subjective vs objective morality

[William]

Humans seem to often have a need to believe there is objective or absolute morality. Theism and religion seem often to play heavily on such beliefs, yet with humanism we do have secular universal morality. Does such a thing truly exist? Is it better for society if it DOES (or if we believe it does), or can a society function just as well with the belief that morality is entirely subjective?

How do Theism and religion/spirituality play into one's beliefs regarding objective/subjective morality and its importance in our daily lives? For those of you who believe in God/gods, do tend to believe morality is subjective or objective?

[Demon]

Although I don't think morality magically falls onto us from the sky,
I think there can be a logical guideline for what is considered moral and immoral. Nearly every human being strives for happiness, fulfillment and prosperity. Likewise we almost always react negatively to suffering and misfortune. That is why I think it's safe to say an act can be considered wrong when it causes suffering or misfortune, and an act can be considered right either when it promotes happiness and prosperity or prevents/ends suffering. This kind of thinking usually leads one to a consequentialist viewpoint, judging an act mainly by its consequences.

However, that which causes suffering to one may cause happiness to another, and vice-versa. A slave-owner profits from the suffering of his slaves, a rapist profits from the misfortune of his/her victim, the same with muggers and serial killers. A solution to this problem may be to say: "Something is morally right when it creates happiness and prosperity or ends suffering without causing additional suffering to another group."

So while I don't believe in a 100% objective morality, I believe there are moral standards that "work better" than others.

[Antiplastic]

Based on years of arguing about this on internets, my considered opinion is that most nonphilosophers use the metaethical terminology of "subjectivity" and "objectivity" as ciphers for first-order normative claims, irrespective of any knowledge of the technical definitions of those terms.

People (theists and nontheists alike) who claim that "morality is objective" are usually trying to take a stand for moral seriousness against flaccid, wittering neutralism. People who claim that "morality is subjective" are often trying to encourage us be more tolerant, less dogmatic, and more respectful of the visions of the Good Life that other cultures and subcultures should be free to express.

Both of these positions are fine as far as they go, but the conversation is often hopelessly compromised by muddled invocations of philosophical and scientific terminology in an attempt to give them a veneer of intellectual sophistication they don't require, and which in any case can't be had by appeal to some rather arcane technical issues in metaphysics and philosophy of language.

[figuer]

I think humanistic morality is both objective and subjective, depending on the different scales of action of the concept "morality".

It follows a specific "objective": maximum individual happiness within maximum social stability.

This concept is an absolute purpose, an yet it is relativistic in nature.

Individual happiness is subjective, based on personal opinion (and yet the person is an "object").

As this type of morality is based on social consensus, it requires objective analysis of consequence of individual actions and desires, which can be determined legitimate only relative to the subjective liking of the majority....etc. etc. etc.

[Aaron SF]

I think this is another faux conundrum humans get ourselves into via the invention of language.

Morality like Love and Consciousness is a concept, one comprised of many other smaller concepts.

Our brain and education tell us that words represent real things. A rock is a thing, a bird is a thing. It's real it's testable it effects our perception of the word.

More complex concepts like morality that are given single word labels are a bit decieving in nature. Common sense says if we talk about morality it is a thing that exists on some level in society and therefore it has determinable nature. But it's not, it's a cummulative concept based on other things, so existence and nature are variable. In one culture it will include certain variables, in another it will not. The Christian and Humanist versions of morality are a prime example of how abstractly different it can be. Christians view morality as divine law that permeates the universe and is overly concerned with the sexual inclinations of one species on this planet. Humanist morality is a measure of activities that cause or promote pain and suffering and personal fullfilment

Christian morality can be entirely masochistic and still be considered morale and righteous.

Because of the nature of the concept there CAN'T be an objective version of it. Although once broken down into it's most commonly associated elements there are objective things you can measure (like pain, damage etc...)

[Gundulf]

Just browsing over the "Why do you hate pedophiles" thread - there are lots of people who seem to categorically assume that pedophelia is objectively wrong. I still struggle to see how, from an atheistic perspective, one can make such a claim - that this, or anything else, "IS" wrong. Perhaps there are just some unspoken assumptions?

A pedophile has as much right to try to force his morality on the rest of society as the rest of society is currently forcing their morality onto pedophiles, surely?

Additionally, if nature had given us slightly different genes, or perhaps if society had shaped us differently, we might think that those people that wanted to have sex with adults were the deviants.

I am still convinced, to steal Richard Dawkins' language - if God is a delusion, then so is 'morality.' 'Morality' may exist as a human phenomenon which affects us deeply, in as real a sense as 'religion' exists; but there is real right and wrong, and truly 'immoral' actions no more than there is a real God, if atheism is true, no?

[Trout]

Objective morals should be impossible to consider for anyone who has exposed themselves to some of the most important and basic philosophies humans have come up with.

[Antiplastic]

Just browsing over the "Why do you hate pedophiles" thread - there are lots of people who seem to categorically assume that pedophelia is objectively wrong. I still struggle to see how, from an atheistic perspective, one can make such a claim -

Well, I struggle to see how anyone from any perspective can successfully make such a claim. Invisible hebrews who may or may not live in the clouds don't enter into it.


that this, or anything else, "IS" wrong. Perhaps there are just some unspoken assumptions?

One unspoken assumption that you seem to rely on is that there is no conceivable sense in which someone could meaningfully assert that something is wrong that does not require them to assert that it is "objectively wrong". Why grant this assumption?

[Angra Mainyu]

A pedophile has as much right to try to force his morality on the rest of society as the rest of society is currently forcing their morality onto pedophiles, surely?

No, he doesn't have the right because the law doesn't give him that right.

I guess you mean something else, but the problem is that you're mixing your idea of an objective morality (whatever that is) with the position of others.

To put it simple: what would it mean, in that context, that the pedophile has a right? Where does that "right" (whatever that is) come from?

I still struggle to see how, from an atheistic perspective, one can make such a claim - that this, or anything else, "IS" wrong. Perhaps there are just some unspoken assumptions?
I don't know about others, but I'm not sure what the problem is. As pointed out, to say that, for instance, an action is wrong, does not require a belief in any objective wrongness (whatever that even means).

For instance, one can say that a movie is great, and that another movie is funny, or that the soup is tasty, or that Linda is hot, and a long etcetera.

That does not mean that one believes in some objective movie greatness, funniness, objective tastiness, hotness, etc.

It is possible that the use of words like "wrong", however, cause confusion because of the very diverse way in which different people seem to use it without realizing that their interlocutor is not using those words in the same sense as they are, so there are plausible reasons to avoid such language, given its obfuscatory potential. Then again, there are also reasonable arguments in favor of keeping them. But the issue is debatable. In any event, I don't see why the use of the verb "to be" would require belief in some mysterious objective wrongness - whatever that is.

[Timetospend]

Humans seem to often have a need to believe there is objective or absolute morality. Theism and religion seem often to play heavily on such beliefs, yet with humanism we do have secular universal morality. Does such a thing truly exist? Is it better for society if it DOES (or if we believe it does), or can a society function just as well with the belief that morality is entirely subjective?

How do Theism and religion/spirituality play into one's beliefs regarding objective/subjective morality and its importance in our daily lives? For those of you who believe in God/gods, do tend to believe morality is subjective or objective?

Having participated in a few of these conversations in the past, it seems to me that the terms "objective" or "subjective" refers primarily to the source of morality. The theist might say that he is being objective because he is accepting standards of morality that come from absolute principles outside of his subjective perspective. The secularist might derive principles of morality from a process of internal reasoning with some purpose in mind, such as the betterment of mankind.

Once established, however loose or strict, the principles can be applied objectively or subjectively. Theists have the problem of adequating interpreting their absolute guide and not allowing personal desire to alter it. Secularists have the problem being true to their purpose, and in achieving common purpose. Both can irrationally apply the principles in momemts of anger, love, jealously, etc.

So not sure if "objective" and "subjective" are the best terms to describe morality, but we are probably stuck with them.

Thanks,

[arkirk]

Deductive or inductive? Might this be another way of phrasing the same question. Whatever "morality" is to about any person, it is something he/she thinks up, debates with others, concludes on the basis of personal experience, etc. It is a mental thing. Does that make it "subjective?" I feel the sources of our feelings about what is right always involve relating to the relative desirability of some action. Our experience should shape our concept of just how the action might impact us and others. Our personal likes and dislikes are as varied as a group of individuals can be.

I think well debated ethic principles can derive healthy consensus for about any group with a will for humanistic living. We first have to agree that humans matter. That's where all the stripes of religion get in the way of consensus humanistic ethics. It is a very complex issue indeed when every guru, every tea leaf reader, every pastor, imam, pope and king and queen bring their own special arguments to the table...and start to destroy the egalitarianism necessary for derived humanistic ethics.

[Gundulf]

I still struggle to see how, from an atheistic perspective, one can make such a claim - that this, or anything else, "IS" wrong. Perhaps there are just some unspoken assumptions?
I don't know about others, but I'm not sure what the problem is. As pointed out, to say that, for instance, an action is wrong, does not require a belief in any objective wrongness (whatever that even means).

For instance, one can say that a movie is great, and that another movie is funny, or that the soup is tasty, or that Linda is hot, and a long etcetera.

That does not mean that one believes in some objective movie greatness, funniness, objective tastiness, hotness, etc.

If you're really willing to say that pedophilia's 'wrongness' is purely in the eye of the beholder, as is greatness, funniness, tastiness, or hotness, then that is consistent at least.

You might want to tell that to the people on the other thread that are trying to force their idea of 'wrongness' onto the pedophiles, though....

[Gundulf]

Just browsing over the "Why do you hate pedophiles" thread - there are lots of people who seem to categorically assume that pedophelia is objectively wrong. I still struggle to see how, from an atheistic perspective, one can make such a claim -

Well, I struggle to see how anyone from any perspective can successfully make such a claim. Invisible hebrews who may or may not live in the clouds don't enter into it.


that this, or anything else, "IS" wrong. Perhaps there are just some unspoken assumptions?

One unspoken assumption that you seem to rely on is that there is no conceivable sense in which someone could meaningfully assert that something is wrong that does not require them to assert that it is "objectively wrong". Why grant this assumption?

It is more of an assertion than an assumption. If one says that something is 'wrong', just not 'objectively wrong'....

'Subjectively wrong' is 'possibly right'.... (to steal the 'mostly dead is partly alive' from the Princess Bride....)

Going around saying pedophilia may be right under certain circumstances, rape might be right under certain circumstances, etc., - I am asserting that this DOES rob the idea of wrongness of any significant meaning. If you really want the statement "____ is wrong" to carry little more objective meaning than "_____ is funny", you are welcome to - but most people, including those on this page, certainly seem to mean more when they say "____ is wrong" than, "I personally find it wrong, but it may be right for another."

The "Why I masturbate my son" thread for instance - the people that responded to that one were pretty clear - they weren't meaning by 'wrong' 'subjectively wrong' - many there were telling the original poster that he WAS wrong, no ifs, ands, or buts, and there was no possibility that what he was doing could, should, or would in any circumstance be considered 'right'.

Sounded pretty objective to me....

[The AntiChris]

Sounded pretty objective to me....Explain what you mean by "objective" in this context.

In the context wthin which you use it here, 'objectively wrong' could simply mean "I really, really think it's wrong" and that wouldn't, I'd have thought, stand in contradiction to a subjective notion of wrong.

Chris

[Angra Mainyu]

If you're really willing to say that pedophilia's 'wrongness' is purely in the eye of the beholder, as is greatness, funniness, tastiness, or hotness, then that is consistent at least.

You might want to tell that to the people on the other thread that are trying to force their idea of 'wrongness' onto the pedophiles, though....
Why would I do that?
I actually disapprove of sex with prepubescent individuals, to the point of supporting laws banning it.

What you're still not taking into consideration is that whether something is called “subjective” or “objective” has no implications regarding how important it is to a person, or what a person is willing to do about it. “Hotness” and “tastiness” may both be subjective, but clearly, they're not the same. The feelings elicited by a tasty soup and by a hot chick are quite different. The same goes for other perceptions called “subjective”. Calling morality “objective” would have no impact on the issue that people would still be forcing their preference onto others.

Just consider the following case: O1 says that adult, consensual incest (ACI) is objectively wrong, and that preventing it is objectively right. A1 and A2 are siblings who want to have sex:

O1: Don't do it.

A1: Why?

O1: Because it's wrong.

A2: Yes, we know you disapprove of it. We disagree.

O1: No, it's not just that I disapprove of ACI. It is objectively wrong.

A1: What's that supposed to mean?

O1: That it's wrongness exists regardless of what you think about it.

A2: But what is this “wrongness”? Why would we not want to do what's “wrong”, in that particular sense?

O1: Because it's wrong. It's a fact.

A1: Yes, but what kind of fact? That the Earth is not flat is a fact. But we still want to have sex. What does it even mean that ACI wrong, beyond the fact that you disapprove of it?

O1: I don't know. There's some fact of the Universe that ACI is wrong.

A2: Again, that you're talking to us is a fact. But that's no reason not to have sex with each other. What kind of fact this “wrong” is?

O1: It's what people mean what they say something is wrong.

A1: What people? People disapprove of things, but whatever else they mean seems to vary from person to person. They don't seem to be talking about the same thing.

O1: No, when people say that “X is wrong” they mean the same, even if they don't know it.

A2: Well, they all mean they disapprove. But what else do they mean?

O1: That the conduct has certain patterns that people call “wrong”.

A1: But different conducts are called “wrong” by different people. The patterns seem to be different. If not, people are making massive mistakes when they say something is “wrong”, by mistakenly identifying the patterns.

O1: Yes, historically the sense of right and wrong of people is massively defective. But that doesn't matter. People are made to identify certain patterns and call them “wrong”, even if they're not doing that now, and they didn't do that in the past.

A1: Ok, so how did people come to be “made” in that manner?

O1: [3 possible replies]

P1: Having that trait was conducive to the reproductive success of our ancestors.

P2: God made them that way.

P3: P1 and P2.

A2: [3 corresponding answers]

R1: So what? Our own moral intuitions are motivating to us, but we're not motivated to act in accordance with the (alleged) intuitions of certain hunter-gatherers, just because (allegedly) having those intuitions helped them be successful breeders, even if we assume, against the evidence available and current neuroscience, that such hard-wiring exists.

R2: We don't believe in any gods. Even if there were a powerful entity calling itself god whose sense of right and wrong were offended by adult, consensual, incest, why would we want to behave according to its sense or right and wrong, and not according to ours? Unless you're saying that we'd be punished otherwise, in which case it's not “because it's wrong” that we'd be motivated to do it, but “because if we do it, we'll be punished”.

R3: R1 plus R2.


Now, if O1 were to force his preference onto A1 and A2, he's doing that: forcing his preference onto others. Calling his preference “objective” appears to be no more than resorting to a magical word “objective” that would somehow change the fact that O1 is forcing his preference onto A1 and A2. It clearly doesn't.

