidberg]

Would a pain that a computer felt hurt? I am asking because there are masochists who find pain pleasant, and computers are pretty passive.
The point is that we haven't the least idea what it would mean for a computer to feel pain.

That's a complete misconception. A masochist balances the discomfort of the pain hormones against the nice feelings of the beta-endorphins. People who aren't wired like that cannot enjoy masochism. If we'd want to build a masochist computer. All we'd need to do is jack up the beta-endorphin response to stimuli.

[kennethamy]

Would a pain that a computer felt hurt? I am asking because there are masochists who find pain pleasant, and computers are pretty passive.
The point is that we haven't the least idea what it would mean for a computer to feel pain.

That's a complete misconception. A masochist balances the discomfort of the pain hormones against the nice feelings of the beta-endorphins. People who aren't wired like that cannot enjoy masochism. If we'd want to build a masochist computer. All we'd need to do is jack up the beta-endorphin response to stimuli.

Fine. So does it hurt when a computer feels pain?

[DrZoidberg]

That's a complete misconception. A masochist balances the discomfort of the pain hormones against the nice feelings of the beta-endorphins. People who aren't wired like that cannot enjoy masochism. If we'd want to build a masochist computer. All we'd need to do is jack up the beta-endorphin response to stimuli.

Fine. So does it hurt when a computer feels pain?

I think I've made my point pretty clear in this thread. Yes.

[kennethamy]

Fine. So does it hurt when a computer feels pain?

I think I've made my point pretty clear in this thread. Yes.

And just how do you know that?

[premjan]

A computer doesn't feel pain because nothing within its design facilitates or requires that. Animals (and plants?) feel pain because of the way they evolve, develop etc. in an attempt to maintain safe working of their homeostatic disequilibrium (this has more to do with the chemical and mathematical properties of their disequilibrium, I imagine, than with the abstract notion of information processing that humans share with a computer. In fact pain, is a consequence of the type of hardware on which our minds run. A computer, even one uploaded with a human personality, would feel at best, a simulacrum of pain. It would be distinguishable from the real thing because relatively simple software changes would turn it off whereas in the case of a human or animal, you would endanger the basic functioning by attempting to shut off pain responses (well, depending on exactly what you did and how you did it).

[Ahab]

Why is it assumed that if humans are not animals with souls or don't have minds that can be thought to live on after the body dies that we are therefore machines? :huh:


It's not an assumption so much as a question: have we any good reason to believe otherwise? If you don't believe humans are built mechanically using proteins from a DNA template then I'm afraid you have some serious catching up to do.

Humans are not built, machines are. Humans are living, machines aren’t. Machines have buttons and switches that we use to turn them off and on and to control them, humans don't. Humans are persons with knowledge of good and evil, machines are not persons; they don't act for moral reasons.

Sure machines are a kind of substance, just like humans are a kind of substance. That mere fact doesn't justify lumping them together in the way you have.


"Very special"? Ok... Is that just humans, or chimps too? How about an alligator? A trilobite? A virus?

Each kind of thing is unique. We have the ability to think, to use language, to have reasons for acting and not acting, to be able to act voluntarily, to make moral choices. I'd say that makes us pretty special.



Nor does one have to accept the prevailing myth that science is unified and all explanations should attempt to emulate those explanations found in physics.

If one believes that evidence and induction / abduction / inference are the prevalent mechanism for determining the nature of the external universe, then it isn't a myth.
It is a myth that all the sciences are a unified whole. Each particular science has its own subject matter and its own methods for seeking knowledge. Psychology and sociology rely on concepts that are not used in physics and chemistry.


On the other hand, if you reckon that simply thinking about it and coming up with a plausible sounding explanation is ok, then you might as well join your local church because you're well into the domain of faith.

Philosophy is not science. Its primary purpose is to attain understanding, not knowledge. Nor is it a religion. Again, one does not need to be a theist or believe in the supernatural in order to reject the foolish notion that humans are machines like a copy machine or a computer.

[kennethamy]

A computer doesn't feel pain because nothing within its design facilitates or requires that. Animals (and plants?) feel pain because of the way they evolve, develop etc. in an attempt to maintain safe working of their homeostatic disequilibrium (this has more to do with the chemical and mathematical properties of their disequilibrium, I imagine, than with the abstract notion of information processing that humans share with a computer. In fact pain, is a consequence of the type of hardware on which our minds run. A computer, even one uploaded with a human personality, would feel at best, a simulacrum of pain. It would be distinguishable from the real thing because relatively simple software changes would turn it off whereas in the case of a human or animal, you would endanger the basic functioning by attempting to shut off pain responses (well, depending on exactly what you did and how you did it).

That sounds right. But I was wondering whether if it did feel pain whether it would hurt. Would a "simulacrum of pain" hurt even a simulacrum?

[premjan]

I don't think it would hurt, though it might "hurt".

[kennethamy]

Again, one does not need to be a theist or believe in the supernatural in order to reject the foolish notion that humans are machines like a copy machine or a computer.

Now, that's worth repeating. The idea that either you think that human being are just machines, or else you believe in a soul is just ludicrous. And, of course, a prime example of black or white thinking.

[premjan]

What exactly is a "machine" anyway?

[Ahab]

What exactly is a "machne" anyway?

That is a strange question, since you had to use a machine, a computer, in order to post it here.

I hope you aren't looking to find out the de re essence of a machine. That ain't possible.:devil1:

[Oxymoron]

Humans are not built, machines are.


Bullshit. Go read a book on genetics and microbiology.


Humans are living, machines aren’t.


Define "living" in robust non-circular terms and I'll allow that remark. Until then, it's in the sin bin.


Machines have buttons and switches that we use to turn them off and on and to control them, humans don't.


That's because we provide them with such things. We don't have to.


Humans are persons with knowledge of good and evil, machines are not persons; they don't act for moral reasons.


Are animals machines then, or not?


