Free will -- a beginners look [Archive I] - Page 5

kennethamy

December 14, 2006, 07:48 AM

But, he told me that freedom meant free from everything affecting his decisions. Compulsion or causation of any type. He did not want even to be possessed by a demon. He didn't want the man to give him a lobotomy and send him on his way. He would then not be tied up nor have a gun to his head, but he said explicitly that he wouldn't call that 'free'.

Are you saying that he told you something different?

Well, first of all, I think that King was specifically talking about how the social structure constrained people, and especially, Afro-Americans, and prevented them from having opportunities to advance themselves. And those are not just causes, those are constraining causes. And, constraint is, of course, a form of compulsion. Compulsion preventing people from attaining something. Not letting people do what they want to do.

In the second place, demon possession, or lobotomies are also constraining (compelling) causes. I don't think that King believed in demons, but if he did, then he would believe that demons who "possess" people are compelling them to do what they would not want to do. And, of course, a lobotomy, does the same thing.

So, you have not presented any counter-examples to the view that it is not causation alone that is antithetical to freedom, but compelling causation. Therefore, the examples you give, not only do not undermine compatibilism, but they are example that support compatibilism.

I think that Fast was right in an earlier post. You still have the idea that compatibilists think that causation does not prevent freedom. They do not believe that. What what they believe is that it is only a certain kind of causation, compelling causation, inhibits freedom. And, so do you. And so does Vicious Love. And so do we all who speak English.

I certainly agree that lack of clear understanding the the meanings of term lead to confusion. Who doesn't. But that doesn't mean that definition at the outset of the discussion will prevent problems, because definition at the outset may only beg the question, and shove the problem under the rug. We have to have some clarity at the start of the discussion, obviously. But full clarity will occur (if it does) only at the end of the discussion when the problems have been dealt with.

TomJrzk

December 14, 2006, 08:05 AM

I don't think that King believed in demons, but if he did, then he would believe that demons who "possess" people are compelling them to do what they would not want to do. And, of course, a lobotomy, does the same thing.
I'm glad you used the term 'think'. I thought maybe you were channeling him or possessed or something.

Yes, I knew the possession argument was weak, that's why I added the lobotomy. I disagree that a lobotomy compels someone to do something; it changes the processing in the brain to the point where they 'want' something else. It's changing the deterministic process within the brain; it's changing the causation of the decisions. That's my point and I think it's a darn good one, even if I have to say so myself ;).
I think that Fast was right in an earlier post. You still have the idea that compatibilists think that causation does not prevent freedom.

They do not believe that. What what they believe is that it is only a certain kind of causation, compelling causation, inhibits freedom. And, so do you. And so does Vicious Love. And so do we all who speak English.
We already know that my meaning of free means free from everything; including causation, just like our friendly Libertarians. You can say the same thing many different ways but we'll still be missing one another until you understand that.

I certainly agree that lack of clear understanding the the meanings of term lead to confusion. Who doesn't. But that doesn't mean that definition at the outset of the discussion will prevent problems, because definition at the outset may only beg the question, and shove the problem under the rug. We have to have some clarity at the start of the discussion, obviously. But full clarity will occur (if it does) only at the end of the discussion when the problems have been dealt with.
That's a step. Thank you.

kennethamy

December 14, 2006, 08:50 AM

I'm glad you used the term 'think'. I thought maybe you were channeling him or possessed or something.

Yes, I knew the possession argument was weak, that's why I added the lobotomy. I disagree that a lobotomy compels someone to do something; it changes the processing in the brain to the point where they 'want' something else. It's changing the deterministic process within the brain; it's changing the causation of the decisions. That's my point and I think it's a darn good one, even if I have to say so myself ;).

We already know that my meaning of free means free from everything; including causation, just like our friendly Libertarians. You can say the same thing many different ways but we'll still be missing one another until you understand that.

That's a step. Thank you.

Isn't the point of a lobotomy to prevent the patient from acting in certain ways? It is, therefore, a constraining cause. You need a different example.

You can mean whatever you like by any word you like. This is a free country (i.e. people in it are protected from the imposition of certain kinds of constraints by the government). But that is not what the word "free" means as ordinarily used. When I am rescued from terrorist kidnappers, I am freed from the restraints the terrorists imposed on me. That's is because I wanted to do certain things that the terrorists prevented me from doing. And, if I wanted to fly unaided, the laws of gravity would prevent me from doing so. And, in that case, the laws of gravity would be a constraining cause. However, the laws of gravity are not a constraining cause of the elliptical orbit of the Earth around the Sun, since the Earth does not want to orbit in any other way than elliptically. (And that, of course, does not mean that the Earth wants to orbit elliptically, either).

That "step" (as you call it) is one I try to take whenever I post. It is important to be as clear as possible, since philosophical problems often are caused by confusions in language, which, in turn, cause confused thinking. In contexts like this one I always like to quote Wittgenstein:

"Philosophy is a constant battle against the bewitchment of the intelligence by language".

As for the powers of definition at the outset of a discussion, I always like to tell about how Abraham Lincoln once asked his son, Tod, this question:

If a dog's tail were called "a leg" then how many legs would a dog have? Tod dutifully replied, "Five legs". And Lincoln replied, "Wrong! calling a dog's tail a "leg" doesn't make a dog's tail a leg" . Lincoln knew how much power definition does not have. And calling a person who is free, "not free" only because there are causes acting on him rather than constraining causes, does not make that person, "not free".

TomJrzk

December 14, 2006, 09:00 AM

Isn't the point of a lobotomy to prevent the patient from acting in certain ways? It is, therefore, a constraining cause. You need a different example.
I think it does more than that. It seems like it removes 'initiative'. Yes, Wiki defines lobotomy as the removal of the prefrontal cortex where:
The basic activity of this brain region is considered to be orchestration of thoughts and actions in accordance with internal goals.
A perfect example of what I mean. You've changed the cause of decisions because you've changed the deterministic brain. Causation, not coercion, not compulsion, thank you very much.

sweetiepie

December 14, 2006, 09:09 AM

kennethamy

December 14, 2006, 09:12 AM

kennethamy

December 14, 2006, 09:14 AM

The legal definition, which is the one you're referring to, that is used to arrive at effective preventative justice, is a lot cleaner then the philosophical bullshit one.

Sorry. Definition of what? It would be better if you explained what you were talking about, rather than just shooting as you drove by.

sweetiepie

December 14, 2006, 09:41 AM

You mean that if I am kidnapped by terrorists, and then they let me go, I am not free as contrasted with how I was when I was in their hands. And, if I say that when I was kidnapped, I was not free to leave, I am mistaken? And if someone asks me, "Did you stay with the terrorists of your own free will" and I say no, I didn't stay of my own free will, I am lying, or mistaken? Or that my statement that I did not stay of my own free will was arbitrary?

If not, then what are you saying? And how would you define what we are arguing about so that if I did not want to stay with the terrorists, but I was forced to do so, I would be staying with them freely?
If it were me (and I realize you didn't ask me) I would side-step the term entirely. It's unnecessary. Instead, when finding what someone believes, and why, ask them direct questions:
to what degree are events caused?
to what degree are events predictable?
to what degree are people predictable?
are people morally responsible for sins?
are people morally responsible for virtues?
do you believe in a soul?
are people like robots?
how do you feel about this?
etc.
You'll end up with a much more complete understanding, you'll be able to tackle any significant misconceptions much more easily, and it'll take maybe 5 posts... rather than 1000.

sweetiepie

December 14, 2006, 09:45 AM

Sorry. Definition of what? It would be better if you explained what you were talking about, rather than just shooting as you drove by.
Definition of not being physically coerced, and therefore, able to be held legally responsible. Your definition is useful for knowing whether or not to throw people in jail. It's not helpful to jail someone for something they were physically unable to prevent. It's A definition of free will, one that is primarily clear because it serves a purpose, but as seen by this thread, it is clearly not the only one available.

kennethamy

December 14, 2006, 12:19 PM

Definition of not being physically coerced, and therefore, able to be held legally responsible. Your definition is useful for knowing whether or not to throw people in jail. It's not helpful to jail someone for something they were physically unable to prevent. It's A definition of free will, one that is primarily clear because it serves a purpose, but as seen by this thread, it is clearly not the only one available.

I still do not know what you are getting at. What definition can there be for, "not physically coerced"? The dictionary definition of "coerced" is:

tr.v. co·erced, co·erc·ing, co·erc·es

1. To force to act or think in a certain way by use of pressure, threats, or intimidation; compel.
2. To dominate, restrain, or control forcibly: coerced the strikers into compliance. See Synonyms at force.
3. To bring about by force or threat: efforts to coerce agreement.

And "not physically coerced" would mean, not to do these things by using physical means. Does that help? But, there is, of course, mental coercion, too. (Although, maybe intimidation and threat would constitute mental coercion). The degree of coercion is central to whether we will punish someone for something. For instance, a bank teller will be excused if she hands over money to the robber if he points a gun at her. But suppose he says that if she does not hand over the money, he will spit into her face. That is not an excuse for handing over the money. It is interesting to examine the kind of "excusing conditions" there are, and when they are appropriate. Aristotle discussed what amounted to excuses in his Nichomachean Ethics (what, I suppose you would call, "philosophy b.s.) Aristotle writes that all excuses can be placed under two heading: ignorance and accident. Both of these kinds of excuses are used to get people off the hook when they have done something wrong. For example, an accidental shooting reduces or even annuls responsibility, when it it can be shown the the shooting is deliberate, the person is fully responsible. But it depends on the accident. The shooter may have shot someone accidentally, but he may still have responsibility because he was negligent. In the law, excuses are called, "pleas".

dongiovanni1976x

December 14, 2006, 01:24 PM

I think it does more than that. It seems like it removes 'initiative'. Yes, Wiki defines lobotomy as the removal of the prefrontal cortex where:

A perfect example of what I mean. You've changed the cause of decisions because you've changed the deterministic brain. Causation, not coercion, not compulsion, thank you very much.
But that's no rebuttal. As I said, the point of the lobotomy is to prevent the person from doing certain harmful or anti-social actions. In other words, constraining him. It is no different, in principle, from preventing him from doing these things by putting him into prison except the constraint is effected by removing the desires he would have if not lobotomized.

Suppose you did the same sort of thing by conditioning the person's behavior (rather than by lobotomizing him). Aren't you also preventing him from doing certain things by removing the desire to do them.

Reduce thoughts and actions to a molecular level and all thoughts and actions become is but a series of caused events: x is the cause of y and y is the cause of z etc in a continual chain stretching back and touching upon a multitude of molecules that are both a part of, and outside, the collective embodiment of molecules that we nominally call "self".

When you look at causation from this stage there is no need to equivocate coercion or constrainment with causation because they are all causes of the events that come after them. There are no free events or phenomena in the world; they all have causes.

What Ken is saying is that "Okay, this is all true but we are not talking physics here we are talking about philosophical ethics so we shouldn't bother ourselves with the obvious fact that all events have causes per se but that morality should be judged upon whether the collective individual acts free from coercion or constrainment" etc (correct me if I am wrong Ken)

My response to this strawman I presented is that the collective individual is nothing but a grouping of binary cells that have a fixed response to the environment they happen to be in at the moment and therefore all putative "choices" that are labelled as coming from the collective individual are nothing but the actualization of the process of each individual cell firing in accord with its fixed programming. (And with this in mind morality should be judge in accord with the environment which individuals are in at the time of "action" and this maybe what Ken is concerned about)

As far as the lobotomized person goes I would argue that there is no constraint on the lombotomized individual because it is a "new" individual. The pre-lombotomized individual may have acted one way as a result of the configuration of cells in its brain and the post-lombotomized individual will act in a different way as a result of the configuration of it's cells. To say that the post-lombotomized individual is coerced in some way is incorrect. The individual has just changed drastically enough that his/her desires are just as drastically different than they were before.

fast

December 14, 2006, 01:32 PM

dongiovanni1976x

December 14, 2006, 01:34 PM

You ought not deny compulsion simply because there is causation.

[COMPULSION: Ety rt- L. compellere "to drive together," from com- "together" + pellere "to drive."] How do you see this as different from "caused" exactly?

dongiovanni1976x

December 14, 2006, 01:41 PM

[COERCE: Ety rt- L. coercere "to control, restrain," from com- "together" + arcere "to enclose, confine, contain, ward off,"]

If all cells do is fire or not fire and they only do so according to a fixed set of rules laid out by their DNA AND individual persons are nothing but a collective embodiment of such cells, then where do you see any act that is ever free from the cellular restrictions that CONSTRAIN action and not only COERCE the collective individual but CAUSE it to act in only ONE particular way for every ONE particular circumstance at any ONE precise moment?

kennethamy

December 14, 2006, 02:17 PM

When you look at causation from this stage there is no need to equivocate coercion or constrainment with causation because they are all causes of the events that come after them. There are no free events or phenomena in the world; they all have causes.

What Ken is saying is that "Okay, this is all true but we are not talking physics here we are talking about philosophical ethics so we shouldn't bother ourselves with the obvious fact that all events have causes per se but that morality should be judged upon whether the collective individual acts free from coercion or constrainment" etc (correct me if I am wrong Ken)

Yes, you are wrong. That is not my argument at all. You write:

"There are no free events or phenomena in the world; they all have causes."

Is that supposed to be a necessary and obvious truth, or have you an argument to support the view that freedom is the absence of causation rather than that freedom is the absence of compulsion? Or, am I supposed to take your word for it?

I say, that human freedom is the absence of compulsion, not simply the absence of causation, and your reply is that since all events are caused, they are not free. I would call that begging the question, since that is exactly what I deny.

kennethamy

December 14, 2006, 02:24 PM

[COMPULSION: Ety rt- L. compellere "to drive together," from com- "together" + pellere "to drive."] How do you see this as different from "caused" exactly?

To start with:
For something to be compelled it is necessary that it not want to do what it is compelled to do. That need not be true about its being caused. If I want to marry Mary, then how can anything compel me to marry Mary? You can't compel me to do what I already want to do.

Then, of course, if I marry Mary because I love her, she is intelligent, and beautiful, those are the causes of my marrying Mary. But those are hardly compelling causes. A compelling cause would be someone threatening to shoot me if I did not marry Mary. Exactly.

So, here we have two reasons I might marry Mary, be caused to marry Mary,
and not be compelled to marry Mary.

dongiovanni1976x

December 14, 2006, 02:50 PM

Yes, you are wrong. That is not my argument at all. You write:

"There are no free events or phenomena in the world; they all have causes."

Is that supposed to be a necessary and obvious truth, or have you an argument to support the view that freedom is the absence of causation rather than that freedom is the absence of compulsion? Or, am I supposed to take your word for it?

I say, that human freedom is the absence of compulsion, not simply the absence of causation, and your reply is that since all events are caused, they are not free. I would call that begging the question, since that is exactly what I deny.

Okay, the adjective "human" when applied to the state of being free (i.e. freedom) makes your case more specific then the general one I painted. however FAR more complex.

I would define the state of being free (i.e. freedom) as "not being subject to rules or constraints that prevent more than one result from any given action". I would define it so because when a billard ball is hit in a particular way and it goes into the corner pocket it is not free to switch its course and go in the side pocket in the same fashion a human cell can remain dormant instead of firing when its threshold is reached.

So with regards to defining HUMAN freedom as a specific subset of freedom I would argue that a human is free if and only if that human can act in more than one way under the exact same circumstances. Since we cannot duplicate such precision in the lab we must present our argument with abstract logic. To do so it is easiest to reduce the HUMAN to its component parts and see how actions take place. At this point we will be arguing issues on the forefront of neuroscience...but we can still make some solid conditional statements: IF the human brain is the center of thought and its components that are responsible for such thought are nothing but a collection of individual cells and all of those cells are limited to rules that constrain them to only one course of action (i.e. failing the definition of being free laid out above) THEN it logically follows that ALL human thought and the concomitant action that results from such thought is the result of the firing processes of these cells which are NOT free. Therefore no human action is free.

dongiovanni1976x

December 14, 2006, 03:15 PM

To start with:
For something to be compelled it is necessary that it not want to do what it is compelled to do. That need not be true about its being caused. If I want to marry Mary, then how can anything compel me to marry Mary? You can't compel me to do what I already want to do.

Then, of course, if I marry Mary because I love her, she is intelligent, and beautiful, those are the causes of my marrying Mary. But those are hardly compelling causes. A compelling cause would be someone threatening to shoot me if I did not marry Mary. Exactly.

So, here we have two reasons I might marry Mary, be caused to marry Mary,
and not be compelled to marry Mary.

When you marry Mary there were many events that took place that preceded that act. In both scenario 1, in which you "wanting to marry her and in scenario 2, where you were "compelled to marry her" there would be a series of events that would have preceded those acts. In both instances that resulting in marrying Mary there was only one possible outcome given the parts involved that led up to that act- i.e. firing and non firing neurons. In neither case were you free (from the rules and constraints set upon the cells that fired and those that did not) to NOT marry Mary.

kennethamy

December 14, 2006, 03:26 PM

So with regards to defining HUMAN freedom as a specific subset of freedom I would argue that a human is free if and only if that human can act in more than one way under the exact same circumstances.

That's not what is ordinarily meant when we say that, for instance, Max married Mary, of his own free will. We mean that Max could have done otherwise if he had chosen to do otherwise. Not that he could have done otherwise even if he had not chosen otherwise. Max's choice (desire, want) makes a difference. You are, in effect, saying that Max could have done otherwise only if indeterminism is true. But that does not seem to be true, insofar as the way we think and speak goes. To say that someone acted freely means that what he did depends on what he chose (wanted, etc.) to do. And we believe that is why he is responsible for his actions: i.e. because he chose to do what he did.

dongiovanni1976x

December 14, 2006, 03:33 PM

That's not what is ordinarily meant when we say that, for instance, Max married Mary, of his own free will. We mean that Max could have done otherwise if he had chosen to do otherwise. Not that he could have done otherwise even if he had not chosen otherwise. Max's choice (desire, want) makes a difference. You are, in effect, saying that Max could have done otherwise only if indeterminism is true. But that does not seem to be true, insofar as the way we think and speak goes. To say that someone acted freely means that what he did depends on what he chose (wanted, etc.) to do. And we believe that is why he is responsible for his actions: i.e. because he chose to do what he did.

Over a billion people believe Jesus rose from the dead but this does not make it true. The way people ordinarily speak is not the end all to how we define things. I think the whole argument is skewed in favor of compatibalism or soft determinism because of the very language we use. It is so imprecise and laden with connotive subjectivity that words like want and desire nearly scream that free will and alternative choices are the way of the world. But if you just look at the mechanics involved in raising your index finger from a neurological point of view, nominal terms like want and desire become rather obsolete.
Such words help us to communicate feelings and states of mind but they mire us into a web of connotive confusion when they are used when discussing brain science.

kennethamy

December 14, 2006, 03:58 PM

Over a billion people believe Jesus rose from the dead but this does not make it true. The way people ordinarily speak is not the end all to how we define things. I think the whole argument is skewed in favor of compatibalism or soft determinism because of the very language we use. It is so imprecise and laden with connotive subjectivity that words like want and desire nearly scream that free will and alternative choices are the way of the world. But if you just look at the mechanics involved in raising your index finger from a neurological point of view, nominal terms like want and desire become rather obsolete.
Such words help us to communicate feelings and states of mind but they mire us into a web of connotive confusion when they are used when discussing brain science.

I can see that's how you feel. But, the fact is that, as I said, no one in the world thinks that when Joe marries Mary, and my companion says that Joe did not marry Mary "of his own free will" that my companion means simply that Joe's choice of Mary simply had causes. It depend on the kind of cause. if the cause was Mary's father with a shotgun, that's one thing. But if the cause of Joe's choice of Mary was that he loved her, and the cause of that was that she was intelligent, pretty, and, most especially is an heiress about to come into twenty million dollars, that is quite a different thing. If you suggesting that there is no difference between the two kinds of causes, I'll take it under advisement, but I don't expect to change my mind.

dongiovanni1976x

December 14, 2006, 03:59 PM

To say that someone acted freely means that what he did depends on what he chose (wanted, etc.) to do. And we believe that is why he is responsible for his actions: i.e. because he chose to do what he did.

He is responsible because he chose and he chose because he wanted. Are you suggesting that his wants are free from cause?

I argue that if you move backwards from the action of the individual there will always be a cause that precedes it INCLUDING the term you label as "want" or "desire". Things do not just happen, they all have causes. But where we probably part company is when you say that the person (aka: the collective embodiment of determinate molecules called a person) some how (collectively) acts in response to a precise brain state called at a precise moment (call it "desire" or "want" what have you) and claim that this COLLECTIVE THING has the ability to act in MORE than one manner at that very moment.
I say that at any given moment there is only one future moment that can result. If we had a computer program simulate an enclosed mini universe with a specific number of molecules in that enclosed mini universe and assigned specific trajectories and speed as well as specific masses and sizes to these moecules and set rules that they had to follow based upon those presets then we could mathematically predict the location and velocity of each future moment we tracked.
Human beings are far more complex but we have no reason to assume that there is anything different about humans aside from their degree of complexity. As neuroscience delves futher into the mind it is uncovering that the mind is quite predictable and the more we understand the variables involved in the mind the greater our predictive capabilities become.

Theoretically, if a person were reduced to its component molecules and we inputed them into our computer program and knew the location, trajectory, and mass of every molecule as well as the preset firing threshold of every cell in the body we could accurately predict the brain state of that individual from moment to moment. Entering in Mary as a love interests compunds the complexity but doesn't all of the sudden mean that there is some free agent floating around free from the determinate molecules that produce all thoughts and their subsequent actions.

kennethamy

December 14, 2006, 04:12 PM

He is responsible because he chose and he chose because he wanted. Are you suggesting that his wants are free from cause?

.

Of course not. I am not an indeterminist. I mentioned what the causes of his wanting to marry Mary were. She is intelligent, pretty, and about to come into twenty million dollars. Those (collectively) seem to me to be more than adequate to explain why Joe wants to marry Mary. (I don't think you read my reply very carefully. I was quite explicit about that. You might want to read my post).

sweetiepie

December 14, 2006, 05:07 PM

I still do not know what you are getting at. What definition can there be for, "not physically coerced"? The dictionary definition of "coerced" is:

tr.v. co·erced, co·erc·ing, co·erc·es

1. To force to act or think in a certain way by use of pressure, threats, or intimidation; compel.
2. To dominate, restrain, or control forcibly: coerced the strikers into compliance. See Synonyms at force.
3. To bring about by force or threat: efforts to coerce agreement.

And "not physically coerced" would mean, not to do these things by using physical means. Does that help? But, there is, of course, mental coercion, too. (Although, maybe intimidation and threat would constitute mental coercion). The degree of coercion is central to whether we will punish someone for something. For instance, a bank teller will be excused if she hands over money to the robber if he points a gun at her. But suppose he says that if she does not hand over the money, he will spit into her face. That is not an excuse for handing over the money. It is interesting to examine the kind of "excusing conditions" there are, and when they are appropriate. Aristotle discussed what amounted to excuses in his Nichomachean Ethics (what, I suppose you would call, "philosophy b.s.) Aristotle writes that all excuses can be placed under two heading: ignorance and accident. Both of these kinds of excuses are used to get people off the hook when they have done something wrong. For example, an accidental shooting reduces or even annuls responsibility, when it it can be shown the the shooting is deliberate, the person is fully responsible. But it depends on the accident. The shooter may have shot someone accidentally, but he may still have responsibility because he was negligent. In the law, excuses are called, "pleas".