As for pedophilia, the reason I chose adult, consensual incest instead is that using examples in which you'll find wide consensus for a ban – such as sex with prepubescent individuals – muddles the waters: the fact that there's wide consensus on banning an activity doesn't change the fact that some individuals - in this case, the vast majority – want to force their preferences onto others. The percentage of individuals supporting certain rule doesn't have any bearing on the fact that said rule is forced upon the dissenters, just because the enforcers have the preference to force it. But it might make it less obvious.

[Angra Mainyu]

Going around saying pedophilia may be right under certain circumstances, rape might be right under certain circumstances, etc., - I am asserting that this DOES rob the idea of wrongness of any significant meaning. If you really want the statement "____ is wrong" to carry little more objective meaning than "_____ is funny", you are welcome to - but most people, including those on this page, certainly seem to mean more when they say "____ is wrong" than, "I personally find it wrong, but it may be right for another."
But the issue here is that if I disapprove of it, I might want to prevent others from doing it. On the other hand, if I find X not funny, and A3 else does find X funny, well, that's it.

I may not feel any desire to prevent A3 from doing X, whereas if I find Y “wrong” (i.e., offensive; that's based on my sense of right and wrong), and A3 doesn't find it offensive, I may well be motivated to prevent A3 from doing Y, either by getting A3 to find it offensive as well (i.e., to present the facts in a manner that will elicit a “wrong” feeling in A3) or, in some cases, by using force if necessary.

Again, different types of feelings may elicit different replies. But even in the case of things like whether a TV show, or an episode thereof, or a movie, a person who finds it fun, great, etc., may very well feel motivated to get others to feel the same way. You can easily find forums for debating different shows, in which people spend lots of time trying to get others to find a show, or an episode, etc., great or crappy, etc., much like people try to get others to find actions wrong or right in these forums.

So, the point is that different things are called “subjective”, but different subjective things carry different motivational weight.

For instance, I can't imagine long discussions trying to get someone to feel that the ice-cream we ate yesterday was yummy, but there will be long arguments trying to get people to find last night's episode great. In the case of morality, there will also be such debates, and even in some (but not all) cases attempts to enforce. So, different types of feelings have different motivational degrees. So what? What does that have to do with “objectivity” and “subjectivity”?

Also, how motivational they are depend on many circumstances. A$ can be motivated enough to try to get others to see an action as “wrong”, but not enough to attempt to use force to impose his preferences. Furthermore, A4 might find some actions (say, what he reads in the newspapers about what's happening thousands of miles away) morally offensive, but while A4 disapproves of those actions, he's not motivated enough to protest, or try to get other people to do something about it, join some NGO, etc. On the other hand, A4 may be motivated to try to get some of his friends to like A4's favorite TV show, or to post long posts on a message board, trying to get others to see last night's episode in the same light as he does.

So, moral intuitions aren't even always more strongly motivational than others referred to TV shows, for instance. It depends on the person and the circumstances. Overall, though, it's clear that moral intuitions carry much more motivational weight, since people are willing to enforce their preference – i.e., they have a preferred normative system, or at least for certain norms, based on their own sense of right and wrong. Then again, intuitions a TV program's greatness are overall more motivational than those about yumminess.

But again, different motivational degrees are present in different matters called “subjective”, so that's not an argument against morality's being called “subjective” in the sense that other matters are – whatever that sense is, given that there seems to be no agreement on what people mean by “objective” and “subjective”.

And just to make that point clear if it's not yet: One's own moral intuitions are motivational to one, not the alleged moral intuitions of some alleged entity called a god or some idealized hunter-gatherers, or some ideal “perfect” person – unless one's intuition is to act in accordance to the alleged intuition of this/these being/s, but even in that case, the intuitions of the (alleged) being(s) is only indirectly motivational; it is motivational as long as one's own intuition refers to it.

So, using the word “objective” as a magical word to back one's intuitions (not necessarily consciously) will not convince those who are not motivated – by their own intuitions – to act according to the intuitions of some alleged idealized entity, or to refrain from a certain conduct that someone else – whoever that someone is – calls “objectively” wrong.

What might “convince” them to act of not to act i a certain manner would be (for instance) that the claim of wrongness or “objective” wrongness is accompanied by a compelling threat. But then again, the threat would be doing the convincing.

Alternatively, and less violently, what could convince them would be to present the facts in a way that triggers the desired (desired by the one making the argument) feeling of rightness or wrongness in them. But then again, in that case, that would be the element doing the convincing, not the magical word “objective”.

[Antiplastic]

Sounded pretty objective to me....Explain what you mean by "objective" in this context.

In the context wthin which you use it here, 'objectively wrong' could simply mean "I really, really think it's wrong" and that wouldn't, I'd have thought, stand in contradiction to a subjective notion of wrong.

That is just what I was trying to get at.

I think it was Sayre-McCord who defined a moral realist as someone who keeps a copy of Mein Kampf in a trunk, and pulls it out every evening to intone, "Hitler was bad. Hitler was really bad."

[Antiplastic]

One unspoken assumption that you seem to rely on is that there is no conceivable sense in which someone could meaningfully assert that something is wrong that does not require them to assert that it is "objectively wrong". Why grant this assumption?

It is more of an assertion than an assumption. If one says that something is 'wrong', just not 'objectively wrong'....

'Subjectively wrong' is 'possibly right'.... (to steal the 'mostly dead is partly alive' from the Princess Bride....)

I don't follow you. What does the mere possibility that one might be mistaken about something have to do with its mind-independence status?

Going around saying pedophilia may be right under certain circumstances, rape might be right under certain circumstances, etc., - I am asserting that this DOES rob the idea of wrongness of any significant meaning.

As a rule, I don't read the rape and pedophilia threads (and there are some specific IIDB posters who shall remain nameless whose emotional experiences with e.g. spanking I just don't want to know) -- so if you're alluding to something specific then I'm afraid I miss the reference. But at any rate, the view you describe above is moral particularism, not moral subjectivism.

If you really want the statement "____ is wrong" to carry little more objective meaning than "_____ is funny", you are welcome to - but most people, including those on this page, certainly seem to mean more when they say "____ is wrong" than, "I personally find it wrong, but it may be right for another."

Well, what the analysis of moral discourse reduces to is hardly a function of what I or anyone else may "want" or "wish" it to be. And there is still no necessary contradiction between a subjectivist calling something wrong, and applying this judgment to everyone else. Indeed, on many expressivist accounts, the sentence "I personally find it wrong, but it may be right for another" is a solecism.

There is a deep connection here with Wittgenstein's dictum: "If there were an English verb meaning 'to believe falsely', it would have no sensible first-person present indicative." Once you understand why this is so, you will see why norm-expressivists don't go around saying things like "I personally find it wrong, but it may be right for another."

The "Why I masturbate my son" thread for instance - the people that responded to that one were pretty clear - they weren't meaning by 'wrong' 'subjectively wrong' - many there were telling the original poster that he WAS wrong, no ifs, ands, or buts, and there was no possibility that what he was doing could, should, or would in any circumstance be considered 'right'.

Sounded pretty objective to me....

But as I hope I have explained, there is no reason at all why a subjectivist cannot describe an action as "wrong, no ifs, ands, or buts, and there is no possibility that it could, should, or would in any circumstance be considered 'right'". Seriousness and forcefulness are not antonyms of subjectivity, nor are they indicia of mind-independence, as He Who Stands Athwart All That Is Chris has pointed out.

[Gundulf]

Sounded pretty objective to me....Explain what you mean by "objective" in this context.

In the context wthin which you use it here, 'objectively wrong' could simply mean "I really, really think it's wrong" and that wouldn't, I'd have thought, stand in contradiction to a subjective notion of wrong.

Chris

By 'objectively wrong' I mean totally wrong. Not "Really, really, really, really, really wrong, although maybe just a teensy bit right under the right circumstance."

I didn't get the impression on that particular thread (or countless others) that people were saying "That is really, really, really, really wrong and distasteful to me. But perhaps, for you, it might just possibly be morally right."

This would be 'subjective morality' - morality that is allowed to change for various 'subjects'.

They seemed to be saying, "If you disagree with my subjective experience of that particular morality, YOU are wrong and messed up."

They were seeming to state that the poster who was discussing masturbating his son WAS wrong, and if he disagreed with their condemnation of his action, then he was AS objectively wrong as if he had said that the sun revolves around the earth.

That is, an appeal to the wrongness of the action was being based on something that is 'above' or 'outside' (i.e., objective) of either poster's subjective feelings, experience, or the like.

Subjective morality, to remain 'subjective' MUST be willing to say, "That is distasteful to me, I find it really really wrong, it is so repugnant to me that I will try to force my subjective morality on you and make you obey it if I can get enough support to pass a law.... But nonetheless, it might be morally right for you."

[Gundulf]

If you're really willing to say that pedophilia's 'wrongness' is purely in the eye of the beholder, as is greatness, funniness, tastiness, or hotness, then that is consistent at least.

You might want to tell that to the people on the other thread that are trying to force their idea of 'wrongness' onto the pedophiles, though....
Why would I do that?
I actually disapprove of sex with prepubescent individuals, to the point of supporting laws banning it.

What you're still not taking into consideration is that whether something is called “subjective” or “objective” has no implications regarding how important it is to a person, or what a person is willing to do about it. “Hotness” and “tastiness” may both be subjective, but clearly, they're not the same. The feelings elicited by a tasty soup and by a hot chick are quite different. The same goes for other perceptions called “subjective”. Calling morality “objective” would have no impact on the issue that people would still be forcing their preference onto others.

Just consider the following case: O1 says that adult, consensual incest (ACI) is objectively wrong, and that preventing it is objectively right. A1 and A2 are siblings who want to have sex:

O1: Don't do it.

A1: Why?

O1: Because it's wrong.

A2: Yes, we know you disapprove of it. We disagree.

O1: No, it's not just that I disapprove of ACI. It is objectively wrong.

A1: What's that supposed to mean?

O1: That it's wrongness exists regardless of what you think about it.

A2: But what is this “wrongness”? Why would we not want to do what's “wrong”, in that particular sense?

O1: Because it's wrong. It's a fact.

A1: Yes, but what kind of fact? That the Earth is not flat is a fact. But we still want to have sex. What does it even mean that ACI wrong, beyond the fact that you disapprove of it?

O1: I don't know. There's some fact of the Universe that ACI is wrong.

A2: Again, that you're talking to us is a fact. But that's no reason not to have sex with each other. What kind of fact this “wrong” is?

O1: It's what people mean what they say something is wrong.

A1: What people? People disapprove of things, but whatever else they mean seems to vary from person to person. They don't seem to be talking about the same thing.

O1: No, when people say that “X is wrong” they mean the same, even if they don't know it.

A2: Well, they all mean they disapprove. But what else do they mean?

O1: That the conduct has certain patterns that people call “wrong”.

A1: But different conducts are called “wrong” by different people. The patterns seem to be different. If not, people are making massive mistakes when they say something is “wrong”, by mistakenly identifying the patterns.

O1: Yes, historically the sense of right and wrong of people is massively defective. But that doesn't matter. People are made to identify certain patterns and call them “wrong”, even if they're not doing that now, and they didn't do that in the past.

A1: Ok, so how did people come to be “made” in that manner?

O1: [3 possible replies]

P1: Having that trait was conducive to the reproductive success of our ancestors.

P2: God made them that way.

P3: P1 and P2.

A2: [3 corresponding answers]

R1: So what? Our own moral intuitions are motivating to us, but we're not motivated to act in accordance with the (alleged) intuitions of certain hunter-gatherers, just because (allegedly) having those intuitions helped them be successful breeders, even if we assume, against the evidence available and current neuroscience, that such hard-wiring exists.

R2: We don't believe in any gods. Even if there were a powerful entity calling itself god whose sense of right and wrong were offended by adult, consensual, incest, why would we want to behave according to its sense or right and wrong, and not according to ours? Unless you're saying that we'd be punished otherwise, in which case it's not “because it's wrong” that we'd be motivated to do it, but “because if we do it, we'll be punished”.

R3: R1 plus R2.


Now, if O1 were to force his preference onto A1 and A2, he's doing that: forcing his preference onto others. Calling his preference “objective” appears to be no more than resorting to a magical word “objective” that would somehow change the fact that O1 is forcing his preference onto A1 and A2. It clearly doesn't.

As for pedophilia, the reason I chose adult, consensual incest instead is that using examples in which you'll find wide consensus for a ban – such as sex with prepubescent individuals – muddles the waters: the fact that there's wide consensus on banning an activity doesn't change the fact that some individuals - in this case, the vast majority – want to force their preferences onto others. The percentage of individuals supporting certain rule doesn't have any bearing on the fact that said rule is forced upon the dissenters, just because the enforcers have the preference to force it. But it might make it less obvious.

I am a bit confused why you chose to substitute an example like "Adult Consensual Incest" instead of pedophelia; the pedophile may just as easily give your Reply 1, 2, or 3, correct?

Just so I follow correctly - you are in favor of the majority forcing its morality upon all?

There is nothing truly ('objectively, universally') wrong with pedophilia, just that it is so distasteful to the majority of us that we have decided to force that morality onto those who disagree, even though, to them it may not be truly immoral?

:huh:


(Which would mean, then, that, were NAMBLA to gain enough popular support and change the laws such to be able to force their morality on everyone else, then pedophilia would magically become 'morally right'?)

[Gundulf]

Going around saying pedophilia may be right under certain circumstances, rape might be right under certain circumstances, etc., - I am asserting that this DOES rob the idea of wrongness of any significant meaning. If you really want the statement "____ is wrong" to carry little more objective meaning than "_____ is funny", you are welcome to - but most people, including those on this page, certainly seem to mean more when they say "____ is wrong" than, "I personally find it wrong, but it may be right for another."
But the issue here is that if I disapprove of it, I might want to prevent others from doing it. On the other hand, if I find X not funny, and A3 else does find X funny, well, that's it.

I may not feel any desire to prevent A3 from doing X, whereas if I find Y “wrong” (i.e., offensive; that's based on my sense of right and wrong), and A3 doesn't find it offensive, I may well be motivated to prevent A3 from doing Y, either by getting A3 to find it offensive as well (i.e., to present the facts in a manner that will elicit a “wrong” feeling in A3) or, in some cases, by using force if necessary.

Again, different types of feelings may elicit different replies. But even in the case of things like whether a TV show, or an episode thereof, or a movie, a person who finds it fun, great, etc., may very well feel motivated to get others to feel the same way. You can easily find forums for debating different shows, in which people spend lots of time trying to get others to find a show, or an episode, etc., great or crappy, etc., much like people try to get others to find actions wrong or right in these forums.

So, the point is that different things are called “subjective”, but different subjective things carry different motivational weight.

For instance, I can't imagine long discussions trying to get someone to feel that the ice-cream we ate yesterday was yummy, but there will be long arguments trying to get people to find last night's episode great. In the case of morality, there will also be such debates, and even in some (but not all) cases attempts to enforce. So, different types of feelings have different motivational degrees. So what? What does that have to do with “objectivity” and “subjectivity”?