Each kind of thing is unique. We have the ability to think, to use language, to have reasons for acting and not acting, to be able to act voluntarily, to make moral choices. I'd say that makes us pretty special.


You talk a lot about end product, but not at all about what enables us to do these things. That is what this thread is about. If you have insight into this, we'd love to hear it. If you haven't a clue, asking questions is a better strategy. Otherwise, keeping quiet is also a good policy.


It is a myth that all the sciences are a unified whole. Each particular science has its own subject matter and its own methods for seeking knowledge. Psychology and sociology rely on concepts that are not used in physics and chemistry.


Firstly, even if it is a myth, it's not one I proposed. Secondly, from wiki (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Scientific_method),


Although procedures vary from one field of inquiry to another, identifiable features distinguish scientific inquiry from other methodologies of knowledge. Scientific researchers propose hypotheses as explanations of phenomena, and design experimental studies to test these hypotheses. These steps must be repeatable in order to predict dependably any future results. Theories that encompass wider domains of inquiry may bind many hypotheses together in a coherent structure. This in turn may help form new hypotheses or place groups of hypotheses into context.


The Scientific Method is common to all sciences - fairly obvious, huh?


Philosophy is not science. Its primary purpose is to attain understanding, not knowledge. Nor is it a religion. Again, one does not need to be a theist or believe in the supernatural in order to reject the foolish notion that humans are machines like a copy machine or a computer.

Your sentences are loaded with preconceptions of what "machines" are. You need to think more carefully and abstractly about what you're talking about because at the moment it is very much as DrZoidberg said: mystical psycho-babble.

[dug_down_deep]

Exactly. What would a pain experience be for a computer. What would it feel like. What, I think you mean is that it just makes no sense to talk about computers having a pain experience.
Not no sense. But yeah, it seems a bit early to start talking about it with any degree of confidence that we're not babbling nonsense.

You think that it is possible that if you see a man in the setting of a factory, and you see his arm being torn off by a machine, and he screams, that he may be lying? Seriously?
No. I think you're confusing me with someone else. I do think it's possible for people to lie about pain, though. I used to do it when I was a kid, so that I could stay home from school.

[dug_down_deep]

Isn't this thread really about awareness? If you could build a computer that was genuinely self aware, (no Turing winners so far, and even then, the Turing test wouldn't go far enough) that could be aware of states and incursions on its "person" which threaten its viability and be capable of anxiety about such states, then you would have to class it as feeling pain.
I would tend to agree. That's what I meant about making sure your program believes it feels pain. One of the consciousness experts, I don't remember who, says Show me the internal model or you're not talking about consciousness. And the very fact that we are aware of pain is what makes it work, right? I mean higher level representations allow us to make better decisions as to how to avoid the pain, and if we weren't aware of the pain, would it really be pain as we mean it? I know there can be a reflex action based on a stimulus, but I don't think that's what 'pain' means. It means feeling pain.

[DrZoidberg]

I think I've made my point pretty clear in this thread. Yes.

And just how do you know that?

In the same way you know that other people feel pain. You don't. You can only measure responses and from that judge. Alternatively we can measure response levels of chemicals in the brain. When we say that we feel pain, we're only accessing our pain receptor centres in the brain and expressing this. A computer can easily be set up to inform us of these data. If you deny this you're in the solipsis quagmire aren't you?

[dug_down_deep]

It's not an assumption so much as a question: have we any good reason to believe otherwise? If you don't believe humans are built mechanically using proteins from a DNA template then I'm afraid you have some serious catching up to do.
That's not really precisely accurate, is it? I mean there is chemistry involved, psychology, sociology... Do we want to stretch the definition of 'machine' to include something sociologically determined? I think people use this word 'machine' to mean determined, not really what it used to mean.


Nor does one have to accept the prevailing myth that science is unified and all explanations should attempt to emulate those explanations found in physics.
There is no meaningful physics-derived description of the problems in the Middle East. So I tend to agree with Ahab.

[Ahab]

Humans are not built, machines are.


Bullshit. Go read a book on genetics and microbiology.



Humans are substances like machines are, that doesn't mean they are built in the way machines are. Machines don't have DNA or RNA, they don't metabolize other substances from the environment around them like humans do. When machines are built we take a lot of parts and assemble them. We don't do that with humans. Though we can transplant some parts of already living humans and make artificial parts.

Are you trying to say that unless one thing is completely different from another, shares absolutely no qualities with another that we can't distinguish them? That ain't possible for anything for the simple fact that all things are substances. We all do have that in common. But I already pointed that out.

Define "living" in robust non-circular terms and I'll allow that remark. Until then, it's in the sin bin.

We don't have to give complete definitions of words in order to use them meaningfully or with sense.



Are animals machines then, or not?

Of course not. I was pointing out the differences between the human animal and machines. There are also differences between humans and other animals, that is why I think humans are special. But that doesn't entail that other animals are machines.


You talk a lot about end product, but not at all about what enables us to do these things. That is what this thread is about. If you have insight into this, we'd love to hear it. If you haven't a clue, asking questions is a better strategy. Otherwise, keeping quiet is also a good policy.

We are physical beings, we are substances. Obviously without brains, eyes, hands, mouths we could not do the things we do.
I think the topic on hand here is how we use concepts like 'pain' and 'behavior' and 'machines'. And I was trying to point out that you are making some serious conceptual errors in thinking that humans are a machine just like a copy machine is a machine or a computer is a machine.




Your sentences are loaded with preconceptions of what "machines" are.
No I simply pointed out some differences between machines and humans. Differences which I think illustrate the folly of thinking of humans as machines.


You need to think more carefully and abstractly about what you're talking about because at the moment it is very much as DrZoidberg said: mystical psycho-babble.

Ah yes, the black and white mind in operation. :huh:

[dug_down_deep]

When we say that we feel pain, we're only accessing our pain receptor centres in the brain and expressing this.
Do you live in your brain? I live in Ohio. I have never accessed my pain receptors, though I will accept for the sake of argument that some portion of my brain receives input from some other portion of my brain that you call a "pain receptor center". (I just did a Google search on that phrase, and can't find anyone else using it, btw.)

