Free will -- a beginners look

[kennethamy]

You were free (per Compatibilism's definition of free) to choose what you preferred. What I'm saying is that it was impossible that you would have preferred paper at that instant; you had no Libertarian free will.

And, even if you have Libertarian freedom you will be unable to construct a four-sided triangle. So you will still not have that kind of freedom of the will.

[TomJrzk]

If someone says that she is a determinist (and divulges no further information), then I do not know whether she believes in or does not believe in free will, but I do know, at least, that she is a determinist.

My question is this. What do we call such a person who believes in free will but divulges no further information in regards to his belief regarding determinism? A libertarian says that determinism is false; therefore, the answer cannot be libertarian.
I would first have to ask 'what does he mean by free will'. And that's the problem. He's a Libertarian if he means LFW (having that free a will precludes determinism) and at least a Compatibilist if he means CFW. That's why we ought to ask for a definition of free will before bothering to take walks.

[TomJrzk]

And, even if you have Libertarian freedom you will be unable to construct a four-sided triangle.
I can't disagree with that, nor would I want to. Or maybe I'm missing your point? It seems like you're extending my point to where it's even more obviously true.

[kennethamy]

I can't disagree with that, nor would I want to. Or maybe I'm missing your point? It seems like you're extending my point to where it's even more obviously true.

I guess that my point is that we do not ordinarily consider our inability to construct a self-contradictory figure a limitation on our freedom, and neither do we ordinarily consider not being able to act otherwise under exactly the same conditions, a limitation on our freedom. I suppose that those who philosophize might invent the limitation of being unable to do the logically impossible as a limitation on free action, and some of the same people might do the same by inventing the view that the fact that we could not have done otherwise in precisely the same circumstances, was a limitation on our freedom. As I have just said, we should consider whether both kinds of limitations are philosophical inventions.

[TomJrzk]

neither do we ordinarily consider not being able to act otherwise under exactly the same conditions, a limitation on our freedom
I guess "we" aren't Libertarians, then. I think this is exactly what creates the Libertarians, and woe that Fast Part I experienced. I think you're over-generalizing, and maybe when you realize that, you might not assume that others are a part of 'we' but have concerns about the ultimate implications of determinism. Then, you might more quickly address their concerns about the loss of LFW and take shorter walks.

Like I said many posts ago, it would have helped me considerably if you had quoted Hume's CFW much earlier.

[fast]

I would first have to ask 'what does he mean by free will'. And that's the problem. He's a Libertarian if he means LFW (having that free a will precludes determinism) and at least a Compatibilist if he means CFW. That's why we ought to ask for a definition of free will before bothering to take walks.

I would like to say (but am very hesitant to say) that not only does a libertarian believe in free will, (which I don't have a problem saying that per se) but I'd like to continue on and say that being a libertarian does not infer that one believes determinism is false.

The Compatibilist has the luxury of also being a determinist and believing in free will, and if believing in free will makes one a libertarian, then not only is a Compatibilist a determinist, but a Compatibilist is also a libertarian.

However, Ken says that a libertarian argues that determinism isn't true.

This makes a mighty mess of things. It would be so much nicer if a libertarian can choose for himself whether or not he believes in determinism much the same way a determinist can choose for himself whether or not believes in free will.

Oh, and just disregard whether or not we can choose beliefs--I think it was clearer not being clean.

[fast]

Fast Part I experienced. Gosh, I feel like I've abandoned you; is there a feeling of betrayal is in the air?

Fear not buddy, for just wait until my sequel comes out: Fast, the defector retracts!

[TomJrzk]

and if believing in free will makes one a libertarian, then not only is a Compatibilist a determinist, but a Compatibilist is also a libertarian.
Does this not wreak from the need for 2 definitions of free will? Compatibilists believe in their free will, but not the Libertarians'. Do you not see this?

[fast]

I guess "we" aren't Libertarians, then. Revisit the beginning of post 693. The libertarian is a hardcore soldier dedicated and committed to a world of isolation, just like the mighty hard determinists who stands tall despite the crying protest. The warring factions maintain their grounds of incompatibility, and flinch not will they in the face of impending defeat.

In other words, no one here is a libertarian, for each of us believes in determinism--at least enough to a degree to associate oneself with the label.

The question though is, what do we call a person who believes in free will?

[fast]

Does this not wreak from the need for 2 definitions of free will? Compatibilists believe in their free will, but not the Libertarians'. Do you not see this?

One's thing for sure: libertarian believe in free will--at least the kind to which Ken refers.

The problem I have at this juncture is the statement that libertarians say that determinism is false.

[kennethamy]

I guess "we" aren't Libertarians, then. I think this is exactly what creates the Libertarians, and woe that Fast Part I experienced. I think you're over-generalizing, and maybe when you realize that, you might not assume that others are a part of 'we' but have concerns about the ultimate implications of determinism. Then, you might more quickly address their concerns about the loss of LFW and take shorter walks.

Like I said many posts ago, it would have helped me considerably if you had quoted Hume's CFW much earlier.

The alleged incompatibility of scientific determinism and freedom is a modern riff on the old themes of the same alleged incompatibility with logical determinism, and with Fatalism. Fatalism has generated even more woe, since it implies that people are helpless in the gloomier sense that their actions are not merely themselves determined, but are inefficacious. The remedy for clinical depression is either prozac, or cognitive therapy of the kind Hume and I have tried to provide. As Wittgenstein put it, "a picture holds you captive". Or, in the words of Franklin Delano Roosevelt, "there is nothing to fear except fear itself".

[TomJrzk]

Gosh, I feel like I've abandoned you; is there a feeling of betrayal is in the air?
No, not betrayal at all. Fast Part I was full of woe over the loss of...well, next to nothing (but NOT nothing!), in my view. Fast Part II would be the apparently happier kicker of cans. Our goal is Fast Part III, comforted in his acceptance of his philosophy (whatever that may be) that relieves him of the battle within his brain.

This Determinist accepts the responsibility that so many others lay at the feet of the unreal; I'd like to improve this world in whatever small way I can.