Also, how motivational they are depend on many circumstances. A$ can be motivated enough to try to get others to see an action as “wrong”, but not enough to attempt to use force to impose his preferences. Furthermore, A4 might find some actions (say, what he reads in the newspapers about what's happening thousands of miles away) morally offensive, but while A4 disapproves of those actions, he's not motivated enough to protest, or try to get other people to do something about it, join some NGO, etc. On the other hand, A4 may be motivated to try to get some of his friends to like A4's favorite TV show, or to post long posts on a message board, trying to get others to see last night's episode in the same light as he does.

So, moral intuitions aren't even always more strongly motivational than others referred to TV shows, for instance. It depends on the person and the circumstances. Overall, though, it's clear that moral intuitions carry much more motivational weight, since people are willing to enforce their preference – i.e., they have a preferred normative system, or at least for certain norms, based on their own sense of right and wrong. Then again, intuitions a TV program's greatness are overall more motivational than those about yumminess.

But again, different motivational degrees are present in different matters called “subjective”, so that's not an argument against morality's being called “subjective” in the sense that other matters are – whatever that sense is, given that there seems to be no agreement on what people mean by “objective” and “subjective”.

And just to make that point clear if it's not yet: One's own moral intuitions are motivational to one, not the alleged moral intuitions of some alleged entity called a god or some idealized hunter-gatherers, or some ideal “perfect” person – unless one's intuition is to act in accordance to the alleged intuition of this/these being/s, but even in that case, the intuitions of the (alleged) being(s) is only indirectly motivational; it is motivational as long as one's own intuition refers to it.

So, using the word “objective” as a magical word to back one's intuitions (not necessarily consciously) will not convince those who are not motivated – by their own intuitions – to act according to the intuitions of some alleged idealized entity, or to refrain from a certain conduct that someone else – whoever that someone is – calls “objectively” wrong.

What might “convince” them to act of not to act i a certain manner would be (for instance) that the claim of wrongness or “objective” wrongness is accompanied by a compelling threat. But then again, the threat would be doing the convincing.

Alternatively, and less violently, what could convince them would be to present the facts in a way that triggers the desired (desired by the one making the argument) feeling of rightness or wrongness in them. But then again, in that case, that would be the element doing the convincing, not the magical word “objective”.

pedophelia is, inherently, in and of itself, [meaning, independently of our reaction to it'] no more right nor wrong than eating coffee-flavored ice cream, except that it tends to ilicit a much, much stronger sensation of distaste in the eye of the beholder....?

[Gundulf]

It is more of an assertion than an assumption. If one says that something is 'wrong', just not 'objectively wrong'....

'Subjectively wrong' is 'possibly right'.... (to steal the 'mostly dead is partly alive' from the Princess Bride....)

I don't follow you. What does the mere possibility that one might be mistaken about something have to do with its mind-independence status?



EXACTLY my point - if I may be so bold, I humbly submit that you have just given away your hand and demonstrated the inconsistency I'm pointing out.

One CANNOT be 'mistaken' about a preference. You prefer it, or you don't.

(I suppose you could be mistaken about a preference like Sir Gallahad in Python's Holy Grail...."What is your favorite color?" "Blue... No!... Yell...AAAAAHHHHH". But besides that....)

There is no being 'mistaken' about a moral preference. You prefer it or you don't. The very idea of a 'mistake' belies a belief that there is something to be, objectively, wrong or right about. If there exists the possibility that one is mistaken about one's morality - that means there is A right answer?

-1. If you take a test that asks you "What is 2+2" - it is possible to believe an answer to that question that is, in fact, mistaken. There is a right answer to it, if you believe that, you are correct; if you don't, you are 'mistaken.'

-2. If you take a test that asks you, "how do you feel about chocolate ice cream?" It is impossible to believe an answer to that question that is mistaken - you feel about it how you do. Your feelings might change, but since there is no objective truth about the taste of chocolate ice cream, your feelings about it are as right as anyone elses. It is impossible to ever be 'mistaken' about it, even if you change your opinion about ice cream over occasions.

Point being, by referring to one's beliefs about a certain morality has even possibly being 'mistaken', I humbly submit you are conceiving, at some level, of morality as being in category #1 - something to which there is an actual right answer, and, if one doesn't believe the actual 'right' answer, one is 'mistaken.'

[Antiplastic]

Explain what you mean by "objective" in this context.

In the context wthin which you use it here, 'objectively wrong' could simply mean "I really, really think it's wrong" and that wouldn't, I'd have thought, stand in contradiction to a subjective notion of wrong.

Chris

By 'objectively wrong' I mean totally wrong.

Well, there's your problem. That's not what 'objective' means. It just isn't, and at least three people have pointed this out to you now. If you insist on using private definitions, the semantic transaction is guaranteed to fail.

Not "Really, really, really, really, really wrong, although maybe just a teensy bit right under the right circumstance."

Once again, this view is moral particularism, not moral subjectivism. The robustest of robust moral realists could be a particularist. If you insist on using private definitions, the semantic transaction is guaranteed to fail.

I didn't get the impression on that particular thread (or countless others) that people were saying "That is really, really, really, really wrong and distasteful to me. But perhaps, for you, it might just possibly be morally right."

Agent relativism (the view you describe here) is indeed a form of subjectivism, but appraiser-relativists need not hold such a view. Neither do noncognitivists.

They seemed to be saying, "If you disagree with my subjective experience of that particular morality, YOU are wrong and messed up."

I should think so. I haven't seen anything like an argument for why antirealists should be forbidden from saying morally serious things.

Subjective morality, to remain 'subjective' MUST be willing to say, "That is distasteful to me, I find it really really wrong, it is so repugnant to me that I will try to force my subjective morality on you and make you obey it if I can get enough support to pass a law.... But nonetheless, it might be morally right for you."

No, it mustn't. I have in this thread named multiple versions of subjectivist theories according to which this just isn't a requirement.

[Gundulf]

But as I hope I have explained, there is no reason at all why a subjectivist cannot describe an action as "wrong, no ifs, ands, or buts, and there is no possibility that it could, should, or would in any circumstance be considered 'right'". Seriousness and forcefulness are not antonyms of subjectivity, nor are they indicia of mind-independence, as He Who Stands Athwart All That Is Chris has pointed out.

Well, then one is using hyperbole. Which one has every right to do, I'm sure, but just be aware that it is hyperbole.

If a certain action IS "absolutely, positively wrong, no ifs, ands, buts, about it, and it is wrong for me, wrong for you, wrong for everyone" (and this is being said literally, without hyperbole), then it is as objective as saying that 2+2 is 4, no ifs, ands, buts, and it is true for me, you, and for everyone.

If it is subjective, meaning, your subjective experience, you might well be able to say, "To me, this is absolutely, positively wrong, no ifs, ands, buts about it.... but it could be right to a different subject."

In case I'm being misunderstood, the two categories of 'subjective' and 'objective' work as follows, unless I am very much mistaken:

OBJECTIVE: A thing is objectively true if it is impossible for any subject to perceive it as anything but true. If a subject perceives it as false, the subject is mistaken. This is obviously true about math and science, generally people don't have problems with that. The earth objectively revolves around the sun. A water molecule is objectively made up of 3 atoms. It doesn't matter who, when, where, or what the subject is that observes these things - they will be true for every subject. If a subject does not believe them to be true, the subject is wrong.

SUBJECTIVE: A thing is subjectively true if its truthfulness lies "in the eye of the beholder." It may be true for a particular person, but another person may dispute it, and cannot rightly be considered 'mistaken.' We generally refer to preferences and tastes in such a category. "'Gone with the Wind' is the best movie ever made." Mosquitoes are annoying. The death penalty is the best way to deal with serious crime. etc. Different subjects will come to different conclusions on the rightness or wrongness of these 'truths', and it is therefore impossible to say that anyone's particular taste on such a truth is 'mistaken'. It may be unpopular, distasteful to others, but is as fasle for one person as it is true for another.

Hence, if you are using hyperbole to say that certain actions "ARE" wrong, and IN NO CIRCUMSTANCES COULD EVER be right - but what you really mean, literally, is "I find this so distasteful that I could never imagine it being right, although I admit that other people may find it tasteful and morally good and acceptable...." then sure, that is subjective.

But if you mean, LITERALLY - "This thing IS wrong and IN NO CIRCUMSTANCES COULD IT EVER be right" - that is, by definition, 'objectively' wrong - in no circumstance, viewed by no subject anywhere could it be anything but wrong - this is, de facto, by definition, "objectively" wrong.

Or what do I miss?

[Gundulf]

By 'objectively wrong' I mean totally wrong.

Well, there's your problem. That's not what 'objective' means. It just isn't, and at least three people have pointed this out to you now. If you insist on using private definitions, the semantic transaction is guaranteed to fail.



Well, 'totally' is admittedly not a good definition. I mean objective in the sense of 'not subjective.' Here are the senses I am using 'objective':


"intent upon or dealing with things external to the mind rather than with thoughts or feelings" or "of or pertaining to something that can be known, or to something that is an object or a part of an object; existing independent of thought or an observer as part of reality."

[Angra Mainyu]

I am a bit confused why you chose to substitute an example like "Adult Consensual Incest" instead of pedophelia; the pedophile may just as easily give your Reply 1, 2, or 3, correct?
Adjusted to the case, yes.

The reason I preferred the other example is explained in my post, so I'm not sure why you'd be confused. The degree of agreement you'll find in the pedophile case will not be found in the other. Wide agreement might make it less likely to see that people is forcing their preferences to others.


Just so I follow correctly - you are in favor of the majority forcing its morality upon all?
No, I'm in favor of having some normative system and so enforce some morality on others. But whether I'm in favor of a particular case of enforcing depends on what is being enforced, not necessarily on how many enforce it – though the number might affect my preference in some cases -, in general, that is not what determines it.

What kind of normative system would I want to see enforced?
Well, one that matches my intuitions, not necessarily those of the majority.


There is nothing truly ('objectively, universally') wrong with pedophilia, just that it is so distasteful to the majority of us that we have decided to force that morality onto those who disagree, even though, to them it may not be truly immoral?

It don't know what you mean by “objectively” wrong, but the fact that we ban it reflects our preferences. This is more clear in the case of adult, consensual incest (ACI).

Were I live, the punishment for is that people will frown upon the action. But there's no legal punishment – it's legal, though marriage is not allowed. I think that's the case where you live as well, but not in other American states. On the other hand, the Incas would gouge out the eyes of men who engaged in incest.

As for me, I have no problem with ACI. I disapprove of the social disapproval of ACI (i.e., I frown upon their frowning upon). I more strongly disapprove of prison terms for people who engage in ACI. And I far more strongly disapprove of gouging out the eyes of men who engage in ACI.

In any case, while most societies seem to have a taboo against incest, what counts as incest varies widely. Some societies banned marriage between cousins within the seventh degree, while in others, 60% married to first cousins or closer relatives.

As for pedophilia, that depends on what you mean by that. If you mean any sexual relations with people not deemed capable of giving valid consent because of age (in your society), then there's also wide variety of views.

If you mean strictly the case of sex with prepubescent individuals, then prohibitions are more widespread, though they weren't universal, either. The point is that the age at which sex is allowed, varies.

Granted, you could find an age at which the vast majority of people will find sex to be repugnant – I think that, for instance, six years old would qualify. Then again, you'll find that the vast majority of people will find human feces to be not yummy, and the vast majority of straight men will find Jessica Alba hotter than a female warthog.

You could also find that the vast majority of people find people of the opposite gender more attractive than people of the same gender. And you could find that the vast majority of straight men in a certain society prefer a certain waist-to-hip ratio in their partners, or that most straight women prefer tall men - other things equal - at least in many if not all societies. You can find that the vast majority of people in the US find chocolate ice-cream yummier than broccoli, etc.

My point here is that finding wide consensus on a particular instance doesn't imply that something is called “objective”. To clarify, here I'm making a statement about what's often called "objective" and "subjective"; I'm not making an argument about whether someone's senses are or are not functioning properly, and in which sense "properly" is appraised.

On the other hand, if there were wide consensus not on a particular instance, but in nearly all instances (e.g., if nearly everyone agreed that a certain food F1 is yummier than a certain food F2, for all food items F1 and F2), it's possible that people would say that F1 is "as a matter of fact" or even "objectively" yummier than F2. But in any event, I concede that it's also possible (but I'm not sure that that has been empirically tested) that, in the case of morality, most people would use expressions like "as matter of fact", "objectively", "absolutely" when they make their claims, regardless of agreement. In any case, that doesn't say much about any objectivity or subjectivity in the sense you prefer.

If you use a technical definition of "subjective" and "objective" (or your technical definition), and according to that definition, you conclude that yumminess, hotness, greatness, etc. are subjective, then the fact that there's wide consensus on certain instances doesn't mean that the matters in question are objective according to your definition (whatever that definition is). But in any case, I'd use the case of adult, consensual incest instead, without making any claims based on that regarding whether morality is, according to your definition, objective. I just like that case better. :)

Of course, now that you've explained your definition, that speculation is pointless. :D But again, I like the case of ACI better.

In any event, my argument (to which you replied) does not depend on whether morality is called “objective” or “subjective”, and in what sense. Even if humans have evolved a single, hard-wired set of moral intuitions applicable to every conduct, that would not change the fact that enforcing morality would mean that some people would be enforcing their preferences on others – even if those preferences resulted from genetic factors that hard-wired them into their brains, instead of coming (as in reality) from a combination of genetic and environmental factors.

Suppose the dissenters prefer their own moral intuitions over those that made certain hunter-gatherers successful breeders. If someone else imposes on the dissenters norms based on the (alleged, but let's assume for the sake of the argument) intuitions of the hunter-gatherers in question, the enforcers are enforcing their own preferences - however they came to be. For more details, see post #15.


(Which would mean, then, that, were NAMBLA to gain enough popular support and change the laws such to be able to force their morality on everyone else, then pedophilia would magically become 'morally right'?)
Based on my experience in recent threads, and the confusion that the use of words “right” and “wrong” seem to generate, I'm very wary about using them. If NAMBLA gained enough popular support were you live, etc., then I would still disapprove of their actions.

So, if I had to use the words “right” or “wrong” (but why?), it'd say that it's wrong – i.e., it offends my sense of right and wrong. On the other hand, as Antiplastic pointed out, other people may mean something else.

Subjective morality, to remain 'subjective' MUST be willing to say, "That is distasteful to me, I find it really really wrong, it is so repugnant to me that I will try to force my subjective morality on you and make you obey it if I can get enough support to pass a law.... But nonetheless, it might be morally right for you."
No, that's not the case. Antiplastic already mentioned different types of subjectivism, but I'll show you an example of why they don't have to make such concesion.

For instance, suppose S1 says “I think it would be wrong for them (say, B and C) to do X”. If B and C actually don't find X objectionable, based on your argument I think you would conclude that S1 is in error – because you seem to assume that S1 refers to the perceptions of them (i.e., of B and C) (or perhaps to some "objective" morality).