I don't have a problem wtih understanding excuses (although, yes Aristotle is full of bs). I have my own system.

My problem was with the term "free will". You have one definiton. Other people have other definitions. Not one of them is necessary to this discussion. It is a muddled, not to mention obviously loaded term. And not a single definition points to something that can't be pointed at via alternative means. The question "do you believe in free will, why or why not?" is a stupid one. You would do better by asking the questions I posed above.

kennethamy

December 14, 2006, 05:39 PM

I don't have a problem wtih understanding excuses (although, yes Aristotle is full of bs). I have my own system.

My problem was with the term "free will". You have one definiton. Other people have other definitions. Not one of them is necessary to this discussion. It is a muddled, not to mention obviously loaded term. And not a single definition points to something that can't be pointed at via alternative means. The question "do you believe in free will, why or why not?" is a stupid one. You would do better by asking the questions I posed above.

I'll take that under advisement. You sound as if you know a lot about philosophy. Particularly since you have your own system. I bet I'll be studying the philosophy of Sweetiepie before very long. (I wonder whether gravity, can be "pointed at via alternative means" whatever that means. Otherwise, we had better discard that too).

Vicious Love

December 14, 2006, 06:29 PM

You mean that if I am kidnapped by terrorists, and then they let me go, I am not free as contrasted with how I was when I was in their hands. And, if I say that when I was kidnapped, I was not free to leave, I am mistaken?

You're still equivocating the everyday and philosophic (whatever the latter may be) meanings of the world "free". I'm not sure about yourself, but most of the indeterminists I've known would say you were perfectly free to resist the terrorists and be killed in the process. Not like we're ever free of circumstance, after all. You might really want to levitate, but the laws of physics would limit you. I'm still not certain I understand the point of conclusively determining whether or not we are free. Would this actually affect anything we do in any way? Even as a purely intellectual pursuit, it seems pretty hollow.

Edit: Showered, returned, finally read the remainder of the thread. You seem to be talking about freedom in an ethical and sociological sense, in which case little of what I posted above is relevant. I mean, you are equivocating one kind of freedom (the seemingly meaningless philosophic kind which I was describing) with another but, given that your freedom is a topic that can actually be fruitfully discussed, I suspect the blame lies with me.

kennethamy

December 14, 2006, 06:47 PM

You're still equivocating the everyday and philosophic (whatever the latter may be) meanings of the world "free". I'm not sure about yourself, but most of the indeterminists I've known would say you were perfectly free to resist the terrorists and be killed in the process. Not like we're ever free of circumstance, after all. You might really want to levitate, but the laws of physics would limit you. I'm still not certain I understand the point of conclusively determining whether or not we are free. Would this actually affect anything we do in any way? Even as a purely intellectual pursuit, it seems pretty hollow.

Edit: Showered, returned, finally read the remainder of the thread. You seem to be talking about freedom in an ethical and sociological sense, in which case little of what I posted above is relevant. I mean, you are equivocating one kind of freedom (the seemingly meaningless philosophic kind which I was describing) with another but, given that your freedom is a topic that can actually be fruitfully discussed, I suspect the blame lies with me.

You seem to be talking about freedom in the sense of being uncaused. I am talking of freedom as compatible with being caused. As when I say that I married Mary of my own freewill. A person would never mean (if he thought of it) that his decision to marry Mary had no causes. Why should he? He would just mean that his decision to marry Mary was not caused in a certain way: namely was not compelled, or constrained in some particular way. You appear to think that the mere fact that a decision is caused implies that it is not a free decision. I think you ought to argue for that. I don't see any reason to believe that is true. After all, why is free the opposite of caused?

Vicious Love

December 14, 2006, 06:56 PM

Absolutely correct. That's what I said in the second paragraph. That's also why I have nothing of substance to say on the topic at the moment, though it does seem like a much more interesting and meaningful discussion than that tired old philosophic free will thing.

kennethamy

December 14, 2006, 07:13 PM

dongiovanni1976x

December 15, 2006, 08:40 AM

After all, why is free the opposite of caused?

Great question/rhetorical point...

This is at the heart of our differences (I believe). If I was to tell my friends that I wanted to marry Mary I would not mire myself in a discussion of the physics of the molecules that collectively compel me to act but simply say "I chose to marry her because I love her and she is intelligent and we both like this and that etc" This "ordinary" conversation does not however negate the fact that I only have one course of action. But it does make for a more romantic dinner topic when I describe how I proposed to her etc. (But Voltaire had nothing on Leibniz accept that he wrote better.)

I really just don't know how to talk about "free" in a philosophical sense without it being an antonym to "caused"- could you give me your opinion in a kind of 1984-esque doublespeak by limiting as much connotive subjectivity as possible...I would be interested to hear your opinion because I think it is here in this definition (as well as our interepretation of personal identity) that we diverge paths from one another.

kennethamy

December 15, 2006, 09:06 AM

Great question/rhetorical point...

This is at the heart of our differences (I believe). If I was to tell my friends that I wanted to marry Mary I would not mire myself in a discussion of the physics of the molecules that collectively compel me to act but simply say "I chose to marry her because I love her and she is intelligent and we both like this and that etc" This "ordinary" conversation does not however negate the fact that I only have one course of action. But it does make for a more romantic dinner topic when I describe how I proposed to her etc. (But Voltaire had nothing on Leibniz accept that he wrote better.)

I really just don't know how to talk about "free" in a philosophical sense without it being an antonym to "caused"- could you give me your opinion in a kind of 1984-esque doublespeak by limiting as much connotive subjectivity as possible...I would be interested to hear your opinion because I think it is here in this definition (as well as our interepretation of personal identity) that we diverge paths from one another.

I think you may be confusing determinism with fatalism. Fatalism is the view that we are helpless creatures and that whatever we do, or try to do, our actions are inefficacious. But determinism implies that future events are not inevitable so that there is nothing we can do to avoid them. So that, for instance, although I chose, for excellent causes, which also were excellent reasons, to marry Mary, and had I not those reasons, or ones like them, I would not have chosen to marry Mary, I could have chosen otherwise, but, being a highly intelligent (and self-interested) fellow, I made the choice I made. So, yes, of course, there were good and sufficient causes for my choice of Mary, which makes it a wise choice. And, not merely a wise choice, but one I made of my own free will. Marrying Mary was up to me, and although my choice to marry her was caused both by her undoubted merits, and by the kind of person I am (full of wisdom) I could have acted otherwise had I chosen to do so, but given the circumstance, I did not so choose. After all, it isn't as if, I had been fated to marry Mary, regardless of what I chose to do; no is it that I was in anyway forced to marry Mary at gun's point; nor was I drugged, nor hypnotized. I chose to marry Mary for good and sufficient reasons which caused me to choose as I did. How could I have acted more freely?

sweetiepie

December 15, 2006, 09:33 AM

I'll take that under advisement. You sound as if you know a lot about philosophy. Particularly since you have your own system. I bet I'll be studying the philosophy of Sweetiepie before very long. (I wonder whether gravity, can be "pointed at via alternative means" whatever that means. Otherwise, we had better discard that too).
You should study me more closely. "Gravity" ranks among the strongest words in the language. Unlike free will, almost everyone knows and agrees on what it means, the meaning is extremely valuable, and difficult to come by without using the word itself. Unlike "free will", the term is not loaded (even though the meaning is:devil1: ), and so it does not contribute to the general confusion of philosophy forums, and it can not be used effectively as propaganda toward false beliefs.

For all these reasons, there is no easy way to sidestep the word, and there is no reason one would want to sidestep the word. It's funny that you should pick it as an example to illustrate my absurdity of destroying words, I think you did because you knew that (unlike free will) it is a word that should never be destroyed.

Btw, it is also a rather beautiful word, and a dactyl to boot.

kennethamy

December 15, 2006, 09:48 AM

You should study me more closely. "Gravity" ranks among the strongest words in the language. Unlike free will, almost everyone knows and agrees on what it means, the meaning is extremely valuable, and difficult to come by without using the word itself. Unlike "free will", the term is not loaded (even though the meaning is:devil1: ), and so it does not contribute to the general confusion of philosophy forums, and it can not be used effectively as propaganda toward false beliefs.

For all these reasons, there is no easy way to sidestep the word, and there is no reason one would want to sidestep the word. It's funny that you should pick it as an example to illustrate my absurdity of destroying words, I think you did because you knew that (unlike free will) it is a word that should never be destroyed.

Btw, it is also a rather beautiful word, and a dactyl to boot.

I am afraid I don't know what a "strong word" is. I never knew that words come in different strengths like bleach. I know what "free will" means. If I am acting of my own free will, I am not acting under any compulsion. I don't see that the term "free will" is loaded. Loaded with what. You'll have to explain that one.

I would not want to "sidestep" any word. But does "sidestep" mean "avoid"? There are, I suppose some words I would want to avoid, perhaps "subjective" and "objective" are two of them. But, I would not want to avoid the term, "free will". Why should I. For example, I am perfectly happy to tell you that I am writing this post of my own free will. And that is true, too. Let me assure you that no one is making me write this post. I guess, though, you'll have to take my word for that.

I am not sure how one goes about "destroying words". You can burn the paper the word in written on, but that would not destroy the word. Can you explain this notion of "destroying words" to me?

sweetiepie

December 15, 2006, 10:46 AM

I am afraid I don't know what a "strong word" is. I never knew that words come in different strengths like bleach. I know what "free will" means. If I am acting of my own free will, I am not acting under any compulsion. I don't see that the term "free will" is loaded. Loaded with what. You'll have to explain that one.
Strong word= one I would not want to avoid and one that would be difficult to avoid.

The terms that make it up are loaded with value. In particular "free" suggests that free will has something to do with freedom. Freedom is a good thing. Freedom means being able to do what you will. Free will, as it is often used on this board, means being able to do what you won't. Tell someone they don't have free will though, and they frown. Tell someone they don't have gravity.. and.. they don't frown.

I would not want to "sidestep" any word. But does "sidestep" mean "avoid"? There are, I suppose some words I would want to avoid, perhaps "subjective" and "objective" are two of them. Now you're getting it. I actually really like the words subjective and objective, but to each his own.

But, I would not want to avoid the term, "free will". Why should I. For example, I am perfectly happy to tell you that I am writing this post of my own free will. And that is true, too. Let me assure you that no one is making me write this post.

Because that's one definition of many. One that's fine for describing your situation. One that is totally unuseful for describing the general state of the universe. You're welcome to hold onto it, but it has no purpose here, where we're discussing non-obvious beliefs.

I am not sure how one goes about "destroying words". You can burn the paper the word in written on, but that would not destroy the word. Can you explain this notion of "destroying words" to me?
You destroy a word by not using it.

fast

December 15, 2006, 11:22 AM

This "ordinary" conversation does not however negate the fact that I only have one course of action.

I just wanted to highlight where you said, "one". I think it would be critical to examine why you said, "one".

dongiovanni1976x

December 15, 2006, 01:27 PM

for instance, although I chose, for excellent causes, which also were excellent reasons, to marry Mary… I made the choice I made. Because of the “excellent reasons/causes- I’m following ya…

had I not those reasons, or ones like them, I would not have chosen to marry Mary Gotcha

I could have chosen otherwise HUH?! Under those precise conditions, if there was some way to duplicate them PRECISELY again, you are saying that you COULD have chosen otherwise? What makes you believe this? This isn’t the case of being a “wise” choice, in fact it is not really a choice at all. It is a Reaction of YOUR nature and YOUR current circumstances- nothing more. The REASON/CAUSE for you to marry Mary were those PRECISE “excellent reasons/causes” that you said, “had I not those reasons, or ones like them, I would not have chosen to marry Mary.” The collective embodiment of molecules that make up the individual entity we nominally call “Ken” for short is not calling any shots anymore than any ONE neuron in his brain does when it encounters a specific chemical that causes it to reach it’s threshold and FIRE and subsequently cascades a signal to neighboring cells ad infinitum.

So, yes, of course, there were good and sufficient causes for my choice of Mary, which makes it a wise choice. And, not merely a wise choice, but one I made of my own free will. Free from what? If Ken is [the nominal term used to describe the collective occurrence of interacting molecules that takes up a certain space from one moment to the next and only ceases to be called Ken when these molecules disperse far away from each other by incorporating into other entities] and [this same Ken’s molecular parts] all follow specific rules where they are subject to natural laws that prevent them from acting in more than one way under the same circumstances, then how does “Ken” act any more “free-er” as the sum of parts subject to ONE reaction then as the parts themselves?

Marrying Mary was up to me But what is “me” but a collection of molecules that all have no control in their movements?

and although my choice to marry her was caused both by her undoubted merits, and by the kind of person I am (full of wisdom) I could have acted otherwise had I chosen to do so Since we cannot duplicate such precise conditions again for this experiment we must rely on theoretical logic. I have laid out this using molecular physics…how can you demonstrate that you are not subject to rules or constraints that prevent you from more than one result from any given circumstance? Mind you I am talking about PERFECTLY PRECISE circumstances.

I chose to marry Mary for good and sufficient reasons which caused me to choose as I did. How could I have acted more freely? I argue that you did not ACT but Reacted. And you are right you could not have Reacted anymore freely than you did given those PRECISE circumstances and the PRECISE nature of your being at that PRECISE moment such a reaction took place.

dongiovanni1976x

December 15, 2006, 01:35 PM

I just wanted to highlight where you said, "one". I think it would be critical to examine why you said, "one".

Because if a scientist knew the exact location of a molecule at an exact time, knew its density, mass and velocity, s/he would be able to predict with absolute precision where the molecule would be at a time in the future. And under the same precise conditions the molecule would act in that SAME way each time (ONE WAY etc)

NOW...say there was some super intelligent being (god/alien what have you) who put all the molecules in existence into a jar and knew the location, size, density and velocity of every one of them, we could say that this intelligent being would be able to do the same thing as the scientist and predict where all the molecules would be at any future time.

Since all HUMANS are is a collection of molecules (arranged in a very complex fashion) then we could say that IF we knew everything about all the parts that make us up and all the parts that we interact with (each other and other matter) we could PREDICT how we would act. And for any given MOMENT X, if those conditions were to be duplicated int his jar we would always get the same result (ONE RESULT, THEREFORE ONE WAY etc)

That is why I said "one".

Given that we are ignorant of that ONE way and the precise nature of ourselves and our circumstances at any given time we are FREE to wallow in the ignorant bliss and self delusion of a free will.

kennethamy

December 15, 2006, 03:36 PM

Free from what?

But what is “me” but a collection of molecules that all have no control in their movements?

Since we cannot duplicate such precise conditions again for this experiment we must rely on theoretical logic. I have laid out this using molecular physics…how can you demonstrate that you are not subject to rules or constraints that prevent you from more than one result from any given circumstance? Mind you I am talking about PERFECTLY PRECISE circumstances.

I argue that you did not ACT but Reacted. And you are right you could not have Reacted anymore freely than you did given those PRECISE circumstances and the PRECISE nature of your being at that PRECISE moment such a reaction took place.

Free from coercion. I did as I pleased.

I am a collection of molecules, but not just a collection of molecules since a door is a collection of molecules and I am not a door. And a rock is a collection of molecules, and I am not a rock. So, since I am not a rock, and I am not a door, but both a door and a rock are collections of molecules, I am not just a collection of molecules. For instance, I can post these messages about free will, but doors and rocks cannot post messages about free will. There is a rather large difference between "A is x" and "A is only x". It so happens that I make choices, and doors and rocks do not make choices. By the way, it is fallacious to argue that just because X is a and Y is a, that X and Y are the same. It is known as the fallacy of the undistributed middle. And the argument that X is a collection of molecules, and Y is a collection of molecules, so X and Y are the same is an instance of that fallacy. It is like arguing that X is a male, and Y is a male, therefore there is no difference between X and Y.
It is just silly for you to deny what is right there in front of your eyes simply because you are in the grip of a theory.

Well, you can argue that I reacted and did not act, but you would be mistaken. There is a clear and distinct difference between my slipping on a banana peel, and falling on my face, and a clown in a circus intentionally slipping and falling, and falling on his face. Mine was a "reaction". The clowns was an action. I slipped accidentally, The clown slipped intentionally. To deny that is simply to deny the facts. Again, you are in the grip of a theory. And people who are in the grip of a theory often deny obvious differences in order to remain beholden to that theory. There is a clear distinction between my doing something, and something happening to me. For example, between my raising my arm, and someone forcing my arm to rise. The difference is as great as that between cheese and chocolate, (both of which, by the way, are also collections of molecules).

dongiovanni1976x

December 15, 2006, 04:16 PM

Free from coercion. I did as I pleased.

I am a collection of molecules, but not just a collection of molecules since a door is a collection of molecules and I am not a door. And a rock is a collection of molecules, and I am not a rock. So, since I am not a rock, and I am not a door, but both a door and a rock are collections of molecules, I am not just a collection of molecules. For instance, I can post these messages about free will, but doors and rocks cannot post messages about free will. There is a rather large difference between "A is x" and "A is only x". It so happens that I make choices, and doors and rocks do not make choices. By the way, it is fallacious to argue that just because X is a and Y is a, that X and Y are the same. It is known as the fallacy of the undistributed middle. And the argument that X is a collection of molecules, and Y is a collection of molecules, so X and Y are the same is an instance of that fallacy. It is like arguing that X is a male, and Y is a male, therefore there is no difference between X and Y.
It is just silly for you to deny what is right there in front of your eyes simply because you are in the grip of a theory.

Well, you can argue that I reacted and did not act, but you would be mistaken. There is a clear and distinct difference between my slipping on a banana peel, and falling on my face, and a clown in a circus intentionally slipping and falling, and falling on his face. Mine was a "reaction". The clowns was an action. I slipped accidentally, The clown slipped intentionally. To deny that is simply to deny the facts. Again, you are in the grip of a theory. And people who are in the grip of a theory often deny obvious differences in order to remain beholden to that theory. There is a clear distinction between my doing something, and something happening to me. For example, between my raising my arm, and someone forcing my arm to rise. The difference is as great as that between cheese and chocolate, (both of which, by the way, are also collections of molecules).

For the sake of simplicity I reduced you to a collection of molecules to demonstrate a point about your identity. Simply because this description shares a similarity with doors and cheese does not make you identical with doors and cheese- as you already understand. However it is important to demonstrate this similarity because doors and cheese REact, as you REact, in a similar, yet far less complex fashion. (e.g. Doors rot and cheese gets moldy. When certain chemicals come into contact with cheese and doors they respond in a fixed way etc...when you encounter a specific chemical there is a linear chronological path of cause and effect that cascades from molecule to molecule, cell to cell causing a RESPONSE. Yours is simply more complex.)

Your concentration on this aspect of my argument has caused you to ignore (whether clown like intentionally or banana slipping accidentally) my question, "how can you demonstrate that you are not subject to rules or constraints that prevent you from more than one result from any given circumstance?" [Mind you I am talking about PERFECTLY PRECISE circumstances]
You might have simply assumed that this was a rhetorical question since there is no way to provide such a demonstration. The best you can offer is to create two situations with very similar circumstances and demonstrate two differening outcomes. This is good evidence but it falls short because it cannot account for all the variables that are unknown. This is why I feel it is best to forego our pragmatic understanding of things and look at this theoretically- especially since this is a philosophy forum and not just a conversation I would have with Mary's dad over dinner to impress him before I pop the question to her.

kennethamy

December 15, 2006, 04:52 PM

sing a RESPONSE. Yours is simply more complex.)

Your concentration on this aspect of my argument has caused you to ignore (whether clown like intentionally or banana slipping accidentally) my question, "how can you demonstrate that you are not subject to rules or constraints that prevent you from more than one result from any given circumstance?"

What rules or constraints are you talking about? It surely is not up to me to demonstrate that I am not subject to such rules or constraints. It is up to you to specify what rules and constraints you have in mind, and then demonstrate that I am subject to them so that I could not have done otherwise. even if I had chosen to do otherwise. You are the one who claims that my choice to do otherwise would have been inefficacious. If I had chosen not to marry Mary, I would not have married Mary. Why do you think that I would have, whether or not I had chosen not to do so? You make some vague reference to what you call "rules and restraints" and then you place the burden on me to show that I could not have done otherwise, even if I had chosen to do otherwise. Isn't the burden of showing that on you rather than on me? After all, there are circumstances in which I could not have done otherwise even if I had chosen otherwise. For example, I could not have flown unaided even if I had chosen to fly unaided. But, why could I not have walked into the next room (although I did not do that either) if I had chosen to walk into the next room? I neither flew unaided, nor did I walk into the next room. I did neither of those two things. But are you really asserting that I could not have done the latter (walk into the next room) just as I could not have done the former (flown unaided)? Most implausible, I must say. Of course I could have walked into the next room, if I had so chosen. I just did not choose to.

Suppose you reply to this post. Are you willing to assert that you could not have not replied to this post, and that if you reply to this post that you could have done nothing else than reply to this post. Could you demonstrate that?

TomJrzk

December 16, 2006, 10:27 AM

kennethamy

December 16, 2006, 10:53 AM

It should be obvious even to the most casual observer (I've always loved that phrase) that Don and Ken are talking about two different definitions of 'free'. I like Sweetiepie's suggestion that we destroy the term 'free will'; that would force Compatibilists to define a new term for 'lack of compulsion' and the Libertarian's to define a new term for 'lack of causation' that both groups can feel proud of.

That, of course, will not happen. Ken and Don (and me and Fast and ...) will continue to use the one term we're given differently.

That being the case, and if I were allowed to start a new thread, I would conduct a poll. In this thread, each person would be allowed to send one post (which they could always edit), saying whatever they want about 'free will'. I would prohibit rebuttal within the thread but disagreements can be taken 'off-line' with a reference to a new thread. That way, someone could get everyone's ideas about the term in some amount of time less than a week. Plus, threads like this could refer to the new thread rather than repeat so much.

Is anyone who can willing to start a thread like this? (I know, the forum rules prohibit editing after 2 hours of posting though.)

If not, and I am someday allowed to start new threads, I would put my best guess on everyone's thoughts in the first post. Any alterations requested would be incorporated into a new post on a new thread.

Note to monitor: never allow Tom to create new threads.

One difficulty is to say what constitutes compulsion. But even if we were to stipulate that we act freely when we are not being compelled, I have a nagging idea that Don (and you) would insist that causation was a kind of compulsion. I doubt whether this is resoluble in the way you believe it is, since not only is compulsion still a kind of causation, but, I think that both you and Don would still think that causation was a kind of compulsion.
And that issue is not to be dealt with by stipulation. After all, don't you still believe that as long as my action is the effect of a chain of causes, that I could not have done otherwise than I did? I think Don does. What you suggest is somewhat as if I were to suggest to a biologist that the whale is a fish, and if he insisted that the whale is a mammal, that in a sense,the whale is a fish, and another sense in which the whale is a mammal. . I don't think that the biologist would take kindly to that suggestion.

How do you destroy a term? In fact, what does it mean to destroy a term?

TomJrzk

December 16, 2006, 11:28 AM

One difficulty is to say what constitutes compulsion. But even if we were to stipulate that we act freely when we are not being compelled, I have a nagging idea that Don (and you) would insist that causation was a kind of compulsion. I doubt whether this is resoluble in the way you believe it is, since not only is compulsion still a kind of causation, but, I think that both you and Don would still think that causation was a kind of compulsion.
And that issue is not to be dealt with by stipulation. After all, don't you still believe that as long as my action is the effect of a chain of causes, that I could not have done otherwise than I did? I think Don does. What you suggest is somewhat as if I were to suggest to a biologist that the whale is a fish, and if he insisted that the whale is a mammal, that in a sense,the whale is a fish, and another sense in which the whale is a mammal. . I don't think that the biologist would take kindly to that suggestion.