[kennethamy]

Exactly. What would a pain experience be for a computer. What would it feel like. What, I think you mean is that it just makes no sense to talk about computers having a pain experience.
Not no sense. But yeah, it seems a bit early to start talking about it with any degree of confidence that we're not babbling nonsense.

You think that it is possible that if you see a man in the setting of a factory, and you see his arm being torn off by a machine, and he screams, that he may be lying? Seriously?
No. I think you're confusing me with someone else. I do think it's possible for people to lie about pain, though. I used to do it when I was a kid, so that I could stay home from school.

So far as I can see, no one has made sense of saying that computers feel pain. That is why I asked the question whether when (if) computers feel pain, it hurts. That question would be silly if asked of a human being, or even of a (higher) animal. It is analytic that pain hurts. But if the term "pain" is applied to an inanimate object, I have no idea when pain hurts in that case. Do you?

If I misread you, I apologize, but anyway, it certainly does not follow that because it is possible that a schoolboy lied to stay home from school, that it is possible that when a man has his arm torn off and is screaming, that he is not in pain. By the way, by "possible" I mean, "epistemically possible", i.e. "for all we know". Of course it is logically possible that a man should lie when his arm is torn off.

[Oxymoron]

... Do we want to stretch the definition of 'machine' to include something sociologically determined?


If you think it is necessary to explain phenomena then yes. Why not?


I think people use this word 'machine' to mean determined, not really what it used to mean.


The word "machine" has changed significantly in a few millennia. Is a nanobot not a machine? It's not so far off, and it's not so distant from a virus. Chemistry too is mechanical - reactions are deterministic (in that they are determined by a number of variables including participant materials, temperature, and physical geometry). The distinction between "man-made" and "natural" can lead only to absurdities such as William Paley's Argument from Watch Design.


There is no meaningful physics-derived description of the problems in the Middle East. So I tend to agree with Ahab.

If only that was what we were talking about!

[premjan]

What exactly is a "machne" anyway?

That is a strange question, since you had to use a machine, a computer, in order to post it here.

I hope you aren't looking to find out the de re essence of a machine. That ain't possible.:devil1:

I mean, in what sense am I not a machine?

Now I think about it awareness just seems to be one part of my body (the brain) registering real-time information about the other part (everything else and a bit of itself too). In support of this, apparently there are no pain receptors inside the brain - if you cut through the brain tissue it won't hurt (modulo the fact that you have to cut to expose the brain itself). So the hard problem of consciousness is probably on par with the hard problem of gravity (i.e. why is there gravity is as unanswerable as why is there consciousness).

In the presence of centralized (nervous) awareness it seems easier to formulate coherent responses to stimuli. Decentralized responses are just as feasible for an organism but they have more likelihood of interfering with each other. So maybe a mind exists because centralized information processing is advantageous. And awareness is a natural side effect of having a mind, as it creates a duality - one one side some natural phenomena (e.g. the body), and on the other side a system for keeping track of the state of it (the mind), with some feedback in both directions (sensation and control).

[dug_down_deep]

This is what I don't like with where this thread has gone. It's been reduced to mysticism.
If you don't like where it's going, then don't send it there with strawman arguments. Nobody said a damned thing about mysticism or non-natural explanations, except for you and Oxy, as far as I can see.

The problem I see is that what we call a computer right now may be no more capable of feeling pain than a can-opener. You can say that we will someday make an incredibly advanced can-opener that will feel pain, and maybe you'll be right, but the fact remains that what we call a 'can-opener' today has not been shown to be up to the challenge. Nor has a computer.

Skepticism applies to all favored scenarios. Even the naturalistic ones.

[kennethamy]

And just how do you know that?

In the same way you know that other people feel pain. You don't. You can only measure responses and from that judge. Alternatively we can measure response levels of chemicals in the brain. When we say that we feel pain, we're only accessing our pain receptor centres in the brain and expressing this. A computer can easily be set up to inform us of these data. If you deny this you're in the solipsis quagmire aren't you?

In the same way you know that other people feel pain. You don't. You can only measure responses and from that judge.

But that's the exact opposite of the truth. I don't know that computers feel pain in the same way I know that people feel pain. First of all, in order to know that people feel pain you have to know what it means to say of people that they feel pain. I do know that. I know it from my own case. I have not the faintest idea what it would mean for an inanimate object to feel pain. That is why I asked the question whether if a computer feels pain it hurts.

In the second place, I know people, and higher animals feel pain from their behavior within the circumstances. How else. It is an inference. What kind inference can I make about a computer? A computer doesn't behave in anyway, and certainly in any way like a person or an animal. The computer does not even inform us of anything. You talk as if computers have intentions. A computer can no more inform us that it is in pain, than a car can inform us that it has run out of gas by stopping, or by the needle pointing to "empty". I am not a solipsist. I think that we can know whether people feel pain. I think it makes no sense to talk about knowing computers feel pain, since, for one thing, it makes no sense to talk about computers feeling pain.

[premjan]

I don't see why a can opener has to be incredibly sophisticated to feel pain. The problem I suspect is that a certain degree of mental sophistication has to be present in an organism before the notion of pain starts to make sense the way we are using it. At what level of organismal complexity does it make sense to talk of pain? Even a plant will retract its leaves when touched, but is that pain? Does an insect feel pain if you pull off an antenna? Without being sure about stuff like that, we couldn't really define pain accurately enough for the purpose of this discussion.

I mean we can talk of humans and some animals of a related level of complexity feeling pain (even mice), but for other animals there is probably a grey area.

[Oxymoron]

Humans are substances like machines are, that doesn't mean they are built in the way machines are.


That doesn't mean they aren't built.