However, S1 may well be (and in my example, he is) referring to his own moral disapproval of X.

For instance, one can easily google and find cases of use of a similar expression in an issue (i.e., funniness) that are generally regarded as subjective:


http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/witness/may/11/newsid_4529000/4529971.stm

We thought it would be funny for them to be inconvenienced by having to move aside whilst the fire was tackled.


http://www.engadget.com/2005/06/06/dude-steals-12-000-ipods-in-los-angeles/

It would be funny if they happened to be defective models on their way to repair... regardless of the actual events... it would be funny for him to turn EACH and EVERY one on, and get dreaded hard drive errors.
It's quite clear that the expressions “it would be funny for them to...” or “it would be funny for him to...” do not refer to how “them” and “him” would find that situation, but rather the person making the statement.

One can find plenty of examples that refer to the person making the statement, or that person and a group of like minded people, etc. But my point is that a subjectivist, anti-realist or whatever you call them (terms are quite confusing in these threads) does not need to grant that maybe, it would be right (or not wrong at least) for someone to engage in pedophilia, or ACI, or in punishing ACI – even if the subjectivist grants that the agents performing the action might perceive those actions as “right”, or “not wrong”.

If you find that use of language potentially obfuscatory, that's another matter. I would concede that that's the case, if people have not made it clear what they're talking about. If someone misread such a statement, that means that, well, there's been a misunderstanding, but that doesn't mean that the person making the statement has incurred in inconsistency, or was talking nonsense.

So, my question to you would be: where is the inconsistency or senselessness of the subjectivist position?


pedophelia is, inherently, in and of itself, [meaning, independently of our reaction to it'] no more right nor wrong than eating coffee-flavored ice cream, except that it tends to ilicit a much, much stronger sensation of distaste in the eye of the beholder....?
What does it mean for a conduct to be inherently, in an of itself, right or wrong?

In any event, as I see it, your replies do not address the challenges I presented.


OBJECTIVE: A thing is objectively true if it is impossible for any subject to perceive it as anything but true. If a subject perceives it as false, the subject is mistaken. This is obviously true about math and science, generally people don't have problems with that. The earth objectively revolves around the sun. A water molecule is objectively made up of 3 atoms. It doesn't matter who, when, where, or what the subject is that observes these things - they will be true for every subject. If a subject does not believe them to be true, the subject is wrong.

SUBJECTIVE: A thing is subjectively true if its truthfulness lies "in the eye of the beholder." It may be true for a particular person, but another person may dispute it, and cannot rightly be considered 'mistaken.' We generally refer to preferences and tastes in such a category. "'Gone with the Wind' is the best movie ever made." Mosquitoes are annoying. The death penalty is the best way to deal with serious crime. etc. Different subjects will come to different conclusions on the rightness or wrongness of these 'truths', and it is therefore impossible to say that anyone's particular taste on such a truth is 'mistaken'. It may be unpopular, distasteful to others, but is as fasle for one person as it is true for another.

Hence, if you are using hyperbole to say that certain actions "ARE" wrong, and IN NO CIRCUMSTANCES COULD EVER be right - but what you really mean, literally, is "I find this so distasteful that I could never imagine it being right, although I admit that other people may find it tasteful and morally good and acceptable...." then sure, that is subjective.

But if you mean, LITERALLY - "This thing IS wrong and IN NO CIRCUMSTANCES COULD IT EVER be right" - that is, by definition, 'objectively' wrong - in no circumstance, viewed by no subject anywhere could it be anything but wrong - this is, de facto, by definition, "objectively" wrong.

Or what do I miss?
With all due respect, I'd say at least my argument on post #15. :)

If you say that the Earth is objectively not flat, that's fine, but that doesn't tell us anything about what to do. If you say that “X is wrong” and you add adjectives like “objectively, absolutely, under all circumstances”, etc., those words wouldn't have (generally speaking) any effect on those who do not perceive X as morally offensive.

And if you try to force them not to do X, you're forcing your preferences (however they came to be) on them. For details, see post #15. To be clear, that doesn't mean I'd disapprove of your forcing your preference on others. That would depend on what you actually enforce (i.e., the content) and what I prefer.

ETA: before we go on on discussing objectivism (or moral realism, or whatever you call your position), I'd appreciate if you answer the following questions, just to clarify your position:

Do you hold that subjectivism necessarily inconsistent, or that it necessarily does not make sense? Or do you agree that subjectivism can be meaningful and consistent?

To be clear, I'm not asking whether you think that all forms of subjectivism are meaningful and consistent - just whether you think that some of them are or at least that it's possible (i.e., that they're not necessarily (as a consequence of being subjectivist positions) meaningless or inconsistent.

Also, I'm not asking whether you think that any subjectivist position is correct in any way you could think the word "correct" might apply. I'm merely asking your take on their meaningfulness and consistency, not on their correctness. We can discuss the latter. :)

[Antiplastic]

I don't follow you. What does the mere possibility that one might be mistaken about something have to do with its mind-independence status?



EXACTLY my point - if I may be so bold, I humbly submit that you have just given away your hand and demonstrated the inconsistency I'm pointing out.

One CANNOT be 'mistaken' about a preference. You prefer it, or you don't.

Then why did you write, "'Subjectively wrong' is 'possibly right'"? You've left me more confused than when I first asked what this had to do with mind-dependence.

There is no being 'mistaken' about a moral preference. You prefer it or you don't. The very idea of a 'mistake' belies a belief that there is something to be, objectively, wrong or right about. If there exists the possibility that one is mistaken about one's morality - that means there is A right answer?

Certainly, cognitivist subjectivism is the view that moral claims are disguised reports of preferences. Noncognitivism is not. I am not (a cognitivist). The difference is a bit technical and narrow, but very, very deep.

-1. If you take a test that asks you "What is 2+2" - it is possible to believe an answer to that question that is, in fact, mistaken. There is a right answer to it, if you believe that, you are correct; if you don't, you are 'mistaken.'

-2. If you take a test that asks you, "how do you feel about chocolate ice cream?" It is impossible to believe an answer to that question that is mistaken - you feel about it how you do. Your feelings might change, but since there is no objective truth about the taste of chocolate ice cream, your feelings about it are as right as anyone elses. It is impossible to ever be 'mistaken' about it, even if you change your opinion about ice cream over occasions.

Point being, by referring to one's beliefs about a certain morality has even possibly being 'mistaken', I humbly submit you are conceiving, at some level, of morality as being in category #1 - something to which there is an actual right answer, and, if one doesn't believe the actual 'right' answer, one is 'mistaken.'

It is not my view that moral claims refer to, describe, or otherwise report on mental states. They express them. Therefore, it is not my view that moral mistakes consist in making erroneous reports of beliefs.

But as I hope I have explained, there is no reason at all why a subjectivist cannot describe an action as "wrong, no ifs, ands, or buts, and there is no possibility that it could, should, or would in any circumstance be considered 'right'". Seriousness and forcefulness are not antonyms of subjectivity, nor are they indicia of mind-independence, as He Who Stands Athwart All That Is Chris has pointed out.

Well, then one is using hyperbole. Which one has every right to do, I'm sure, but just be aware that it is hyperbole.

I simply fail to see how such phraseology is an exaggeration.

If a certain action IS "absolutely, positively wrong, no ifs, ands, buts, about it, and it is wrong for me, wrong for you, wrong for everyone" (and this is being said literally, without hyperbole), then it is as objective as saying that 2+2 is 4, no ifs, ands, buts, and it is true for me, you, and for everyone.

Nothing in that phraseology requires a mind-independence thesis. Therefore, nothing in it commits one to saying it is an objective claim.

OBJECTIVE: A thing is objectively true if it is impossible for any subject to perceive it as anything but true. If a subject perceives it as false, the subject is mistaken. This is obviously true about math and science, generally people don't have problems with that. The earth objectively revolves around the sun. A water molecule is objectively made up of 3 atoms. It doesn't matter who, when, where, or what the subject is that observes these things - they will be true for every subject. If a subject does not believe them to be true, the subject is wrong.

SUBJECTIVE: A thing is subjectively true if its truthfulness lies "in the eye of the beholder." It may be true for a particular person, but another person may dispute it, and cannot rightly be considered 'mistaken.' We generally refer to preferences and tastes in such a category. "'Gone with the Wind' is the best movie ever made." Mosquitoes are annoying. The death penalty is the best way to deal with serious crime. etc. Different subjects will come to different conclusions on the rightness or wrongness of these 'truths', and it is therefore impossible to say that anyone's particular taste on such a truth is 'mistaken'. It may be unpopular, distasteful to others, but is as fasle for one person as it is true for another.

These are not antonyms. The dichotomy is in fact one of (nontrivial) mind-dependence.

But if you mean, LITERALLY - "This thing IS wrong and IN NO CIRCUMSTANCES COULD IT EVER be right" - that is, by definition, 'objectively' wrong - in no circumstance, viewed by no subject anywhere could it be anything but wrong - this is, de facto, by definition, "objectively" wrong.

I wish you would stop saying "by definition" when you mean "according to my private definition".



Well, 'totally' is admittedly not a good definition. I mean objective in the sense of 'not subjective.' Here are the senses I am using 'objective':


"intent upon or dealing with things external to the mind rather than with thoughts or feelings" or "of or pertaining to something that can be known, or to something that is an object or a part of an object; existing independent of thought or an observer as part of reality."

That's much better.

[The AntiChris]

By 'objectively wrong' I mean totally wrong.That's a very odd usage.

Is this a purely private (solely your own) usage or do you know of others who use the term 'objective' in this way (can you cite references)?

I ask because I suspect you'll run into all sorts of misunderstandings if you continue to use the word in this this way without first clearly defining your terms.

Chris

[Angra Mainyu]

Of course, now that you've explained your definition, that speculation is pointless.
On second thought, I'm still unsure about your definition....


Well, 'totally' is admittedly not a good definition. I mean objective in the sense of 'not subjective.' Here are the senses I am using 'objective':


"intent upon or dealing with things external to the mind rather than with thoughts or feelings" or "of or pertaining to something that can be known, or to something that is an object or a part of an object; existing independent of thought or an observer as part of reality."

OBJECTIVE: A thing is objectively true if it is impossible for any subject to perceive it as anything but true. If a subject perceives it as false, the subject is mistaken. This is obviously true about math and science, generally people don't have problems with that. The earth objectively revolves around the sun. A water molecule is objectively made up of 3 atoms. It doesn't matter who, when, where, or what the subject is that observes these things - they will be true for every subject. If a subject does not believe them to be true, the subject is wrong.

SUBJECTIVE: A thing is subjectively true if its truthfulness lies "in the eye of the beholder." It may be true for a particular person, but another person may dispute it, and cannot rightly be considered 'mistaken.' We generally refer to preferences and tastes in such a category. "'Gone with the Wind' is the best movie ever made." Mosquitoes are annoying. The death penalty is the best way to deal with serious crime. etc. Different subjects will come to different conclusions on the rightness or wrongness of these 'truths', and it is therefore impossible to say that anyone's particular taste on such a truth is 'mistaken'. It may be unpopular, distasteful to others, but is as fasle for one person as it is true for another.
I'm not sure the two definitions match...

But regardless, my argument on post #15 is a challenge to your argument about not imposing one's preferences, and regardless of what you mean by “objective”.

[figuer]

This comes from another thread;
Originally Posted by Gundulf
The point is that there may have been something that God desired MORE than the non-existence of evil (for example, the existence of 'forgiveness') - and, if that thing (forgiveness) were mutually exclusive with the non-existence of evil, then perhaps God was willing to put up with, temporarily, something he didn't want, in order to get something else that he could not have otherwise had.

I don't understand how Gundulf can champion the concept of absolute morality as an attribute of God and then have this God violate his own moral system in order to satisfy some creative "desire". This makes God's morality subjective according to Gundulf's definition.

[Angra Mainyu]

OBJECTIVE: A thing is objectively true if it is impossible for any subject to perceive it as anything but true. If a subject perceives it as false, the subject is mistaken. This is obviously true about math and science, generally people don't have problems with that. The earth objectively revolves around the sun. A water molecule is objectively made up of 3 atoms. It doesn't matter who, when, where, or what the subject is that observes these things - they will be true for every subject. If a subject does not believe them to be true, the subject is wrong.

SUBJECTIVE: A thing is subjectively true if its truthfulness lies "in the eye of the beholder." It may be true for a particular person, but another person may dispute it, and cannot rightly be considered 'mistaken.' We generally refer to preferences and tastes in such a category. "'Gone with the Wind' is the best movie ever made." Mosquitoes are annoying. The death penalty is the best way to deal with serious crime. etc. Different subjects will come to different conclusions on the rightness or wrongness of these 'truths', and it is therefore impossible to say that anyone's particular taste on such a truth is 'mistaken'. It may be unpopular, distasteful to others, but is as fasle for one person as it is true for another.

I have a few questions about your definition. :)


Is any of the following propositions objectively true?

Is any of them objectively false?

Is any of them subjectively true?

P1) That rotten cow carcass is not yummy.

P2) A female warthog is not hotter than Jessica Alba.

P3) Flower A and flower B are of the same color.

(for P3, assume that both A and B look the same, from a chromatic perspective, to the vast majority of humans, but quite different to bees and some birds).

P4) God has banned adult, consensual incest.

[Gundulf]

No, I'm in favor of having some normative system and so enforce some morality on others. But whether I'm in favor of a particular case of enforcing depends on what is being enforced, not necessarily on how many enforce it – though the number might affect my preference in some cases -, in general, that is not what determines it.

What kind of normative system would I want to see enforced?
Well, one that matches my intuitions, not necessarily those of the majority.


Then, all you can do is hope that the majority agrees with you? :huh: or at least try to convince the rest of the majority to come along to your side. If you are successful at this, you are then able to enforce YOUR morality on the rest of society - if you fail, then society forces its morality on you.

Still, if I follow your position, there is no way to say who is right - only who is more powerful. Once upon a time abolishonists were considered immoral by the majority. I consider slavery wrong, someone else considers it right, and the only resolution is not who is right and who is wrong, but who is more powerful or who gets enough popular support....?


(You gave me a bunch to chew on - will get to the rest as I can...)

[Gundulf]

One can find plenty of examples that refer to the person making the statement, or that person and a group of like minded people, etc. But my point is that a subjectivist, anti-realist or whatever you call them (terms are quite confusing in these threads) does not need to grant that maybe, it would be right (or not wrong at least) for someone to engage in pedophilia, or ACI, or in punishing ACI – even if the subjectivist grants that the agents performing the action might perceive those actions as “right”, or “not wrong”.

If you find that use of language potentially obfuscatory, that's another matter. I would concede that that's the case, if people have not made it clear what they're talking about. If someone misread such a statement, that means that, well, there's been a misunderstanding, but that doesn't mean that the person making the statement has incurred in inconsistency, or was talking nonsense.

So, my question to you would be: where is the inconsistency or senselessness of the subjectivist position?