[TomJrzk]

or cognitive therapy of the kind Hume and I have tried to provide.
I have no qualms with your goal, just a problem with your tactics. Seems to me that Cognitive therapy ought to address peoples' thoughts and what they mean; not talk around them. Or does acknowledging peoples' concerns push them over the brink? I would hope for a statement along the lines of 'yes, determinism implies that you do not have LFW but there still is CFW which is what you experience every day'. Anyone with half a brain will eventually stumble over Fast's woe (hmmm, maybe not?!?!); once they extrapolate determinism to neural activity, they will come to the same concern: my choices are actually already determined. Then they can try to fold in the fact that their choices are actually already determined by the person that they are, without taking so many walks.

Or maybe Fast can attest to the possibility that the walks are necessary to ease the brain into it?

[t.w.]

I see no way of avoiding hard determinism. Quantum physics only makes matters worse.
Events are either determined, in which case we couldn't have done anything else and we don't have free will, or random, in which case they certainly weren't our choice, as nothing caused them.
Have I formed a false dichotomy between an event being random or determined? I doubt it - I can't conceive of an event being anything other than caused(deterministic) or uncaused(random). I really see no way that free will can exist unless we re-define it, but still, that doesn't change there being only one possible outcome, or a random outcome, neither of which are compatible with free will.

[fast]

I see no way of avoiding hard determinism. Try not confusing free will with indeterminism...worked for me.

[TomJrzk]

The problem I have at this juncture is the statement that libertarians say that determinism is false.
I think that stems from your 35 cents. It would be nice and clear if determinism were a quarter but free will a dime. But, Libertarians, by definition, believe they have will beyond determinism; liberty, after all, means free! And that's both necessary and sufficient to putting them in their box.

I think you will have this statement problem until you cash in your change.

[TomJrzk]

Try not confusing free will with indeterminism...worked for me.
I think Ken needs to take t. w. on a walk ;).

More seriously, I think that Hard Determinists... Oh, never mind. I think my chart summed it up.

Everyone should state their definition of free will each and every time they use it, if you ask me...

[t.w.]

Try not confusing free will with indeterminism...worked for me.

How exactly can determinism/randomness and free will be compatible, when, if determinism/randomness is true, there is only one possible determined outcome and several other random ones, none of which would have anything to do with me (other than I would be the helpless robot by which they outcomes were channeled).

Funny how you say confusing, when there isn't really any of that going on. Most of the definitions of free will I see, especially from those who support it(e.g. D.Dennet Freedom Evolves), involve there being several possible outcomes of which my will can decide between.

Don't think that I, like you, am new to this topic. I've read several books on the matter - none of which I feel adequately answer my objections.

[t.w.]

I think Ken needs to take t. w. on a walk ;).


I don't think so.....(we've already discussed the matter before in other free will threads - there's really nothing I can learn from him).

[TomJrzk]

How exactly can determinism/randomness and free will be compatible, when, if determinism/randomness is true, there is only one possible determined outcome and several other random ones, none of which would have anything to do with me (other than I would be the helpless robot by which they outcomes were channeled).
Let me try, then, since we HDs seem to be in the minority.

Compatibilists (at least the Hume variety) define free will as:


According to Hume, free will should not be understood as an absolute ability to have chosen differently under exactly the same inner and outer circumstances. Rather, it is a hypothetical ability to have chosen differently if one had been differently psychologically disposed by some different beliefs or desires.
You and I, apparently, talk about Libertarian Free Will, where everything you said makes sense.

So, Compatibilists believe as you and I do, given our definition of free will. But you can probably accept "How exactly can determinism ... and free will be compatible" given their definition????

[fast]

Fast Part I was full of woe over the loss of...well, next to nothing (but NOT nothing!), in my view.
Fast part 1 (and we'll call him slow) had felt slighted by the worldly implications of determinism--not just limited to free will mind you, but it covers a broad and wide range of issues such as what his kindness is attributable to, for example.

Then, slow realized the language barrier and noticed that to choose and decide in a deterministic world isn't being negated by determinism but rather supported by it. Without the causal effects of the thrust of life, we would never be who we are--I'll thank Hoo Doo for that one.

Finally, the inevitable conclusions that the woe to which he much disliked is real as he first suspected, but that's okay, for slow's woe was nothing more than an amplified picture brought on by role playing in character. He saw something, latched on to it, and took it to the extreme. From that, he was able to feel (and so he felt) the angst of determinism.

Now, I have you left (not in solitude, for slow is with you), and all you have to do is see that what you call free will is really called indeterminism; then, you only have to see that language is the culprit the rest. As for sharing in the woe of slow's character, you did well.

[TomJrzk]

all you have to do is see that what you call free will is really called indeterminism
Yes, I knew that coming into this thread. What I didn't know was Hume's definition of free will. I was trying to argue against LFW while Ken was arguing for CFW (which is so blatantly obviously real to me that I didn't know of a need to use this definition). I'm totally with the Compatibilists in their beliefs, just not in their confusing redefinition of free will. I'll stick with CFW and LFW, so I don't confuse others???

[fast]

Don't think that I, like you, am new to this topic.
I am fast.

You ask, "How exactly can determinism/randomness and free will be compatible, when, if determinism/randomness is true, there is only one possible determined outcome and several other random ones, none of which would have anything to do with me (other than I would be the helpless robot by which they outcomes were channeled)."

The outcome (the choice I make) is spawned after it's filtered through the contemplation of the choices (subsequent to the decision making process); language becomes a crucial component (as to why I have free will) at this juncture. We must ask ourselves, what is it to say of someone that one has free will--and the answer isn't dependent on the fact there's a deterministic world--it's dependent on the real life circumstance we find ourselves in.

Free will is compatible with determinism. I can no longer deny that. The key is to understand that free will is not determinism's arch enemy but rather a goodfellow along for the ride. Free will is like another box car on a train. If we send object to free will, then we are going to have to object to a whole lot more--the implications of determinism (assuming we have a good handle on it) is staggering, and we can't forsake what something means to fit the vague notions of it.

[wiploc]

The question though is, what do we call a person who believes in free will?