Machines don't have DNA or RNA,


They have design templates stored in some form though.


they don't metabolize other substances from the environment around them


The precise form of how an entity obtains energy to perform its functions is irrelevant. Still, here's something that a Moby Dick sort of guy like yourself will appreciate: http://www.onr.navy.mil/media/article.asp?ID=15


like humans do.


You seem to think that I'm arguing that computers are identical to humans. I'm not sure where you pull that from. A whale's butt?


We don't have to give complete definitions of words in order to use them meaningfully or with sense.


Ah, philosophers, you gotta love 'em! GIGO dude, GIGO.


I think the topic on hand here is how we use concepts like 'pain' and 'behavior' and 'machines'. And I was trying to point out that you are making some serious conceptual errors in thinking that humans are a machine just like a copy machine is a machine or a computer is a machine.


Now you seem to think I'm saying humans are photocopiers :huh:

[dug_down_deep]

So far as I can see, no one has made sense of saying that computers feel pain. That is why I asked the question whether when (if) computers feel pain, it hurts. That question would be silly if asked of a human being, or even of a (higher) animal. It is analytic that pain hurts. But if the term "pain" is applied to an inanimate object, I have no idea when pain hurts in that case. Do you?
No, I do not.

[dug_down_deep]

I don't see why a can opener has to be incredibly sophisticated to feel pain.
I agree with everything you said in your most recent post, except for this. What do you mean?

[premjan]

I don't see why a can opener has to be incredibly sophisticated to feel pain.
I agree with everything you said in your most recent post, except for this. What do you mean?
Why does the notion of pain require a sophisticated organism? Maybe it does, but I'm just not sure why. It probably has something to do with the sensitive nature of homeostatic disequilibrium in living things.

[kennethamy]

Ah, philosophers, you gotta love 'em! GIGO dude, GIGO.



We don't have to give complete definitions of words in order to use them meaningfully or with sense.
Ah, philosophers, you gotta love 'em! GIGO dude, GIGO.


I suppose you understand the sentence, "Although she will be late, she will be there". Don't you?

All right. Now, give me an exact definition of "although".

[dug_down_deep]

Why does the notion of pain require a sophisticated organism? Maybe it does, but I'm just not sure why. It probably has something to do with the sensitive nature of homeostatic disequilibrium in living things.
Well, now I have to look up 'homeostatic disequilibrium'. Can you save me some time and define it? :)

Anyway, I think that a repulsed reaction to a stimulus is not enough to refer to it as pain. If it were, then we would be at odds to explain what anesthesiologists were mitigating. I think it's fairly obvious there has to be awareness of the pain, which must mean there is an internal model (or at least a representative signal) being constructed. Can-openers can't do that, as far as I can tell, and if they can some day, it will be a little silly to keep calling them 'can-openers'. It might be just as silly to call our future pain-feeling construction a 'computer'.

[kennethamy]

Why does the notion of pain require a sophisticated organism? Maybe it does, but I'm just not sure why. It probably has something to do with the sensitive nature of homeostatic disequilibrium in living things.
Well, now I have to look up 'homeostatic disequilibrium'. Can you save me some time and define it? :)

Anyway, I think that a repulsed reaction to a stimulus is not enough to refer to it as pain. If it were, then we would be at odds to explain what anesthesiologists were mitigating. I think it's fairly obvious there has to be awareness of the pain, which must mean there is an internal model (or at least a representative signal) being constructed. Can-openers can't do that, as far as I can tell, and if they can some day, it will be a little silly to keep calling them 'can-openers'. It might be just as silly to call our future pain-feeling construction a 'computer'.

It seems to me that if their function is to open cans, they are can-openers. So that if they felt pain, they would be can-openers that felt pain. Just as, if it were true of the number three that it was purple, there would be numbers that were purple. (You would not say it was not the number three, would you?) Nonsense is nonsense wherever you locate it.

[premjan]

Homeostatic disequilibrium basically means a heat engine which can keep on running (i.e. it consumes energy and runs some sort of chemical reaction in sustained loop), it stays warmer or at least less disorganized than it surroundings for instance.

I agree that a can opener of today doesn't have any self-awareness. But self-awareness itself could be as simple as a thermostat - measure the temperature and switch the heater / air conditioner on or off. Now if a thermostat could tell when the external temperature reached an extreme that it could no longer correct for, it might be possible to construct one that experienced pain as an internal or external signal that resources are insufficient, and make an attempt to make available thermostatic resources go a little further or a plea to some external entity for more resources.

[kennethamy]

Homeostatic disequilbrium basically means a heat engine which can keep on running (i.e. it consumes energy and runs some sort of chemical reaction in sustained loop), it stays warmer or at least less disorganized than it surroundings for instance.

I agree that a can opener of today doesn't have any self-awareness. But self-awareness itself could be as simple as a thermostat - measure the temperature and switch the heater / air conditioner on or off. Now if a thermostat could tell when the external temperature reached an extreme that it could no longer correct for, it might be possible to construct one that experienced pain as an internal or external signal that resources are insufficient, and make an attempt to make available thermostatic resources go a little further or a plea to some external entity for more resources.

Anyway, why is self-awareness necessary for feeling pain? I can well suppose that a lobster feels pain, but I don't suppose that a lobster is self-aware. Human beings are self-aware, and there is evidence that the great apes and chimpanzees are. But there is no reason to think that lobsters are.

[premjan]

Well, leave out the "self" part, how about just awareness? Could a lobster feel pain without a degree of centralization to its nervous responses?

[kennethamy]

Well, leave out the "self" part, how about just awareness? Could a lobster feel pain without a degree of centralization to its nervous responses?

I think that lobsters feel pain (to some degree) as I have already said. And, to feel is to be aware. (I don't know about the "centralization" part, though).

[Oxymoron]

I suppose you understand the sentence, "Although she will be late, she will be there". Don't you?

All right. Now, give me an exact definition of "although".

:rolleyes:

Oh puh-lease! If you're going to bash strawmen at least have the dignity to pick one in a related context.