How do you destroy a term? In fact, what does it mean to destroy a term?
But I've said in the past that compulsion is a type of causation. It's second-person causation in that X was caused to compel Y. I think Don, too, believes that everything is caused so compulsion is only worth discussing in the context of law; not free will. We agree that will is not free, it's entirely caused.

Also, Mary's dad could have tried to lobotomize you (instead of using a shotgun), but he could only have HOPED that the different you would want to marry Mary; that's not compulsion. I think the shoehorn you had to use to include a lobotomy as a form of compulsion might have made your toes hurt. From my perspective, an excellent, in fact perfect, example of:
And people who are in the grip of a theory often deny obvious differences in order to remain beholden to that theory.;)

kennethamy

December 16, 2006, 12:20 PM

But I've said in the past that compulsion is a type of causation. It's second-person causation in that X was caused to compel Y. I think Don, too, believes that everything is caused so compulsion is only worth discussing in the context of law; not free will. We agree that will is not free, it's entirely caused.

Also, Mary's dad could have tried to lobotomize you (instead of using a shotgun), but he could only have HOPED that the different you would want to marry Mary; that's not compulsion. I think the shoehorn you had to use to include a lobotomy as a form of compulsion might have made your toes hurt. From my perspective, an excellent, in fact perfect, example of:
;)

Of course, all compulsion is causation. But that isn't the issue. The issue is whether all causation is compulsion. That everything is caused is just determinism. I don't know whether compulsion is worth talking about only in the context of the law, but the issue is whether if an action is caused, then that action is not free. And, if you and Don agree that causation implies non-freedom, we are back at the same old stand. What is the argument for that? I keep asking, but there are no answers.

Lobotomy is as much a form of compulsion as is post-hypnotic suggestion. It changes a person's desires so that he desires what he would not have desired had he not been hypnotized, and those new desires are those suggested by the hypnotist. Perhaps you have read the novel, The Manchurian Canditate or, at least watched the original film or the remake (the original film is much better). In it, Raymond is compelled to murder the girl he loves by making him want to do it.

TomJrzk

December 16, 2006, 01:21 PM

Of course, all compulsion is causation. But that isn't the issue.
Yes, I did misread your statement, but probably because my brain couldn't get around why someone would think that all causation is compulsion.
The issue is whether all causation is compulsion. That everything is caused is just determinism.
Maybe this is the problem: these two statements don't follow. I believe in the second statement completely but believe in the first statement not at all. Can you explain why your wording seems to equate the two?

It woulda made more sense to me if the first sentence was "The issue is whether all compulsion is causation."
And, if you and Don agree that causation implies non-freedom, we are back at the same old stand. What is the argument for that? I keep asking, but there are no answers.
The argument for that, I keep trying to answer, is that 'freedom IS the lack of causation!", so of course causation implies non-freedom. Again, you're arguing your definition against mine. In my world freedom is an illusion.

Cel

December 16, 2006, 03:24 PM

Anything . All compulsion is, of course, causation. But the question is whether all causation is compulsion.
Clearly, for something (or someone) to be compelled to do something, it must be true that what is compelled does not want to do that thing. Otherwise, why call it "compulsion"? But, it is not true that, for instance, the Earth does not want to rotate on its axis. The Earth is an inanimate thing, and it has no wants or desires. However, the Earth is caused to rotate on its axis. Therefore, causation need not be compulsion. So, it has nothing to do with the observation of causes. It has to do with what the term "compulsion" means. If we turn to the case of a person, there may be a number of causes for Joe's choosing Mary to marry. Joe may cite Mary's beauty, her intelligence, her kindness, and last, but not least, her money. But all of those things are the causes of Joe's desire to marry Mary. But since Joe did not want not to desire to marry Mary, those causes did not compel Joe either to desire to marry Mary, or even to marry Mary.

Is it possible that you implicitly accept that the word "want" or "desire" implies some mystical property simply because it involves a human (as opposed to an inanimate object)? I think your definition has EVERYTHING to do with observation of causes. If you could see exactly what caused a human to "want" or "desire" something, and you were caused to speak in technical terms, you might say something like a human "was caused to move toward" a thing for reasons x,y, and z -- just as you'd say a the earth is caused to rotate on its access. ever read daniel dennett's intentional stance? Anyway, if Joe did not "want" to wed Mary, there are causes for him not wanting to as well -- you wouldn't have to use the word "want". Why not talk about it in terms of forces. If one force A is greater than force B pushing from the opposite side, then the result is that the object goes in force A's direction. Why add extra meaning to "compelled"? just because force B pushed in the opposite direction and the "object" was human? what is so special about that that we need to introduce extra meaning in the words "want" or "desire"?

kennethamy

December 16, 2006, 10:29 PM

Is it possible that you implicitly accept that the word "want" or "desire" implies some mystical property simply because it involves a human (as opposed to an inanimate object)? I think your definition has EVERYTHING to do with observation of causes. If you could see exactly what caused a human to "want" or "desire" something, and you were caused to speak in technical terms, you might say something like a human "was caused to move toward" a thing for reasons x,y, and z -- just as you'd say a the earth is caused to rotate on its access. ever read daniel dennett's intentional stance? Anyway, if Joe did not "want" to wed Mary, there are causes for him not wanting to as well -- you wouldn't have to use the word "want". Why not talk about it in terms of forces. If one force A is greater than force B pushing from the opposite side, then the result is that the object goes in force A's direction. Why add extra meaning to "compelled"? just because force B pushed in the opposite direction and the "object" was human? what is so special about that that we need to introduce extra meaning in the words "want" or "desire"?

That our wants are caused does not make them any the less wants. And, the mere fact that our wants are caused need not imply that our wants are compelled. Whether we are compelled to want to do this or that would depend on the kind of cause it was. If the cause of my wanting to give over my wallet to a robber is caused by his pointing a gun at me, that is one thing, but if the cause of my wanting to give money to a beggar is my feeling of pity for him, that is quite a different thing.

Juma

December 17, 2006, 04:46 AM

kennethamy

December 17, 2006, 09:06 AM

I dont get it: Ken, are you discussing the social meaning of "free will" or the "natural scientific" meaning?

Think of an advanced robot, Gizmo, that behaves very much like a human being but which "brain" is some sort of very sophisiticated computer known to be completely deterministic. Being a clever robot Gizmo learns and acts to available input. Thus Gizmo makes a lot of choices: Stays indoor when it rains, changes batteries before instead of after viewing the news, etc.
Since this robot cleverly acts on input it would avoid being destroyed by a terrorist and thus probably performed whathever the terrorist wanted. In which case we would probably not say that he performed these actions of its own free will. But if it instead rambled the street and robbed people because it would make him richer, shouldnt we then say that it did this of its own free will?

I did not know there were two meanings of. "I did it of my own free will", which means, in English, "I was not forced to do it".

I don't think that robots have any "wills" at all, so I don't think they have free will. But if a person acted that way, then, yes, that is what I would say, unless I knew that when he robbed people he was under post-hypnotic suggestion, or, perhaps, had a brain lesion. Or even that his family had been kidnapped, and the kidnappers had threatened to kill his family unless he did these things.

Cel

December 17, 2006, 09:15 PM

That our wants are caused does not make them any the less wants.

agreed. but isn't the "want" (or relative state of deprivation) is just another link in the causal chain?

And, the mere fact that our wants are caused need not imply that our wants are compelled. Whether we are compelled to want to do this or that would depend on the kind of cause it was. If the cause of my wanting to give over my wallet to a robber is caused by his pointing a gun at me, that is one thing, but if the cause of my wanting to give money to a beggar is my feeling of pity for him, that is quite a different thing.

In my view, your stated difference between compelled and caused is completely artificial. Similarly, I could say that wet side walks that became wet from the rain are different things from sidewalks that became wet from a sprinkler. But aren't wet sidewalks, just wet sidewalks? Why distinguish between the type of sidewalk (causation) just because it was caused to be wet from a different source? What do you really gain from that kind of distinction?

I can't help but wonder, are you caused to make this distinction because you think without the distinction between compulsion and causation, the morals of society are undermined and it's then unfair to lock up the robber? or execute the serial killer?

kennethamy

December 17, 2006, 09:48 PM

agreed. but isn't the "want" (or relative state of deprivation) is just another link in the causal chain?

In my view, your stated difference between compelled and caused is completely artificial. Similarly, I could say that wet side walks that became wet from the rain are different things from sidewalks that became wet from a sprinkler. But aren't wet sidewalks, just wet sidewalks? Why distinguish between the type of sidewalk (causation) just because it was caused to be wet from a different source? What do you really gain from that kind of distinction?

I can't help but wonder, are you caused to make this distinction because you think without the distinction between compulsion and causation, the morals of society are undermined and it's then unfair to lock up the robber? or execute the serial killer?

I agree that all wet sidewalks are wet sidewalks, but I do not agree that all causes are compelling causes.

To begin with, a planet, for example, cannot be compelled to do anything since planets have no wants or wills, and only entities which have wants or wills can be compelled to do anything.

Next, there are causes, and then, there are causes. If I am, for example, caused to want to act in a certain way for good reasons, as when the cause of my wanting to marry some woman is that I find her intelligent, attractive, and last, but not least, she is wealthy, that is one kind of cause. But if I am caused to want to marry some woman because her father threatens to blow my head off with his shotgun if I do not make an honest woman of his daughter, that is another thing.

So, since I am an entity that does have wants and desires, and if these wants and desires are caused by good reasons, rather than force of some kind, I act of my own free will. That is how the notion of acting of one's own free will is employed in ordinary life and conversation. I know you think that is naive, or unscientific, or something of the sort. But it is still true. And I don't see that the mere fact that my actions, or my desires or choices from which these actions flow are caused, matters, since causes differ, and some causes are restraining or constraining causes, and some are not. And some causes make my actions reasonable, and some do not.

As for your second question, it goes to my motive for my view, and therefore is irrelevant for whether my view is true or false, or whether my argument for my view is a good one or a poor one. But, to answer it directly, since you asked, the answer to it is, no. But, in fact, I do not think that your view has those implications in any case, since your view would, as would mine, allow for punishment as deterrence. The rest is sentimentality.

Juma

December 21, 2006, 02:34 PM

I don't think that robots have any "wills" at all
So what do you say those "wills" that we have but the robots dont, are? Arent those just justifications to ourselves for doing what we do?

kennethamy

December 21, 2006, 04:23 PM

So what do you say those "wills" that we have but the robots dont, are? Arent those just justifications to ourselves for doing what we do?

No. Since robots have no consciousness, they have no wills. We do have consciousness.

fast

December 21, 2006, 05:59 PM

This might be off topic, but the thought that my very own beliefs are not under my control keeps creeping in.

I cannot believe that I'm sitting in a red chair, for example, and it matters not how much I try, I cannot alter that true belief that I am sitting in a blue chair. I suppose I could get out of the blue chair and sit in a red chair, and yes, I could see to it that my belief changes by changing the facts of the situation, but the change of that belief still won't be a factor of my own will--though the change of the situation will be.

I can control my actions despite my disposition to act in certain ways. For example, if I have an urge to do something to which I know I ought not, I am comforted in knowing that I have the will power to resist the urge that is present--present perhaps due to the disposition.

But, somehow, and in someway, I still keep getting this feeling that since my own beliefs are not under my control, then maybe my ability (and will power) to resist temptations are somehow ... and this is my thoughts become hazy and I lose clarity of thought.

There's something I can't quite put my finger on about the implications that I may not believe as I choose. I have consciousness, and I can contemplate, yet I cannot believe as I please.

kennethamy

December 21, 2006, 06:38 PM

fast

December 21, 2006, 10:14 PM

But if I suggest that you believe right now that you are in India hunting elephants, I suppose that you can control what you do not believe.I appreciate your vote of confidence, but no matter how hard I try to fight it, I continue to believe that I am not in India hunting elephants. You claim that I can control ... but there doesn't seem to be any control--least not any that I am aware. I am not saying what I think the implications of this is, so I'm really not trying to suggest any inference to this supposed fact.

kennethamy

December 22, 2006, 03:29 AM

I appreciate your vote of confidence, but no matter how hard I try to fight it, I continue to believe that I am not in India hunting elephants. You claim that I can control ... but there doesn't seem to be any control--least not any that I am aware. I am not saying what I think the implications of this is, so I'm really not trying to suggest any inference to this supposed fact.

But are there not occasions when we do control what we believe? If, for instance, you know that you are a jealous person, and you find a strong feeling of jealousy arising, so that you believe that when your wife in talking to a man, and smiling at him (he happens to be just asking her for the time) she is flirting with him, you may be able to tell yourself that it is all quite innocent, and that the rising belief that she is flirting with him is simply your old jealous disposition in action. William James, in his "The Will to Believe" was quite clear that since he thought it would be better for us to believe in "what is eternal" that we should try to do so.

In any case, even if it were true that our beliefs are not under our control, why would it be legitimate to generalize this fact to the conclusion that our actions and our choices are not under our control?

fast

December 22, 2006, 07:57 AM

But are there not occasions when we do control what we believe?And if it were true that there are perhaps the occasional rare cases, then would that mean anything in particular? It could be that the rare occasion is like nothing more than an exception to some general rule that our beliefs are beyond our control. Additionally, it might not even be an exception after all, but rather a misunderstanding that leads us to erroneously think we have control over our beliefs when we don't.

People tend to think they have control over their beliefs, yet I bet if we pressed them and challenged them to believe something that they would not otherwise do, I bet if honesty was a factor, they couldn't do it--least not directly, and like I eluded to before, if it's indirectly, then that doesn't say much for how much direct control a person really has in controlling one's beliefs.

If, for instance, you know that you are a jealous person, and you find a strong feeling of jealousy arising, so that you believe that when your wife in talking to a man, and smiling at him (he happens to be just asking her for the time) she is flirting with him, you may be able to tell yourself that it is all quite innocent, and that the rising belief that she is flirting with him is simply your old jealous disposition in action. I mentioned misunderstanding earlier. Does the truly jealous person actually hold a belief? I'm not so sure that I would even go so far as to declare that a typical jealous person even has a suspicion, let alone a true defacto belief.

William James, in his "The Will to Believe" was quite clear that since he thought it would be better for us to believe in "what is eternal" that we should try to do so. I don't understand that.

In any case, even if it were true that our beliefs are not under our control, why would it be legitimate to generalize this fact to the conclusion that our actions and our choices are not under our control?Here's the kicker. I don't think it's fair to generalize as you say. It's just something that gives me reason to take pause, albeit not a good reason I suppose. I'm not even saying it's relevant--heck, I even said that it might be off-topic, but I thought it was kinda curious that my will and my choices are in control by me yet my desires and wants and wishes and beliefs and feelings and those occasional pesky thoughts seems not to be sometimes.

ETA: Wishes might be pushing it a little, but oh well.

TomJrzk

December 22, 2006, 08:26 AM

I'm not even saying it's relevant--heck, I even said that it might be off-topic, but I thought it was kinda curious that my will and my choices are in control by me yet my desires and wants and wishes and beliefs and feelings and those occasional pesky thoughts seems not to be sometimes.

ETA: Wishes might be pushing it a little, but oh well.
Welcome back. This is exactly the topic that you started and abandoned with your embracing of CFW, so it's not at all off-topic. You're again seeing the illusion in the free will that CFW affords.

CFW is real and useful and a wonderful thing; we do choose which cereal to eat in the morning. But all this CFW is based on determinism, which says that Fast is Fast and will choose Fruit Loops.

You say "my choices are in control by me", what you really mean (and so does Ken, in my opinion ;)) is that your choices are in control by "my desires and wants and wishes and beliefs and feelings and those occasional pesky thoughts". And determinism determines those pesky things.

You can say CFW is the true definition free will, but you still realize that it's not free from determinism.

What does 'ETA' stand for?

fast

December 22, 2006, 08:41 AM

Welcome back. :)

What does 'ETA' stand for?Edited to add.

Ordinarily when one edits a post that has already been sent, the fact that there has been an edit is automatically noted, but if it's done fast, then it doesn't show up at all.

kennethamy

December 22, 2006, 08:42 AM

You can say CFW is the true definition free will, but you still realize that it's not free from determinism.

Realize? But, have you forgotten? Compatibilists are determinists!

TomJrzk

December 22, 2006, 08:57 AM

Realize? But, have you forgotten? Compatibilists are determinists!
I don't think Fast is all the way to Compatibilism yet. He still has nagging feelings from the loss that determinism costs. His thoughts on CFW seem to still include some freedom and I think he realizes that again.

So, you and I know CFW is not free from determinism but Fast just realized that again.

kennethamy

December 22, 2006, 09:04 AM

I don't think Fast is all the way to Compatibilism yet. He still has nagging feelings from the loss that determinism costs. His thoughts on CFW seem to still include some freedom and I think he realizes that again.

So, you and I know CFW is not free from determinism but Fast just realized that again.

Why do you think that's what he did? I thought that he was just having doubts about compatibilism. And I think you forget that compatibilism "includes" a lot of freedom, it just does not include contra-causal freedom.
I think we can sometimes control what we want, and I am not "free from determinism". (You make determinism sound like a disease).

fast

December 22, 2006, 09:35 AM

I don't think Fast is all the way to Compatibilism yet. The moment I become all the way, (assuming I’m reading into this right) and fully immersed in the grip of a theory, I will have stopped thinking. I then would have become close-minded and too stubborn to listen to reason and arguments to which they are based any further. I hope not to make it all the way, if making it all the way entails what I’ve assumed it to include.

At present, the compatibilist view seems closer to the truth than the alternatives, but as new information becomes available, perhaps my views will change. As of now, I wouldn't mind pinning the compatibilist tag to my shirt, for I feel comfortable with it given the alternatives, however, but that ought not be construed with an inability to change.

He still has nagging feelings from the loss that determinism costs. The realization for the implications of determinism was a bit unsettling, yes. Or, at least my thought on what those implications are.

His thoughts on CFW seem to still include some freedom and I think he realizes that again.I hesitate to respond because I'm not exactly sure what you mean by CFW. Wiploc kinda gave up on me when he realized what I thought it meant, so I'm cautious to assume that I have a clear idea of what you mean by it. I know that you still have this idea that there are literally multiple free will's, and I just don’t know what to make of that.

So, you and I know CFW is not free from determinism but Fast just realized that again.Notwithstanding whatever implications of what you think CFW entails, I realize that freedom from constraint does not imply freedom from causation.

TomJrzk

December 22, 2006, 09:37 AM

(You make determinism sound like a disease).
You may want to propagate the "wretched subterfuge" that is CFW but I prefer uncomplicated clarity. As much as Compatibilism tries to defer the full ramifications of determinism to a discussion of indeterminism, the truth is that determinism has some impact on some views of freedom.

I wouldn't call it a disease (though it makes Fast uneasy) but I don't want to ignore it altogether. I think it's important to address LFW for those who consider its loss.

TomJrzk

December 22, 2006, 10:13 AM

His thoughts on CFW seem to still include some freedom and I think he realizes that again.

I hesitate to respond because I'm not exactly sure what you mean by CFW. Wiploc kinda gave up on me when he realized what I thought it meant, so I'm cautious to assume that I have a clear idea of what you mean by it. I know that you still have this idea that there are literally multiple free will's, and I just don’t know what to make of that.

Notwithstanding whatever implications of what you think CFW entails, I realize that freedom from constraint does not imply freedom from causation.
My bad. CFW is the freedom from coersion while LFW is the freedom from determinism. I don't call "freedom from coersion" 'free', as I discussed in way too many posts already.

So, to interpret my own statement: His thoughts on CFW seem to still include some freedom that can only be expressed in terms of LFW and I think he realizes that again. In other words, you seemed to embrace CFW as everything you ever had and wanted but now you're back to questioning your loss of LFW.

kennethamy

December 22, 2006, 11:45 AM

You may want to propagate the "wretched subterfuge" that is CFW but I prefer uncomplicated clarity. As much as Compatibilism tries to defer the full ramifications of determinism to a discussion of indeterminism, the truth is that determinism has some impact on some views of freedom.

I wouldn't call it a disease (though it makes Fast uneasy) but I don't want to ignore it altogether. I think it's important to address LFW for those who consider its loss.

I created a monster when I mentioned Kant's characterization to you. Honesty is nearly never the best policy ;)

Determinism certainly does have an effect (I use "impact" only for wisdom teeth) but I consider it the consequence of confusion. (I don't understand your point about indeterminism, though). I agree that uncomplicated clarity is desirable, but not when it is wrong.

Why should freedom of the will mean contra-causal freedom when no one means that except some philosophers? Wittgenstein remarks that some philosophers think that certain concepts are "superconcepts" which do not have the meanings which they have, but special meanings which philosophers believe they have. Whereas, Wittgenstein points out, the meanings of concepts like, "truth", or, "knowledge", or "freedom" are terms in ordinary conversation, and, as such, must have the same "humble meanings" as the terms, "lamp" and "door".*

*Thus, "I don't call "freedom from coersion" 'free'" And why not? My next door neighbor does. What do you know about freedom of the will that he doesn't?

TomJrzk

December 22, 2006, 12:04 PM

I created a monster when I mentioned Kant's characterization to you. Honesty is nearly never the best policy ;)

I was already a monster, he just voiced exactly what I feel ;).

Determinism certainly does have an effect (I use "impact" only for wisdom teeth) but I consider it the consequence of confusion. (I don't understand your point about indeterminism, though). I agree that uncomplicated clarity is desirable, but not when it is wrong.
My point about indeterminism is that Compatibilists talk about free will (and sometimes don't first distinguish that from LFW) being obviously true - you choose the cereal you want, don't you? Ah, but lurking behind the curtain of this initial conversation (hence the subterfuge) is that the Compatibilist is a determinist, so any will that is more free is called indeterminism.

Why should freedom of the will mean contra-causal freedom when no one means that except some philosophers? Wittgenstein remarks that some philosophers think that certain concepts are "superconcepts" which do not have the meanings which they have, but special meanings which philosophers believe they have. Whereas, Wittgenstein points out, the meanings of concepts like, "truth", or, "knowledge", or "freedom" are terms in ordinary conversation, and, as such, must have the same "humble meanings" as the terms, "lamp" and "door".*

*Thus, "I don't call "freedom from coersion" 'free'" And why not? My next door neighbor does. What do you know about freedom of the will that he doesn't?
Why? Because I think most non-philosophers think free will means free from everything. So yes, free is freedom from coersion but it is also freedom from determinism and probably even freedom from one's own brain; there's some soul that will live on once the brain has fired its last neuron.

Fully dependent on a deterministic brain is not free.

wiploc

December 22, 2006, 12:16 PM

Wiploc kinda gave up on me when he realized what I thought it meant,

What I realized is that I have no idea what you mean.

The moment I become all the way, (assuming I’m reading into this right) and fully immersed in the grip of a theory, I will have stopped thinking.

Too bad for you. You're either all the way in or all the way out, because you set up your grid so as to preclude middle ground.

crc

fast

December 22, 2006, 12:51 PM

Too bad for you. You're either all the way in or all the way out, because you set up your grid so as to preclude middle ground.

Determinism and indeterminism are not opposite ends of a continuum. It's a categorical construct reminiscent of an X and not X scenario. If missy believes that she's a blonde, then she believes that she's a blonde, and if missy doesn't believe that she's a blonde, then she doesn't believe that she's a blonde, and if the hair dresser goofs and if before she is shown the mirror, then it's true that she doesn't know that she's now a brunette, and that doesn’t change the fact of what she does or doesn't believe either way. It is still true that she believes she's a blonde irrespective of what she does or does not know.