A Free Willy?

crc

[kennethamy]

Yes, I knew that coming into this thread. What I didn't know was Hume's definition of free will. I was trying to argue against LFW while Ken was arguing for CFW (which is so blatantly obviously real to me that I didn't know of a need to use this definition). I'm totally with the Compatibilists in their beliefs, just not in their confusing redefinition of free will. I'll stick with CFW and LFW, so I don't confuse others???

What is "LFW"? If it implies indeterminism, what has it to do with freedom of the will?

[t.w.]

According to Hume, free will should not be understood as an absolute ability to have chosen differently under exactly the same inner and outer circumstances. Rather, it is a hypothetical ability to have chosen differently if one had been differently psychologically disposed by some different beliefs or desires.

But then we lose all practicality of the term: when discussing whether a murderer should be punished and how he should be punished, we almost always consider whether he could have done otherwise. In fact, we consider this to such an extent that we feel someone who is mentally ill was sufficiently lacking that they could not have 'changed their mind', thus the penalty for the mentally ill, whilst still preventing them from damaging society(in the same way we prevent a flood even though the flood has no free will), is less severe.
My position is that the case of the mentally ill person is no different to the case of the perfectly sane person. And the case of both is no different to the case of the flood.
I believe it is as rational to say a human has free will as to say that a flood has free will. And funnily enough, according to your definition above, a) almost all animals have free will, including the smallest of insects and b) if we broaden psychological to 'all determining factors', we can say the flood has free will.

a) Mighten the flood not have devstated those Indonesian villages if only its determining factors were a little different?(in this case the factors are purely physical)
b) Mighten that murderer not have killed those people if only his determining factors were a little different? (in the case the facotrs are purely physical despite our superficial label of 'pyschological)
What is the difference between a) and b)?

[fast]

A Free Willy?


I may be looking too much into labels, but I think it's important we don't start making incorrect inferences or implications about what it means to be one thing or another.

What do you think? Do you think that being a libertarian implies something about a person beyond that of believing in free will?

Being a determinist doesn't imply that such a person does or doesn't believe in free will; why then would being a libertarian imply something about being or not being a determinist?

Recall that we have still not settled the issue regarding the implications of being a Compatibilist.

On an unrelated issue, but along the same line of thought, I have been struggling with what a sound argument entails. There are two components to a sound argument.

One is that the argument must be valid. Notice the use of a single word, “valid”. An argument must be valid (and something else) to be a sound argument.

But, when I go to figure out the second thing that is needed, notice that I can’t do it with a single word! Stuff like that drives me bonkers. Why, I keep asking myself; why can’t there be a single word that encapsulates the fact that the premises must be true in order to have a sound argument along the same vein as it was with the term “valid”?

Then, what Oldal told me about Pitman hits me. “Valid” is simply shorthand, so while I’m trying to reduce the length of the phrase regarding premises being true to make a valid argument sound, I actually ought to be lengthening “valid” to say something regarding the form of an argument.

I need clarity, and with it, I can move mountains, so along the same kind of thought pattern, I need terms to fit in holes where terms are not present. I need more inference from the mere fact that I am a Compatibilist. I need it to infer more than the mere fact that I am a determinist; it must, and I demand of it that it infer that I am something else, and if Ken won’t let it be libertarian (for it for some bewildering reason infers something about determinism), then I need something in it’s place, and I’m to the point that free Willy, as funny as it is, seems quite appetizing at the moment, but I’d prefer a concession in regards to the implications of what it means to be a libertarian.

However, I’ve been thinking though about the contrast between that of a soft determinist and a hard determinist and wondering if I can somehow bridge some gaps. For example, perhaps we could distinguish between types of libertarians, much like Ken to my amazement articulated a distinction between two varieties of determinism (i.e logical and scientific). There has to be a way through this issue.

[kennethamy]

I believe it is as rational to say a human has free will as to say that a flood has free will. And funnily enough, according to your definition above, a) almost all animals have free will, including the smallest of insects and b) if we broaden psychological to 'all determining factors', we can say the flood has free will.

a) Mighten the flood not have devstated those Indonesian villages if only its determining factors were a little different?(in this case the factors are purely physical)
b) Mighten that murderer not have killed those people if only his determining factors were a little different? (in the case the facotrs are purely physical despite our superficial label of 'pyschological)
What is the difference between a) and b)?

How could it possibly be as reasonable to say that a flood has free will as it is to say that a person does? Floods have no will at all. And people do have wills. It makes as much sense to say of a flood that it has free will, as to say of a stone that it is happy.

The flood could not have "done otherwise even if it had chosen to do so" inasmuch as the flood does not act at all, and the flood makes no choices. But it surely makes sense to say of the murderer that he could have done otherwise if he had chosen, since murderers are people, and it makes sense to say that of people. The difference between what you call "psychological factors" and any other factors is crucial, since floods and rocks have no psychology.

[TomJrzk]

What is "LFW"? If it implies indeterminism, what has it to do with freedom of the will?
It's the acronym for Libertarian Free Will, the term you gave me. It, to me, is what lay people think of when they feel the freedom of choices. Many attribute it to a spirit or soul, like a feeling of freedom from physics. This is what Fast was originally lamenting the loss of. Yes, indeterminism. And it's related to free will, at least for me, because that's what I read into other people's support for free will; I did not think free will meant our obvious ability to consider consequences and weigh choices; that's CFW or Compatibilist Free Will.

It's what Hume said in his caveat: an absolute ability to have chosen differently under exactly the same inner and outer circumstances.

[TomJrzk]

according to your definition above
If you had memorized the entirety of the nearly 800 posts in this thread, you would know that that was not my definition. My definition of Free Will is the same as the Libertarians': the ability to make a different choice under the exact same inner and outer conditions. And, no, like you, I do not believe that free will exists. I do believe in CFW, as stated in Hume's definition because I weigh alternatives and make 'choices'.

I think it's unfair to change the definition of free will.

I, too, believe that murderers and the insane differ in degree rather than kind. That's why I don't believe in punishing criminals except as a shortcut to modifying the behavior of otherwise-soon-to-be-criminals. It's OK to be less controlling of the insane if the cause is treatable or transient and unlikely to recur.