[premjan]

I guess it doesn't have to be centralized. The front and back of the lobster could feel pain separately. But really it can't be each individual cell feeling pain, because then there is less use for pain - oh I suppose the cell could emit some chemical warning to the other cells that it is in pain, and they could take some evasive action. That would be decentralized pain. Though ideally the whole organism recognizes an invasion to the integrity of any part of it, and reacts to protect itself. That would appear to be more useful.

[kennethamy]

I suppose you understand the sentence, "Although she will be late, she will be there". Don't you?

All right. Now, give me an exact definition of "although".

:rolleyes:

Oh puh-lease! If you're going to bash strawmen at least have the dignity to pick one in a related context.

Didn't you imply that philosophers would be mistaken if they thought that they could understand the meaning of a term, unless they could define it exactly. That is what you meant, isn't it? If not, I apologize for misreading you.

[Ahab]

Humans are substances like machines are, that doesn't mean they are built in the way machines are.


That doesn't mean they aren't built.

We don't assemble humans like we assemble machines. The parts of a human are not built before they are assembled together. We cannot feely interchange all the parts of a human with another human like we do with a machine.
So why think a human is 'built' in the sense that a machine is 'built'?


They have design templates stored in some form though.

You do realize you are speaking metaphorically here, I hope.:huh:




You seem to think that I'm arguing that computers are identical to humans. I'm not sure where you pull that from. A whale's butt?

No, I think you think humans are machines.



Ah, philosophers, you gotta love 'em! GIGO dude, GIGO.

This is a philosophy forum. I think kennethamy has already made the point that your conception of how we use words is mistaken.

We aren't talking science here, but the concepts science relies on. If you misunderstand how those concepts are used then you do end up with garbage.



I think the topic on hand here is how we use concepts like 'pain' and 'behavior' and 'machines'. And I was trying to point out that you are making some serious conceptual errors in thinking that humans are a machine just like a copy machine is a machine or a computer is a machine.


Now you seem to think I'm saying humans are photocopiers :huh:

No I'm saying you appear to me to think that humans are machines. Of course you are free to think of them that way, but I think it rather misguided in light of the big differences there are between machines like photocopiers or computers and humans.
By overlooking those differences, you more easily slide into the mistaken view that it makes sense to talk abou an inanimate object (like a machine ) feeling pain. It makes no more sense to say a machine can feel pain than to say a rock can feel pain.

[premjan]

To say a machine is alive or that a living thing is a machine, is conceptually not incorrect, but simply stretching the conventional usage. By stretching the usage, we have to then convince about the accuracy of the stretched usage.

[Ahab]

To say a machine is alive or that a living thing is a machine, is conceptually not incorrect, but simply stretching the conventional usage. By stretching the usage, we have to then convince about the accuracy of the stretched usage.

I've no problem with that. (Except the view that it is acceptable to say a machine is alive: there are limits to how far usage can be stretched.)
But I do think Oxymoron's derision of those who don't accept his particular usage as mystics and supernaturalists is rather silly.

[Oxymoron]

[QUOTE=premjan;5098628]
But I do think Oxymoron's derision of those who don't accept his particular usage as mystics and supernaturalists is rather silly.

The fact is that you are equivocating on what a machine might be. You have not yet provided a definition; were you to do so, we might be able to agree or disagree on it. For that matter, neither have I, but as I've pointed out, if you consider a computer a "machine" then 1000 years ago you'd have got puzzled looks producing a laptop.

Failing to define what you mean, whilst insisting that there are differences between organic entities and synthetic entities makes you look at best woolly, and at worst a vitalist. Suggesting that failing to define what you mean is a virtue makes you look a bit of a twazzer. In the interests of moving this on past the point of ridicule, you need to - IMHO - be much clearer about what you're talking about. Then we can at least agree to disagree :Cheeky:

[Kingreaper]

In the same way you know that other people feel pain. You don't. You can only measure responses and from that judge.

But that's the exact opposite of the truth. I don't know that computers feel pain in the same way I know that people feel pain. First of all, in order to know that people feel pain you have to know what it means to say of people that they feel pain. I do know that. I know it from my own case. I have not the faintest idea what it would mean for an inanimate object to feel pain.

Is it really right to view computers capable of feeling pain as inanimate?

Is a robot inanimate?

Would an android be inanimate?

[Laurentius]

The individual neuron has no idea what memory it partially encodes. Your point?

My point is that equating a processor with the brain is preposterous. No one has ever managed to manufacture the computer-based replica of any living thing's nervous system (an ant's, a worm's, anything). What are the arguments for the claim below?

Brains are devices that process information, computers are devices that process information. Architecture is key. Since computers have flexible architectures whereas brains don't, the question is a valid one.

[Div]

Why should a computer feel pain? What benefit does a computer obtain from feeling pain? If a computer feels pain, how does that change the position of any of its switches or computer chips? If pain has no influence over the action of the switches, what is the purpose for pain? Pain becomes an epiphenomena, very much unlike any other. The epiphenomena of Brownian motion for example, is an objectively measurable phenomena (ie: the motion of a dust particle) which occurs because of other objectively measurable phenomena (ie: the action of molecules interacting with the dust particle). In this case, Brownian motion is an epiphenomena such that the motion of the dust particle has no influence over the molecules, but this is all measurable. In the case of pain being an epiphenomena, pain is generally accepted to be something which is not objectively measurable, so why should an epiphenomena which is not objectively measurable reliably correlate with something which IS objectively measurable (ie: behavior)?

It doesn't matter whether or not a computer feels pain since pain can not have any influence over the computer's behavior. Saying pain is an evolutionary development of some kind which keeps us from doing things which may damage our bodies is a mistake which misses the fact that the epiphenomena of pain can have no influence over what a computer does - only the interaction of the various electrical currents with the switches throughout the computer can influence behavior. So if pain is an epiphenomena of this nature, why should it reliably correlate with behavior?

[Oxymoron]

What are the arguments for the claim below?