Just because you don't know if our world is deterministic changes the facts not one bit. You still, like it or not, do not believe that all events have antecedent causes. No fence for you, sorry, and there can be no fence in situations that take on categorical exhaustiveness--it's in the rule book.

I am a compatibilist (a full blooded one) that am sitting directly in my cozy little box, for the two conditions are met. That, however, is still a different issue that the other issue. The other issue is whether the confidence level of my belief is "all the way". I'm not so confident that I am certain. I merely know what I'm talking about.

What I realized is that I have no idea what you mean.And I'll humbly take the blame for that.

There are not varying types of free will--least not in term of CFW and LFW.

I've been cautioned that a little bit of philosophy in the wrong minds can be a dangerous thing, so with that in mind, cautiously I proceed not to become to dedicated to my own musings.

sweetiepie

December 22, 2006, 03:18 PM

As much as Compatibilism tries to defer the full ramifications of determinism to a discussion of indeterminism, the truth is that determinism has some impact on some views of freedom.

I wouldn't call it a disease (though it makes Fast uneasy) but I don't want to ignore it altogether. I think it's important to address LFW for those who consider its loss.

I'd like to throw in here, that "Disease" is a more accurate term than "Freedom". If you are to spend time seriously addressing LFW, then you should begin by admitting that we're not dealing with freedom, as it is normally understood.

Freedom, as a concept, means being able to do what you will. LFW, as a concept, means being able to do what you won't.

Don't get me wrong, LFW is still special. It has special consequences (like living in a universe that isn't prerecorded) It really does make fast queezy. It is worth analyzing. Because of this, you should start this discussion by talking about what EXACTLY about determinism makes fast uneasy, rather than assuming that it has something to do with that thing that Pat Henry was willing to give his life for.

Maybe it's not an issue of "freedom" but still an issue.

sweetiepie

December 22, 2006, 03:24 PM

Why? Because I think most non-philosophers think free will means free from everything. So yes, free is freedom from coersion but it is also freedom from determinism and probably even freedom from one's own brain; there's some soul that will live on once the brain has fired its last neuron.

Fully dependent on a deterministic brain is not free.

From how it's always been extremely roughly described to me, souls are themselves determined, just not from this universe. That is, they were consciously created.
Do you feel differently?

wiploc

December 22, 2006, 03:39 PM

I am a compatibilist (a full blooded one) that am sitting directly in my cozy little box....

The other issue is whether the confidence level of my belief is "all the way". I'm not so confident that I am certain.

Your box has low sides. :)

crc

TomJrzk

December 22, 2006, 08:26 PM

From how it's always been extremely roughly described to me, souls are themselves determined, just not from this universe. That is, they were consciously created.
Do you feel differently?
I'm sorry. I tried but I could not come up with anything that wasn't laughable in describing something that I don't believe. I do feel differently, though. Souls would be anything but deterministic, they would be free to change even their dispositions. A soul would be able to no longer want to be a pedophile or free itself from jealousy.

So, no, I don't think LFW only allows a person to do what they won't. It would allow people to make real choices that are not determined and those choices could differ completely given the exact same circumstances and even the same will. It's magic. But I see no need for magic.

kennethamy

December 23, 2006, 12:30 AM

So, no, I don't think LFW only allows a person to do what they won't. It would allow people to make real choices that are not determined and those choices could differ completely given the exact same circumstances and even the same will. It's magic. But I see no need for magic.

In other words, "real choices" are the choices that no one can make because they would be magical: and the choices that people do, in fact, make, are fake choices. Got ya!

fast

December 23, 2006, 10:37 AM

He still has nagging feelings from the loss that determinism costs.

I have as far as I can remember accepted the idea of cause and effect. An effect without a cause would be like introducing the idea of uncaused effects, and that I have maintained is silly, yet I suppose, if I came to find out that there truly are causeless effects, I guess I wouldn't be all that surprised.

However, despite the fact that our minds are apart of the physical world, I always from a constructural perspective categorically separated existents into very broad groups. I have framed existents as either physical or mental with the realization that mental is a subset of physical. Also, and recently, I tried very hard to allow a third alternative, that of abstract existents, which I also tried to frame as being a subset of the mental. Anyhow, because of the confusion that I have as of yet managed to work out, I've simply been treating them as three independent existents: 1) physical 2) mental, and 3) abstract.

Back to cause and effect. One of the things I think of when thinking of cause and effect is the impact on the physical world (hence, not much consideration to the cause and effect in how it applies to the mental existents). Imagine a small cross-section of a rock within a very large rock formation millions of years ago. Having an understanding of cause and effect enables us to realize that a wide array of events is the culprit that explained how it has come to be that a particular rock we see today had its origins. If you'd allow me a little room to personify, imagine being able to trace the life of a rock back in history. The wind and water and gravity and humans and all sorts of different factors all play apart in explaining how a particular rock not only came to be but also how it came to be where it's at in the form it's in. The rock example reminds me of the complexity as illustrated with previous billiards table break. If recorded, we could see how everything came about, and that extends to physical existents like the life of the rock.

Now, to address your remark (or at least to touch on it). Understanding determinism isn't simply to understand the life of the rock (and other physical existents), but it's also to understand the life of a choice, (and other mental existents), and once we start tracing the life of a choice, (as an example) we are no longer talking about what is generally referred to as something in the physical world but rather what is internal to our brains-in a manner of speaking. We are now looking at the second type of existent: the mental existent.

What are the implications of cause and effect in terms of mental existents, I wonder. Well, if I maintained that the mental world is a subset of the physical world, then perhaps it would be a no-brainer, but things just have a way of becoming mighty tricky when we start contrasting this mental existent with physical existents as if one is not the subset of the other.

Ken picked up on your use of the term "real" when you used it to describe choices. I knew he would, but I also know that you certainly don't mean to say "real" as if to contrast it with fake, so what do you mean by real? For that matter, what is it I have meant when I have said it myself?

One alternative explanation is that we feel that our choice (though real) is limited in some way. So too is our walking limited by gravity, so the fact that it's limited might not mean that much. But then again, does it?

The libertarians view free will in the light that our free will (our one and only :) ) has no limitations, whereas the mighty soft compatibilists accepts that our free will (our one and only :D ) does have limitations.

Refocusing on your statement. What bothers me isn’t quite clear; I guess I should admit that. If our actions are destined (the faint hard determinist in me speaking) [and I can hear Wiploc going, “I told ya your boat would be swamped with those low sides”,] then how much real control [and yes, Ken, I hear you too] do we actually have with our choices?

How attributable to me is the love I have for another? How different am I really to a murderer who cares not what he does? If all our actions are in the cards, so to speak, then I don’t get to take quite as much pride in my actions being of a good nature—born of me. Kinda presumptuous and intellectually dishonest of me to take the credit for any good actions and deeds when the actions and deeds were written (pre-written in fact) in the script of life.

It’s like walking in the foot path of another that’s leads me out of the wilderness so that I am no longer lost but taking credit for knowing where I was going.

We talk about determinism being the belief that all events have antecedent causes, but we fail to see that if that is so, then so too do all events have subsequent effects. Wonder not why I am unsettled by that when it implies that our future is written like the script of a movie.

I’m walking a dangerous line here again. I’m not supporting the hard determinist view. I just want you to know that I know where you’re coming from, Tom. I could walk a mile in your shoes so to speak.

We all become a little less special when all our good actions are viewed as if they’re nothing more than predestined causal effects.

I still maintain that I’m a compatibilist. I have not faltered from that position. I just haven’t been a very good spokesperson for the position in this post.

wiploc

December 23, 2006, 11:03 AM

I have as far as I can remember accepted the idea of cause and effect. An effect without a cause would be like introducing the idea of uncaused effects, and that I have maintained is silly, yet I suppose, if I came to find out that there truly are causeless effects, I guess I wouldn't be all that surprised.

Causeless effects are no more possible than square circles. By definition, an effect is a thing with a cause. If something doesn't have a cause, it isn't an effect. Possibly you mean that you wouldn't be surprised by a causeless event, rather than a causeless effect.

crc

fast

December 23, 2006, 11:20 AM

Causeless effects are no more possible than square circles. By definition, an effect is a thing with a cause. If something doesn't have a cause, it isn't an effect. Possibly you mean that you wouldn't be surprised by a causeless event, rather than a causeless effect.

crc

Yeah, that's what I meant. It's my understanding that by definition, if there's an effect, then there must have been a cause.

I keep confusing all that event stuff because an event is an occurence, and so too is an effect, so since an effect is precipitated by a cause, then I keep thinking there are causes for events as well. Or something like that. I never really had a good handle on all that.

Wasn't Alf a big supporter of causeless something or another--maybe it was events; I ain't know. It's been awhile.

premjan

December 23, 2006, 11:24 AM

I think causeless events (e.g. pair creation in quantum mechanics) may exist.

TomJrzk

December 23, 2006, 11:32 AM

In other words, "real choices" are the choices that no one can make because they would be magical: and the choices that people do, in fact, make, are fake choices. Got ya!
OK, here we go again.

The choices that people do, in fact, make, are illusionary choices. They don't feel the deterministic machinery that cranks out their every whim. Their mulling over of alternatives is a part of that machinery; whether you choose to mull over these words is already decided, probably in large part because of the words themselves. So, yes, you can call choices 'fake' if you want and you can even be a bit snarky while doing so ;). But these illusionary choices are all we have and I enjoy every one of mine.

Anything more would be magic (or freewillions in the parallel-universe-spirit field that's currently beyond our senses to the point of feeling like magic).

kennethamy

December 23, 2006, 03:27 PM

OK, here we go again.

The choices that people do, in fact, make, are illusionary choices. They don't feel the deterministic machinery that cranks out their every whim. Their mulling over of alternatives is a part of that machinery; whether you choose to mull over these words is already decided, probably in large part because of the words themselves. So, yes, you can call choices 'fake' if you want and you can even be a bit snarky while doing so ;). But these illusionary choices are all we have and I enjoy every one of mine.

Anything more would be magic (or freewillions in the parallel-universe-spirit field that's currently beyond our senses to the point of feeling like magic).

You apparently mean by "illusionary choices" choices that are determined. But, since those are exactly (if determinism is true) what we ordinarily refer to as "choices" how could they not be real choices. Suppose I pointed to a red ball, and I told you that it was not really red because if it were really red, it would look red not only in the light, but it would look red in pitch blackness as well, would you agree? I wouldn't since the objects we say are red are not objects which are required to look red under all conditions. How could it be that what we normally call an X is not an X? Are objects that do not look red in the dark (as all objects do not) only illusionarily red objects? And are choices that are determined only illusory choices? Who says so? And more important, why?

By the way, I do sometimes feel the "deterministic machinery" that "cranks away". I call such choices choices I am forced to make, as when the "deterministic machinery" is a gun held to my head.

And what is snarky about calling what is illusory, fake? Isn't that what "illusory" means?

TomJrzk

December 24, 2006, 11:20 AM

And are choices that are determined only illusory choices? Who says so? And more important, why?

I don't think I'll answer that a 3rd time, no matter how many times you imply that I haven't already.
In other words, "real choices" are the choices that no one can make because they would be magical: and the choices that people do, in fact, make, are fake choices. Got ya!
And what is snarky about calling what is illusory, fake? Isn't that what "illusory" means?
If you don't see the sarcasm dripping from the "Got ya!" or you don't admit an attempt to ridicule my understanding of illusionary free will by calling it 'fake', then I can see where you wouldn't also see my cause for calling your post snarky :rolleyes:. Yes, the :rolleyes: was snarky right back atcha.
By the way, I do sometimes feel the "deterministic machinery" that "cranks away". I call such choices choices I am forced to make, as when the "deterministic machinery" is a gun held to my head.
But this is far more telling. It looks here that you draw a line of distinction between the determinism at work in your brain right now as you read my words and some other determinism at work when there is a gun to your head. Again, I'll have to ask the question, Are you really a determinist? Or are you just playing the devil's advocate? Are you really only a determinist in the second sense and not the first? That would explain everything.

kennethamy

December 24, 2006, 02:25 PM

I don't think I'll answer that a 3rd time, no matter how many times you imply that I haven't already.

If you don't see the sarcasm dripping from the "Got ya!" or you don't admit an attempt to ridicule my understanding of illusionary free will by calling it 'fake', then I can see where you wouldn't also see my cause for calling your post snarky :rolleyes:. Yes, the :rolleyes: was snarky right back atcha.

But this is far more telling. It looks here that you draw a line of distinction between the determinism at work in your brain right now as you read my words and some other determinism at work when there is a gun to your head. Again, I'll have to ask the question, Are you really a determinist? Or are you just playing the devil's advocate? Are you really only a determinist in the second sense and not the first? That would explain everything.

I did not call your understanding of free will "fake". I pointed out that to call free will "illusory" is the same thing as calling it "fake". Not your understanding was fake, but your understanding of free will as being fake. Illusory X's are fake X's, aren't they?

I do think, however, that it is quite peculiar to think that what we ordinarily call free will is fake free will, whereas what we never call free will would be free will if there were such a thing-which there isn't. (Isn't that what you maintain?) The analogy I gave is it is as if someone were to say that a red ball is not red because it would be red only if it would look red in the dark, and conclude that a ball is red only when it looks red in the dark, which it never does.

As for your question, you are right. At least I do draw a distinction between just being my actions being just caused, and my actions being coerced. Coercion is a kind of causation, but causation is not a kind of coercion. So, my view (as you know) is that whereas all my actions are caused, not all my actions are coerced. But determinism is, as I have always understood it, the view that every event (including human actions) have a cause, and in that sense, of course I am a determinist. My view is (again, as you know) that causation simplicitur is not the opposite of free action, but that only causation which is coercive is the opposite of free action. Why should I not be a determinist if I hold that although all actions have causes, some actions are not coerced? Are you puzzled because you don't distinguish between coercive causes and non-coercive causes? If that is true, then you must think that planets are not only caused to move about the Sun in elliptical orbits, but are coerced to do so. But is that what you hold? If so, then you must think that planets do not want to move in elliptical orbits, for how can something be coerced to do something unless it does not want to do that thing? But do you really think that planets don't want to move in elliptical orbits, and are forced to do so? If you think that planets have wants, then isn't that as peculiar as thinking that there is magic?

wiploc

December 24, 2006, 03:06 PM

I do think, however, that it is quite peculiar to think that what we ordinarily call free will is fake free will, whereas what we never call free will would be free will if there were such a thing-which there isn't. (Isn't that what you maintain?) The analogy I gave is it is as if someone were to say that a red ball is not red because it would be red only if it would look red in the dark, and conclude that a ball is red only when it looks red in the dark, which it never does.

Let me offer the mirage analogy again:

[mirage analogy]

The libertarian says there is a real lake on the highway ahead, and we may as well put on our swimtrunks.

The compatibilist says that there's no lake. Rather there is an illusion or "fake" of a lake, but there is a real thing there, a mirage, which deceives the libertarians. The lake is fake, but the appearance of a lake is real. And we may, therefore, properly refer to the "lake" so long as we understand that the "lake" referred to is really a visual phenomenon, not a body of water.

The hard determinist says that the lake is not real because it is not a body of water. There is no lake. A reflection of the sky, or whatever it is that the compatibilist is calling a lake, is not really a lake, and should not be called a lake. Calling a visual phenomenon a "lake" only confuses people.
[/mirage analogy]

This analogy has some weaknesses.

1. If we were really talking about a mirage rather than free will, we would have the word "mirage" available to us. The hard determinist wouldn't have any problem using the word "mirage." He would not insist that no mirage existed, and he would not be confused when the compatibilist called his mirage an illusion of a lake.

Of course, we ought to be able to straighten that right out by calling the mirage CFW and the lake LFW, though that would have to be over Fast's inexplicable objection.

2. The analogy privileges the compatiblist viewpoint. That is, readers of the analogy understand that the lake isn't really there. They see the libertarians as credulous, and the hard determinist as pedantic. In a better analogy, it would not be clear who was right.

crc

kennethamy

December 24, 2006, 07:18 PM

In a better analogy, it would not be clear who was right.

crc

Why not, if in what is being compared there is a right? If that is so, then if in the analogy it was not clear who was right, then the analogy would be a bad analogy.

So, an analog watch is an analog of the Earth's rotation on its axis. The hand go round the watch just like the Sun rotates on its axis. If the hands of the watch did not go around the watch every twenty-four hours, the watch would not be a correct analogy of the rotation of the Earth. And, just as it is clear that the Earth rotates on its axis that every place on the Earth arrives at the same position every 24 hours, so the hands of the watch do the same. The analogy between the rotation of the Earth, and the watch is, therefore, an excellent analogy, because it is exact.

kennethamy

December 24, 2006, 07:34 PM

Yeah, that's what I meant. It's my understanding that by definition, if there's an effect, then there must have been a cause.

I keep confusing all that event stuff because an event is an occurence, and so too is an effect, so since an effect is precipitated by a cause, then I keep thinking there are causes for events as well. Or something like that. I never really had a good handle on all that.

Wasn't Alf a big supporter of causeless something or another--maybe it was events; I ain't know. It's been awhile.

An apple is a fruit, and so is an orange. But that does not lead me to think that all apples are oranges.

sweetiepie

December 26, 2006, 02:26 PM

I'm sorry. I tried but I could not come up with anything that wasn't laughable in describing something that I don't believe. I do feel differently, though. Souls would be anything but deterministic, they would be free to change even their dispositions. A soul would be able to no longer want to be a pedophile or free itself from jealousy.
Whoa. Slow down here. People can change their dispositions. Nothing against that, even in a soulless deterministic universe. If you want to change, you can (to some degree, you can't will yourself into believing you are a dinosaur). The question the deterministic universe asks is: why do you want to change? But anyway...

So, no, I don't think LFW only allows a person to o what they won't. It would allow people to make real choices that are not determined and those choices could differ completely given the exact same circumstances and even the same will. It's magic. But I see no need for magic.
No. Again. Don't say "real choices", there's nothing more real about an uncaused or unpredictable choice. This is exactly what I'm talking about. We need to figure out what the hell LFW actually provides, and why not having it makes us queezy. It's not about "real choices" and it's not about "freedom".

It is maybe about unpredictability?

I say that "it allows a person to do what they won't" because, in a deterministic universe you can ask a question that begins "what would you do if...?" and expect a single answer.

An indeterministic universe, by definition, is one where there is no "what you would do" because you might, for no reason at all, act differently.

sweetiepie

December 26, 2006, 04:50 PM

Hey fast, I think you and I are pretty much in dead agreement and confusion at this point. I'd like to throw in whatever remaining thoughts I've had recently on your stance. You'll notice they aren't in quite perfect order :)

Refocusing on your statement. What bothers me isn’t quite clear; I guess I should admit that. If our actions are destined (the faint hard determinist in me speaking) [and I can hear Wiploc going, “I told ya your boat would be swamped with those low sides”,] then how much real control [and yes, Ken, I hear you too] do we actually have with our choices?
Before we can answer this question, we need to get a grasp on what we are.

Determinism says: We can't be what we aren't. And accordingly we can't choose what we wouldn't.

We are a thing that has been made. We may be a pretty thing. Or an ugly thing. Or a stupid thing. Or an immoral thing. We can change some of these features. Our ability and willingness to change these features, however, is limited (determined) BY these same features. Are we anything besides these features? We determine ourselves, according to ourselves.

A good person, being good, will want to become better; in a deterministic universe, this person can and must succeed. In acting according to her will, is she controlling herself? Should she be rewarded? Should she be happy for succeeding?

How attributable to me is the love I have for another?
This is trick. Love is coercion. ;)

How different am I really to a murderer who cares not what he does?
Back on path. Yes you are fated. Modern science has narrowed the difference to not 3 fates, but just two wicked women: Nature and Nurture. If you were raised the same way as him, and had his genes, then you would be him. Because you weren't, you aren't. Is that something to be proud of? No, you shouldn't be proud of your genes. And no, you shouldn't be proud of how you were raised. In his circumstances, you WOULD have done what he did, in that, you would have been him.

Ghandi for example, if he had my brains and my blood and my life, would be me. What does he have to be proud of?

On the other hand, murder is still wrong. The murderer shouldn't commit the crime. The murderer chose to commit the crime. The murderer likes to harm people, he is evil.

Is he to blame? If he is the result of nature and nurture-- then yes-- we should blame for being this evil thing that is the result of nature and nurture.

Should we forgive him? Yes, we ALL would have done the same thing.

Ok-- time to move on-- the two voices in my head are about to kill each other.

If all our actions are in the cards, so to speak, then I don’t get to take quite as much pride in my actions being of a good nature—born of me. Kinda presumptuous and intellectually dishonest of me to take the credit for any good actions and deeds when the actions and deeds were written (pre-written in fact) in the script of life.
This is not a given.
Maybe you should be proud of your role in the script.
Your actions are the result of you, even if you are the result of something else.

We all become a little less special when all our good actions are viewed as if they’re nothing more than predestined causal effects.
It's not just our actions, its us too. When you look at yourself as part of the clockwork universe, body-mind-soul-and-all then maybe you can start being happy again?

fast

January 4, 2007, 07:20 PM

Before we can answer this question, we need to get a grasp on what we are.

Determinism says: We can't be what we aren't. And accordingly we can't choose what we wouldn't.I agree that we cannot currently be something other than what we currently are, and I agree that we can't act in impossible ways.

In his circumstances, you WOULD have done what he did, in that, you would have been him.The undertone of your dialogue suggests that a person could not have acted in a manner other than which they did.

Is he to blame? If he is the result of nature and nurture-- then yes-- we should blame for being this evil thing that is the result of nature and nurture.That doesn't sound like a good reason to lay blame.

Should we forgive him? Yes, we ALL would have done the same thing.Why? Because all events have antecedent causes? That's a tough sell.

This is not a given.
Maybe you should be proud of your role in the script.
Your actions are the result of you, even if you are the result of something else.Proud of the role in the script. Cute. If it's a script, and if I were to be proud, I would have had no choice.

Elaborate on "This is not a given". It sounds like something I should be saying ... not you.

It's not just our actions, its us too. When you look at yourself as part of the clockwork universe, body-mind-soul-and-all then maybe you can start being happy again?I can be happy knowing that my choice to run or not run the mile was a choice of my own free will --and wasn't set in stone since the days of the big bang. If the deterministic clutches of the universe are so grand that it was inevitable that I would choose the mile walk today, then we live in a sadder world than I originally thought.

kennethamy

January 4, 2007, 07:23 PM

Hey fast, I think you and I are pretty much in dead agreement and confusion at this point. I'd like to throw in whatever remaining thoughts I've had recently on your stance. You'll notice they aren't in quite perfect order :)

Before we can answer this question, we need to get a grasp on what we are.

Determinism says: We can't be what we aren't. And accordingly we can't choose what we wouldn't.

But of course we can choose what we wouldn't. We just do not. I would not choose to have butternut ice-cream, but why can't I? It is available, and I have the money. What is preventing me? Nothing, except that I don't like butternut. But that doesn't stop me from choosing it. For example, I might choose butternut just to show that I would not (ordinarily) choose butternut.

kennethamy

January 5, 2007, 09:11 AM

fast

January 5, 2007, 06:20 PM

Why would the fact that it was determined (set in stone) that you were going to choose to run a mile mean that you did not choose it "of your own free will", as long as it was not inevitable that you would choose it so that it was up to you whether you would choose it?All events are caused, and some events are compelled; therefore, all events that are compelled are caused; moreover, not all caused events are compelled; consequently, compulsion has an inferior relationship to causation; furthermore, though our actions might be constrained in some way at particular times fails to change or otherwise alter or negate the fact that all events are at all times caused.