I have discussed with people who have thought throught the issues and are consistently subjectivist on their morality - I don't see a truly logical inconsistency, except that it seems sub-human, if it is truly consistent. To be truly consistent in subjectivist morality, one must be willing to say, for instance:

-There is nothing wrong with slavery. Some people find it significantly distasteful, some people do and have liked it, and we all have different preferences regarding it. If someone tried to enslave you, and you didn't like it, you can fight back and try to force your desire for freedom onto your enslavers, but there is nothing MORE moral about what you are doing than what he is doing.

-There is nothing wrong with rape. If you don't like being raped, then you should try to force that standard on society. But people that are against rape are no more or less moral than people who like to rape. They have different preferences. If your particular preference is such that you find rape absolutely repugnant, you have the ability to pressure the rest of society to force its view on you - but realize that rapists are simply doing the same with their preferences, and are no less moral for trying to enforce their preferences....

Etc., etc., etc. This is consistent subjective morality - the moment someone judges between two moral systems and says one is "better", "more moral" or whatever, the two systems are being judged by an external, objective standard.

Now, if there is an objective standard, that is fine - we CAN say "Morality X makes for more peaceful societies." Sure, that is objective, and can be measured, and is still consistent with subjectivist moralilty. The two subjects in question have their own morality, and you are using some particular, unchanging standard (what is peaceful for society, etc.) to judge which better conforms to that particular standard. Sure, and that is fine.

But then the rapists or slave traders can say, "So? What do I care about peaceful society? I want what I want." We could all agree that some moralities are better for making peaceful societies....

But why is "wanting a peaceful society" better than "wanting a chaotic society"? Sure, again you go into people's happiness, preferences of the majorities, etc.

But you still are left with, at core, there is nothing more 'inherently' moral about being an abolishonist than being a slave trader. They are simply different preferences. If one is OK with saying that slave traders are truly no more or less moral than abolishionists, that rapists are no more or less moral than defenders of public peace... but that they simply have different prefernces.... I find that to be at least consistent.

But I find very, very few people who are willing to go that far. Typically, people still want to say that some such behavior is WRONG. Not "inefficient for making peaceful societies", Not "disruptive", but WRONG. If so, they are, perhaps unwittingly, appealing to an eternal, unchanging, dare I say, "supernatural" standard.


Personally, I work with victims of crimes quite often. And I would find it so, well, WRONG, to tell a rape victim, "Well, what your rapist did was right for him. He didn't do anything 'wrong', and he isn't any more or less moral than you. What he did hurts you and brings about less peaceful societies, and, because we want a peaceful society, we'll try to lock him up. But remember, he didn't do anything WRONG. Just that he has a different standard."

But, with a consistently subjective moral perspective, I don't see an alternative.



With all due respect, I'd say at least my argument on post #15. :)

If you say that the Earth is objectively not flat, that's fine, but that doesn't tell us anything about what to do. If you say that “X is wrong” and you add adjectives like “objectively, absolutely, under all circumstances”, etc., those words wouldn't have (generally speaking) any effect on those who do not perceive X as morally offensive.

And if you try to force them not to do X, you're forcing your preferences (however they came to be) on them. For details, see post #15. To be clear, that doesn't mean I'd disapprove of your forcing your preference on others. That would depend on what you actually enforce (i.e., the content) and what I prefer.

ETA: before we go on on discussing objectivism (or moral realism, or whatever you call your position), I'd appreciate if you answer the following questions, just to clarify your position:

Do you hold that subjectivism necessarily inconsistent, or that it necessarily does not make sense? Or do you agree that subjectivism can be meaningful and consistent?

To be clear, I'm not asking whether you think that all forms of subjectivism are meaningful and consistent - just whether you think that some of them are or at least that it's possible (i.e., that they're not necessarily (as a consequence of being subjectivist positions) meaningless or inconsistent.

Also, I'm not asking whether you think that any subjectivist position is correct in any way you could think the word "correct" might apply. I'm merely asking your take on their meaningfulness and consistency, not on their correctness. We can discuss the latter. :)

I think I hit some of your later points already - I can find them consistent, but not meaningful. Sure, it is consistent to say that between abolishonists and slave traders, neither is more moral than the other, but they have different preferences. I find it meaningless, though - or, perhaps more accurately, to have a 'sad' meaning. People that fought for other's freedom against the greed of a system that enslaved humans WERE more moral than those that bought into the greed, etc. A system of morality that says that neither is more moral than the other is not just meaningless - it has presents a downright sad meaning - to me, at least.

And, using the words "People absolutely did, in fact, objectively, walk on the moon" have no effect on people who are convinced that the moon landing was faked. Just because someone is wrong doesn't mean that the 'object' of their belief is therefore subjective.

Sure, people really did walk on the moon - it is an objective fact. that some people don't believe it does not cease to make it objectively true.

I would say, for instance, that rape is objectively wrong - that some people don't believe that does not make it cease to be objectively true that it is wrong.

(Also, for clarification - I certainly believe that large parts of morality are in fact subjective. The Bible itself makes that plain enough in various places - what may be wrong for one person may in fact not be wrong for another - there is a large degree of subjectivity in morality - that change based on a person's understanding of things, culture, background, experiences, and such things. But underneath this is an objective foundation that some things just ARE wrong, and some ARE right. It is possible, even amidst the various subjectivism, to be able to say that some things ARE wrong.)

[Gundulf]

I have a few questions about your definition. :)


Is any of the following propositions objectively true?

Is any of them objectively false?

Is any of them subjectively true?



P1) That rotten cow carcass is not yummy.

Subjective, though probably universally true for humans. Vultures, on the other hand...


P2) A female warthog is not hotter than Jessica Alba.

Subjective, though I sure hope universally true for huamns. (Although, for a male warthog....)




P3) Flower A and flower B are of the same color.

(for P3, assume that both A and B look the same, from a chromatic perspective, to the vast majority of humans, but quite different to bees and some birds).

Well, as you hinted in the question, depends on your exact definition of 'same' If you're getting extremely specific in the definitions, you'd probably say that absolutely no two flowers on the entire planet emit the exactly identical frequency of light patterns, and therefore, objectively false. If we're using an extremly precise, exacting definition of the word 'same', then there are objectively probably very few things that are objectively the 'same' - until you start speaking of water molecules.... Even then, each one probably has some slight variation in the locations & velocities of subatomic particles.....

Idea, still, being that something that is objectively true is true no matter who (or what) looks at it, and, if they don't see it, then they are wrong.

I happen to be color blind - so when I see a traffic light made of red, yellow, and white lights.... I know I am wrong. I subjectively see something different because of a deficiency in my color vision. So, sure, a human that says that the two flowers are the same color (and they mean by that, exact, identical wavelengths, etc.), then they are objectively wrong.

If they are using the implied meaning that a person would when they say they are the same color - meaning, "Although there are technically innumerable numbers of different colors in the spectrum of light, when speaking of the way that we humans typically categorize colors in basic categories as red, orange, yellow, green, blue, and violet... These two flowers are both red...."

Then yes, in that sense, objectively true. Assuming that the person had adequate color vision, unlike myself.




P4) God has banned adult, consensual incest.

Objectively true, insofar as the Bible is correctly understood to include an accurate record of things that God has banned.

[Gundulf]

This comes from another thread;
Originally Posted by Gundulf
The point is that there may have been something that God desired MORE than the non-existence of evil (for example, the existence of 'forgiveness') - and, if that thing (forgiveness) were mutually exclusive with the non-existence of evil, then perhaps God was willing to put up with, temporarily, something he didn't want, in order to get something else that he could not have otherwise had.

I don't understand how Gundulf can champion the concept of absolute morality as an attribute of God and then have this God violate his own moral system in order to satisfy some creative "desire". This makes God's morality subjective according to Gundulf's definition.

Not sure why you are conceiving of God 'violating his own moral system.' You have to explain more what you're thinking there - but you seem to be suggesting that God isn't playing by the rules he gave us. Sure, God doesn't follow a system of conduct that he designed for humans.... Point being?

[figuer]

Sure, God doesn't follow a system of conduct that he designed for humans....Point being?That seems to contradict "Being created in God's likeness". If we are created in his likeness, why should we be under a different system of conduct? It is also evident that your objective morality is based on God's subjective choices.

It seems that you are able to see that the normal Christian benevolent God doesn't fit the evidence. Basically, your God is as Evil as he is good, yet you remain a Christian. I can understand your basic conception of God (in essence Pantheistic), but I can not understand your Christianity, since Christianity itself doesn't fit the evidence. It comes to your choice in believing that the Biblical myth is true.

[figuer]

Also, for clarification - I certainly believe that large parts of morality are in fact subjective. The Bible itself makes that plain enough in various places - what may be wrong for one person may in fact not be wrong for another - there is a large degree of subjectivity in morality - that change based on a person's understanding of things, culture, background, experiences, and such things. But underneath this is an objective foundation that some things just ARE wrong, and some ARE right. It is possible, even amidst the various subjectivism, to be able to say that some things ARE wrong.Bolds mine: The Bible?? Decades of anthropological, zoological research, yet you prefer what some ignorant goat herders wrote?? Based on what?? Humans can be observed to be animals, animals have instincts. It is to be expected that some core instincts resides within human that create the basis for morality and establish a propensity towards certain behaviours. Observations don't support the view that immanent morality transcends the bare basics.

[Angra Mainyu]

Then, all you can do is hope that the majority agrees with you?
r at least try to convince the rest of the majority to come along to your side. If you are successful at this, you are then able to enforce YOUR morality on the rest of society - if you fail, then society forces its morality on you.

That depends on the case, but I can – for instance – try to get people to see things my way, by presenting the facts in a way that's appealing to their moral intuitions. I can get into politics and try to convince not the majority, but the ones who actually pass the laws.

Even in a system called democratic, there does not have to be – and often, there isn't – majority agreement on how do deal with a specific situation, whether to ban a conduct, etc. For instance, a country may support the abrogation of death penalty, even if most people will want to have it. Many politicians are going to support adhering to the treaty, because (for instance) a substantial minority will not vote for someone who doesn't support the treaty, whereas the majority who likes the death penalty aren't so emotionally involved as to decided their vote over that issue. Alternatively, one can take the issue to the courts.

That's merely an example, but in general, my point is that politics are more complicated than just getting more than 50% of the voters to like a particular norm.



If you are successful at this, you are then able to enforce YOUR morality on the rest of society - if you fail, then society forces its morality on you.
Mine and that of those who agree with me, that is. So, maybe I could say our preferred norms – we may have certain disagreements, true, but there can be considerable agreement regarding some norms.

In some cases, just just the majority but the vast majority, politicians, etc., will agree (e.g., we don't want to let people go around blowing themselves up to kill others), so convincing won't even be an issue.


Still, if I follow your position, there is no way to say who is right - only who is more powerful. Once upon a time abolishonists were considered immoral by the majority. I consider slavery wrong, someone else considers it right, and the only resolution is not who is right and who is wrong, but who is more powerful or who gets enough popular support....?
If I want to use the word “wrong” (which isn't necessarily the case), I can say that slavery is wrong, and refer to my disapproval.

Of course, A7 else might say it's not wrong, and refer to his own lack of disapproval or to whatever else he might mean by that. I can still say that that A7's position is wrong, but not in the sense of “mistaken”; instead, I would be expressing that I disapprove of his position.

As for whether slavery will be allowed, of course the resolution will be that whoever is more powerful will impose their will – obviously, if they're more powerful they can't lose; else they wouldn't be more powerful, unless you're using “powerful” in a different manner.

Of course, I don't have to accept that because they're more powerful and accept slavery, then slavery is right. I can still say it's wrong, expressing my disapproval – or I can simply say that I disaprove of it. Of course, I can also take different actions (trying to get people to perceive slavery as morally offensive, organize a revolution maybe, etc.). Perhaps, if I'm going for a revolution, I'll find it easy to gather support from a good number of people – namely, most slaves. If the plan goes well, I (or we, since it'd be a collective effort, of course) might be able to shift the balance of power in our favor, and succeed. Or, I can just go get some slaves. :devil1:

But then again, a revolution might not be necessary. Perhaps, we can manage to convince enough people to get a peaceful change. It depends on the case. In the US, for instance, at some point the majority of the people in some states supported slavery, but the majority in other states didn't. There was a war, and those opposed to slavery won and imposed their preference – which, by the way, I approve of.

Much later, several states didn't allow interracial marriages, but then again, the SCOTUS ruled that the laws outlawing them were unconstitutional, so despite majorities in those states supporting segregation, they had to deal with it.

More recently, the SCOTUS struck down a law criminalizing some forms of sex (including anal sex) in Texas. I don't know whether the majority of Texans supported the law (probably most Americans didn't), but in any case, many did. Well, too bad, deal with it. :D I, by the way, approve of the Court's decisions.

Also, while the majority isn't always decisive, it usually matters, but then, one has to consider which majority matter (Lawmakers? The people of country? The people of state? The people of the world? The majority of presidents and prime ministers of developed countries? What will matter the most depends on the case. So, it's quite complicated actually. But I hope I'm at least explaining the gist of it.


(You gave me a bunch to chew on - will get to the rest as I can...)
Ok, I can wait. :)

I just hope that this debate continues, even if it takes time. I remember you and I had another debate long ago, but the thread just faded away. I'd rather see where the sticking points are, even if it takes time. Again, I can wait. :-)


I have discussed with people who have thought throught the issues and are consistently subjectivist on their morality - I don't see a truly logical inconsistency, except that it seems sub-human, if it is truly consistent.
Great. :D

I mean, “Sub-human” makes me think that you disapprove of it;), but that's ok, we can discuss that. The acknowledgment that someone can be a subjectivist and be consistent is a start. :-)

Of course, some subjectivists can be inconsistent or talk nonsense, but it's good o see that you don't put all subjectivists in that category. :-)

To be truly consistent in subjectivist morality, one must be willing to say, for instance:

-There is nothing wrong with slavery. Some people find it significantly distasteful, some people do and have liked it, and we all have different preferences regarding it. If someone tried to enslave you, and you didn't like it, you can fight back and try to force your desire for freedom onto your enslavers, but there is nothing MORE moral about what you are doing than what he is doing.
I disagree. One need not be willing to say that there's nothing wrong with slavery. One may be consistent and keep saying that slavery is wrong, in the sense that one disapproves of it.

As for whether there's something more moral, then you have introduced a new term I'd have to ask you about. What is it for something to be “more moral” (or, in general, moral)?


-There is nothing wrong with rape. If you don't like being raped, then you should try to force that standard on society. But people that are against rape are no more or less moral than people who like to rape. They have different preferences. If your particular preference is such that you find rape absolutely repugnant, you have the ability to pressure the rest of society to force its view on you - but realize that rapists are simply doing the same with their preferences, and are no less moral for trying to enforce their preferences....
No, in order to be a consistent subjectivist, one need not be willing to say, “there's nothing wrong with rape”. It's a possibility, but not a necessity. One may claim, “rape is wrong” to express one's disapproval of rape.

As for being more or less moral, again, I'd have to ask you to explain that term, please. The word can be used and has been used in more than one sense.