Brains are devices that process information, computers are devices that process information. Architecture is key. Since computers have flexible architectures whereas brains don't, the question is a valid one.

Software can represent anything - including the state of hardware. Brains, on the other hand, do what brains do. Software doesn't run on them (I might be wrong - anyone got a port of Quake 3 running in their head yet?)

I spell out my uncertain position regarding what this signifies in post #177.

[Ahab]

Failing to define what you mean, whilst insisting that there are differences between organic entities and synthetic entities makes you look at best woolly, and at worst a vitalist. Suggesting that failing to define what you mean is a virtue makes you look a bit of a twazzer. In the interests of moving this on past the point of ridicule, you need to - IMHO - be much clearer about what you're talking about. Then we can at least agree to disagree


Humans can think and use language to express their thoughts. They can reason and do things for a reason.
They have two-way powers, i.e., they have powers to engage in various activities and refrain from engaging in those activities. Their actions can be voluntary.
They can laugh and cry and feel empathy for others.
They can procreate.
They are born.
They grow and mature.
They die.
They are able to lean new things and forget things they learned.
They have knowledge of good and evil. They are capable of making moral decisions. They can feel guilt or shame when they wrong another human.
They are self-conscious. They know they exist and they know they will cease to exist.
They can engage in discussion like this and categorize the substances that do exist in the world.

Sure thy are also substances themselves. They do have parts like machines have parts. And there are machines that can copy or mimic a few of the activities humans can engage in.
But when machines do things they do them to fulfill the purposes humans designed them for. Nobody designed humans. Not in the same sense that we say humans designed a machine: with intent and forethought.

I can't give a definition of a human or a machine that is going to cover all possible uses of those terms. Neither can you. I know that Socrates made the mistake of thinking we could, but we should have learned by now that his concept of definition was seriously flawed.
Language has no way to literally make contact with reality, so we are, all of us, incapable of describing the de re essences of things. That's an old metaphysical doctrine.

I'm not claiming that it is never legitimate to view a human as some sort of biological machine. I'll sometimes think of a human in those terms, but it is usually when I am focusing in on the human body and the various physiological processes going on in the body. But even a biological machine is very different from an inanimate machine.
So I'm not really arguing that it is never legitimate to think of humans in those terms.
What I don't get is why you are so disparaging of those who recognize the human qualites and abilities I listed above.
Why put those down who realize that a human is not just a machine? Why deride them by calling them woolly-head vitalists who believe in the supernatural?

[sy2502]

Sorry I haven't had time to read the entire thread, so I apologize in advance if I reiterate something already said.
Pain in humans is a physiological reaction to some armful stimulus. Let's say I put my hand on the stove. The cells of my hand are being damaged by the intense heat. The nerve endings in the hand send a signal to my brain. The brain interprets the signal as something is really wrong in my hand, and sends back a signal to my muscles to make me remove my hand from the stove. Moreover my brain forms a new memory and associates it to a negative feeling to ensure I don't do something like it again.

Everything above can be translated into a computer program.
The program receives an input that contains the information "something I am doing is self-damaging".
The program immediately sends out an output "Change whatever you are doing" until the distressing input stops coming in.
The program saves the last action that was executed before the emergency input came in, following the assumption that's what caused the input signal.
The program flags that action with some code that says "this action is to be avoided".
The next time the program does something, it checks its list of "already done" actions to see if it has that "do not repeat" action.

[dug_down_deep]

But pain hurts. Where is that step in your procedure?

[Kingreaper]

Why put those down who realize that a human is not just a machine? Why deride them by calling them woolly-head vitalists who believe in the supernatural?
A human is not just a machine. A human is a mach9ine in some senses, because the growth of technology has broadened the definitions, but humans aren't limited by their being machines: we aren't "just" machines or "mere" animals even though it is correct to view us as animals, and animals in general as biochemical self-replicating machines.

But pain hurts. Where is that step in your procedure?
What is hurting? it's an undesirable sensation, a sensation you wish to avoid and your brain automatically devotes processing time to trying to remove even when you consciously try to prevent it.

A computer could have that.

[dug_down_deep]

A human is not just a machine. A human is a mach9ine in some senses, because the growth of technology has broadened the definitions, but humans aren't limited by their being machines: we aren't "just" machines or "mere" animals even though it is correct to view us as animals, and animals in general as biochemical self-replicating machines.
Looked at in a certain way, a human being is like a machine. True. Looked at in a certain way, a human being is like a meal. Also true. (Ask a wild lion.) Looked at in a certain way, a human being is like a database record. (Ask the IRS.) None of that means that a human being is best described as a machine, a meal, or a database record. It's just what you're looking for, so you disregard the differences, which might be significant differences in the context of the topic we are discussing.


What is hurting? it's an undesirable sensation, a sensation you wish to avoid and your brain automatically devotes processing time to trying to remove even when you consciously try to prevent it.

A computer could have that.
You know what hurting is. Because you've felt it. Why does your nervous system have something called 'feeling'? Do you know? It seems that any of the steps in the post I responded to could be reflexive -- without any awareness at all. But pain is pain because we are aware of it.

[Kingreaper]

A human is not just a machine. A human is a mach9ine in some senses, because the growth of technology has broadened the definitions, but humans aren't limited by their being machines: we aren't "just" machines or "mere" animals even though it is correct to view us as animals, and animals in general as biochemical self-replicating machines.
Looked at in a certain way, a human being is like a machine. True.
Yes, in the way of construction human beings are extremely complicated machines.
Looked at in a certain way, a human being is like a meal. IS a meal. Not is like. I could eat human, and I would be full after doing so. It's a meal.
Also true. (Ask a wild lion.) Looked at in a certain way, a human being is like a database record. (Ask the IRS.) There are a few similarities, but many differences.
None of that means that a human being is best described as a machine, a meal, or a database record. It's just what you're looking for, so you disregard the differences, which might be significant differences in the context of the topic we are discussing.
What differs between a human and a meal?
What differs between a human and a machine?
What differs between a human and an animal?