To illustrate, if I decide to run a mile of my own free will and choosing, then both the fact that my run was caused and not compelled are true. If I had been forced at gunpoint (for example), then though I would have been compelled to run the mile (hence, against my own free will and choosing), then the run would still have been caused. Therefore, the relationship between an event being caused and an event being compelled are not polar opposites like many others here, and probably elsewhere, would have us to believe.

Compulsion ought to be looked at as more of a subset (or subordinate issue) to the grand and foundational superset of causation. Think, if no causation, then no ice-tea, no automobiles, no free will, no warm and snuggly in the middle of the night, and no love; however, if causation but no compulsion, then there is no effect to the grand scale of things like it would be if no causation.

We can have causation without compulsion, but we can’t have compulsion without causation; thus, the theme continues: Free will is dependent upon determinism (it’s a necessary condition), but causation is not a sufficient condition, for constraining forces can restrict free will in our deterministic universe.

kennethamy

January 5, 2007, 06:40 PM

All events are caused, and some events are compelled; therefore, all events that are compelled are caused; moreover, not all caused events are compelled; consequently, compulsion has an inferior relationship to causation; furthermore, though our actions might be constrained in some way at particular times fails to change or otherwise alter or negate the fact that all events are at all times caused.

To illustrate, if I decide to run a mile of my own free will and choosing, then both the fact that my run was caused and not compelled are true. If I had been forced at gunpoint (for example), then though I would have been compelled to run the mile (hence, against my own free will and choosing), then the run would still have been caused. Therefore, the relationship between an event being caused and an event being compelled are not polar opposites like many others here, and probably elsewhere, would have us to believe.

Compulsion ought to be looked at as more of a subset (or subordinate issue) to the grand and foundational superset of causation. Think, if no causation, then no ice-tea, no automobiles, no free will, no warm and snuggly in the middle of the night, and no love; however, if causation but no compulsion, then there is no effect to the grand scale of things like it would be if no causation.

We can have causation without compulsion, but we can’t have compulsion without causation; thus, the theme continues: Free will is dependent upon determinism (it’s a necessary condition), but causation is not a sufficient condition, for constraining forces can restrict free will in our deterministic universe.

All true, but your worry was that if it is true that our choices are "set in stone" from the beginning of the Big Bang, then we did not choose freely. But that does not follow. For what if it was "set in stone" from the beginning of the Big Bang that we were sometimes going to choose freely. Leibniz said that it was known from the beginning of time that Judas would betray Christ. But it was also known from the beginning of time that Judas would freely choose to betray Christ. So, although he was going to betray Christ, he was not forced to betray Christ, but he betrayed Christ of his own free will. And that was also known. Does that make you feel better?

fast

January 6, 2007, 12:30 AM

All true, but your worry was that if it is true that our choices are "set in stone" from the beginning of the Big Bang, then we did not choose freely. But that does not follow. If our choices are caused, determined, or otherwise set in stone, then that does not therefore lead to the conclusion that we are not making choices of our own free will. The presence of constraining forces affects the truth of propositions regarding the presence of free will, so no, my worry is no longer what it exactly once was many pages ago; however, there is a slight worry that continues to capture me so.

For what if it was "set in stone" from the beginning of the Big Bang that we were sometimes going to choose freely. Leibniz said that it was known from the beginning of time that Judas would betray Christ. But it was also known from the beginning of time that Judas would freely choose to betray Christ. So, although he was going to betray Christ, he was not forced to betray Christ, but he betrayed Christ of his own free will. And that was also known. Does that make you feel better?

No. That makes me feel worst (worse?). You are inadvertently helping solidify the very worry to which I ought to be talked out of. Is it true, or is it not true that it was possible that Judas could have chosen not to betray Christ? How could Judas have escaped the clutches of the deterministic universe rendering it true that Judas might choose not to betray Christ? If one knows what the future holds, then it must be true that the future will unfold as predicted, and if things can happen in the only single way possible, then that leaves very little room for the possibility that Judas might have chosen otherwise.

How is it possible that an alternative something might happen if you know that the non-alternative thing will? Even if you don’t know (hence, knowledge is irrelevant), then how is it that a coin might land on heads if the events that are set in motion demands that it must land on tails? Why must? Because the fact that all events have antecedent causes implies that all events have subsequent effects.

kennethamy

January 6, 2007, 09:24 AM

If our choices are caused, determined, or otherwise set in stone, then that does not therefore lead to the conclusion that we are not making choices of our own free will. The presence of constraining forces affects the truth of propositions regarding the presence of free will, so no, my worry is no longer what it exactly once was many pages ago; however, there is a slight worry that continues to capture me so.

No. That makes me feel worst (worse?). You are inadvertently helping solidify the very worry to which I ought to be talked out of. Is it true, or is it not true that it was possible that Judas could have chosen not to betray Christ? How could Judas have escaped the clutches of the deterministic universe rendering it true that Judas might choose not to betray Christ? If one knows what the future holds, then it must be true that the future will unfold as predicted, and if things can happen in the only single way possible, then that leaves very little room for the possibility that Judas might have chosen otherwise.

How is it possible that an alternative something might happen if you know that the non-alternative thing will? Even if you don’t know (hence, knowledge is irrelevant), then how is it that a coin might land on heads if the events that are set in motion demands that it must land on tails? Why must? Because the fact that all events have antecedent causes implies that all events have subsequent effects.

Of course it was possible for Judas to choose not to betray Christ. But he did so. And, in The Book of Life, it said that it would have been possible for Judas not to betray Christ, but he did so, freely; for no one, and nothing compelled him to betray Christ.

My knowing that X will happen, does not force X to happen. I (pretty well) know that in the next five minutes, you will not do a strip tease standing on the kitchen table, singing "Yankee Doodle Dandy". How does my knowing that impede your freedom of will?

fast

January 6, 2007, 10:41 AM

Of course it was possible for Judas to choose not to betray Christ. But, if Judas had chosen not to betray Christ, then it would not have been true that it was known that Judas would betray Christ.

But he did so. But of course; did you expect otherwise? You said yourself that it was known that he would, and you know that if you know something, then the something you know is true, for knowledge is a true, justified belief.

And, in The Book of Life, it said that it would have been possible for Judas not to betray Christ, but he did so, freely; for no one, and nothing compelled him to betray Christ. Perhaps the assumption that it would have been possible is predicated on the knowledge that there would be no compulsion, but as we've seen, it's causation (and not compulsion) that all events have.

My knowing that X will happen, does not force X to happen. I (pretty well) know that in the next five minutes, you will not do a strip tease standing on the kitchen table, singing "Yankee Doodle Dandy". How does my knowing that impede your freedom of will?This, I agree with. The knowing is not the cause. The mental wherewithal that something will happen is not the causal factor stimulating an events occurrence.

Juma

January 6, 2007, 11:35 AM

No. Since robots have no consciousness, they have no wills. We do have consciousness.
So what? How do the fact that we experience lead to the conclusion that that we also have "will"?

premjan

January 6, 2007, 12:02 PM

Maybe robots do have or can have consciousness - how do you know they don't or can't?

fast

January 6, 2007, 05:33 PM

So what? How do the fact that we experience lead to the conclusion that that we also have "will"?

The fact that we are able to experience things does not lead to the conclusion that we can do as we will, for the ability to experience things is not a sufficient condition for acting of our own free will, but being able to experience things is a necessary condition (as opposed to a sufficient condition) for having free will.

For example, one can experience being a prisoner, and such an experience is the experience of being constrained by force, so it's not enough (it's insufficient) to merely experience things to have free will. To not be a prisoner in this case is not to experience the constraint of being imprisoned.

Maybe robots do have or can have consciousness - how do you know they don't or can't?
A necessary condition of consciousness is for there to be a biological entity. Robots aren't biological. Therefore, robots do not have consciousness--least not of the variety normally thought of.

kennethamy

January 6, 2007, 06:12 PM

Maybe robots do have or can have consciousness - how do you know they don't or can't?

No evidence that they do.

kennethamy

January 6, 2007, 06:24 PM

But, if Judas had chosen not to betray Christ, then it would not have been true that it was known that Judas would betray Christ.

But of course; did you expect otherwise? You said yourself that it was known that he would, and you know that if you know something, then the something you know is true, for knowledge is a true, justified belief.

Perhaps the assumption that it would have been possible is predicated on the knowledge that there would be no compulsion, but as we've seen, it's causation (and not compulsion) that all events have.

This, I agree with. The knowing is not the cause. The mental wherewithal that something will happen is not the causal factor stimulating an events occurrence.

"But, if Judas had chosen not to betray Christ, then it would not have been true that it was known that Judas would betray Christ."

Obviously. On the other hand,(Necessarily) if it it is known than Jesus betrayed Christ then , Jesus betrayed Christ, but NOT that Jesus necessarily betrayed Christ. Remember? We went all through that with Garrett. Although it is a necessary truth that if p is known, the p is true; it is not true that if p is known then p is a necessary truth.

Therefore, if I know that p is true, p might still be false. For that it is a necessary truth that if p is known, then p is true, it is not true that if p is known, then p is a necessary truth. Therefore, although it may be known that Judas will betray Christ, it is still possible for Judas not to betray Christ, in which case, as you say, it could not be known that Judas would betray Christ.

fast

January 6, 2007, 07:51 PM

On the other hand,(Necessarily) if it it is known than Jesus betrayed Christ then , Jesus betrayed Christ, but NOT that Jesus necessarily betrayed Christ. Remember? We went all through that with Garrett.

If it is known that I went to the store, then it's true that I went to the store, but just because it is true that I went to the store, that doesn't mean that I was compelled to go to the store, so it's not as if it was a must that I had to go to the store.

So yes, I remember.

If it is known in advance that I will go to the store and rob it, then it's true that I will go to the store and rob it. It might not be a must that I will (in that I am not compelled to do so), but I hypothesize that it is a must nevertheless that I will if it is to remain unequivocally true that I will. How so? It has nothing to do with compulsion. Rather, it has to do with causation.

If it's true that I will do something, then it's not true that I might not. If it's true that I may do something, then it's true that I might not.

Although it is a necessary truth that if p is known, the p is true; it is not true that if p is known then p is a necessary truth.
It was known that Judas would betray Christ, and it was true he would do so of his own free will; therefore, since compulsion isn't a factor to keep it true that he would do as declared, then the only other explanation is that the future causal links could be seen in advance. Hence, all events have predictable, subsequent effects, so once the events were set in motion, the future could be nothing other than what it was destined to be.

So, my reservations are that in that sense, it was a must that Judas would betray Christ of his own free will.

premjan

January 7, 2007, 01:10 AM

A necessary condition of consciousness is for there to be a biological entity. Robots aren't biological. Therefore, robots do not have consciousness--least not of the variety normally thought of.
Why is this a necessary condition? And why should consciousness only be of the biological variety?

fast

January 7, 2007, 09:14 AM

Why is this a necessary condition? And why should consciousness only be of the biological variety?

We have to keep the scope or reach of the terms we use within reason and common usage.

If I see a state-of-the-art robot but think that I am seeing a living breathing person, then I am not seeing a sentient being regardless of what I think that I am seeing. Just because the robot might have a computer brain so complicated and technologically advanced that it's able to mimic the happenings of a biological human brain, that doesn't mean that we ought to also erroneously expand the scope of other words we would ordinarily extend on the living.

For example, we may feel like saying the thing is alive, but since the thing doesn't have life as we ordinarily regard it, then calling it alive or bestowed with consciousness is incorrect usage of the terms. It's called personification.

premjan

January 7, 2007, 09:16 AM

I guess we will come up with a different word for whatever robots end up having.

fast

January 7, 2007, 09:55 AM

I guess we will come up with a different word for whatever robots end up having.

Yes, it would we expected that a distinction will be made. For example, we wouldn't call such a grand robot intelligent, even if it happens to perform superior to that of a person. We won't insist that the robot has a consciousness no more than we would insist that the robot is intelligent.

We'll notice the intelligent-like similarities; however, we won't lose sight of the differences between us, so what we'll end up doing is not saying that a robot has intelligence and instead say that the robot has artificial intelligence; perhaps we'll call what the robot has “artificial consciousness.”

Just because we're animals, we will continue to distinguish us between that of humans and the remainder of the animal world. Likewise, we'll insist on making it transparent to others that no matter how smart-like and human-like a robot might become, we will always desire to be special and called something different than that of what we create.

StillDreaming

January 7, 2007, 10:14 AM

I can be happy knowing that my choice to run or not run the mile was a choice of my own free will --and wasn't set in stone since the days of the big bang. If the deterministic clutches of the universe are so grand that it was inevitable that I would choose the mile walk today, then we live in a sadder world than I originally thought.

I've only read a few of the 28 pages of this thread, so maybe I'm repeating what others have said already, but I'd like to make a few remarks on this subject.

To start, regarding 'free will' I consider myself as a hard determinist and a compatibilist. In my understanding, the only difference between the two positions is that they use different definitions of what is meant by the words 'free will', which is really just an (philosophically) utterly uninteresting discussion about labels: In one sense, 'free will' is an absurdity, a contradictio in terminis, a thing that cannot exist by definition; in a different sense it is something we all experience. But as long as it is clear what definition one uses this cannot cause confusion or disagreement.

Now, you say that if your choices would be inevitable, you would live in a sadder world than you originally thought. But are you sure that the world you originally thought of actually made sense? And if so, what, exactly, would have to be different compared to a deterministic world to make it less sad?
Would you rather live in a world where your choice is not determined by your desires? Would you rather live in a world where you have no desires at all? Would you rather live in a world where your desires or choices are purely random, changing from one preference to another for no reason whatsoever, leaving you always wondering why the heck you chose X rather than Y? In what way would this give more freedom, more control to you? Does it?

The difficulty that lots of people have (including myself when I started thinking about this subject) is that they like to be in full control. Being in full control is associated with freedom and power and these are considered as positive traits. So at first glance it might seem attractive to be 'in full control of your own choices', while having no 'free will' means less control and less power and is therefore less attractive. But upon closer inspection it appears that talking about free will in that sense makes no sense at all. It is a confused idea, and yes it can be difficult and embarrassing to accept dismissing a positive feeling about a nonsensical idea.

As for responsibility, blame and praise, a distinction often made is that between ultimate responsibility and moral responsibility. Something can only be held ultimately responsible if it has no external causes. In the deterministic worldview, people are obviously not ultimately responsible for their actions. Only uncaused events (Big Bang? Gods? Quantum events?) could be capable of bearing ultimate responsibility. (Btw, the question how uncaused events fit in a deterministic world is left as an exercise to the reader :) )

Moral responsibility is what we assign to each other. If an entity is sufficiently aware of the consequenses of its actions, we hold it morally responsible for its actions. It comes in gradations; animals, children and retards are held somewhat responsible for their actions, or not at all, while healthy adults are held fully responsible.

Now, maybe that's arbitrary assignment that can only be justified by unanimous or majority agreement, but people do it, people accept it, and I think everybody agrees it's very useful (especially in a deterministic universe). Personally I think the fact that people generally accept responsibility is very significant. After all, it is still you who makes the choice, or maybe I should say: the choice is still made inside you; and this decisioning process is fully part of you. And that's how we experience it.

As a final note, I consider the proces of making a choice as a proces of becoming aware which outcome from a range hypothetical outcomes best matches our desires: we realize what it is that we want under specific circumstances, and that is what we inevitably will choose.

fast

January 7, 2007, 11:16 AM

To start, regarding 'free will' I consider myself as a hard determinist and a compatibilist. It cannot be the case that you can be both a hard determinist and a compatibilist. Hard determinists are incompatibilists. A compatibilist cannot be an incompatibilist.

In my understanding, the only difference between the two positions is that they use different definitions of what is meant by the words 'free will', Though it might be the case that those with different positions may adhere to a particular so-called definition, the distinction between the two positions is more than mere adherence to a particular so-called definition. I say so-called because I do no believe there are two different definitions of free will in this context despite the claims that there are two different definitions.

Compatibilists are believers of free will that hold that determinism is true. Hard determinists are not believers of free will that hold that determinism is true.

which is really just an (philosophically) utterly uninteresting discussion about labels: In one sense, 'free will' is an absurdity, a contradictio in terminis, a thing that cannot exist by definition; in a different sense it is something we all experience. But as long as it is clear what definition one uses this cannot cause confusion or disagreement.

Free will is the absence of compulsion. Believing (because of confusion) that causation implies no free will doesn't change the truth of what free will is--let alone create another true definition of free will.

fast

January 7, 2007, 11:41 AM

Now, you say that if your choices would be inevitable, you would live in a sadder world than you originally thought.

If every good and bad deed that would ever occur was known to you, (and you're isolated so that you cannot interfere), then there's no room for hope that the bad guys of days to come might not do the evil deeds to which they’ll partake. They won’t change their minds and make the right decisions, for it’s true that they will make a bad decision.

Why do you think movie-goers don't want to be told how the block buster movie they're going to see ends? Knowing the future diminishes the awe. In Lethal weapon, Amanda Huntsacker fell from the balcony of the roof because she was drugged and got too close, and no matter how many times I watch the movie, it continues to happen every time despite the fact that the movie makers could have (which itself is questionable) made it so that she wouldn't fall to her death. The script of her movie life was destined, and I have no hope that she will not fall.

Knowing that my future decisions (and yes, they are made of my own free will--save for when I am compelled to act as I would otherwise do) ... are inevitable highly suggests to me that a silent observer has no hope for whether or not I'll make the right decisions. It's awful that my decisions WILL turn out as predicted with 100% accuracy despite the intermixed mental contemplation of those very own decisions by me.

StillDreaming

January 7, 2007, 11:54 AM

Compatibilists are believers of free will that hold that determinism is true. Hard determinists are not believers of free will that hold that determinism is true.
And the reason is because they assign different meanings to the words 'free will'. If we replace these words by their meanings we get 'compatibilists are believers of X that hold that determinism is true. Hard determinists are not believers of Y that hold that determinism is true.' Since X != Y these positions are not necessarily mutually exclusive.

Free will is the absence of compulsion.
Fine. But you won't find a hard determinist who says that absence of compulsion does not exist. With this definition free will has no relevance at all in the determinism-indeterminism debate.

Believing (because of confusion) that causation implies no free will doesn't change the truth of what free will is--let alone create another true definition of free will.
The thing you refer to is what it is, regardless how we call it. But there is not an authority who decides what thing is refered to by what label, so different people sometimes use the same label to refer to different things.

When an incompatibilist says that determinism is incompatible with free will, he is not referring to 'absence of compulsion' but to the confused, nonsensical notion of free will that some people have. He would say that free will is incompatible with indeterminism as well.

At least that's how I see it :)

StillDreaming

January 7, 2007, 12:02 PM

If every good and bad deed that would ever occur was known to you, (and you're isolated so that you cannot interfere), then there's no room for hope that the bad guys of days to come might not do the evil deeds to which they’ll partake. They won’t change their minds and make the right decisions, for it’s true that they will make a bad decision.

Why do you think movie-goers don't want to be told how the block buster movie they're going to see ends? Knowing the future diminishes the awe. In Lethal weapon, Amanda Huntsacker fell from the balcony of the roof because she was drugged and got too close, and no matter how many times I watch the movie, it continues to happen every time despite the fact that the movie makers could have (which itself is questionable) made it so that she wouldn't fall to her death. The script of her movie life was destined, and I have no hope that she will not fall.

Knowing that my future decisions (and yes, they are made of my own free will--save for when I am compelled to act as I would otherwise do) ... are inevitable highly suggests to me that a silent observer has no hope for whether or not I'll make the right decisions. It's awful that my decisions WILL turn out as predicted with 100% accuracy despite the intermixed mental contemplation of those very own decisions by me.

Yes, when you know the script you cannot hope for a different outcome. But as long as you don't know it (and we don't) we have the same hope as if there were no script, even if we know there is a script. I like your movie analogy: we all know it's just a script with only one possible outcome, but in no way does that make us less curious to the outcome or reduce the excitement of watching how the chain of events develops, just like in real life.

fast

January 7, 2007, 12:29 PM

And the reason is because they assign different meanings to the words 'free will'. The term "free will" is a referring term, and as all referring terms, it has a referent, and the referent of the term "free will" is nothing other than free will--where free will is the absence of compulsion.

It is true that some people when discussing the “free will / determinist” issue will refer to something other than free will when using the term "free will". What they'll often refer to is "absence of causation", but as I've already pointed out, the referent of the term "free will" is absence of compulsion--not absence of causation, so when one uses the term "free will" to refer to absence of causation, that does not therefore mean that there are two different meanings to the term "free will" despite the fact that there are two different things being referred to by different people.

Who is right is who is using the term to refer to the appropriate referent. In this case, the referent of the term "free will" properly refers to free will which is absence of compulsion.

The thing you refer to is what it is, regardless how we call it.Very good. A rose would smell just as sweet by any other name.

But there is not an authority who decides what thing is refered to by what label, so different people sometimes use the same label to refer to different things.If we call the tail of a dog a leg, then how many legs does a dog have?

Just because people sometimes formulate idiosyncratic definitions, that in no way implies that the thing being referred to is what it’s being called.

I look to how fluent users of the English language use the term free will in my decision as to which usage is correct.

When I say that I went to the store, I don’t say that I went of my own free will. I say that I went to the store. Why? Because free will is a denial term. It’s used to deny something. It’s used to deny compulsion.

For example, after the fair, I and my love went and found a place to park. An officer stopped and inquired of her if she was there of her own free will. I assure you that the officer was not asking if her presence was uncaused. He was asking if her presence was compelled.

StillDreaming

January 7, 2007, 09:30 PM

All fine with me. As I said, I'm not interested at all in advocating one definition or another. With the definition you propose, the incompatibilist viewpoint can be empirically proven false, so no reason to bother about that anymore either.

But I'm still wondering what kind of world you would consider to be less sad than a world in which our free will is fully determined by external causes. To repeat myself, would you rather live in a world where your choice is not determined by your desires? Would you rather live in a world where you have no desires at all? Would you rather live in a world where your desires or choices are purely random, changing from one preference to another for no reason whatsoever, leaving you always wondering why the heck you chose X rather than Y?

fast

January 8, 2007, 12:29 AM

[W]ould you rather live in a world where your choice is not determined by your desires?No.

Would you rather live in a world where you have no desires at all? No.

Would you rather live in a world where your desires or choices are purely random, changing from one preference to another for no reason whatsoever, leaving you always wondering why the heck you chose X rather than Y?No.

Nazaroo

January 8, 2007, 12:40 AM

"But, if Judas had chosen not to betray Christ, then it would not have been true that it was known that Judas would betray Christ."

Obviously. On the other hand,(Necessarily) if it it is known than Jesus betrayed Christ then , Jesus betrayed Christ, but NOT that Jesus necessarily betrayed Christ. Remember? We went all through that with Garrett. Although it is a necessary truth that if p is known, the p is true; it is not true that if p is known then p is a necessary truth.

Therefore, if I know that p is true, p might still be false. For that it is a necessary truth that if p is known, then p is true, it is not true that if p is known, then p is a necessary truth. Therefore, although it may be known that Judas will betray Christ, it is still possible for Judas not to betray Christ, in which case, as you say, it could not be known that Judas would betray Christ.