[TomJrzk]

contrast between that of a soft determinist and a hard determinist
I think you will give yourself yet another headache if you try to tackle this while still holding on to your insistence that there is but one free will.

In Tom's world, a hard determinist is one who believes there is no such thing as free will but defines free will as 'the absolute ability to make different choices under the exact same inner and outer circumstances' (yes, I almost have that memorized). The soft determinist is one who believes there is such a thing as free will but only because their definition is not the same; it's that people could make different choices under different inner (and maybe outer?) circumstances.

Of course, Tom's world has a population of nearly 1.

[fast]

I think you will give yourself yet another headache if you try to tackle this while still holding on to your insistence that there is but one free will.Let's say that you drive a car, and let's say that I ride a bicycle, and let's say that I fast wish to drive a car, for fast likes to go fast. Now, suppose that I start telling you that I'm driving my car even though it's clear to all that I am riding a bicycle.

Every time I tell you that I'm driving my car and that I'm going fast, you're going to know what I mean when I use the term car in place of the term bi-cycle, but at no time does my definition of car (even though it's different than the real definition of car) constitute a second additional definition.

In other words, to make up a definition isn't to elevate said utterance to the status of a real definition.

Let me try again; there isn't a second definition of free will; there is one definition and one misuse.

It's critical that we explore what common users of our language mean when they use the term. If it so happens that there are two wide uses, then perhaps I'll concede to there being two differing definitions--or uses. But, until such time, there's no reason to think that there's actually more than one definition; positing it as if it's one doesn't make it so.

a population of nearly 1. :D

[wiploc]

I may be looking too much into labels, but I think it's important we don't start making incorrect inferences or implications about what it means to be one thing or another.

What do you think?

Me? I'm embarrassed to say that I haven't been following the thread closely.




Do you think that being a libertarian implies something about a person beyond that of believing in free will?

Yes, because compatiblists can believe in free will without being libertarians.





Being a determinist doesn't imply that such a person does or doesn't believe in free will; why then would being a libertarian imply something about being or not being a determinist?

You are correct. Wait. This is going to cost me hours of catching up on the thread. Okay, you are incorrect. The free will believed in by compatibilist determinists cannot be LFW, because LFW is not determined.
So, being a determinist does imply that you don't believe in LFW.

Phrased differently, a libertarian doesn't believe that compatibilists believe in free will at all. They (compatibilists) say they do (believe in free will), but they are really talking about something else.

(In the imediately prior paragraph, I used "compatibilists" in a way contradictory to something I said earlier in the thread. If I was going to be consistent, I might say something like, "A libertarian doesn't believe that compatibilists (at least those compatibilists who believe in both free will and determinism...").)




Recall that we have still not settled the issue regarding the implications of being a Compatibilist.

On an unrelated issue, but along the same line of thought, I have been struggling with what a sound argument entails. There are two components to a sound argument.

One is that the argument must be valid. Notice the use of a single word, “valid”. An argument must be valid (and something else) to be a sound argument.

But, when I go to figure out the second thing that is needed, notice that I can’t do it with a single word! Stuff like that drives me bonkers. Why, I keep asking myself; why can’t there be a single word that encapsulates the fact that the premises must be true in order to have a sound argument along the same vein as it was with the term “valid”?

Then, what Oldal told me about Pitman hits me. “Valid” is simply shorthand, so while I’m trying to reduce the length of the phrase regarding premises being true to make a valid argument sound, I actually ought to be lengthening “valid” to say something regarding the form of an argument.

Valid in form. A sound argument is valid in form and has true premises. You can shorten, "valid in form," to just, "valid," because that won't confuse anybody or cause resistence. You could theoretically try to shorten, "has true premises," to, "true," as in, "A sound argument is valid and true," but you'd run into more trouble than it's worth.





I need clarity, and with it, I can move mountains, so along the same kind of thought pattern, I need terms to fit in holes where terms are not present. I need more inference from the mere fact that I am a Compatibilist. I need it to infer more than the mere fact that I am a determinist; it must, and I demand of it that it infer that I am something else,
You have to believe in free will. Just not LFW. You'd have to believe in the lessor kind of free will that libertarians might call illusory (though I'd love to know who they think is being fooled).

Unfortunately, I'm not with you on compatibilism implying determinism. That's because I'm a compatibilist without being a determinist. I believe in free will because it couldn't be more obvious, but I'm not clear on whether I believe in LFW. It is clear, however that if LFW doesn't exist, then CFW does. I like to say, "If free will is an illusion, then that illusion is what we mean by free will."



and if Ken won’t let it be libertarian (for it for some bewildering reason infers something about determinism), then I need something in it’s place, and I’m to the point that free Willy, as funny as it is, seems quite appetizing at the moment, but I’d prefer a concession in regards to the implications of what it means to be a libertarian.

However, I’ve been thinking though about the contrast between that of a soft determinist and a hard determinist and wondering if I can somehow bridge some gaps. For example, perhaps we could distinguish between types of libertarians, much like Ken to my amazement articulated a distinction between two varieties of determinism (i.e logical and scientific). There has to be a way through this issue.
I'll go back and do some reading.

crc

[kennethamy]

It's the acronym for Libertarian Free Will, the term you gave me. It, to me, is what lay people think of when they feel the freedom of choices. Many attribute it to a spirit or soul, like a feeling of freedom from physics. This is what Fast was originally lamenting the loss of. Yes, indeterminism. And it's related to free will, at least for me, because that's what I read into other people's support for free will; I did not think free will meant our obvious ability to consider consequences and weigh choices; that's CFW or Compatibilist Free Will.

It's what Hume said in his caveat: an absolute ability to have chosen differently under exactly the same inner and outer circumstances.

I think that "lay people" are unlikely to have any definite philosophical views at all, and certainly, when Sam says to Joe that Richard did not marry Susan "of his own free will" Joe would think that Sam was saying that Susan's father had a shotgun pointed at Richard because Susan was pregnant. And not that Richard's delight in Susan had antecedent causes. Don't you?