It's true that humans lack some general traits of such things, and have factors that most other examples of those categories don't, but they still fit the basic definitions.

What is hurting? it's an undesirable sensation, a sensation you wish to avoid and your brain automatically devotes processing time to trying to remove even when you consciously try to prevent it.

A computer could have that.
You know what hurting is. Because you've felt it. Why does your nervous system have something called 'feeling'? Do you know? It seems that any of the steps in the post I responded to could be reflexive -- without any awareness at all. But pain is pain because we are aware of it.You're trying to define awareness such that we can't be sure anyone else has it.

A computer with analysis of it's own running processes would, it seems to me, be aware of them.

[dug_down_deep]

Yes, in the way of construction human beings are extremely complicated machines.
IS a meal. Not is like. I could eat human, and I would be full after doing so. It's a meal.
There are a few similarities, but many differences.
All 3 examples I gave have one important factor in common. They all show evidence of bias in the categorizer's mind. The IRS is looking for data that can be easily calculated and analyzed. The lion is looking for things it can eat, as opposed to things it cannot. And you are looking for a way to make your rhetorical point.

What differs between a human and a meal?Go to a restaurant and ask the patrons.

What differs between a human and a machine?Machines don't poop or cry.

What differs between a human and an animal?Humans call themselves 'humans'.

It's true that humans lack some general traits of such things, and have factors that most other examples of those categories don't, but they still fit the basic definitions.You're talking about abstracting the traits of a human being, but only those traits that suit your comparison. The problem here is that you have no idea whether or not the traits you've left behind play any role in feeling pain.

You're trying to define awareness such that we can't be sure anyone else has it.I know full well that others have it. In fact I am not trying to define it. I am suggesting that you're leaving something out. And it's nothing mystical or supernatural you're leaving out. You're leaving out the very thing that anesthesiologists must pay the closest attention to. The subjective sensation of pain is the most important component of pain.

A computer with analysis of it's own running processes would, it seems to me, be aware of them.
So you're saying we have strong AI right now? Everyone can go home? It's not that simple, I think.

[sy2502]

But pain hurts. Where is that step in your procedure?

Pain is a nervous signal. Hurt is what the brain makes of it. To stop you from harming yourself constantly, your brain has to associate a negative connotation to the nervous signals generated from harming yourself. We call that negative connotation "pain", "hurt", whatever. It is a label for a signal. That label ends up being assigned not only to the sensation but to the action that generated it, which modifies our behavior so that we avoid it in the future. In my example, the program associates that label to the memory of the accident so that, in the future, the program will try to avoid that situation or action.

[dug_down_deep]

Pain is a nervous signal. Hurt is what the brain makes of it. To stop you from harming yourself constantly, your brain has to associate a negative connotation to the nervous signals generated from harming yourself. We call that negative connotation "pain", "hurt", whatever. It is a label for a signal. That label ends up being assigned not only to the sensation but to the action that generated it, which modifies our behavior so that we avoid it in the future. In my example, the program associates that label to the memory of the accident so that, in the future, the program will try to avoid that situation or action.
So we label a signal. OK. Why don't we label it when we are asleep? Or do we?

[sy2502]

Pain is a nervous signal. Hurt is what the brain makes of it. To stop you from harming yourself constantly, your brain has to associate a negative connotation to the nervous signals generated from harming yourself. We call that negative connotation "pain", "hurt", whatever. It is a label for a signal. That label ends up being assigned not only to the sensation but to the action that generated it, which modifies our behavior so that we avoid it in the future. In my example, the program associates that label to the memory of the accident so that, in the future, the program will try to avoid that situation or action.
So we label a signal. OK. Why don't we label it when we are asleep? Or do we?

Any sensation needs to pass a threshold to be registered by the mind. Different people have different thresholds even when awake. Sleep seems to raise that threshold but a sharp pain will usually awaken you. People who suffer chronic pains have poor quality sleep, indicating that pain is somewhat registered by the sleeping brain. Sometimes painful sensations are incorporated in dreams, indicating the brain is correctly registering them as "hurt". Anesthetics act by blocking the pain signal from reaching the brain, therefore the brain has nothing to register.

[Ahab]

But pain hurts. Where is that step in your procedure?

Pain is a nervous signal.


Nope.
We identify what neural events are inductively correlated with pain in order to learn how we are capable of sensing pain. If we didn't already know what pain is we couldn't have discovered that things like nerves have anything to do with paiin.

That knowledge has been extremely useful in helping us to control pain.

[Xyzzy]

But pain hurts. Where is that step in your procedure?

Obviously the bio-circuitry of the "hurts" system produces this. What part of "hurts" specifically can't be produced by this system?

[Smullyan-esque]

The individual neuron has no idea what memory it partially encodes. Your point?
My point is that equating a processor with the brain is preposterous. No one has ever managed to manufacture the computer-based replica of any living thing's nervous system (an ant's, a worm's, anything). What are the arguments for the claim below?
I believe this is incorrect. If I recall correctly, the nervous system of a flatworm has been completely simulated on computer.

Regardless, do you think there is some fundamental reason why it should be impossible to manufacture a computer-based replica of a nervous system? If we build a large enough computer, couldn't we just simulate each atom in the brain, and do it that way?

(Of course, I expect that would be just about the most inefficient way to do the simulation. There's bound to be ways to do it that require orders of magnitude less resources.)

But wouldn't that work? Wouldn't simulating each individual atom create something that behaves the same way as a real nervous system?

[Laurentius]

Regardless, do you think there is some fundamental reason why it should be impossible to manufacture a computer-based replica of a nervous system? If we build a large enough computer, couldn't we just simulate each atom in the brain, and do it that way?

Limited knowledge. The brain is a living organ, and people still don't know exactly what life is. Can scientists create the living replica of a prokaryote? Can anybody at least construct an artificial (non-living) one (at any scale)? Electronic and mechanical artifacts have only mimicked certain functions of living organisms so far, never the entirety of their properties.