Do you mean JUDAS betrayed Christ? Because it complicates the argument further if you mean JESUS betrayed Christ. This could have a variety of connotations.

StillDreaming

January 8, 2007, 02:23 AM

No.

No.

No.
Well ok, if you're willing to give serious answers I'll quit. Have fun with the next 28 pages. :rolleyes:

fast

January 8, 2007, 07:55 AM

Well ok, if you're willing to give serious answers I'll quit. Have fun with the next 28 pages. :rolleyes:

I'll admit that I on occasion fail to exhibit a certain level of seriousness ... I tend to like conversations that stay light hearted, but now isn't such a time that I am not displaying a certain amount of seriousness.

Please, don't equate short (not to mention very direct) answers with a lack of seriousness. Sometimes I don't answer all questions posed before me, and sometimes it has to be pointed out to me that certain questions (important questions) are nevertheless in need of an answer, and when you said, "To repeat myself, [...]," that immediately clued me in to the possibility that I had overlooked a series of questions (that for one weren't rhetorical or two emphatic or three for shock effect) that were nevertheless in need of being answered.

I studied your questions, gave them serious attention, and answered them as truthfully, clearly, and bluntly as I could.

With kindest regards, I am and remain,

fast

kennethamy

January 8, 2007, 12:13 PM

Do you mean JUDAS betrayed Christ? Because it complicates the argument further if you mean JESUS betrayed Christ. This could have a variety of connotations.

Judas, of course.

StillDreaming

January 8, 2007, 03:15 PM

I'll admit that I on occasion fail to exhibit a certain level of seriousness ... I tend to like conversations that stay light hearted, but now isn't such a time that I am not displaying a certain amount of seriousness.

Please, don't equate short (not to mention very direct) answers with a lack of seriousness. Sometimes I don't answer all questions posed before me, and sometimes it has to be pointed out to me that certain questions (important questions) are nevertheless in need of an answer, and when you said, "To repeat myself, [...]," that immediately clued me in to the possibility that I had overlooked a series of questions (that for one weren't rhetorical or two emphatic or three for shock effect) that were nevertheless in need of being answered.

I studied your questions, gave them serious attention, and answered them as truthfully, clearly, and bluntly as I could.

With kindest regards, I am and remain,

fast

Heh ok, I wrote that response just after waking up, and usually I'm not on my best at that time :) . I interpreted you briefness as lack of interest, because I'm mainly interested in what kind of world, exactly, you would consider to be less sad than a world in which our free will is fully determined by external causes. But maybe I just wasn't clear enough.

The three questions you answered merely served as some suggestions; you answered them with 'No', but I'd like to know what exactly you would answer with 'Yes', and why.

fast

January 9, 2007, 09:20 AM

Heh ok, I wrote that response just after waking up, and usually I'm not on my best at that time :) .
No problem.

I interpreted you briefness as lack of interest [...] You would have no way of knowing this, but I spent the few hours in-between our posts writing a long message trying to describe why it is I feel the way I do--trying to connect the dots if you will ... trying to shed a helpful light on the matter. Unfortunately, each time I do it (and I have done it before), and as I dredge through the complexity surrounded by my own confusion, I invariably reach a point where I seem to find myself in something that I can only call a paradox.

[...] I'm mainly interested in what kind of world, exactly, you would consider to be less sad than a world in which our free will is fully determined by external causes. Ignorance is bliss. I want to unlearn what I know about determinism. I want to go back to how things once was--a state where I didn't know...

Okay, so that's a little mellow dramatic. I want to throw a coin up in the air, and at T minus 2 seconds, I want it to be true that it might land on either heads or tails. Yet, I think it is true, but I also think it is not true. That's a contradiction.

On the one hand, it's obvious that it will land on one or the other, yet it's not true that it might land on one or the other. If determinism is true, and if all events having antecedent causes implies that all events will have subsequent effects, then at T minus 2 seconds, destiny is a must. There’s no chance that it will land on something that it won’t.

Language is my biggest opponent.

Hoodoo Ulove

January 9, 2007, 07:29 PM

If determinism is true, and if all events having antecedent causes implies that all events will have subsequent effects, then at T minus 2 seconds, destiny is a must. There’s no chance that it will land on something that it won’t.

Language is my biggest opponent.Second biggest is physics?

StillDreaming

January 9, 2007, 10:44 PM

No problem.

You would have no way of knowing this, but I spent the few hours in-between our posts writing a long message trying to describe why it is I feel the way I do--trying to connect the dots if you will ... trying to shed a helpful light on the matter. Unfortunately, each time I do it (and I have done it before), and as I dredge through the complexity surrounded by my own confusion, I invariably reach a point where I seem to find myself in something that I can only call a paradox.
I remember I was embarassed and confused when I realized my vague idea about being in full control of my will did not make sense upon closer inspection, and it somehow felt like a loss. I'm wondering if your main concern with determinism is that everything occurs according to a fixed scheme, or with this 'lack of control' - which would not be solved by introducing nondeterministic events either.

Ignorance is bliss. I want to unlearn what I know about determinism. I want to go back to how things once was--a state where I didn't know...
Heh I love knowledge too much for that; moreover in practice it makes no difference whatsoever whether determinism or indeterminism is true, so it's not a big deal :)

Okay, so that's a little mellow dramatic. I want to throw a coin up in the air, and at T minus 2 seconds, I want it to be true that it might land on either heads or tails. Yet, I think it is true, but I also think it is not true. That's a contradiction.

On the one hand, it's obvious that it will land on one or the other, yet it's not true that it might land on one or the other. If determinism is true, and if all events having antecedent causes implies that all events will have subsequent effects, then at T minus 2 seconds, destiny is a must. There’s no chance that it will land on something that it won’t.
I look at it this way: Only one single chain of events will happen in the universe. Now we can make a model of this chain of events, and to this model we can add multiple branches at each event, such that the model consists of a whole tree of events ending up in zillions of parallel chains rather than one single chain. And now we can start wondering what probabilities should be assigned to taking a certain branch at a certain event. All zero except for one (determinism), or at least two branches with non-zero values (nondeterminism)?

But basically all we've done is make an abstraction, added entities to it and now we are guessing what the properties are of the additional entities we just made up ourselves. Isn't that actually an utter waste of time? :D It's the same as asking: Suppose I would hear someone walking outside, what would be the color of her hair?

In other words, why would we model the actual chain of events as a tree with branches in the first place? We only have a single chain, a single sample, a single universe. Does it actually make sense at all to call a single sample deterministic or indeterministic?

fast

January 9, 2007, 10:48 PM

Second biggest is physics?

I'm just catching the dickens trying to properly convey what it is I want to say.

Speaking of physics, it seems to limit what can result from certain actions, yet regardless of the definitive truth of what the coin will undoubtedly land on after being thrown, it seems that there's still some among us that believes it nevertheless true that the coin might land on the one side that physics dictate cannot happen.

Do you happen to have a misplaced quarter lodged between the seats of your vehicle? You might, or you might not, right? Well, if the answer is yes, then how in the world is it physically possible that you might not?

Speaking of baffling terms like might, must, and necessary, how come every time "must" is brought up, invariably two different senses of the term surfaces? To say that a subsequent effect must follow a cause is not to say that it was a must that the cause ever came about.

If determinism is like a clockwork universe where all subsequent events will unquestionably happen given the physics of all the matter of the universe in motion, why in tarnation does one person interpret the term necessary to mean one thing while another is meaning something else?

?evoluoyodohw

fast

January 9, 2007, 11:09 PM

I'm wondering if your main concern with determinism is that everything occurs according to a fixed scheme, or with this 'lack of control' - which would not be solved by introducing nondeterministic events either.I don't know about the whole answer to your question, but that part about, "everything occurs according to a fixed scheme" does strike me as close. I want it so that it's true that the bad guy could indeed have chosen not to perform the bad deeds they did, but when I envision determinism [the physics of causality] as the dictator of what will unquestionably happen, the possibilities of what a bad person might choose seems limited to only a single possibility, and that bothers me.

Heh I love knowledge too much for that; moreover in practice it makes no difference whatsoever whether determinism or indeterminism is true, so it's not a big deal :) Yeah, I got a little carried away with one.

I look at it this way: Only one single chain of events will happen in the universe. Yes, yes, yes! I agree 100%.

When looking back to the past, we will see that a particular path of each atom was taken. We can hypothetically trace the movement all physical particles backwards, and in doing so, we don't have to wonder which "mights" was taken. For example, imagine a drop of water zigging it's way across your windshield during a thundershower with the wiper going while the wind is blowing. The drop took a single path (as each drop did) regardless of all the different ways it might have traveled if things would have been different.

What bothers me is that part about if things could have indeed been different. If they could have, then all is fine, but if things could not have been different, then how is it that things might have traveled a different path?

Notice that I started out, "when looking back to the past, we will see that a particular path". I don't mind that. It's the looking into the future part that bothers me the most. If things could have been different in the past, then things need not take a certain path in the future—though things will need to take a particular path. I hope I said that right. I mean, it’s only going to take one path, and if it’s one of many, then all is fine, but if it’s one of one, then there you have it: the source of the sadness.

This brings me back to Ken's walking the mile example. His argument that he might choose to walk the mile tomorrow is based on the fact that he has walked it before, but as soon as a temporal argument like that is used in his defense, it doesn't seem to quite address the pressing issue.

As to the remainder of your post, I need more time with it.

TomJrzk

January 10, 2007, 07:13 AM

Why do you think movie-goers don't want to be told how the block buster movie they're going to see ends? Knowing the future diminishes the awe.
A very good analogy. To me, the way you talk about your choices implies that you would not want to see a movie. You already know it has one determined end, why bother watching. In the same way, you seem to lose the awe you feel for the choices you will make, only because they're determined, even if you are the determining factor.

Or let me address this another way. You say that you lose pride in your decisions because of determinism; let's test that.

Say I was buried neck-deep in the sand, looking away from you, if you like. You walk up and see a hammer lying next to me and you know there is no one within 10 miles and no one would ever know if you picked up the hammer and put me out of our miseries. We know whether you would or not if we could measure each of your neurons, your decision is determined. Would you feel proud if you helped me out of the sand rather than clobber me?

You're not OJ. Bad people would use the hammer just for the 'fun' of it. I'm glad for every person who wouldn't; they deserve my appreciation of their nobility.

kennethamy

January 10, 2007, 08:12 AM

A very good analogy. To me, the way you talk about your choices implies that you would not want to see a movie. You already know it has one determined end, why bother watching. In the same way, you seem to lose the awe you feel for the choices you will make, only because they're determined, even if you are the determining factor.

Or let me address this another way. You say that you lose pride in your decisions because of determinism; let's test that.

Say I was buried neck-deep in the sand, looking away from you, if you like. You walk up and see a hammer lying next to me and you know there is no one within 10 miles and no one would ever know if you picked up the hammer and put me out of our miseries. We know whether you would or not if we could measure each of your neurons, your decision is determined. Would you feel proud if you helped me out of the sand rather than clobber me?

You're not OJ. Bad people would use the hammer just for the 'fun' of it. I'm glad for every person who wouldn't; they deserve my appreciation of their nobility.

That's interesting, Tom. Let me ask you whether if Fast's choice to help the man out of the sand had been determined by a strong post-hypnotic suggestion although, Fast was well known as a sadist and would like nothing better than to clobber the man (sorry Fast, only a counter-example) Fast should feel proud of helping the man because his choice had been determined by post-hypnotic suggestion rather than by the fact that he had been well-brought up, and was not a sadist? I am going to suppose that you would say, no, that he should not feel proud if his choice to help the man was caused by post-hypnosis, but that he should feel proud if he did it (as we would normally say) of his own free-will. Why make (if you do) that distinction? His choice was determined in both cases?

fast

January 10, 2007, 08:46 AM

A very good analogy. To me, the way you talk about your choices implies that you would not want to see a movie. On the contrary. I love movies. I enjoy feeling the angst of whether or not the girl will escape the clutches of the lurking bad guy. As I'm watching a tantalizing movie to which I've not seen before, there's this looming feeling that the potential for many outcomes are possible, yet when I, you, (or anyone for that matter) watch a rerun for the umpteenth time it becomes painfully obvious that no matter how many times you watch this one particular movie, the good guy just doesn't make it--the bad actually gets away!

So, when I flip a coin, there's this feeling that it might land on tails or that it might land on heads. When I see the bad guy on live television holding a hostage at gun point, we don't know (possess the knowledge) of what will happen, so it seems that one outcome is just as possible as another outcome, but that feeling is from the lack of knowledge of what will happen.

Just like the coin is destined to land on heads at T minus two seconds because of the physics of the throw (disallowing the possibility that it truly might land on tails), then I also start to think that the physics of what causes our desires and aspirations will follow suit with the same kind of destination despite the intervening contemplation of our decisions.

The fact that our choices are without coercion or not betwixed with compulsion seems to be an obfuscation of the issue; nevertheless, I buy into the idea that free will is the absence of compulsion.

You already know it has one determined end, why bother watching. I haven't lived my life yet, so I don't know what's going to happen, so the awe of life is still here, but if it were such that we were all as smart as God whereas we were all knowing, then watching a movie for the first time would be like watching a rerun for the one thousandth time. The awe of the future would be diminished.

All of this assumes perfect predictability. It seems to be a consequence of determinism (not hard determinism). The sadness is from the knowledge that it's not as true as it seems that the coin might land as we think it might. It comes from the fact that we're living in what boils down to be a written script of life. Yes, we make choices, but the choices we'll make are emotionally diminished by the fact that the choices are not choices among many alternatives but rather choices among one. After all, all events having antecedent causes implies all events having subsequent effects rendering it impossible that the coin might land on heads given the trajectory of the given variables that lead to the coins final state ... to the bad guys final state of mind before finally succumbing to the propensity that he just couldn’t overcome.

In the same way, you seem to lose the awe you feel for the choices you will make, only because they're determined, even if you are the determining factor.Hallelujah! Yes!

It's like I'm being told that I get to choose among the alternatives available while there's this rule that says only one choice is available. If all events have antecedent causes, and if that implies that all events have subsequent effects, and if the effects are destined because of the physics of the universe, then my choice is destined, and if it's destined, then there's no satisfaction that I am better than the bad guy. It's like, why feel proud that I have made a good choice when it's obvious to any third-rate all knowing God that I was going to. It's just as obvious to the silent all knowing observer that the bad guy was going to make his choice as it was that I was going to make my choice.

It's at this junction that Ken wants to intervene by throwing the fact that what matters is whether or not we're compelled to act as we do, and though I recognize (finally) and agree with the presence of the distinction, it's not the presence of or lack of compulsion that bothers me so (though I act as though it does in my daily life). It's the idea (because of determinism) despite compulsion that I will do as I will do because necessarily I will do what I will do—that captivates me so.

It's here that he denies that it's true that I must do what I will do. Heck, I can come up with an example that seems to support his view. I will go to the store, but it's not a must that I go to the store because I'm not compelled to go to the store. If it had been true that I was being compelled to go to the store, then it would have been true that it was a must that I had to go to the store. And, it gets deeper, if it's true that I must have went to the store (per the compulsion), then it was necessary that I went to the store.

So, the necessity (the must) is being driven by the presence of compulsion, but I'm saying that irrespective of compulsion, the necessity is still there but for a different reason. There's another driving force! It's the physics of determinism directing our every atom making it so that what seems to be (to me) that a coin might land on a particular side is false.

Or let me address this another way. You say that you lose pride in your decisions because of determinism; let's test that. okay.

Say I was buried neck-deep in the sand, looking away from you, if you like. You walk up and see a hammer lying next to me and you know there is no one within 10 miles and no one would ever know if you picked up the hammer and put me out of our miseries. We know whether you would or not if we could measure each of your neurons, your decision is determined. Would you feel proud if you helped me out of the sand rather than clobber me? Yes, and the fact that was determined before I was born seems to minimize the fact that we ought to attribute the goodness of me as being because of me. Determinism seems to suggest that I have no REAL control. The only control I have is directly reminiscent of the control a movie stars seems to exhibit when he acts as he does. But, when we rewind the tape and view it again, the good guy still makes the same stupid decisions.

Yes, I make decisions, change my mind, decide to do (but slightly different) what I had set out to do on occasion, just like the character in the movie, but all of it (the contemplation of the choice, the fact that the fly landed on me and was the last straw that frustrated me to the point that I decided to go take a break and saw.... all of life’s events, if they are indeed destined, makes things not so grand.

You're not OJ. Bad people would use the hammer just for the 'fun' of it.If it's part of their script where the choices they were destined to make NECESSARILY came about, then it's obvious because of the physics of our universe that it's not true that the bad guy might not have done what he done. That is the picture that grips me so. I don't buy into it. Thus, I have the conundrum of both believing that we are responsible for our actions and responsible only because it was destined to be--minimizing the emotional aspects of it.

I'm glad for every person who wouldn't; they deserve my appreciation of their nobility.If I understand determinism like I think I do, then of course you're glad for it. You were programmed by the evolving physics of nature millions of years ago. All events were aligning and destined to converge so that things would be just right and fall in place just so that you would be glad. Um, minus all the personification of course.

Now, how does it feel to know that I have stripped you of your fame? It seemed to be that how you felt was attributable to you, but now that I’ve gotten a hold of you with this twisted idea of what determinism means, I have now stolen your understanding of who is responsible for your gladness and now attributed it to some obscure events that happened probably long before this big bang everyone keeps talking about.

Of course, I don’t believe half the stuff I’m saying with any strong conviction. It’s important to remember that. Why am I saying it? Well, it’s because I want to convey the picture I see when I try and embrace what I think the implications of determinism is. I take it all in stride though, and it’s already been said (by Ken) that we really might not have a firm grip on it anyway, so I’m careful not to get too overly involved with it. I just use the verbiage of sadness because I think it accurately describes the feeling I get when I ponder the seeming consequences of that dreadful idea of determinism.

TomJrzk

January 10, 2007, 09:07 AM

That's interesting, Tom.
Yes, your question was interesting, too, but I'd prefer to help Fast work through his contradictions and discomfort. I don't think I can spend much more time helping you dig the hole I see you in. I talked my mother-in-law into buying my 5yo an XBOX 360 and I have to make sure it works -- and, apparently, at every level I can ;). If I ever get the notion to get help from the hole you no doubt see me in, you'll be the first I'll ask; I think you really do have a good grasp on your position.

But, to answer your questions, the sadist should feel proud to have allowed himself to be hypnotized and for allowing the process to work (as I've heard that you can't be forced in this way to do something you REALLY don't want to (despite Hollywood's always correct depiction of science as I guess they did in the Manchurian Candidate?)). And I'll thank the hypnotist for doing something to my great benefit.

kennethamy

January 10, 2007, 09:21 AM

But, to answer your questions, the sadist should feel proud to have allowed himself to be hypnotized and for allowing the process to work (as I've heard that you can't be forced in this way to do something you REALLY don't want to (despite Hollywood's always correct depiction of science as I guess they did in the Manchurian Candidate?)). And I'll thank the hypnotist for doing something to my great benefit.

But Tom, the issue is not whether the sadist should feel proud of having allowed himself to be hypnotized, but whether the sadist should feel proud of helping the man because he is doing it under hypnosis. So whether he should feel proud for allowing himself to be hypnotized is a not only a red herring, it is a scarlet or crimson herring. (Or, if you like, change the cause of the sadist's aid to the man to some kind of drug). The point is, of course, that according to your view, a cause is a cause, and it makes no difference. After all, it was only "neurons zapping along" whether he did it because he was a hypnotized (or drugged, if you like) sadist, or whether because Fast is a compassionate fellow. Right?

TomJrzk

January 10, 2007, 09:24 AM

Yes, and the fact that was determined before I was born seems to minimize the fact that we ought to attribute the goodness of me as being because of me.
I don't see the distinction between the 2 'me's that give this statement any sense. You are you and your goodness comes from you. There is nothing else unless you have a floating spirit. The goodness in you is due to the fact that you are well adapted to your current environment.

I wish I could say what I feel more clearly.
If I understand determinism like I think I do, then of course you're glad for it.
Exactly, but, because of the environment which you find yourself in, you're not as glad for it. I'm trying to change the environment so that you feel my gladness. The contradictions fall away and the pride and appreciation return, even with determinism, once you understand that you ARE you (the deterministic one). Your goodness comes from you. You can be proud of who you are. The good deterministic future depends on your goodness. If you were worse, so, too, would the future be. Doesn't this make you feel more connected to the future?

TomJrzk

January 10, 2007, 09:29 AM

But Tom,...
Sorry, I spent my time giving the sadist as much credit as possible and left out the "no, of course he should not be proud of helping; he should be proud only of allowing himself to be hypnotized".

But you and I are not going to resolve this 'free will' thing, that will have to be left to others.

kennethamy

January 10, 2007, 09:32 AM

Sorry, I spent my time giving the sadist as much credit as possible and left out the "no, of course he should not be proud of helping; he should be proud only of allowing himself to be hypnotized".

But you and I are not going to resolve this 'free will' thing, that will have to be left to others.

But aren't all cases of neurons zipping along equal, and not that some cases of neurons zipping along are more equal than others? Resolution is not at issue, but consistency is. Shouldn't you, to be consistent say that he should feel no more proud of helping because he was hypnotized than because he was compassionate. There aren't compassionate neurons and hypnotized neurons, are there?

fast

January 10, 2007, 09:59 AM

Yes, and the fact that was determined before I was born seems to minimize the fact that we ought to attribute the goodness of me as being because of me.I don't see the distinction between the 2 'me's that give this statement any sense. There wasn’t supposed to be a distinction between them. Let me rephrase.

I am who I am. I can be nothing other than who I am. How I feel is how I feel. It cannot be true that I can now feel any different than I how I now feel. I have certain attitudes towards things at this very moment. It is such now that I would indeed want to help one out if they were in a fix as described in your scenario. When I would go to do it, I would do so of my own free will, for it will be true that if I had so chosen, I could have decided to go against the grain of how I desired to help you out, but being a good person, I’ll choose to help, and I’ll be able to choose to help, for I am not under the pressures of another forcing me to leave you be, nor am I under the influence of a really bad drug, nor has my mind been messed with by any big meany doctors.

You are you and your goodness comes from you. Am I not a product of my environment so-to-speak? Could it not be the case that certain propensities have been shaped by the very circumstances that I have found myself in? Have I not been molded by the social pressures of my youth? My middle school teachers told me that I was a “smart cookie”; doesn’t the little things in life influence how I’ll be when I grow up? My point is that not all of my traits are necessarily attributable to me. My compassionate tendencies and occasional vile thoughts is resultant of a certain number of years of life experiences. So, my goodness may be displayed by me, but that’s not to say that the genesis of my goodness is born of me.

There is nothing else unless you have a floating spirit. The goodness in you is due to the fact that you are well adapted to your current environment.Could it have been any other way? For that matter, is it true that it might have turned out any other way than it has? Is it possible that I could have been born to another family? How could such a cottin-pickin’ thing happen?

I wish I could say what I feel more clearly.I struggle too! I wish I were more fluent in my own native language. It would make things so much easier—not to mention the fact that people wouldn’t have to keep repeating so much to me over and over. Gosh I feel really dumb sometimes.

Exactly, but, because of the environment which you find yourself in, you're not as glad for it. I'm trying to change the environment so that you feel my gladness. The contradictions fall away and the pride and appreciation return, even with determinism, once you understand that you ARE you (the deterministic one). Your goodness comes from you. You can be proud of who you are. The good deterministic future depends on your goodness. If you were worse, so, too, would the future be. Doesn't this make you feel more connected to the future? I will help shape the course of our future world, yes, but if all events are destined, then the part I play is as awesome as a stoic mannequin fulfilling its destined duties.