[TomJrzk]

I like to say, "If free will is an illusion, then that illusion is what we mean by free will."
Exactly. Thanks! I was really beginning to think that I'm either completely insane or speaking a different language to the point where no one could tell the difference.

Yes, that illusion is what Compatibilists call free will. It's an illusion because we don't see every neuron firing during a decision. If we could, we would see how deterministic our decisions truly are.

You have an official invitation to Tom's world, though you'd probably be better off where you are. Now that we are part of a legion (OK, 1.8 is an insignificant part of a legion), maybe Fast will hear what we're saying better?

[kennethamy]

Exactly. Thanks! I was really beginning to think that I'm either completely insane or speaking a different language to the point where no one could tell the difference.

Yes, that illusion is what Compatibilists call free will. It's an illusion because we don't see every neuron firing during a decision. If we could, we would see how deterministic our decisions truly are.

You have an official invitation to Tom's world, though you'd probably be better off where you are. Now that we are part of a legion (OK, 1.8 is an insignificant part of a legion), maybe Fast will hear what we're saying better?

How can it be compatibilism be the illusion of free will? You, yourself, have allowed there are at least two senses of "free will", the libertarian and the compatibilist. So, in which sense of "free will" is free will an illusion? Surely not in the compatibilist sense! In that sense it is the Libertarians and the Hard Determinists who are confused.

Perhaps you mean that if the Compatibilists saw all those neurons firing away, they would change their minds about what free will is, and see that Incompatibilism is true, and not only that, but Hard Determinism is true? Somehow I doubt that, since Compatibilists already accept determinism. They believe those neurons are going rat-tat-tat-ti-tat too.

[wiploc]

How can it be compatibilism be the illusion of free will? You, yourself, have allowed there are at least two senses of "free will", the libertarian and the compatibilist. So, in which sense of "free will" is free will an illusion?

To the libertarian (and to people who believe there's no such thing as free will) the compatibilist version of free will is an illusion. When they come out of the cinema, the unfreewilly is insisting that there is no such thing as "movies," that there was only a series of still pictures. The libertarian is saying that there can't have seen a series of stills, because he saw the pictures move. The compatibilist says that he saw the pictures move like the compatibilist, and he believes in the series of still pictures like the unfreewilly, and he believes they are compatible. Both of the others tell the compatibilist that he believes in an illusion. But he is undisturbed. "If it's an illusion, it's a good one," he says happily. "And if the sense of motion created by a series of stills is what movies are, then that's what I mean by 'movies.'"



Surely not in the compatibilist sense! In that sense it is the Libertarians and the Hard Determinists who are confused.


The libertarians and hard determinists think the compatiblist is confused, that what he means by free will is an illusion.




Perhaps you mean that if the Compatibilists saw all those neurons firing away, they would change their minds about what free will is,

No. If the libertarian saw that firing neurons is all there is to free will, then he's the one who might change his mind about what free will is. The unfreewilly already believes that, and he's not changing his mind. For him, libertarian free will is the only kind of free will there can be---because that's what "free will" means---and since he doesn't believe LFW exists, he doesn't believe the FW exists.

crc

[TomJrzk]

Perhaps you mean that if the Compatibilists saw all those neurons firing away, they would change their minds about what free will is, and see that Incompatibilism is true, and not only that, but Hard Determinism is true?
No.

I am a Compatibilist but only if the definition of free will is Compatibilism's.

I am a Hard Determinist but only if the definition of free will is Libertarianism's. I prefer LFW's definition as more honest and more to the point when people start questioning determinism as a philosophy, so I call myself an HD with the LFW rider.

So, yes, CFW is actually an illusion, but that has no effect on anything in my mind. There IS a man behind the curtain and it IS the source of your inner conditions that effect (and affect) CFW. But your inner conditions are YOU, why would anyone want it any other way? And why the woe? Fast is a good person because he is a good person, and he should take pride in that even though his goodness is largely the fault of his parents' goodness.

[kennethamy]

To the libertarian (and to people who believe there's no such thing as free will) the compatibilist version of free will is an illusion. When they come out of the cinema, the unfreewilly is insisting that there is no such thing as "movies," that there was only a series of still pictures. The libertarian is saying that there can't have seen a series of stills, because he saw the pictures move. The compatibilist says that he saw the pictures move like the compatibilist, and he believes in the series of still pictures like the unfreewilly, and he believes they are compatible. Both of the others tell the compatibilist that he believes in an illusion. But he is undisturbed. "If it's an illusion, it's a good one," he says happily. "And if the sense of motion created by a series of stills is what movies are, then that's what I mean by 'movies.'"

crc


If you mean that there are three opposing views, compatibilism, hard determinism, and libertarianism, you are right. (In fact, there are, for these puposes, only two opposing positions: compatibilism and incompatibilism, since hard determinists and libertarians both hold that determinism and freedom are incompatible. According to the compatibilist, then, both hard determinists and libertarians are making the same mistake). The question is, who is right, and how is that to be settled.

It is pretty clear that ordinary language and "the man on the street" are on the compatibilist side. In fact, compatibilism is the expression of how an expression of the kind, "he did it of his own free will" is ordinarily used. The idea is that it is not that the fact that a choice or action is caused that implies the choice of action is not done freely, but rather it is that the cause is of a certain kind that matters. If the cause is a compelling cause, then the action or the choice is not a free one. All compelling causes are causes, but some causes are not compelling causes. If I am not compelled to do something, if I do not do it "against my will", then how could I not be doing it "of my own free will"?

[kennethamy]

No.

I am a Compatibilist but only if the definition of free will is Compatibilism's.

I am a Hard Determinist but only if the definition of free will is Libertarianism's. I prefer LFW's definition as more honest and more to the point when people start questioning determinism as a philosophy, so I call myself an HD with the LFW rider.

So, yes, CFW is actually an illusion, but that has no effect on anything in my mind. There IS a man behind the curtain and it IS the source of your inner conditions that effect (and affect) CFW. But your inner conditions are YOU, why would anyone want it any other way? And why the woe? Fast is a good person because he is a good person, and he should take pride in that even though his goodness is largely the fault of his parents' goodness.