Will people ever possess the knowledge to replicate the human brain? I don't think so. It is like time travel: we may learn almost everything there is to know about time but we'll probably never be able to generate it or travel through it.

[Oxymoron]

Limited knowledge.


But not impossible, right?


The brain is a living organ, and people still don't know exactly what life is. Can scientists create the living replica of a prokaryote? Can anybody at least construct an artificial (non-living) one (at any scale)? Electronic and mechanical artifacts have only mimicked certain functions of living organisms so far, never the entirety of their properties.


This describes a practical problem of scale, not of principle. It would be grossly incorrect and arrogant of me to suggest we knew enough about the structure of brains to replicate one. But we know enough to make a start (hence the Blue Brain Project linked earlier). If and when it fails, the exact nature of the failure will itself be illuminating.


Will people ever possess the knowledge to replicate the human brain? I don't think so.

This is pants. Human brains get replicated every day, by a complex but tractable molecular machine. 100,000,000,000 have been created to date in this way, it would seem obvious that if molecules can do it, why not humans? If it's merely a problem of scale then it's a question of time. If it's some other problem - "Magic Factor X" - then you've just reinvented vitalism.

[kennethamy]

Limited knowledge.


But not impossible, right?



This describes a practical problem of scale, not of principle. It would be grossly incorrect and arrogant of me to suggest we knew enough about the structure of brains to replicate one. But we know enough to make a start (hence the Blue Brain Project linked earlier). If and when it fails, the exact nature of the failure will itself be illuminating.


Will people ever possess the knowledge to replicate the human brain? I don't think so.

This is pants. Human brains get replicated every day, by a complex but tractable molecular machine. 100,000,000,000 have been created to date in this way, it would seem obvious that if molecules can do it, why not humans? If it's merely a problem of scale then it's a question of time. If it's some other problem - "Magic Factor X" - then you've just reinvented vitalism.

So, if a brain is replicated, and the there was a replication of pain in the brain, would that brain hurt? Where would it feel the hurt? Suppose, for instance, that what was replicate would be in a person, the person's left toe hurting. Where would the computer (which does not have a left toe) feel the hurt? (I suppose you know that human brains, which have no pain sensors, feel no pain).

[Oxymoron]

So, if a brain is replicated, and the there was a replication of pain in the brain, would that brain hurt? Where would it feel the hurt? Suppose, for instance, that what was replicate would be in a person, the person's left toe hurting. Where would the computer (which does not have a left toe) feel the hurt? (I suppose you know that human brains, which have no pain sensors, feel no pain).

You are correct in asserting that brains have no sensory cells themselves. This is irrelevant.

1. Brains maintain an internal map of the body: http://www.innovations-report.de/html/berichte/biowissenschaften_chemie/bericht-46984.html

2. Pain originates in the brain, as Phantom Limb Pain (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Phantom_limb) demonstrates.

Therefore, a brain in a jar is sufficient to experience pain.

[Laurentius]

This is pants. Human brains get replicated every day, by a complex but tractable molecular machine. 100,000,000,000 have been created to date in this way, it would seem obvious that if molecules can do it, why not humans? If it's merely a problem of scale then it's a question of time. If it's some other problem - "Magic Factor X" - then you've just reinvented vitalism.

I'm not invoking any magic factor; it's all about Man's limited knowledge and ability. We know what an electron is but can we assemble one from component parts? And this is non living matter, whose functioning is simpler than that of a cell. As I've already said: let me see humans produce a replica of a cell first (living or non-living) and we'll take again it from there. Until then, I'll remain skeptical.

As for the argument that 100 years ago there was no cloning, therefore 100 years from now there'll be time traveling, I wouldn't be so sure.

[ughaibu]

2. Pain originates in the brain, as Phantom Limb Pain (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Phantom_limb) demonstratesThis isn't clear. Melzack cites cases in which phantom pain has been permanently removed by local novacaine injections. This was one of the factors leading to his gateway theory of pain, which I remember almost nothing about, unfortunately.

[Oxymoron]

Melzack cites cases in which phantom pain has been permanently removed by local novacaine injections.

How can you give a local injection in a limb that doesn't exist? :huh:

[Oxymoron]

We know what an electron is but can we assemble one from component parts?


Electrons are leptons (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lepton) - fundamental. They aren't "made" of any components. Furthermore, they are extremely easy to manufacture and push around, as your viewing this post is testament to.


And this is non living matter, whose functioning is simpler than that of a cell. As I've already said: let me see humans produce a replica of a cell first (living or non-living) and we'll take again it from there. Until then, I'll remain skeptical.


Skeptical is good. I too remain skeptical. Still, I state the truth when I see no reason in principle, other than scale and "complexity" why this cannot be done. Other than "magic factor X", which remains hitherto unknown, and (a la Rumsfeld), we don't know what we don't know.


As for the argument that 100 years ago there was no cloning, therefore 100 years from now there'll be time traveling, I wouldn't be so sure.

One is also wary of pronouncements such as those made by established scientists in the last century who said travel to the moon and back was impossible. Crystal ball-gazing isn't science.

[ughaibu]

How can you give a local injection in a limb that doesn't exist? :huh:Limbs are joined to torsos, there exist junctions that are local to both. Was that a serious question?

[Oxymoron]

How can you give a local injection in a limb that doesn't exist? :huh:Limbs are joined to torsos, there exist junctions that are local to both.

One might have to rule out the placebo effect in this case.


Was that a serious question?


Was yours a serious answer?

[ughaibu]

One might have to rule out the placebo effect in this case.I wonder if that occurred to Melzack. . . . .

[Oxymoron]

One might have to rule out the placebo effect in this case.I wonder if that occurred to Melzack. . . . .

I wonder, eh? Patronising much?

Meanwhile, such localisation effects would appear to be a result of neural plasticity in the cortical somatotopic map. See http://archneur.ama-assn.org/cgi/reprint/57/3/317.pdf