As for having the ability to pressure the rest of the society, I'm not sure what you mean. In the case of rape, I doubt pressure would be necessary where you or I live. Then again, other societies allowed (and some still do) many instances of rape – they, of course, wouldn't call it rape, but I'm using the definitions accepted in your state, for instance.

For instance, in some societies, there is:

R1) Rape because of age:

Different societies would allow sex with people who aren't allowed to consent where you live. That could take the form of arranged marriages, or not. In the case of arranged marriages, in some cases, the husband will have to wait before he can have sex, but not always for that long.

R2) Arranged marriages:

While it's not the case that the woman never has a say, it's also not uncommon or disallowed that women have to marry men they don't like. Then, they have to have sex with them.

R3) Spousal rape (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spousal_rape)

In many societies, and even until recently, the husband was allowed to force his wife to have sex with him, if he so chose.

R4) Slavery + rape:

Men could buy women – or get them by conquest – and then the women (their slaves) would have no say on the issue of sex (i.e., they wouldn't be allowed to resist).

R5) Other forms of servitude:

For instance, the feudal lord

Additionally, the way of dealing with rape has changed a lot. In the past, in some societies, the law considered rape as a crime against property (of the husband, father, etc.); others required raped women to commit “suicide”, etc.

I do find all that morally offensive.


Etc., etc., etc. This is consistent subjective morality - the moment someone judges between two moral systems and says one is "better", "more moral" or whatever, the two systems are being judged by an external, objective standard.

No, that is not the case. Many people will say that a band is much better than another, or a TV show is, etc. Consider the following propositions:

http://datawarrior.almostfabulous.com/cgi-bin/tild.cgi?200305
PR1: Buffy is way better than Angel.

http://darkhat.blogspot.com/2007/07/jessica-alba-is-hotter-than-your.html
PR2: Jessica Alba is hotter than your girlfriend

http://jyte.com/cl/hot-chocolate-is-better-than-coffee
PR3: Hot chocolate is better than coffee.

Of course, anyone could easily google and find plenty of examples like that. There's nothing inconsistent or nonsensical about any of those statements, and they do not require any belief in objective hotness, objective TV goodness, or objective yumminess in order for those statements to make sense and be not contradictory.


Now, if there is an objective standard, that is fine - we CAN say "Morality X makes for more peaceful societies." Sure, that is objective, and can be measured, and is still consistent with subjectivist moralilty. The two subjects in question have their own morality, and you are using some particular, unchanging standard (what is peaceful for society, etc.) to judge which better conforms to that particular standard. Sure, and that is fine.

Indeed. For instance, I saw comparisons between normative systems based on how well they reflected the moral intuitions of most people in a given society, or how good they are at promoting world peace, etc.


But then the rapists or slave traders can say, "So? What do I care about peaceful society? I want what I want." We could all agree that some moralities are better for making peaceful societies....

But why is "wanting a peaceful society" better than "wanting a chaotic society"?
Because “better” is judged from one's perspective.

Of course, I could give reasons for my preference – just as one can give reasons for the statement “Buffy is way better than Angel”. Those reasons can be attempts to capture the particular characteristics of the conduct or the TV series that result on one's preference, or attempts to appeal to the other person's sense of right and wrong (which will probably have at least something in common with one's or of TV goodness (in which some agreement may be found too), or both.

Whether those attempts are successful is another matter. The point is that they make sense, and are consistent (well, not necessarily, but not necessarily inconsistent, either; that depends on the particular arguments).

Back to the peaceful vs. chaotic society, I could argue that the peaceful one is better because most people will live much happier lives, the latter will have terrible suffering all around, etc. Of course, someone can then ask “but then why are happier lives/less suffering better than the alternative”, etc. And of course, at some point, the answer will be something like “it's self-evident” (in other words, “because I say so, and I hope and perhaps expect others to agree”).

And to the extent that we're all humans, there's going to be at least some degree of agreement on moral issues, as there will be in matters of gustatory preferences, or sexual preferences, etc. Of course, there will also be disagreements. In the case of morality, the agreement will increase with the similarity between environmental factors the people involved in the conversation have been exposed to – though genetic factors might play a role as well. The same can be said about other preferences (for examples and details, see post #26).

Sure, again you go into people's happiness, preferences of the majorities, etc.
Or a variety of other things. Sure. :)


But you still are left with, at core, there is nothing more 'inherently' moral about being an abolishonist than being a slave trader. They are simply different preferences. If one is OK with saying that slave traders are truly no more or less moral than abolishionists, that rapists are no more or less moral than defenders of public peace... but that they simply have different prefernces.... I find that to be at least consistent.
Again, I'd have to ask what you mean by “more moral”.

Even someone who actually does not uses the words “right” and “wrong” could talk about things or people being “more moral” than others. One just has to be careful to be clear.

For instance:
http://www.wjh.harvard.edu/~jgreene/GreeneWJH/Greene-Dissertation.pdf

Ask a garden-variety Westerner what it is to be a moral person and you might get
an answer like this: “A moral person is one who thinks about what’s right and
what’s wrong, tries to do the right thing, and usually manages to do so.” You
also might get an answer like this: “A moral person is one who doesn’t just think
about herself, but who thinks about the interests of others and tries to take the
interests of others into account in her actions.”
I'm not arguing I agree with all of Greene's arguments – or, in particular, regarding his arguments against the use of words like “right” and “wrong”. I'm just providing an example of different uses of the expression “more moral”.

In that sense, someone opposing slavery can be more moral than someone supporting it.

There are other senses that might be taken into consideration – for instance, whether someone is acting on moral preferences, or other preferences (sexual desire, etc.). They may all be preferences, but they aren't of the same kind (just like gustatory preferences aren't the same as musical preferences).


But I find very, very few people who are willing to go that far. Typically, people still want to say that some such behavior is WRONG. Not "inefficient for making peaceful societies", Not "disruptive", but WRONG. If so, they are, perhaps unwittingly, appealing to an eternal, unchanging, dare I say, "supernatural" standard.
Or they're simply expressing their disapproval and trying to convince others, and they just choose to use that word, like people can say that “Buffy” is great, or Jessica Alba is hot, etc., without appealing to any magical standard.

If words like “right” and “wrong” have a considerable obfuscatory potential, they don't get anywhere near words like “objective” and “subjective”, which I dare say are used as some kind of magical words, as if the former could make their arguments somehow “inherently” better and their imposing of their preferences somehow “inherently” justified (what does "inherently" mean in context? It's a magical word ;-) Sorry I couldn't resist it).


Personally, I work with victims of crimes quite often. And I would find it so, well, WRONG, to tell a rape victim, "Well, what your rapist did was right for him. He didn't do anything 'wrong', and he isn't any more or less moral than you. What he did hurts you and brings about less peaceful societies, and, because we want a peaceful society, we'll try to lock him up. But remember, he didn't do anything WRONG. Just that he has a different standard."
Under many circumstances, I too would disapprove of saying that.

But why try to lecture the rape victim in metaethics? :confused:

If I were to say something, I'd rather say something like, “sun of a bitch!”, or try to sympathize with her. Then again, I don't know much about how to treat rape victims, so in reality, I'd probably not say a word unless I think she wants me to say something. But then again, what I'd do in that situations or what some subjectivist would do isn't the point. The point is about the consistency and meaningfulness of subjectivism.

But, with a consistently subjective moral perspective, I don't see an alternative.
Why?

I've been providing alternatives since the thread started, and other posters have do so as well. If you disagree and don't think that the alternatives in question are consistent, I'd like to know why you think so, so I can defend them, because as I see it, I've already made arguments that should be compelling, but I can't defend them if I don't know what your objections are. :)

As far as I can tell, now you'd seem to be saying that if someone has a consistent subjective moral perspective, then you'd judge their actions “wrong” (what you mean, I don't know; but at least you mean you'd disapprove of their actions).

Is my interpretation of your post correct?

I mean, if someone is a consistent subjectivist, are you saying that he's condemned to offend you? Whenever you think a moral decision is required, are his actions, regardless of what they are, offensive to you, as long as they're consistent with his subjectivism? Just because of his metaethical beliefs?

No offense; maybe I misread, but I get the impression that this guy – the consistent subjectivist – would offend you because of his beliefs. In fact, you'd call his actions “wrong” because of his beliefs.

But what would you have him do, in order for him not to offend you? Demanding that he choose to change his beliefs is beyond his possibilities, I think. I mean, for instance, I can't just “choose to believe” in Athena, Thor, or “objective” morality – in any of the senses that would somehow magically justify the imposition of norms beyond one's own preference. (I don't know whether you consider me to be a consistent subjectivist, but anyway, you acknowledge that there are some consistent subjectivists, so this applies to them at least)

So, my question is: are those people (i.e., consistent subjectivists) bound to offend you?

If so, well, that would be your preference – which I definitely wouldn't share. But if that's what you say (if it not, sorry for the misunderstanding; please clarify :)) what I would challenge is any claim that you have anything beyond your preference to call their actions “wrong”.



I think I hit some of your later points already - I can find them consistent, but not meaningful.

Ok, but by “not meaningful” at least you're not saying that they're talking nonsense or making meaningless noise – given that you can find them consistent.


. Sure, it is consistent to say that between abolishonists and slave traders, neither is more moral than the other, but they have different preferences. I find it meaningless, though - or, perhaps more accurately, to have a 'sad' meaning. People that fought for other's freedom against the greed of a system that enslaved humans WERE more moral than those that bought into the greed, etc. A system of morality that says that neither is more moral than the other is not just meaningless - it has presents a downright sad meaning - to me, at least.
There are different meanings to the expression “more moral”. Some are accessible to consistent subjectivists. I'm not sure what you mean by those expressions, though.


And, using the words "People absolutely did, in fact, objectively, walk on the moon" have no effect on people who are convinced that the moon landing was faked. Just because someone is wrong doesn't mean that the 'object' of their belief is therefore subjective.
No, but then again, if you don't convince people to refrain from doing X, and you force them not to do X, you force your preference on them, regardless of what supernatural magical words you could try to appeal to.


Sure, people really did walk on the moon - it is an objective fact. that some people don't believe it does not cease to make it objectively true.

I would say, for instance, that rape is objectively wrong - that some people don't believe that does not make it cease to be objectively true that it is wrong.

The difference is that when you say that people really did walk on the Moon (objectively, or whatever), I understand.

When you say that rape is objectively wrong, I understand your disapproval, but the use of the word “objective” means nothing to me, since I don't know what “wrong” would mean beyond that disapproval.

Furthermore, regardless of whatever fact of the universe you may be trying to invoke, if you say, for example, that adult consensual incest is objectively wrong, and A8 and A9 are adults siblings who want to have sex with one another and don't find ACI morally offensive, then if you use any kind of force to stop them or punish them, you're forcing your preferences on them. It doesn't matter what kind of a fact of the universe you “ACI is morally wrong” might be; they have a different preference, and yours is only better in your eyes, and the eyes of those of similar preferences.

As for rape, I'll grant you that you'll find much more agreement to stop the rapist. I would agree, for one.


(Also, for clarification - I certainly believe that large parts of morality are in fact subjective. The Bible itself makes that plain enough in various places - what may be wrong for one person may in fact not be wrong for another - there is a large degree of subjectivity in morality - that change based on a person's understanding of things, culture, background, experiences, and such things. But underneath this is an objective foundation that some things just ARE wrong, and some ARE right. It is possible, even amidst the various subjectivism, to be able to say that some things ARE wrong.)

Well, then, that looks like a big concession to anti-realism, so I guess I may be misinterpreting you. Could you provide some examples, please?


P1) That rotten cow carcass is not yummy.

Subjective, though probably universally true for humans. Vultures, on the other hand...


P2) A female warthog is not hotter than Jessica Alba.

Subjective, though I sure hope universally true for huamns. (Although, for a male warthog....)




P3) Flower A and flower B are of the same color.

(for P3, assume that both A and B look the same, from a chromatic perspective, to the vast majority of humans, but quite different to bees and some birds).

Well, as you hinted in the question, depends on your exact definition of 'same' If you're getting extremely specific in the definitions, you'd probably say that absolutely no two flowers on the entire planet emit the exactly identical frequency of light patterns, and therefore, objectively false. If we're using an extremly precise, exacting definition of the word 'same', then there are objectively probably very few things that are objectively the 'same' - until you start speaking of water molecules.... Even then, each one probably has some slight variation in the locations & velocities of subatomic particles.....

Idea, still, being that something that is objectively true is true no matter who (or what) looks at it, and, if they don't see it, then they are wrong.

I happen to be color blind - so when I see a traffic light made of red, yellow, and white lights.... I know I am wrong. I subjectively see something different because of a deficiency in my color vision. So, sure, a human that says that the two flowers are the same color (and they mean by that, exact, identical wavelengths, etc.), then they are objectively wrong.

If they are using the implied meaning that a person would when they say they are the same color - meaning, "Although there are technically innumerable numbers of different colors in the spectrum of light, when speaking of the way that we humans typically categorize colors in basic categories as red, orange, yellow, green, blue, and violet... These two flowers are both red...."

Then yes, in that sense, objectively true. Assuming that the person had adequate color vision, unlike myself.


Why is P1 subjective, and P3 objective?

After all, the perceptions of all nearly all humans would render the carcass not yummy, like they would see the flowers as having the same colors, right?

But there's a more fundamental problem here, and I think that this will show why the claim of objectivity wouldn't help your case for morality.

You say that two flowers are objectively white (for instance) even though bees and many birds see them as having very different colors.

But what make them have the same color, objectively?

How did the came to be objectively of the same color?

If evolution had taken a different turn, would they be objectively of the same color?

Suppose now that someone wants to make a similar argument with regard to, say, adult consensual incest. Back to my previous example, just consider the following case: O1 says that adult, consensual incest (ACI) is objectively wrong, and that preventing it is objectively right. A1 and A2 are siblings who want to have sex:

O1: Don't do it.

A1: Why?

O1: Because it's wrong.

A2: Yes, we know you disapprove of it. We disagree.

O1: No, it's not just that I disapprove of ACI. It is objectively wrong.

A1: What's that supposed to mean?

O1: That it's objectively wrong just like those two flowers are objectively of the same color – namely, white.

A2: But what is this “wrongness”? Why would we not want to do what's “wrong”, in that particular sense?

O1: Because it's wrong. It's a fact.

A1: Yes, but what kind of fact? That the Earth is not flat is a fact. But we still want to have sex. What does it even mean that ACI wrong, beyond the fact that you disapprove of it?

O1: Any person with a normal sense of right and wrong will disapprove of what you're trying to do, just like any person with normal vision will perceive the two flowers as having the same color.

A1: Actually, there's no such hard-wired sense of right and wrong, but let's assume, for the sake of the argument, that there is. So, we'll grant you, for the sake of the argument, that humans evolved such a mechanism, just as they evolved eyes that would see the flowers as having the same color. Now, we don't perceive incest as wrong, so why would we not do it?