If you believe what you wrote in the last paragraph (above) then why do you think that compatibilism is an illusion? I thought you just expressed it pretty well, and indicated that you accept it. ("Fault"? I would rather say, "happy outcome") Fast is not being tempted to be good: Fast is not being forced to be good; Fast is (if you are right) good for nothing. ;) So why isn't Fast good of his "own free will"? What I think, Tom, is that you may be suffering from cognitive dissonance. You hold two opposing beliefs at the same time. You express that with this very peculiar statement, CFW is actually an illusion, but that has no effect on anything in my mind. If you think compatibilism is an illusion, then you must think it is false. If you think it is false, then why don't you just stick to HD? What do you mean, you think compatibilism is false, but that has no effect on you mind? When else does your belief that proposition is false have no "effect on your mind". Perhaps you ought to say what you mean by "has no effect on my mind".

(I don't know whether you do, but suppose you believe that God is an illusion, i.e. you are an atheist. Would that have no effect on your mind? What would that mean? Would that mean that you might happily go on worshiping God, and join a church? What about whether universe was created by someone? How could you be a Theist, and still believe that God is an illusion? and how could you be a Compatibilist, and still believe that compatibilism is an illusion? That's what I would call, "cognitive dissonance".)

[t.w.]

If you had memorized the entirety of the nearly 800 posts in this thread, you would know that that was not my definition.
Sorry, I knew it wasn't. I should have said 'the definiton you quoted'.


My definition of Free Will is the same as the Libertarians': the ability to make a different choice under the exact same inner and outer conditions. And, no, like you, I do not believe that free will exists. I do believe in CFW, as stated in Hume's definition because I weigh alternatives and make 'choices'.
Good.


I think it's unfair to change the definition of free will.
Precisely - if we desperately attempt to change the definition to acheive 'free will' then we aren't really acheiving free will at all. Rather like if we say I have a cave and I acutally want a house, and then we re-define house so that cave is a house, we still haven't acheived our aim.


I, too, believe that murderers and the insane differ in degree rather than kind. That's why I don't believe in punishing criminals except as a shortcut to modifying the behavior of otherwise-soon-to-be-criminals. It's OK to be less controlling of the insane if the cause is treatable or transient and unlikely to recur.
I agree.

[TomJrzk]

If you believe what you wrote in the last paragraph (above) then why do you think that compatibilism is an illusion?

I meant to say that the free will of Compatibilism is an illusion (not that Compatibilism is an illusion), it's the result of deterministic neurons. Compatibilism is true, once granting their definition of free will (which is not free from our neurons, and therefore not really free).
You express that with this very peculiar statement, CFW is actually an illusion, but that has no effect on anything in my mind. If you think compatibilism is an illusion, then you must think it is false. If you think it is false, then why don't you just stick to HD? What do you mean, you think compatibilism is false, but that has no effect on you mind? When else does your belief that proposition is false have no "effect on your mind". Perhaps you ought to say what you mean by "has no effect on my mind".

I left out a comma. I meant "has no effect, in my mind", meaning that in my view it has no effect. It's an illusion, because of the man behind the curtain, but that does not affect my day-to-day activities; in that way, it has no effect.

This is wonderful dialog (trialog?...), by the way. Thanks!

[t.w.]

How could it possibly be as reasonable to say that a flood has free will as it is to say that a person does?
I do believe I attempted to explain why in the post you quoted from.


Floods have no will at all. And people do have wills.
Talk about starting with a conclusion....


It makes as much sense to say of a flood that it has free will, as to say of a stone that it is happy.
Precisely my point!:confused: I argued that because it is ridiculous to say a wave has free will, it is ridiculous to say a human has free will. I was never claiming it 'makes sense' to claim a wave has free will. I was using what is normally referred to as a reductio ad absurdum, although unfortunatrly you seem to have been convinced I am arguing for my absurd analogy!


The flood could not have "done otherwise even if it had chosen to do so" inasmuch as the flood does not act at all,
The flood clearly acts. It does things. Whether those acts are the result of free will are what is being discussed - not whether they are acts at all.


and the flood makes no choices.
Isn't that what we're debating? If so, shouldn't that be your conclusion rather than your first premise?


But it surely makes sense to say of the murderer that he could have done otherwise if he had chosen, since murderers are people, and it makes sense to say that of people.

We are seeing a variation of the no true scotsman fallacy. that, and plain old bad logic:

It makes sense to say that of people(murderers), because people(murderers) are people(murderers). A=A=A.

The difference between what you call "psychological factors" and any other factors is crucial, since floods and rocks have no psychology.

But you see there is no real difference. Both involves movement of particles, that's all there is to it. We humans give the movement of particles a special name (psychological factors) because of our inbuilt human chauvinism. To say there is a difference between movement of particles under the name 'psychological' and movement of particles under the name 'physical' is a consequence of semantical confusion; similar to saying there is a difference between love and l'amour(assuming they translate as exactly the same word).

[kennethamy]

Precisely - if we desperately attempt to change the definition to acheive 'free will' then we aren't really acheiving free will at all. Rather like if we say I have a cave and I acutally want a house, and then we re-define house so that cave is a house, we still haven't acheived our aim.




I agree that changing the meanings of words in order to prove something is a dead end. (A person does not believe in God just because he believes that there are laws of nature even, if he says that God=the forces of nature)

But by saying that a person who claims to believe there is free will when he is a compatibilist is doing the same sort of thing as the person who claims to believe in God when he believes there are forces of nature, assumes that the true or correct meaning of "free will" is an incompatibilist one. Now, it you are able to substantiate that assumption, that's fine. But it is not sufficient simply to make that assumption and leave it at that. In fact, that sort of thing is called, "begging the question".

[t.w.]

assumes that the true or correct meaning of "free will" is an incompatibilist one. Now, it you are able to substantiate that assumption, that's fine. But it is not sufficient simply to make that assumption and leave it at that. In fact, that sort of thing is called, "begging the question".