TomJrzk

January 10, 2007, 10:01 AM

There aren't compassionate neurons and hypnotized neurons, are there?
Yes, I believe there are 'compassionate neurons'. And 'hynotizable neurons'. (Of course, the neurons don't zip along, the chemicals and electrons zip along as directed by the neurons.)

A person is compassionate because there are neurons within their brains that imbue that person with empathy and others that dispose the person to do something about it.

fast

January 10, 2007, 10:06 AM

There aren't compassionate neurons and hypnotized neurons, are there?You asked! :D

Hoodoo Ulove

January 10, 2007, 10:07 AM

. . . why in tarnation does one person interpret the term necessary to mean one thing while another is meaning something else?Yes, physical vs logical necessity is the source of much confusion, but then, even your screen name is ambiguous: get over it - we can work it out. . . . the seeming consequences of that dreadful idea of determinism.But when you ponder the seeming consequences of an indeterminist world, you're in a bigger mess.

fast

January 10, 2007, 10:11 AM

Yes, I believe there are 'compassionate neurons'. And 'hynotizable neurons'. (Of course, the neurons don't zip along, the chemicals and electrons zip along as directed by the neurons.)

A person is compassionate because there are neurons within their brains that imbue that person with empathy and others that dispose the person to do something about it.

Um, uh, oof; how do I say this? Technically speaking, I'd venture to guess that it's not true that there are in fact compassionate neurons or hypnotizable neurons. I might agree that there are 'compassionate neurons' and hypnotizable neurons' [notice the single quotes] if I actually knew what they were, but I can't rightly say that you are defeating Ken's argument on this one if what is true is what I suspect is true.

Just be happy that I'm going to pull out of the quicksand :)

TomJrzk

January 10, 2007, 10:19 AM

Am I not a product of my environment so-to-speak?
Yes, I've said in the past (maybe not here?) that you are a product of your genes and environment. Of course, your disposition may have been worse to the point where being called a "smart cookie" was taken as an insult.

And, yet, I still say that I feel proud of myself! I can't seem to get this feeling across to you though I think I've said all I can say (multiple times at that!). At some time in the future, you may get what I have or I may fall into the abyss of what you have.

For both of our sakes, I hope it's the former before the latter.

fast

January 10, 2007, 10:20 AM

but then, even your screen name is ambiguous:

The rate of my progress is much faster than the rate of your progress, so just because you're miles ahead of me, don't think for a moment that I'm not only going to catch up, but I'm going to surpass you like you're sittin' still. :Cheeky:

But, it'll be awhile because you're like in forth place in knowledgability; woe is me, I have so far to go :(

fast

January 10, 2007, 10:28 AM

But when you ponder the seeming consequences of an indeterminist world, you're in a bigger mess.

Yeah.

I need a way to see that even though things have happened in a particular single way, there needs to be a way to see that things might happen in any particular number of ways.

kennethamy

January 10, 2007, 10:31 AM

Yes, I believe there are 'compassionate neurons'. And 'hynotizable neurons'. (Of course, the neurons don't zip along, the chemicals and electrons zip along as directed by the neurons.)

A person is compassionate because there are neurons within their brains that imbue that person with empathy and others that dispose the person to do something about it.

But wait a sec. Tom: those hypnotizable neurons are the result of imposition on Fast, the sadist. Coercion. Ever read A Clockwork Orange by Anthony Burgess, or see the Stanley Kubrick film? Those horrible and sadistic kids are "made over" through behavioristic techniques to be docile and nice. Against their wills. It is better that they should now be that way. But is that something for them to take pride in? Should a prisoner in jail take pride in the fact that he is no longer out in society harming people?

kennethamy

January 10, 2007, 10:47 AM

Yes, I've said in the past (maybe not here?) that you are a product of your genes and environment. Of course, your disposition may have been worse to the point where being called a "smart cookie" was taken as an insult.

And, yet, I still say that I feel proud of myself! I can't seem to get this feeling across to you though I think I've said all I can say (multiple times at that!). At some time in the future, you may get what I have or I may fall into the abyss of what you have.

For both of our sakes, I hope it's the former before the latter.

David Hume distinguished between talents and virtues. Patience, we are told, is a virtue. It is "up to us" whether we are patient or impatient. But intelligence is a talent. In elementary school I was in a special class for smart kids (allegedly) and one of the first things the teacher told us was that we should not lord it over the kids in the other classes because it was not "your doing that you happen to be smart. You were born that way." (I have no idea what sort of effect that had on us). A person may feel proud of him/herself for being good-looking too, but should he/she? After all, it was not up to him/her.

TomJrzk

January 10, 2007, 10:47 AM

Those horrible and sadistic kids are "made over" through behavioristic techniques to be docile and nice. Against their wills. It is better that they should now be that way. But is that something for them to take pride in? Should a prisoner in jail take pride in the fact that he is no longer out in society harming people?
Of course not. I don't think you understood what I said:
"no, of course he should not be proud of helping; he should be proud only of allowing himself to be hypnotized"
I'm REALLY growing tired of this conversation... And I know that my disposition is such that when I get tired I get irritable, so I try to stop.........

fast

January 10, 2007, 10:50 AM

And, yet, I still say that I feel proud of myself! I can't seem to get this feeling across to you though I think I've said all I can say (multiple times at that!). At some time in the future, you may get what I have or I may fall into the abyss of what you have.

I think I'm going to sit back a little on this issue. I’m still going to participate, but I'm going to let that that sadness bit go. Meanwhile, feel comforted in knowing that it makes perfect sense that we ought to proud of our good deeds, even if is so happens that they were destined, for it's still apart of us.

At any rate, I'm not well versed in philosophical matters, so careful am I, as I forge forward in this new pastime endeavor. As it was once said, (and if it wasn't, it ought to have been) :) , a little bit of philosophy in the wrong hands can be a dangerous weapon.

Hoodoo Ulove

January 10, 2007, 10:57 AM

The rate of my progress is much faster . . .I'm glad you're not stuck fast, fast.

kennethamy

January 10, 2007, 11:15 AM

I think I'm going to sit back a little on this issue. I’m still going to participate, but I'm going to let that that sadness bit go. Meanwhile, feel comforted in knowing that it makes perfect sense that we ought to proud of our good deeds, even if is so happens that they were destined, for it's still apart of us.

At any rate, I'm not well versed in philosophical matters, so careful am I, as I forge forward in this new pastime endeavor. As it was once said, (and if it wasn't, it ought to have been) :) , a little bit of philosophy in the wrong hands can be a dangerous weapon.

I think that part of your problem is your thinking that because your actions are determined, that they are destined. The term "destined" implies "inevitability" so that it is not up to you what happens. "Destined" is nearly synonymous with "fated". And that is a gloomy prospect, since it implies helplessness. But although your actions are determined, it doesn't follow that they are inevitable because you cannot do anything about what you do. You can (and so can I) reconsider what I want to do and, as a result, change my mind. I don't have to do what I was at first going to do. I don't have to act on impulse, unless there is something seriously wrong with my personality. You are, as Wittgenstein remarked, held captive by a picture, maybe a picture of you, a helpless pawn in the hands of the Great Chess
Master. But that is only a picture. You can decide what you are going to do, and decide not to do what you were going to do, but do something different. Of course, you may say that it is determined that you are going to do that too. But what that comes to is the tautology that you are going to do whatever you are going to do. And although that is true, and even necessarily true, it is an empty truism.

fast

January 10, 2007, 02:54 PM

I think that part of your problem is your thinking that because your actions are determined, that they are destined.Yes, you have eloquently captured the essence of my dilemma.

The term "destined" implies "inevitability" so that it is not up to you what happens. I partially agree.

I agree that destined implies inevitability, but I don’t agree with the tag on part that it is not up to us as to many of the things that happens. To illustrate, I do not agree with fatalism. For example, it is not the case that I’m not going to call the ambulance because I believe the outcome will be the same regardless of what I do. I believe what I do greatly impacts what will happen. But, to deny fatalism (as you’ve presented it to me) is not to deny fate (or that things that will happen will necessarily happen).

"Destined" is nearly synonymous with "fated". And that is a gloomy prospect, since it implies helplessness. Yes, yes, and double Yes! The only difference is that I used a much simpler word. I said, "sad". But, you convey here and now exactly what I'm feeling is the implications of determinism. The deterministic view (or the picture that grips me so) is that we are destined, fated, helpless, and thus you now see the source of this sadness that has been lingering along.

But although your actions are determined, it doesn't follow that they are inevitable because you cannot do anything about what you do.Earlier, I partly agreed, and the part I did not agree on was the part where you said it implied its not up to me, so following suit and in the interest of consistency, I, unfortunately, feel the need to only partially agree again, for here you are saying that it implies that I cannot do anything about what I do.

That's not true. I can.

You can (and so can I) reconsider what I want to do and, as a result, change my mind. Absolutely. But, it's only I that am recognizing that too is fated. The very components into the reconsideration of an idea is fated.

I don't have to do what I was at first going to do.Of course not. That's what I've been saying. You can change your mind. In fact, you will likely do it many many times over the course of your life. But, each elemental aspect of those decisions were all caused (and many many not compelled), and you agree with that, but what you don't agree with is that because it's determined that it is also fated that you will change your mind given the causal sufficient conditions to do so.

I don't have to act on impulse, unless there is something seriously wrong with my personality. True. You don't have to act on impulse. Sometimes we do. Sometimes we don't. We have 'control' over our urges, and we're able to change our mind mid-stream and go against the grain of what we might ordinarily do, but when it's determined by the forces of cause and effect, it has to imply fated. When I turn the wench clockwise, the rope pulls the boat forward, and like the gears of the universe, when we wind our future forward, the events are the inevitable-fated result of the causes that produces them.

You are, as Wittgenstein remarked, held captive by a picture, maybe a picture of you, a helpless pawn in the hands of the Great Chess Master.You've mentioned him so much that I think I'm going to take a look-see at the many other great things he's said.

But that is only a picture. I don't doubt for a moment that I'm wrong, but I'm not one to merely follow the herd. I want it soaked into me so that I can go away believing what I suspect is true anyway: that determinism doesn't imply the sad world I envision, but simply mimicking the words you say isn't enough for me; I feel the need to thoroughly grasp the precepts of the issue.

You can decide what you are going to do, and decide not to do what you were going to do, but do something different. Agreed, as I have been agreeing all along.

Of course, you may say that it is determined that you are going to do that too. I'm [big gulp] saying it.

But what that comes to is the tautology that you are going to do whatever you are going to do. And although that is true, and even necessarily true, it is an empty truism.If I were to concede that the first sentence is true, I would agree with the second sentence. The issue at hand, now, is if the first sentence is true.

Why is it not the case that if point D is determined that the cause (point C) did not necessarily cause point D? As we trace our steps backwards, each effect has a cause. That's why people keep bringing up the big bang. Daddy can only drive his car on one road at a time, so looking back in time, there was only one road for each traveling atom. The coin cannot land on heads at T minus two seconds, so it’s not true that it might land on heads. The path of possibilities aren't there.

Personally, I can't imagine (though the idea slushes about), that the transpiring events of those eons gone by set the fate of the decisions I would make today, yet that's exactly what determinism seems to imply.

<Note to self: Determinism doesn't imply fated; determinism doesn't imply necessary; determinism doesn't imply must. The world may very well be such that things might happen… gotta keep me in check after all.>

kennethamy

January 10, 2007, 04:01 PM

>[/I]

Suppose someone told you that he was sad that the interior angles of parallel lines were equal, or that the law of non-contradiction (that nothing can be both A and not-A) was true. I don't know why he would say that. Let's suppose he does. What might you say to him? Would you, as I might, tell him that it is unreasonable for him to be sad about that? These are necessary truths, and it would be impossible-logically impossible for them to be false. In fact, it is not only that they cannot but be true, it makes no sense (in a way) to suppose that they might be otherwise. He might reply that is exactly what makes him so sad. It is the inevitability of it. His helplessness in the face of logical truth.

Whatever will happen, will happen, is, a logical truth. It would be impossible for something both to happen, and not happen. Indeed, it is an instance of the law of non-contradiction. We can put it that, "it must be that whatever will happen will happen". But, Fast, that is very different from saying that "Whatever will happen must (inevitably) happen". That is false. As you yourself allow, many things that happen were not inevitable. You could have averted somethings that happen, and avoided other things that happen.

You are seduced by a picture, but you may also be seduced by a modal confusion, namely that the two propositions, necessarily it something happens it happens, and if something happens then it necessarily happens, are equivalent. They are not. Necessarily if you marry Mary, then you marry Mary, is true. But if you marry Mary, then you necessarily marry Mary, is certainly not true.

Hoodoo Ulove

January 10, 2007, 05:23 PM

You are seduced by a picture, but you may also be seduced by a modal confusion, namely that the two propositions, necessarily it something happens it happens, and if something happens then it necessarily happens, are equivalent. They are not. Necessarily if you marry Mary, then you marry Mary, is true. But if you marry Mary, then you necessarily marry Mary, is certainly not true.You seem to be conflating logical necessity and what might be called physical necessity. Although it is not logically necessary that the moon should move in an ellipse about the earth, I PREDICT we shall see this behavior continue through at least the end of the month.

"If something happens then it necessarily happens" is not a truism but an alternate expression of the contingent statement that events unfold according to natural law, a view called determinism.

kennethamy

January 10, 2007, 06:42 PM

You seem to be conflating logical necessity and what might be called physical necessity. Although it is not logically necessary that the moon should move in an ellipse about the earth, I PREDICT we shall see this behavior continue through at least the end of the month.

"If something happens then it necessarily happens" is not a truism but an alternate expression of the contingent statement that events unfold according to natural law, a view called determinism.

I don't think that I am making that conflation. But I do think that it may be that those who believe that it if John marries Mary, then he will necessarily marry Mary, are conflating logical with physical necessity. For they think that if John marries Mary, it was inevitable that John would marry Mary.

Fast's belief that if John marries Mary it is impossible that John should not have married Mary is based on the confusion between natural (physical) necessity and logical necessity.

StillDreaming

January 10, 2007, 06:42 PM

I don't know about the whole answer to your question, but that part about, "everything occurs according to a fixed scheme" does strike me as close. I want it so that it's true that the bad guy could indeed have chosen not to perform the bad deeds they did, but when I envision determinism [the physics of causality] as the dictator of what will unquestionably happen, the possibilities of what a bad person might choose seems limited to only a single possibility, and that bothers me.
True. Now in this post I'm not going to attempt to polish up determinism, but I'll try to show that indeterminism is an equally depressing can of worms. I hope I'm not ruining your life forever now :D.

Do you agree that in an indeterministic world the bad person is having no options either? Because if his decisions are uncaused, he cannot be in control of them at all. Yes, the outcome of the decision could have been different in an indeterministic world, but not because of the kind of person he is. The decisions just happen.

If you say that being proud of goodness is only justified if the genesis of this goodness is born from you and only you, then there is no escape and you will have to live with unjustified pride forever. This does not depend on determinism or indeterminism. You already ruled out the deterministic case yourself, by noting that your justification requirements needs uncaused causes. But they also need to be under your control, otherwise it's still a passive process of becoming aware that some kind of uncaused cause has occured which made(!) you select a certain outcome. So your justification requirement can only be met if you are a Causer of Uncaused Causes, and although that sounds like an impressive title, I'm sure you spot the Mother of All Contradictions in there. In the end, your role is limited to the role of a redundant observer of either deterministic or indeterministic events, who adds nothing original.

To summarize: originality requires uncaused causes, ruling out determinism, while control rules out uncaused causes, and hence indeterminism. Do you agree with this?

If so, either change your justification requirements for pride, or learn to live with unjustified pride :). I'd like to add that pride is an emotion, caused by biochemical processes that are not impressed at all by mere rational conclusions. Just like pain does not go away when you conclude that it lacks justification.

StillDreaming

January 10, 2007, 06:57 PM

<Note to self: Determinism doesn't imply fated; determinism doesn't imply necessary; determinism doesn't imply must.
Hm, I'd say [metaphysical] determinism does imply necessary, must and (depending on the definition) fate. What makes you say otherwise?

fast

January 11, 2007, 07:41 AM

Whatever will happen, will happen, is, a logical truth. A truth. Trivial. A trivial truth. A tautology. Whatever is bumped is bumped. Whatever is driven is driven. Wherever she is kissed, is where she is kissed.

A tautology, a simple animal, a truism. To admire the truism is to have misguided admiration. Tells us nothing (nothing much) beyond what we already know.

But, Fast, that is very different from saying that "Whatever will happen must (inevitably) happen". That is false. As you yourself allow, many things that happen were not inevitable. You could have averted somethings that happen, and avoided other things that happen.

I am here before you to say that once and for all, I do solemnly agree that just because something in the past has happened (like an event that has already occurred), the existence of said event/occurrence isn’t necessarily present because it had to happen; it wasn't a fated must that it had to happen.

I can't thrust upon you any harder how much it is that I agree with you. Normal am I, as I embrace the obvious.

But, when I look the monster in the face and stare deep into it's scary eyes, I see a grizzly gloom that beckons me to believe otherwise. But, I resist, and I am relentless to hold on to the belief that just because something happens, that didn't mean that necessarily, it was a must that it would happen. Yet, the red two-horned satanistic devil (aka determinism) rears its ugly head and flings its crusty nostrils and screams that I am wrong. It dares to say that you are wrong too!

Another poster had said (in another thread), "A determinist believes that any cause has a particular inevitable effect with no other possible outcome." I disagree, and so too do you, right?

Hoodoo Ulove

January 11, 2007, 09:06 AM

Another poster had said (in another thread), "A determinist believes that any cause has a particular inevitable effect with no other possible outcome." I disagree, and so too do you, right?You disagree for the moment, but, given your history, may agree again. Here's the thing you don't seem to realize, seems to me. A sufficiently complex, chaotic, non-linear system such as a human being in a social context cannot in theory, I think, be modelled with sufficient accuracy to make detailed predictions of its behavior by a model simpler than the system itself. There is, and cannot be, a movie of our future. So the determinist hypothesis, as applied to our lives, is in principle untestable.

fast

January 11, 2007, 09:49 AM

You disagree for the moment, but, given your history, may agree again. Sometimes, it's easier to switch hats than it is to convince someone that I'm expounding on what 'I see' [as a potential consequence of a theory] rather than espousing what I agree with . Either way, astute observation. Kudos’ to Hoodoo Ulove.

Here's the thing you don't seem to realize, seems to me. A sufficiently complex, chaotic, non-linear system such as a human being in a social context cannot in theory, I think, be modelled with sufficient accuracy to make detailed predictions of its behavior by a model simpler than the system itself.

I agree, but I don't know if what you said is what you meant. I also agree that we aren't good enough to do it, and I don't think we'll ever be good enough to do it, but the truth of the matter (and that's important--the truth of the matter) is separate and distinct from what we know (the knowledge of the matter.)

Whether we can know the truth is independent of the truth, so in that sense, I agree that it's not predictable, for we are unable (and will never be able) to fully predict all future events given the current state of every atomic affair.

But, ability aside, knowledge and potential knowledge aside, and to focus you on what's important (not knowledge but rather the truth of the matter), is it true that future events are fully predictable despite the knowledge implication of the necessity of knowledge?

Why exactly is it not true that all atomic movements aren’t necessary movements given the causes that determine them?

[I]There is, and cannot be, a movie of our future.I agree. [for now :devil3: ]

But, how do we reconcile the grip of the determinism picture that I see?

So the determinist hypothesis, as applied to our lives, is in principle untestable.What is the determinist hypothesis?

I’ve been going off half cocked spouting that a determinist is one who believes that all events have antecedent causes, but then, elsewhere, I’m met face to face with an objection that states that I’m wrong. Which is it? Is it that all determinists are people who believe that all events have antecedent causes, or is the case that all determinists are people who believes “that any cause has a particular inevitable effect with no other possible outcome.”

Hoodoo Ulove

January 11, 2007, 10:30 AM

But, ability aside, knowledge and potential knowledge aside, and to focus you on what's important (not knowledge but rather the truth of the matter), is it true that future events are fully predictable despite the knowledge implication of the necessity of knowledge?By my reading of pop physics, there is still some disagreement whether subatomic happenings have a random element, or whether the apparent randomness is the result of hidden variables. It seems irrelevant to the free will question, anyhoo, because subatomic randomness is not going to give you a satisfying version of the free will you want.But, how do we reconcile the grip of the determinism picture that I see?That's a tough one for me, because I don't see it as a problem. The appropriate response to accepting determinism, to me, is humility about my own achievements, and forgiveness for others' shortcomings; what's wrong with that?

kennethamy

January 11, 2007, 10:36 AM

Is it that all determinists are people who believe that all events have antecedent causes, or is the case that all determinists are people who believes “that any cause has a particular inevitable effect with no other possible outcome.”

What is an "inevitable effect"? That it is impossible that it should not occur? What if there is an intervening occurrence? A stone falls. It is inevitable that it will hit the ground. But then I intervene and catch it, so it does not hit the ground. Did the falling of the stone then have the "inevitable effect" of hitting the ground? Not according to the dictionary.

in·ev·i·ta·ble /ɪnˈɛvɪtəbəl/ Pronunciation Key - Show Spelled Pronunciation[in-ev-i-tuh-buhl] Pronunciation Key - Show IPA Pronunciation
–adjective
1. unable to be avoided, evaded, or escaped; certain; necessary: an inevitable conclusion.
2. sure to occur, happen, or come; unalterable: The inevitable end of human life is death.
–noun
3. that which is unavoidable.

The stone's hitting the ground was avoidable. In fact, it was avoided by my having caught it. So, the stone's hitting the ground was not an inevitable effect of its falling. Even had I not caught it, was it not "evitable".

fast

January 11, 2007, 10:41 PM

The appropriate response to accepting determinism, to me, is humility about my own achievements, and forgiveness for others' shortcomings; what's wrong with that?

Hmmm.

I suppose I shouldn't overly gloat for that which I am capable, nor should I overly condemn others for their failings. I can accept that.

fast

kennethamy

January 12, 2007, 08:16 AM

The appropriate response to accepting determinism, to me, is humility about my own achievements, and forgiveness for others' shortcomings; what's wrong with that?

William James once said that he tried go through life dealing with other people as if every one else was determined, and only he was "free".

Hoodoo Ulove

January 12, 2007, 09:27 AM

What is an "inevitable effect"? That it is impossible that it should not occur? What if there is an intervening occurrence? A stone falls. It is inevitable that it will hit the ground. But then I intervene and catch it, so it does not hit the ground.The difficulty here arises from explicating determinism in terms of cause and effect. As the Stanford article on determinism defines it . . .

"Determinism: The world is governed by (or is under the sway of) determinism if and only if, given a specified way things are at a time t, the way things go thereafter is fixed as a matter of natural law."

this particular difficulty with inevitability dissolves, though others remain.

kennethamy

January 12, 2007, 10:26 AM

The difficulty here arises from explicating determinism in terms of cause and effect. As the Stanford article on determinism defines it . . .

"Determinism: The world is governed by (or is under the sway of) determinism if and only if, given a specified way things are at a time t, the way things go thereafter is fixed as a matter of natural law."

this particular difficulty with inevitability dissolves, though others remain.

Why is the metaphor of "fixed" any the less problematic?