O1: Because it's objectively wrong, regardless of your perceptions. Your perceptions are faulty just as those of someone who didn't perceive those flowers as having the same colors would be faulty. But you're mistaken, ACI is wrong.

A1: Yes, for the sake of the argument, we're granting that in that sense, it's objectively wrong, so we're not mistaken – we grant the point. So, having that trait (i.e., perceiving ACI as morally offensive) was conducive to the reproductive success of our ancestors. However, we don't perceive it as morally offensive, we like each other, and we want to have sex. Why would we not have sex?


O1: Because it's objectively wrong, like the two flowers are objectively white.

A2: Yes, we granted you that already. But one's own sense of right and wrong is motivational, not the alleged unique sense of right and wrong that helped our ancestors reproduce, even if it existed. That having those moral intuitions (by assumption) helped them be more successful breeders is not a reason for us to behave in line with them. So, again, I'll grant you that it's “objectively” wrong in that sense. So, why would we not do it?

At this point, if O1 forces A1 and A2 not to have sex, O1 is forcing his own preference on them, even if O1 happens to believe that what he's doing is “objectively” right, and even if O1 were (let's assume for the sake of the argument) correct that humans evolved mechanisms to find ACI morally repugnant and to find preventing ACI morally right. O1 would be acting on a preference that is the result of genetic factors (which came to be because of past reproductive success of certain hunter-gatherers), imposing his preference on A1 and A2, who have different preferences as a result of a combination of genetic and environmental factors.

Is O1's preference “better”?

No. Why? Because I don't find it better, and I judge from my perspective – also a result of a combination of genetic and environmental factors. Of course, I agree that other people would perceive it differently.

I hope that, by now, the point I was trying to make is clear enough:

Whether wrongness is subjective or objective in accordance to your definition, people would always be impossing their preferences on others, and the relative worth of two of those preferences can only be evaluated from the perspective of one's preference. “Objectiveness” in the sense you mentioned is irrelevant to the matter under discussion.


Why, then, would it matter if wrongness is objective?

Ok, sorry about those colors. :D

I'm just kind of hoping – perhaps, not wisely, given my experience in on-line discussions – that I might convince you. Plus, to be honest, the repeated contention that objective subjectivists somehow have no choice but to do something “wrong” is slightly upsetting, especially because of a claim of “objectivity” of that accusation – as if that made it somehow magically stronger. But no offense intended.


P4) God has banned adult, consensual incest.

Objectively true, insofar as the Bible is correctly understood to include an accurate record of things that God has banned.
And if it isn't?

Let's say, for the sake of the argument, that atheism is correct (just bear with me; it's merely for the sake of the argument; I'm definitely not trying to convince you of that one).

Would the flowers not be objectively white, despite God's nonexistence?

Let's further assume (though this assumption is false, but bear with me again) that humans evolved a unique sense of right and wrong that yields ACI as “wrong”, but A1 and A2 still want to have sex, and they're siblings – they just don't perceive ACI as morally offensive, because of some combination of environmental and genetic factors.

The flowers would still be objectively white, and ACI would still be, in the sense you brought up, objectively wrong. Yet, as explained, if O1 tried to impose his preferences on A1 and A2, again, he'd just be acting on a genetically-based preference, imposing it against a genetically+environmentally based preference.

My question is:

How does the issue of objective vs. subjective matters?

Is it not merely a red herring? (or a herring of some other color, if you prefer ;-))

To be clear, I'm not arguing that the existence of the God of the Bible would change matters; I'm merely trying to convince you that whether moral statements are objective or subjective in the meaning you intended, is irrelevant. If we can get past that (I know, I know ;-)), we can later discuss other meanings of "objective", and the issue of God and whether He'd be relevant, etc.

However, if you still think that "objective" and "subjective" actually make a difference, I'd like to know why, so that I can try to address your objections. :-)

[Gundulf]

Also, for clarification - I certainly believe that large parts of morality are in fact subjective. The Bible itself makes that plain enough in various places - what may be wrong for one person may in fact not be wrong for another - there is a large degree of subjectivity in morality - that change based on a person's understanding of things, culture, background, experiences, and such things. But underneath this is an objective foundation that some things just ARE wrong, and some ARE right. It is possible, even amidst the various subjectivism, to be able to say that some things ARE wrong.Bolds mine: The Bible?? Decades of anthropological, zoological research, yet you prefer what some ignorant goat herders wrote?? Based on what?? Humans can be observed to be animals, animals have instincts. It is to be expected that some core instincts resides within human that create the basis for morality and establish a propensity towards certain behaviours. Observations don't support the view that immanent morality transcends the bare basics.

If what you say is true, how can I trust anything that you or any human believes - if our beliefs about truth, morality, goodness, and the like are simply complex animal instincts, why should I trust ANYONE's? Our animal instincts have given us the Hitlers, Mother Thereseas, Pol Pot's, Stalins, Ghandis, Ted Bundys of the world, all of whom believed what they were doing was right. Some of those 'core instincts' you would call 'good', some you would call 'bad'. Lying seems to be a consistent human instinct when cornered, as does aggression, murder, and lots of other things.

If our observations support the idea that our morality is simply an animal instinct, more advanced than that of other animals, why in the world should I trust any human being's idea of what is moral?

[Antiplastic]

Bolds mine: The Bible?? Decades of anthropological, zoological research, yet you prefer what some ignorant goat herders wrote?? Based on what?? Humans can be observed to be animals, animals have instincts. It is to be expected that some core instincts resides within human that create the basis for morality and establish a propensity towards certain behaviours. Observations don't support the view that immanent morality transcends the bare basics.

If what you say is true, how can I trust anything that you or any human believes - if our beliefs about truth, morality, goodness, and the like are simply complex animal instincts, why should I trust ANYONE's? Our animal instincts have given us the Hitlers, Mother Thereseas, Pol Pot's, Stalins, Ghandis, Ted Bundys of the world, all of whom believed what they were doing was right. Some of those 'core instincts' you would call 'good', some you would call 'bad'. Lying seems to be a consistent human instinct when cornered, as does aggression, murder, and lots of other things.

If our observations support the idea that our morality is simply an animal instinct, more advanced than that of other animals, why in the world should I trust any human being's idea of what is moral?

You've sold me. Clearly, the moral views of a tyrannical invisible jew who lives in the clouds and is obsessed with menstruation and chopping the heads off of penises is a highly trustworthy source of moral instruction.

Seriously, do Christians ever think about what their book says? Ever?

[Gundulf]

Sure, God doesn't follow a system of conduct that he designed for humans....Point being?That seems to contradict "Being created in God's likeness". If we are created in his likeness, why should we be under a different system of conduct? It is also evident that your objective morality is based on God's subjective choices.

It seems that you are able to see that the normal Christian benevolent God doesn't fit the evidence. Basically, your God is as Evil as he is good, yet you remain a Christian. I can understand your basic conception of God (in essence Pantheistic), but I can not understand your Christianity, since Christianity itself doesn't fit the evidence. It comes to your choice in believing that the Biblical myth is true.

:rolleyes: The same reason that a child that is very much like me, in many respects, still has to go obey a different set of guidelines than I do... Don't tell me that, when you were a kid, you had the EXACT same privileges and responsibilities as your parents?

Look, God is conceived as the unquestioned Lord and master of the universe, and besides that authority that comes just by having made the world, just being omniscient and perfectly just should give a person more rights than the normal person.

A person who is omniscient doesn't need to get a couple of witnesses before he can judge whether someone is guilty of a crime. We humans need to do that, God doesn't. If you're omniscient, you know if someone is guilty or not.

We can't go around executing vigilante style justice without a court, because we really can't know if we're being actually just, for instance. If God wanted to (which he seems to have done numerous times in the Bible, striking people dead out of the blue here and there, etc.,) - what, you call him unjust because the guy struck dead didn't have a trial? If one is omniscient, you know if a person is guilty.

God can do stuff that the people in his image aren't allowed to do for more or less the same reason we don't let 6-year olds drive cars.

If you are equating the terms 'benevolent' with 'good', then I must challenge those definitions. Granted, good can be a synonym of 'benevolent', but it can also be a synonym of 'tasty' - when we say God is 'good' we Christians mean a very specific sense of 'good' - that is, morally good.

Morally good is not synonymous with benevolent. This is why I have such a hissy fit when someone tries to describe the Christian God as "omnibenevolent." He is most certainly not omnibenevolent, and no Christian formation of who God is for the last two thousand years has described him as such. They describe him as "all good" but not "all benevolent", and for a reason.

When God does things that are less than 'benevolent' (flooding the world, sending plagues, striking people dead) - these actions are admittedly, by definition, not benevolent. Nor are they evil, however. They are morally good. A police officer is not demonstrating 'benevolence' when he shoots at an armed man intent on killing an innocent bystander... and this is morally good of him.

God is understood by Christians as benevolent, sure - and at times certainly NOT benevolent. But when God did things that were obviously not rooted in benevolence - flooding the world, sending plagues, sending Christ to suffer on a cross, etc., etc., we Christians would never conceive of such things as 'evil' - while I understand of course that you probably would. But we see them all as part of his righteousness, justice, hatred toward evil (which is required of a 'good' being) and basically, these less than benevolent actions are rooted in his goodness.

Being good kind of requires that one show malevolence toward evil, after all. Showing benevolence to evil is, well, evil.

[Gundulf]

If what you say is true, how can I trust anything that you or any human believes - if our beliefs about truth, morality, goodness, and the like are simply complex animal instincts, why should I trust ANYONE's? Our animal instincts have given us the Hitlers, Mother Thereseas, Pol Pot's, Stalins, Ghandis, Ted Bundys of the world, all of whom believed what they were doing was right. Some of those 'core instincts' you would call 'good', some you would call 'bad'. Lying seems to be a consistent human instinct when cornered, as does aggression, murder, and lots of other things.

If our observations support the idea that our morality is simply an animal instinct, more advanced than that of other animals, why in the world should I trust any human being's idea of what is moral?

You've sold me. Clearly, the moral views of a tyrannical invisible jew who lives in the clouds and is obsessed with menstruation and chopping the heads off of penises is a highly trustworthy source of moral instruction.

Seriously, do Christians ever think about what their book says? Ever?

Well, my point on this thread is more that, if there is no such a thing as objective morality, then NO source is trustworthy for moral instruction, since no morality can objectively be better than another - you just have the various preferences.

[Gundulf]

Seriously, do Christians ever think about what their book says? Ever?

(I like to think I do - which is why object to such nonsense as calling him 'omnibenevolent'... ;) )

[Angra Mainyu]

Well, my point on this thread is more that, if there is no such a thing as objective morality, then NO source is trustworthy for moral instruction, since no morality can objectively be better than another - you just have the various preferences.
And respectfully, I think I have already shown that whether morality is objective in the sense you mean it, is irrelevant with respect to the matter at hand: morality could be objective and people would still just be enforcing their preferences. :)

You could still argue that objective morality wouldn't guarantee that people would have more than their preferences, but lack of objective morality would make it impossible for anyone to enforce anything but their preferences, in which case objective morality would be a necessary even if insufficient condition. However, I think I've shown that adding other conditions such as God, would still not change the matter.

[figuer]

If what you say is true, how can I trust anything that you or any human believes ...If our observations support the idea that our morality is simply an animal instinct, more advanced than that of other animals, why in the world should I trust any human being's idea of what is moral?You seem to have no trouble trusting the moral ideas of ancient ignorant Hebrews....but that is irrelevant. The fact is: there is no reason to 'trust' anyone's morality, not even your own. Morality is not about trust, it is about functionality. You observe actions and their consequences, evaluate, and decide if they are worthy or not, based on your self-interest and the interest of those you are attached to.

[figuer]

The same reason that a child that is very much like me, in many respects, still has to go obey a different set of guidelines than I do... Don't tell me that, when you were a kid, you had the EXACT same privileges and responsibilities as your parents?.....Being good kind of requires that one show malevolence toward evil, after all. Showing benevolence to evil is, well, evil.Yes, you are childish, enough to believe old mythical tales are the word of a god, and fit instruction in the matters of the world. Humans (at least a minority), have matured, we are no longer in our infancy, and with our maturity comes the realisation that understanding God/Universe-morality, is an ongoing process, that shouldn't depend on the mystical ramblings of some ignorant goat herder. Your Biblical God is not good, as he certainly is credited with creating the evil in the world. His ill-temper is not just to punish evil, evil is his responsability, his choice, the product of his whim and desire.

[Gundulf]

If I want to use the word “wrong” (which isn't necessarily the case), I can say that slavery is wrong, and refer to my disapproval.

Of course, A7 else might say it's not wrong, and refer to his own lack of disapproval or to whatever else he might mean by that. I can still say that that A7's position is wrong, but not in the sense of “mistaken”; instead, I would be expressing that I disapprove of his position.

As for whether slavery will be allowed, of course the resolution will be that whoever is more powerful will impose their will – obviously, if they're more powerful they can't lose; else they wouldn't be more powerful, unless you're using “powerful” in a different manner.

Of course, I don't have to accept that because they're more powerful and accept slavery, then slavery is right. I can still say it's wrong, expressing my disapproval – or I can simply say that I disaprove of it. Of course, I can also take different actions (trying to get people to perceive slavery as morally offensive, organize a revolution maybe, etc.). Perhaps, if I'm going for a revolution, I'll find it easy to gather support from a good number of people – namely, most slaves. If the plan goes well, I (or we, since it'd be a collective effort, of course) might be able to shift the balance of power in our favor, and succeed. Or, I can just go get some slaves. :devil1:


Wow, you wrote me a book. I'll work through the rest as I have opportunity.

As for this part - fair enough. You are consistent enough to say that things you disapprove of are only wrong 'for you', or that you 'disapprove.' Typically, though, when someone says that 'slavery is wrong' they sure seem to be implying more than their own personal disapproval - since they go the next step and say that the other person is wrong for holding his preference.

That is the point I'll challenge you on for the moment - Though you are clarifying it by saying that when you say that another person is 'wrong' for his beliefs, you don't mean by that 'mistaken', just expressing your disapproval....

I still submit that you are using language that implies something else. In any other context, when you say that another person "IS wrong", you generally mean that they are objectively incorrect/mistaken. When you look at a person's math homework and say that their answer for #4 "IS wrong" - you're not expressing disapproval, you're saying that they are objectively incorrect. When you look in history at the people that think the sun revolved around the earth and say that they "were wrong" you're not expressing disapproval, you're expressing the idea that they were 'mistaken.'

Even when I use the term in jest (like when someone tells me they like pepper on their ice cream, and I tell them - "That is just wrong..." I am, in jest, expressing my disapproval - but doing so in language that they know normally would mean that they are, in fact, mistaken for believing that such is a good thing.

So why use language that, in every other context means "You are mistaken"? I can't help but think the intent is to imply just a tiny bit more than "I disapprove."