I haven't assumed anything. I concluded that the proper definition of free will is the one I see frequented in most books on the matter I have read, and the one that actually has some practicality to it, because we all agree as human beings that if I couldn't possibly have done anything else, I can't be blamed. It is only when we feel we had a choice thaat we feel justified in invoking blame.

[kennethamy]

I meant to say that the free will of Compatibilism is an illusion (not that Compatibilism is an illusion), it's the result of deterministic neurons. Compatibilism is true, once granting their definition of free will (which is not free from our neurons, and therefore not really free).

I left out a comma. I meant "has no effect, in my mind", meaning that in my view it has no effect. It's an illusion, because of the man behind the curtain, but that does not affect my day-to-day activities; in that way, it has no effect.

This is wonderful dialog (trialog?...), by the way. Thanks!

"I meant to say that the free will of Compatibilism is an illusion (not that Compatibilism is an illusion), it's the result of deterministic neurons. Compatibilism is true, once granting their definition of free will (which is not free from our neurons, and therefore not really free)."

I am baffled once again. If "the free will of compatibilism" is "an illusion" which is to say, that kind of free will does not exist, then why isn't compatibilism "an illusion"? That is, if the compatibilist claims there is free will, and there isn't any, then why isn't the compatibilist just plain wrong? I think you ought to drop this term "is an illusion" which is confusing, and just say, "is false". If you also want to be nice, and say that it is quite understandable why compatibilists believe there is free will, although there isn't any free will, then, why not just say that? This "illusion" stuff is a little mealy-mouthed. It sort of gives the impression that on the one had, you think it is false, but, on the other hand, you seem to think there is something in it, too. That is why I think you are suffering from cognitive dissonance. Of course, granting someone's notion of freedom, then their theory of freedom is true. That's a trivial tautology, and hardly needs to be said. It's like saying that once you grant that someone's belief is true, the belief is true. So what? The question is whether the belief is true in the first place. And the same is true of compatibilism. If the compatibilist notion of freedom is right, then-their right. But you don't think they are right, isn't that true? Tolerance is fine, but not to the extent that tolerance makes what is a real issue, disappear. The question is why you think that just because our choices and actions have causes, whether the causes of physiological or whether they are enviromental [as the famous behaviorist psychologist argued in his polemic against the notion of freedom of the will in his, "Beyond Freedom and Dignity" he thought that not only freedom was false, but so was human dignity, because we are "robots" (and how can robots have dignity?)] It is the same question for both you and for Skinner, because both of you make the very same (unargued for) assumption. Namely, that an action or a choice cannot be both caused and free, whatever the kind of cause it is.

[TomJrzk]

This "illusion" stuff is a little mealy-mouthed. It sort of gives the impression that on the one had, you think it is false, but, on the other hand, you seem to think there is something in it, too. That is why I think you are suffering from cognitive dissonance.
CFW, as defined, is true. It's the 'free' part that I think is an illusion, because we don't feel the inner workings of the neurons and our choices just 'come' from our ruminations or whatever. It feels free, but it is not. We know that now, we didn't know it then. When the term was defined, you say 'but they didn't know about neurons' and that's exactly my point. They labeled 'the result of their souls' as free will; I think that's the default meaning. You say the default meaning disregards inner circumstances, I say it doesn't; they didn't know that inner circumstances even existed, the brain was merely the seat of the soul or whatever. When lay people say free will, I think they mean something spiritual, and you don't. And we shall probably always disagree, so I'll try to talk about CFW and LFW.

[fast]

*******The Story*******

Lucy walked out of her house and got into her car. She realized after getting into her car that she left her keys in her house, but before she could get out of her car so she could go back in her house to get her keys, Denise (her prankster, younger sister) used a second keyless remote to lock the car doors -- thereby trapping Lucy in her car.

Lucy wanted to get out of her car, but Denise (the practical joker) wouldn’t let Lucy out of her car, so the free will (the freedom to go and come as she pleased) to which Lucy experienced prior to getting in the car is no longer experienced. She is now held captive, and yes, she is being held against her will.

So, she had free will to go and come as she pleased, but now because of Denise, she no longer has free will—she cannot do as she will.

Lucy recognizes that she is being held against her will and has never ever even heard of the term determinism—let alone what it might mean if she did.

Let’s label Lucy; let’s call Lucy a soft libertarian. (unless you want to call her a believer in free will), but then again, I don’t want to use a term that has multiple roles.

*******The rant*******

Of course, I’m still new to all this, and I don’t think I ought to be making up labels out of the blue , but we ought to have a term for Lucy that people can relate to without having to constantly reiterate the distinction between what is meant from what is not meant. I want to know why we can’t call Lucy a libertarian. The answer I hear is because libertarians believe determinism is false. Of course, Lucy believes no such thing. Either it’s not true that to be a libertarian is to believe determinism if false, and thus, we can call Lucy a libertarian, or to be a libertarian does indeed imply believing determinism is false, thereby rendering Lucy without a label.

But then again, it could be that there is a label for her but that we just don’t know what it is because we haven’t found out whether or not she believes in determinism, but that’s not fair, for on the flip side of all this, we do have the determinist label which manages to fair quite well without implying a belief in regards to free will, so I think …. Dang it, fast wants a label for Lucy!—that doesn’t make inferences regarding determinism.

"Free willy" was an attempt at humor, so people not privy to the conversation won’t know what one is talking about if uttered out in an unrelated venue. Is there not a term that describes Lucy’s belief regarding free will? Does it take creativity like “soft libertarian” to which no one will understand unless it’s explained? Or, I am I bound to calling her a “believer in free will—of the compatibilist variety” , over and over and over and over.

Fast (who is now pouting) demands a term to fill in the gap to which a term is apparently not readily available. Me wants ice cream, and people good for nothing deserves ice cream.

[wiploc]

Three men walking a forest trail.

The libertarian says, "Look, a UFO."

The compatibilist says, "The UFO is probably really just swamp gas reflected off a fog bank.

Kenneth Amy the hard determinist says, "'UFO' means 'flying saucer,' it means 'space aliens.' And since there are no space aliens, it follows that we are not seeing a light in the woods.

crc

[TomJrzk]

If "the free will of compatibilism" is "an illusion" which is to say, that kind of free will does not exist
I'm sorry, I should have replied to this line instead of the one I did.