Hoodoo Ulove

January 12, 2007, 10:53 AM

Why is the metaphor of "fixed" any the less problematic?Your objection to inevitability was that besides the one condition (the stone falls) rather arbitrarily being designated the cause other conditions or actions could intervene making the supposedly inevitable evitable. "Given a specified way things are" being all-inclusive, leaves no room for "other conditions".

I don't see why you call "fixed" a metaphor here. The determinist view is that given a particular present, there's only one possible future. I don't know that this is true, but you seem to dismiss it out of hand. Why?

fast

January 12, 2007, 06:13 PM

What is an "inevitable effect"? That it is impossible that it should not occur? They're saying that all events are necessary events--every single solitary last one of them. Every event occurring, every event that has ever occurred, and every event that will ever occur is purportedly necessary events by certain people on this board—necessary in that each physical element of matter that is in motion (serving as a cause) will by force of the laws of physics lead to an inevitable, fated, destined (necessary effect).

I've been flopping back and forth between the two opposing factions (digging as I probe about), and my heart remains on the side that says all events are not necessary events.

At this juncture, let me state that we have a few different issues floating about that are in need of address. One question to be answered (and to be differentiated from a completely different question) is “what is the definition of determinism?”

It could be that the definition either more closely resembles either A) all events have antecedent causes, where only some events are necessarily caused, and B) all events have antecedent causes, where (not some but) all events are necessarily caused. You, I, and a few others hold that A more closely resembles the definition of determinism than does B. Some others, however, do not share that which you, I, and a few others hold though; they hold that B is the definition.

That question (what is the definition of determinism), of course, is a different question than an alternative question, which is: which of the following propositions mentioned are of a more correct representative of reality, where the two propositions are: 1) All events have antecedent causes, and some events are necessarily caused, and 2) All events have antecedent causes, and all events are necessarily caused.

Even if you and I are correct in that all events have antecedent causes such that only some events are necessary events (proposition 1), that does not in itself mean that the definition of determinism is as we say it is, for whether the definition is what we say it is, is independent of whether the proposition is true or not.

Your counter examples, clear as they are, (and good as they are) are somewhat in question because there’s this lingering doubt that maybe they don’t counteract the spirit behind the objections being conveyed.

Let’s take a look.

What if there is an intervening occurrence? If there is an intervening occurrence, then tautologically so, there is an intervening occurrence; also, if there isn’t an intervening occurrence, then there isn’t an intervening occurrence. Additionally, if there was an intervening occurrence, then there was … but no one doubts that there was, is, or can be intervening occurrences, so to use your own words, “what if there is […]?”

The problem is that if there was an intervening occurrence, the question becomes, was the intervening occurrence a necessary intervening occurrence as they purport is the case? You and I say no, and though it seems like you’ve delivered us some pretty darn good counter examples to help in combating their onslaught of objections, it still doesn’t appear to defeat the essence of their same ole underlying refrain that “all events are necessary events including but not limited to intervening occurrences”; therefore, your examples don’t seem to quite counteract the idea that no matter what example you posit, even that event will still be purportedly necessary, so it’s in that vein that your objections seems to lose a bit of its glow.

Nevertheless, I still maintain, in heart of hearts if nothing else, that all events are not necessary events—not necessarily because of the eloquent examples you provide, (yet they do help shed a brighter light on the finer details of things) but because of a deeper more capturing (and less easy to articulate) reason. Suffice it to say though, that as things have happened in a single way (just as things will take but a single path), I believe it’s possible that any number of possible events can occur (within physical limitations) just as I believe it was possible that events could have ventured in other directions.

A stone falls. If it did, then it was a must that it would, per the ones declaring that all events are necessary events.

It is inevitable that it will hit the ground. But then I intervene and catch it, so it does not hit the ground. Did the falling of the stone then have the "inevitable effect" of hitting the ground? Not according to the dictionary. Of course not. It wasn’t an effect at all. It didn’t hit the ground, nor is it the case that it could have hit the ground, for it was a must that you would intervene (or so they all say—seems silly to the average Joe, but they say it anyway).

Why in the world is it a must that you would intervene? Why isn’t it the case that you could jump out of the way as I throw you a Frisbee? Why is it that every time you catch it that it was a must that you would catch it, and why is it that every time you miss it that it was a must that you would miss it? Aren’t these the types of questions you want to thrust at the die-hard advocates that declare that all events are necessary events? I bet it is.

They hear the gears of a clockwork, dictating universe and envision both its forward and reverse crank upon us, but doomed are they, for they have been lured by the very language that grips them so. As Ludwig Josef Johann Wittgenstein once said … well, I’m sure he said something fitting to the occasion, but I doubt (seriously doubt) that it was a must.

Enjoy your weekend

kennethamy

January 20, 2007, 01:33 PM

They're saying that all events are necessary events--every single solitary last one of them.

Your counter examples, clear as they are, (and good as they are) are somewhat in question because there’s this lingering doubt that maybe they don’t counteract the spirit behind the objections being conveyed.

I guess I have lost the thread of this thread. I still think that determinism is true (at least, for the sake of this thread) so I am not sure what you mean when you say that I have presented counter-examples to the view that all events are necessary. A determinist holds that that every event has a cause, but how does that become "every event is necessary"? I am not even sure I know just what that means.

If that means that every event can be subsumed under some law of nature, so that whenever A occurs, then B will occur (given certain initial conditions) then that is what a determinist believes. But I don't know what more you think determinism is.

Certainly that every event of type A is followed by an event of type B (e.g. whenever a metal is heated, the metal expands is not just an accident. There is a (molecular explanation) for that law of nature. And laws of nature are sometimes called expressions of "natural necessity" which is distinguished from logical necessity (e.g. all triangles have three sides) but exactly what kind of necessity is causal necessity still requires examination and explication.

But I really am hazy about what you call the "spirit" of what is being maintained.

But maybe I really have lost the thread of what is going on, so bring me up to speed if you will.

fast

January 22, 2007, 03:59 PM

[...]I am not sure what you mean when you say that I have presented counter-examples to the view that all events are necessary.

If I throw a ball, and if you catch it, then not only was there a cause for your catching it, but according to some (not me but others), the very catching of that ball by you was necessary. It was a must and thus you had to catch it--so they say.

Now, you might say to me, "Let's try it. Throw me a ball." Then, I toss you a ball. Right as the ball approaches, you jump out of the way and exclaim, "Gotcha! I told you that not all events are necessary," implying that it wasn't a necessary event for you to catch the ball.

To which I would promptly reply, "the catching of that ball wasn't an event at all." You never caught the ball, so it wasn't a must that you would, but what you did do is jump out of the way of the ball, and that was an actual event that actually occurred, and it was that actual happening which was a must and thus necessary--so they purport.

Awe you cry back, "But Fast, I didn't have to jump out of the way of the ball. I could have caught the ball if I had chosen to; therefore, it’s not the case that it was a must and thus necessary that I had to jump out of the way of the ball.”

The crying back is the example, Ken, whereby you (well, me in this case) are giving a counter example to the idea that all events are necessary. You are showing that if one can jump out of the way of the ball (or catch the ball) at will, then it's not true that either choice was a necessary choice.

This is where things become very sticky. If (on the other hand) it's the case that jumping out of the way is necessary when you jump out of the way, and if it's the case that catching the ball is necessary when you catch the ball, then it's not the case that your counter example shows what it purports to show.

It’s being claimed (by others) that every event (that does occur) are events that must occur. So, if you caught the ball, then it was a must that you would, and if you jumped out of the way of the ball, then it was a must that you would have done that. No matter what you did, said, thought, or contemplated … no matter the event, it was a must that what happened would happen—or so they continue to say.

A determinist holds that that every event has a cause, Yes, but are all that hold that every event has a cause determinists?

For me, you, and a few others, a determinist is one who believes that all events have antecedent causes. But, there are a scattered few (no pun intended) who believe that we cannot rightfully conclude that a person is a determinist just because one believes that all events have antecedent causes. That is only one of two conditions they say. They say, yes, for one to be a determinist, one must believe that all events have antecedent causes, but they also say that there is another second condition. They say that the second condition is that of necessity. In other words, there are those that claim that determinists (to even be a determinist) are those that 1) believes that all events have antecedent causes and 2) believes that all events are necessary events.

We believe (on the other hand) that 1) all events have antecedent causes and 2) some events are necessary events.

The distinction between our view and their view is understood by noticing the difference between “all” and “some.” We say some events are necessary whereas they say that all events are necessary.

Neither you nor I believe that it was necessary to catch a ball if we were not compelled to do so, but compelled or not, to them, it makes not one difference in terms of necessity. They believe that no matter the circumstance, all events (not some) are necessary.

but how does that become "every event is necessary"? I am not even sure I know just what that means. Recall, there are two issues on the table. One issue is whether you and I are using the correct definition of determinism. You say that believing that all events having antecedent causes is a sufficient condition for being labeled a determinist.

Some others, on the other hand, feel differently. They feel that though that’s a necessary condition, it’s not a sufficient condition. The second individually necessary condition for being properly labeled a determinist is that all events are necessary events. We, unlike them, do not feel that all events are necessary events—we feel, instead, that only some events are necessary events.

The first issue, again, has to do with what a determinist is. The second issue has to do with what we believe. For example, do you believe that all events have antecedent causes? Yes. Do you believe that all events are necessary events? No. Do they believe that all events have antecedent causes? Yes (well, never mind the libertarians and other indeterminists for now). Do they believe that all events are necessary events? Yes, the self-proclaimed hard determinists certainly do!

Notice (and this is worth noticing) that even if you believe that all events have antecedent causes, that is not enough to make you a determinist if it so happens to be that their definition of determinism is correct. It is also very much worthwhile to note that if they are wrong about all events being necessary events yet still have their definition correct, then you are still not a determinist.

TomJrzk

January 23, 2007, 07:41 AM

It’s being claimed (by others) that every event (that does occur) are events that must occur. So, if you caught the ball, then it was a must that you would, and if you jumped out of the way of the ball, then it was a must that you would have done that. No matter what you did, said, thought, or contemplated … no matter the event, it was a must that what happened would happen—or so they continue to say.
As one of the 'others', I must say that this is a very good representation of my beliefs.

Otherwise, all of the universe is deterministic, with the sole exception of the decisions of humans. Or maybe dogs, too. Or maybe ants, too. Or maybe amoeba, too. Or maybe snowflakes, too.

Here's why amoeba are a part of the spectrum: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dictyostelid

kennethamy

January 23, 2007, 08:17 AM

If I throw a ball, and if you catch it, then not only was there a cause for your catching it, but according to some (not me but others), the very catching of that ball by you was necessary. It was a must and thus you had to catch it--so they say.

Now, you might say to me, "Let's try it. Throw me a ball." Then, I toss you a ball. Right as the ball approaches, you jump out of the way and exclaim, "Gotcha! I told you that not all events are necessary," implying that it wasn't a necessary event for you to catch the ball.

To which I would promptly reply, "the catching of that ball wasn't an event at all." You never caught the ball, so it wasn't a must that you would, but what you did do is jump out of the way of the ball, and that was an actual event that actually occurred, and it was that actual happening which was a must and thus necessary--so they purport.

Awe you cry back, "But Fast, I didn't have to jump out of the way of the ball. I could have caught the ball if I had chosen to; therefore, it’s not the case that it was a must and thus necessary that I had to jump out of the way of the ball.”

The crying back is the example, Ken, whereby you (well, me in this case) are giving a counter example to the idea that all events are necessary. You are showing that if one can jump out of the way of the ball (or catch the ball) at will, then it's not true that either choice was a necessary choice.

This is where things become very sticky. If (on the other hand) it's the case that jumping out of the way is necessary when you jump out of the way, and if it's the case that catching the ball is necessary when you catch the ball, then it's not the case that your counter example shows what it purports to show.

It’s being claimed (by others) that every event (that does occur) are events that must occur. So, if you caught the ball, then it was a must that you would, and if you jumped out of the way of the ball, then it was a must that you would have done that. No matter what you did, said, thought, or contemplated … no matter the event, it was a must that what happened would happen—or so they continue to say.

Yes, but are all that hold that every event has a cause determinists?

For me, you, and a few others, a determinist is one who believes that all events have antecedent causes. But, there are a scattered few (no pun intended) who believe that we cannot rightfully conclude that a person is a determinist just because one believes that all events have antecedent causes. That is only one of two conditions they say. They say, yes, for one to be a determinist, one must believe that all events have antecedent causes, but they also say that there is another second condition. They say that the second condition is that of necessity. In other words, there are those that claim that determinists (to even be a determinist) are those that 1) believes that all events have antecedent causes and 2) believes that all events are necessary events.

We believe (on the other hand) that 1) all events have antecedent causes and 2) some events are necessary events.

The distinction between our view and their view is understood by noticing the difference between “all” and “some.” We say some events are necessary whereas they say that all events are necessary.

Neither you nor I believe that it was necessary to catch a ball if we were not compelled to do so, but compelled or not, to them, it makes not one difference in terms of necessity. They believe that no matter the circumstance, all events (not some) are necessary.

Recall, there are two issues on the table. One issue is whether you and I are using the correct definition of determinism. You say that believing that all events having antecedent causes is a sufficient condition for being labeled a determinist.

Some others, on the other hand, feel differently. They feel that though that’s a necessary condition, it’s not a sufficient condition. The second individually necessary condition for being properly labeled a determinist is that all events are necessary events. We, unlike them, do not feel that all events are necessary events—we feel, instead, that only some events are necessary events.

The first issue, again, has to do with what a determinist is. The second issue has to do with what we believe. For example, do you believe that all events have antecedent causes? Yes. Do you believe that all events are necessary events? No. Do they believe that all events have antecedent causes? Yes (well, never mind the libertarians and other indeterminists for now). Do they believe that all events are necessary events? Yes, the self-proclaimed hard determinists certainly do!

Notice (and this is worth noticing) that even if you believe that all events have antecedent causes, that is not enough to make you a determinist if it so happens to be that their definition of determinism is correct. It is also very much worthwhile to note that if they are wrong about all events being necessary events yet still have their definition correct, then you are still not a determinist.

I guess we have to figure out what you mean (or what is meant) by saying that the occurrence of an event is necessary. There is a clear meaning of "necessary" in the philosophical literature which is, "logically necessary". A proposition which is logically necessary is one whose negation is a self-contradiction, or implies a self-contradiction. An obvious example would be the proposition that all triangles have three angles. The negation of that proposition, some triangle do not have three angles, would be self-contradictory.

But propositions about the occurrence of an event are surely not logically necessary. It is true that I had breakfast at 8 am on Nov. 12. But the denial of that proposition, I did not have breakfast at 8 am on Nov, 12, is surely not a contradiction, nor does it imply one.

So, what is supposed to be necessary about the proposition that I had breakfast at 8 am on Nov. 12? One understanding might be this: Given all the applicable laws of nature, and given all the initial conditions which prevailed on Nov. 12. at 8 am, it follows from those applicable laws of nature and those initial conditions (e.g. I felt hungry at the time) that I would have breakfast on Nov. 12. etc. What that means is that just as any conclusion is deducible from its premises, the proposition that I would have breakfast on etc. was deducible from the premises consisting of the applicable laws of nature and those initial conditions.

Now, I don't know whether that is true, but putting that aside, notice that means that the proposition expressing the event of my having breakfast etc. is not necessary in itself (there is nothing logically necessary about my having breakfast etc.) but it is conditionally (hypothetically) necessary, on the condition that the premises consisting of the laws of nature, and the initial conditions are, (1) true, and (2) complete. But, also, and this is important, the premises (laws of nature and initial conditions) are not, themselves necessary propositions, and the conclusion (the proposition of the event itself) is not a necessary proposition. All that is necessary is that if the premises are true, then the conclusion (the proposition of the occurrence) is also true. That is why it is called "conditionally necessary".

Now, maybe the above is what you mean (what is meant) by saying that all events are necessary. Or maybe not. But we have to know what it means to say of the occurrence of an event that it is necessary, before we decide whether it is true. I suppose you will agree to that.

fast

January 24, 2007, 08:04 AM

I guess we have to figure out what you mean (or what is meant) by saying that the occurrence of an event is necessary. There is a clear meaning of "necessary" in the philosophical literature which is, "logically necessary". A proposition which is logically necessary is one whose negation is a self-contradiction, or implies a self-contradiction. An obvious example would be the proposition that all triangles have three angles. The negation of that proposition, some triangle do not have three angles, would be self-contradictory.

I'm gathering that my not fully understanding this term and the distinctions of it is a source for some of my confusion--perhaps not just my confusion but perhaps the confusion of some (but not all) of the others as well.

It seems to me that you think of logical necessity as being definitionally true. If that's the extent of what it means for something to be logically necessary, I have no idea.

For example, I would suppose that bachelors are unmarried males is a logical necessity. Not that it's necessary (in the normal layman sense) but rather that it's definitionally necessary (or logically necessary). To clarify what I'm thinking, I'd say that if we are talking about a triangle, then necessarily (hence, logically necessarily), we are talking about something with three angles because that’s the definition of a triangle.

But, this version of necessary which seems to apply only to definitions doesn't seem to be applicable to what is meant when one here says that all events are necessary. So, when one says that all events are necessary, I'm betting that they mean something else other than logically necessary.

But propositions about the occurrence of an event are surely not logically necessary. It is true that I had breakfast at 8 am on Nov. 12. But the denial of that proposition, I did not have breakfast at 8 am on Nov, 12, is surely not a contradiction, nor does it imply one. Agreed.

I'll acknowledge the remainder of your post separately.

fast

January 24, 2007, 08:59 AM

So, what is supposed to be necessary about the proposition that I had breakfast at 8 am on Nov. 12? One understanding might be this: Given all the applicable laws of nature, and given all the initial conditions which prevailed on Nov. 12. at 8 am, it follows from those applicable laws of nature and those initial conditions (e.g. I felt hungry at the time) that I would have breakfast on Nov. 12. etc. What that means is that just as any conclusion is deducible from its premises, the proposition that I would have breakfast on etc. was deducible from the premises consisting of the applicable laws of nature and those initial conditions.

I'm going to start off by saying that I feel like I'm standing chest deep in murky water.

If we are going to talk about the breakfast you did have at 8 am on November 12, then we will be talking about a physical event that actually occurred at that time. Well, an event that commenced at the time anyhow; hence, there was a duration or length of time. It had a starting point in time and an ending point in time.

Why the detail? Well, I want to make sure that while we remain focused on the events and whether or not the events were necessary, I don't want to inadvertently allow you to divert the conversation to that of an argument with premises, inferences, and conclusions. Can we not talk about the events instead?

When one talks about all events being necessary, they are talking about the physical events being causal factors that dictate what necessary and subsequent events must follow from the antecedent causes.

When you talk of breakfast, it's like you have zoomed out for a glance at the big picture. But when people are talking about events being necessary, they are zooming in microscopically to look at the finer detail of the happenings.

Let's say that you started breakfast at 8:00 am on the dot. Now, fast-forward 4 minutes and 8 seconds into breakfast. Take a snapshot of that entire one-second time frame (from 4 minutes and 8 seconds all the way to 4 minutes and 9 seconds.)

Take a look at the volumous transpiring events happening during that whole second. What happened? Look at it microsecond by microsecond if you have to. Notice each micro event that occurs. Wouldn't you agree that we are still looking at events but just micro events on a smaller zoomed in scale than that of the big picture breakfast?

If we look at the happenings very closely, we see that each event that does occur had to occur given the stimulus that prompted it—so they say. Could it be? Could it be that these micro events are necessary events given the physical laws of nature?

Here’s something exciting. Rewind back to the point where you made the decision to even have breakfast, that encompasses not merely a point in time but rather a section (or time frame) of time, and when we zoom in and notice the events on a micro level, what we see are the gears of life cranking away.

It's almost as if there are two truths. There’s the common sensical truth that we see when we zoom out, but then there's the other seemingly contradictory truth we see when we are zoomed in. We cannot stand for there to be a contradiction, so to reconcile it, what shall we do? Blame it on the peculiarity of language?

Let me guess. The events are necessary in only that they are causally necessary, but to say of something that it’s causally necessary is not to say of something that it’s necessary, for to say of something that it is necessary is to say of something that it’s logically necessary?

kennethamy

January 24, 2007, 10:40 AM

I'm going to start off by saying that I feel like I'm standing chest deep in murky water.

If we are going to talk about the breakfast you did have at 8 am on November 12, then we will be talking about a physical event that actually occurred at that time. Well, an event that commenced at the time anyhow; hence, there was a duration or length of time. It had a starting point in time and an ending point in time.

Why the detail? Well, I want to make sure that while we remain focused on the events and whether or not the events were necessary, I don't want to inadvertently allow you to divert the conversation to that of an argument with premises, inferences, and conclusions. Can we not talk about the events instead?

When one talks about all events being necessary, they are talking about the physical events being causal factors that dictate what necessary and subsequent events must follow from the antecedent causes.

When you talk of breakfast, it's like you have zoomed out for a glance at the big picture. But when people are talking about events being necessary, they are zooming in microscopically to look at the finer detail of the happenings.

Let's say that you started breakfast at 8:00 am on the dot. Now, fast-forward 4 minutes and 8 seconds into breakfast. Take a snapshot of that entire one-second time frame (from 4 minutes and 8 seconds all the way to 4 minutes and 9 seconds.)

Take a look at the volumous transpiring events happening during that whole second. What happened? Look at it microsecond by microsecond if you have to. Notice each micro event that occurs. Wouldn't you agree that we are still looking at events but just micro events on a smaller zoomed in scale than that of the big picture breakfast?

If we look at the happenings very closely, we see that each event that does occur had to occur given the stimulus that prompted it—so they say. Could it be? Could it be that these micro events are necessary events given the physical laws of nature?

Here’s something exciting. Rewind back to the point where you made the decision to even have breakfast, that encompasses not merely a point in time but rather a section (or time frame) of time, and when we zoom in and notice the events on a micro level, what we see are the gears of life cranking away.

It's almost as if there are two truths. There’s the common sensical truth that we see when we zoom out, but then there's the other seemingly contradictory truth we see when we are zoomed in. We cannot stand for there to be a contradiction, so to reconcile it, what shall we do? Blame it on the peculiarity of language?

Let me guess. The events are necessary in only that they are causally necessary, but to say of something that it’s causally necessary is not to say of something that it’s necessary, for to say of something that it is necessary is to say of something that it’s logically necessary?

I don't know whether you are ascribing that view to me. But if you are, let me assure you that I do not hold it. The 17th century Rationalists held such a view, which David Hume destroyed. I certainly do not think that the only kind of necessity is logical necessity. There is, certainly, causal necessity. The philosophical question is what that kind of necessity is. How to understand and analyse it. There have, of course, been attempts to do it. Notably by the late Nelson Goodman who argued that causally necessary statements are conditionals that support counterfactuals. (See: http://www.science.uva.nl/~seop/archives/spr2001/entries/causation-counterfactual/
)

"If we look at the happenings very closely, we see that each event that does occur had to occur given the stimulus that prompted it—so they say."

How do we see the "had to occur" part? What does "had to occur" look like apart from does, in fact, occur? David Hume was very clear about this. He gave the example of one billiard ball hitting another billiard ball, and pointed out that we can, of course, see that the second ball did move. And maybe it had to move. But what is that supposed to look like? That is why Hume, and empiricist who goes only by what he can observe, held that the necessity that the second billiard ball move is no more than our strong "habit of expectation" that it will move. The "necessity" is "in our heads" and is a projection of that expectation on the world. It is certainly not something that we can "see" as you suggest in the above sentence.