HAven't read the rest of your response, you might have gotten to it below, but I personally think many people (not necessarily yourself) use such language because they instinctively know how weak it would be to say what they really mean. "I disapprove of slavery - there is nothing wrong with your belief that it is OK, but I personally disapprove of it." "I disapprove of rape - there is nothing truly 'wrong' about you that you like it, but I strongly disapprove." That is so weak, that people don't speak like that - they would much rather say "slavery is wrong" or "rape is wrong" and, by that, mean that people that believe it is in fact good aren't just expressing a different opinion, but a mistaken one.

Will dig into the rest of your response as I can...

[Gundulf]

Well, my point on this thread is more that, if there is no such a thing as objective morality, then NO source is trustworthy for moral instruction, since no morality can objectively be better than another - you just have the various preferences.
And respectfully, I think I have already shown that whether morality is objective in the sense you mean it, is irrelevant with respect to the matter at hand: morality could be objective and people would still just be enforcing their preferences. :)

You could still argue that objective morality wouldn't guarantee that people would have more than their preferences, but lack of objective morality would make it impossible for anyone to enforce anything but their preferences, in which case objective morality would be a necessary even if insufficient condition. However, I think I've shown that adding other conditions such as God, would still not change the matter.


This, I think I generally agree with - I'll have to read through the rest of what you wrote to see the fuller treatment. But I would concur - a deistic universe, for instance, could have a philosophical basis for saying "there is an objective morality, a true right and wrong..." - but, if God hadn't seen fit to tell us, it is still up to our best guess as to what is, in fact, right, and what is, in fact, wrong. We'd still be enforcing preferences, not the bona fide, genuine, objective rights and wrongs of the universe.

At that level, I think we concur.

[Angra Mainyu]

As for this part - fair enough. You are consistent enough to say that things you disapprove of are only wrong 'for you', or that you 'disapprove.' Typically, though, when someone says that 'slavery is wrong' they sure seem to be implying more than their own personal disapproval - since they go the next step and say that the other person is wrong for holding his preference.
They're at least expressing their disapproval. Whatever else they say, I don't know. But my point is that there's no inconsistency in using it for expressing disapproval. At most, you could argue that subjectivists who hold that people usually use those words to refer to their own disapproval only, are in error. But they wouldn't be inconsistent.

As for me, I'm not sure what people refer to. As I see it, different people seem to refer to different things, though at least they express their disapproval. In that sense, I wouldn't be one of the subjectivists you mention – though I wouldn't be an objectivist, either. Perhaps you'd count me as another type of subjectivist.

Regardless, my point is that subjectivists can be consistent.


That is the point I'll challenge you on for the moment - Though you are clarifying it by saying that when you say that another person is 'wrong' for his beliefs, you don't mean by that 'mistaken', just expressing your disapproval....

I still submit that you are using language that implies something else. In any other context, when you say that another person "IS wrong", you generally mean that they are objectively incorrect/mistaken.
No, I'm not saying that the other person is wrong for his beliefs. I'm saying that his stance is wrong, just like I could say, “slavery is wrong”, I'm not saying that slavery is in error. And if they say they support slavery, and I say that their stance is wrong, I'm saying that I disapprove of their preferred ethical system that allows slavery.


When you look at a person's math homework and say that their answer for #4 "IS wrong" - you're not expressing disapproval, you're saying that they are objectively incorrect. When you look in history at the people that think the sun revolved around the earth and say that they "were wrong" you're not expressing disapproval, you're expressing the idea that they were 'mistaken.'

Yes, but when you say, “slavery is wrong”, you're expressing your disapproval and maybe saying something else, but you're not saying that slavery is mistaken.

That said, I do recognize the obfuscatory potential of words like “right” and “wrong”, which is why I hardly ever use them – I'm using them here just to show that they can be used by a subjectivist.


Even when I use the term in jest (like when someone tells me they like pepper on their ice cream, and I tell them - "That is just wrong..." I am, in jest, expressing my disapproval - but doing so in language that they know normally would mean that they are, in fact, mistaken for believing that such is a good thing.
Your argument is an argument against the correctness of a type of subjectivism, not against its consistency.


So why use language that, in every other context means "You are mistaken"? I can't help but think the intent is to imply just a tiny bit more than "I disapprove."
The language is obfuscatory, yes. Why use it? Good question, I'd rather not. ;)

But there may be reasons. While a subjectivist may be expressing his disapproval, he may also be trying to do something about it – to convince others. Actually, morality is usually for social doing I'd say. So, for whatever reason, the subjectivists in question may think that using words like “right” and “wrong” carry a stronger emotional appeal, or it's just customary.

In any event, that's a challenge to the convenience of using such language on the part of the subjectivist. That depends on the case. But that's not a challenge to the consistency of subjectivism.


HAven't read the rest of your response, you might have gotten to it below, but I personally think many people (not necessarily yourself) use such language because they instinctively know how weak it would be to say what they really mean. "I disapprove of slavery - there is nothing wrong with your belief that it is OK, but I personally disapprove of it." "I disapprove of rape - there is nothing truly 'wrong' about you that you like it, but I strongly disapprove." That is so weak, that people don't speak like that - they would much rather say "slavery is wrong" or "rape is wrong" and, by that, mean that people that believe it is in fact good aren't just expressing a different opinion, but a mistaken one.

Will dig into the rest of your response as I can...
It's possible. Even subjectivists may want to use that language for that reason. After all, they may be talking to moral realists or objectivists who wouldn't take a “I disapprove” seriously, or so the subjectivists in question think. Whether they're correct about the issue (about what others would think) is another matter.


This, I think I generally agree with - I'll have to read through the rest of what you wrote to see the fuller treatment. But I would concur - a deistic universe, for instance, could have a philosophical basis for saying "there is an objective morality, a true right and wrong..." - but, if God hadn't seen fit to tell us, it is still up to our best guess as to what is, in fact, right, and what is, in fact, wrong. We'd still be enforcing preferences, not the bona fide, genuine, objective rights and wrongs of the universe.

At that level, I think we concur.

That's not what I've shown, though. I've shown that there could be objective moral facts, in the sense you define the word “objective”, without any deities. Atheism could be correct and yet there could be objective morality in the sense you define the word “objective”. I provided an example of that - not that the morality in that example actually exists, but the point is that it's compatible with atheism and objective. Actually, there are other objective moralities one could think of, compatible with atheism.

The morality I used as an example, while objective, would not change the fact that people would be just enforcing their preferences. The point is that “objective” doesn't help your case. I've shown that in the last part of my previous post.

[Antiplastic]

Morally good is not synonymous with benevolent. This is why I have such a hissy fit when someone tries to describe the Christian God as "omnibenevolent." He is most certainly not omnibenevolent, and no Christian formation of who God is for the last two thousand years has described him as such.

No formulation? Ever?

The omnibenevolence of God is given in my fourth argument, that God is the source of all objective moral values. He is the locus and embodiment of absolute goodness. So when you consider my cumulative case, yes, you do get the attributes of God.

http://www.leaderu.com/offices/billcraig/docs/washdeba-craig2.html

But in His omnibenevolence, He has actualized a world containing an optimal balance between saved and unsaved. God in His providence has so arranged the world that as the Christian gospel went out from first century Palestine, all who would respond freely to it if they heard it did hear it, and all who do not hear it are persons who would not have accepted it if they had heard it. In this way, Christian exclusivism may be seen to be compatible with the existence of an omnipotent and omnibenevolent God.

http://www.leaderu.com/offices/billcraig/docs/middle1.html

Omnibenevolence appears have a very casual usage among some Protestant Christian commentators. The earliest record for its use, according to the Oxford English Dictionary, is in 1679. The Catholic Church does not appear to use the term omnibenevolent in the liturgy or Catechism.

Modern appearances of the term include George H. Smith, in June 1980, in his book Atheism: The Case Against God,[1] where he argued that divine qualities are inconsistent. However, the term is also used by authors who defend the coherence of divine attributes, including but not limited to, Jonathan Kvanvig in The Problem of Hell,[2] and Hoffman and Rosenkrantz in The Divine Attributes.[3]

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Omnibenevolence

Go ahead. Pull the other one.

[Simen]

As for this part - fair enough. You are consistent enough to say that things you disapprove of are only wrong 'for you', or that you 'disapprove.' Typically, though, when someone says that 'slavery is wrong' they sure seem to be implying more than their own personal disapproval - since they go the next step and say that the other person is wrong for holding his preference..


Are you saying that Angra Mainyu is inconsistent, or are you saying that his usage of moral terms is inconsistent with what people seem to be implying by their usage of moral terms?

There is a difference between discussing whether moral value is real, and whether people think it's real. That's the difference between asking "is moral value real?" and asking "what do people mean when they say, 'This is wrong'?". You seem to be confusing the two.

[Gundulf]

Yes, but when you say, “slavery is wrong”, you're expressing your disapproval and maybe saying something else, but you're not saying that slavery is mistaken.


No, I'd be saying that people who think "slavery is right" are mistaken - and I mean, mistaken - not simply meeting with my disapproval.

[Gundulf]

Morally good is not synonymous with benevolent. This is why I have such a hissy fit when someone tries to describe the Christian God as "omnibenevolent." He is most certainly not omnibenevolent, and no Christian formation of who God is for the last two thousand years has described him as such.

No formulation? Ever?



http://www.leaderu.com/offices/billcraig/docs/washdeba-craig2.html



http://www.leaderu.com/offices/billcraig/docs/middle1.html

Omnibenevolence appears have a very casual usage among some Protestant Christian commentators. The earliest record for its use, according to the Oxford English Dictionary, is in 1679. The Catholic Church does not appear to use the term omnibenevolent in the liturgy or Catechism.

Modern appearances of the term include George H. Smith, in June 1980, in his book Atheism: The Case Against God,[1] where he argued that divine qualities are inconsistent. However, the term is also used by authors who defend the coherence of divine attributes, including but not limited to, Jonathan Kvanvig in The Problem of Hell,[2] and Hoffman and Rosenkrantz in The Divine Attributes.[3]

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Omnibenevolence

Go ahead. Pull the other one.

Try to google 'attributes of God' and let me know how many you find with 'omnibenevolent.' Craig (of whom I am unfamiliar, so invoking his name doesn't do much for me) is obviously using the term to mean "all-good." This is a terrible misapplication of the term, in my opinion, since "benevolent" does NOT mean "morally good."

Hence, I don't disagree with Craig's concept - insofar as he seems to mean that God is "all-good" - which you WILL find on all the Christian formations of God's character.

Using the term omnibenevolent to mean "all-benevolent" (interestingly enough), however, is clearly not accurate to describing the Christian God. I would imagine that, if pressed, Craig would concede that God is certainly NOT 'all-benevolent.'

I object to the word so much because the word means something that Christians do NOT believe about God (he is all-benevolent), but people use it to mean something different (all-good). Popular use seems to be from atheists and skeptics in applying the word to God (which smells to me of a straw man of sorts) - but then I have seen Christians start to take it up - not realizing that it means something, at core, that we don't believe about God, thinking the word simply means "all-good."


(By the way, I looked over the articles you linked - as doesn't surprise me, Craig isn't using the terms 'omnibenevolence' on his own, out of his Christian philosophy or theology - he is using the terms in response to a debate where someone else asked, "If God is omnipotent and omnibenevolent....."

He seems to have assumed that his opponent meant 'all-good' by 'omnibenevolent' and responded in kind.)

[fencingmatt]

Humans seem to often have a need to believe there is objective or absolute morality. Theism and religion seem often to play heavily on such beliefs, yet with humanism we do have secular universal morality. Does such a thing truly exist? Is it better for society if it DOES (or if we believe it does), or can a society function just as well with the belief that morality is entirely subjective?Well I don't think there is any form of objective morality. It doesn't and cannot exist as everyone's morality is different. And, while I agree that the creation of a certain morality which is deemed best for society may well benefit the human race, it does not always benefit the individual. That is what I base my morality on, the individual. Hence anything which interferes with the free will of another is immoral.

[Antiplastic]

No formulation? Ever?



http://www.leaderu.com/offices/billcraig/docs/washdeba-craig2.html



http://www.leaderu.com/offices/billcraig/docs/middle1.html



http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Omnibenevolence

Go ahead. Pull the other one.

Try to google 'attributes of God' and let me know how many you find with 'omnibenevolent.'

Why should I? I disproved your claim in rather dramatic and decisive fashion. If you're just going to backpedal and handwave whenever you've been shown to be wrong you'll fall off your bike.

And by the way, when last I checked, 9,440 was a larger number than zero. (http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&q=attributes+of+god+omnibenevolent&btnG=Search) Really, the thing to do is just swallow hard and move on.

[Gundulf]

Try to google 'attributes of God' and let me know how many you find with 'omnibenevolent.'

Why should I? I disproved your claim in rather dramatic and decisive fashion. If you're just going to backpedal and handwave whenever you've been shown to be wrong you'll fall off your bike.

And by the way, when last I checked, 9,440 was a larger number than zero. (http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&q=attributes+of+god+omnibenevolent&btnG=Search) Really, the thing to do is just swallow hard and move on.

And how many of your 9,440 were on Christian websites describing Christian attributes of God, and how many were from skeptical/atheist perspectives discussing the problem of evil? The very fact that the vast majority of your hits were from other-than-Christian perspectives smells of it being a straw man, does it not?

I don't deny that the term is gaining popularity in the last decades, and that (sadly) it might be finding its way into Christians' vocabularies (I don't vouch for how smart Christians are nowadays) - but regardless, it is a straw man argument. Christians do not believe that God is "all-benevolent."

[figuer]

No, I'd be saying that people who think "slavery is right" are mistaken - and I mean, mistaken - not simply meeting with my disapproval.Since the Bible allows slavery, you'd be saying the Bible is mistaken. Of course, I can imagine how that would be one of your "greater good" things. Thus, you will say that although the law god gave the hebrews permits slavery, god doesn't really like slavery. Although the new testament did not forbid slavery, god disproves it. This means the Bible is not a proper guide to morality, and that god shows his true intentions by other methods. Since your faith is based on the Bible, and not on other methods, you would be admitting that your faith is based on a faulty, incomplete book. This leaves you with nothing to base your faith on, but I am sure you'll find some nice square=circle excuse to continue on with your particular brand of theoaddiction.

[Angra Mainyu]

No, I'd be saying that people who think "slavery is right" are mistaken - and I mean, mistaken - not simply meeting with my disapproval.
Well, you claim that. I didn't say you didn't. :)

That aside, I'd appreciate if you addressed my argument in the last part of post #38, where I show that “objective” wouldn't change the fact that people would be enforcing their own preferences.

Not trying to be impatient :), but I remember the other thread, where the debate continued and my arguments were not addressed. If you disagree, I'd like to know why. :)

[arkirk]

Ethics is a better word for the description of a negotiated set of rules to live by. Rules should facilitate not only survival of the species, but also maximize our potentials to pursue good outcomes for as many as possible. The source of information we base these rules upon must be human experience. The more communication of factual material that occurs the better the rules. But...negotiation is at the heart of the establishment of rules. The idea of either intrinsic or divine rules of behavior existing (absolute and perfect) in a vacuum should have died with Plato.