By 'illusion' I do not mean that it does not exist, I mean it's an illusion of the brain. If I spin around and stop, I might see the room spinning and feel sick. But the room is not spinning, it's an illusion. How can I feel sick from something that's not real? Well, the illusion is real, the spinning is not.

The illusion we experience as CFW is real. And very useful.

[A_M]

I haven't assumed anything. I concluded that the proper definition of free will is the one I see frequented in most books on the matter I have read, and the one that actually has some practicality to it, because we all agree as human beings that if I couldn't possibly have done anything else, I can't be blamed. It is only when we feel we had a choice thaat we feel justified in invoking blame.
You "haven't assumed anything"? I'd say you are assuming a lot of things, considering that I disagree with most of what you say (and know for a fact that plenty of other philosophers do so too) despite your claim that these are things "we all agree [on] as human beings". In particular, though I agree that the definition that should be used is the one that has some practicality to it, I definitely do not agree that this is the definition you have offered (the one that presumes "could have done differently" as a requirement for free will).

What we want to know when making moral judgements is not merely "could the person have done otherwise?", but "could the person have done otherwise had he/she been a more moral person?". What we are actually doing when "blaming" someone is voicing our disapproval of that persons morals (or lack thereof). This does not disqualify determinism and indeed still has loads of "practicality" in the sense that using this form of moral judgement allows us to influence peoples future decisions towards more desirable outcomes.

[t.w.]

You "haven't assumed anything"? I'd say you are assuming a lot of things,
What?

considering that I disagree with most of what you say (and know for a fact that plenty of other philosophers do so too)
I don't know a philosopher who agrees with me.


despite your claim that these are things "we all agree [on] as human beings". In particular, though I agree that the definition that should be used is the one that has some practicality to it, I definitely do not agree that this is the definition you have offered (the one that presumes "could have done differently" as a requirement for free will).
So if someone pointed a gun at your head and told you to steal something, would you to be blame for that theft? Not how I understand the word 'blame'. Replace the gun with the irrevocable laws of physics and determinism and we have an equivalent situation in my opinion. Of course, you may feel that you still deserve blame for stealing at gunpoint(I will call this scenario X) - but I doubt many human beings will agree.


What we want to know when making moral judgements is not merely "could the person have done otherwise?", but "could the person have done otherwise had he/she been a more moral person?".
Could they have done otherwise if they were a different person? No philosopher on the planet would answer that question with anything other than 'yes'. So isn't it a useless, tautological question? If the person were more moral (however you measure morality I don't know!), they would be different, their determining factors would have been different and their actions would have been different - but they still seem to be light years away from freedom in respect to their 'will'.



What we are actually doing when "blaming" someone is voicing our disapproval of that persons morals (or lack thereof).
To some extent I agree, and feel you have summed up the case very eloquently. But still, let us consider that psychological differences that would have made me more moral in the first place can be reducted to physical movements of particles. So we can again refer to the scenario X. and we realise that were the physical movements that preceded and caused that event different, the person may not have been in that position at all. And thus using your logic, we can argue that a man at gunpoint who is told to steal and is forced to steal does have free will, which is an absurdity.


This does not disqualify determinism and indeed still has loads of "practicality" in the sense that using this form of moral judgement allows us to influence peoples future decisions towards more desirable outcomes.
My personal belief is that it is necessary, if human society is to function efficiently, for us to invent this concept of blame in order to justify locking away dangerous people. Of course, if my beliefs are true, then there is no way we could have avoided this anyway:D

[fast]

To begin, let me note that when I talk of free will, I will only be talking of the variety experienced by Lucy.

To set the composure (or stage) for analogy, recall the components of a sound argument:
1) valid form 2) true premises.

In keeping with a consistent form, note that the components of compatibilism are:
1) being a determinist and 2) being a believer in free will.

It’s from this that one can easily infer that if one is a compatibilist, then necessarily, one is a determinist. Additionally, and thanks to Lucy for pointing this out, one can infer that if one is a compatibilist, then necessarily, one is also a believer in free will. So, it’s not merely that being a compatibilist infers just that one is a determinist, but it also infers that one is a believer in free will.

This leads me to my second (beyond not knowing the label for Lucy) and much more complicated dilemma.

When I think of compatibilism, ought I immediately conjure the thoughts that one believes that two things are compatible, or that two things can be compatible with one another? Key word was “can”!

For example, one car part may fit a particular car, but it might also fit another type of car, so the same car part will not only fit one but at least two different cars. I’d say that the car part is compatible. But, the reason the car part may be compatible may be because one end of a particular gizmo part is circular instead of square. I believe that not only is it compatible with some cars that currently exist, but I also believe that it’s compatible (or will be compatible) with future cars as well with the same circular end on the gizmo car part.

Though I may believe that something is compatible, I don’t necessarily believe that the thing to which it is compatible yet exists. I think this is right up there on existential import alley—something to which I am not familiar btw.

So, why is it indeed that we can infer that all compatibilists are determinists (and that all compatibilists are believers of free will) if it’s possible that one such person may indeed believe in the compatibility of them but think that maybe one doesn’t exist. It’s like one could say, yes I believe determinism is compatible with free will regardless of whether or not I believe both exists. To agree that a car part is compatible ought not entail an agreement in regards to the existence of something—kind of like I ought to be able to say unicorns have horns without implying that there are unicorns, for saying unicorns have horns is like saying, if there are unicorns, then unicorns have horns.

[fast]

By 'illusion' I do not mean that it does not exist, I mean it's an illusion of the brain. You mean that Lucy really wasn't trapped in the car?

[Oldal.]

fast,

Lucy, poor girl, still has 'free will'. She is just unable to exercise it. Having free will does not imply that one is able to perform whatever one is 'free' to do. I am currently 'free' to perform a double somersault from my chair whilst holding a half full wine glass. But I also am aware that physical constraints prevent me from doing so. (I have just drained the wine glass!). I am 'free' to do so many things in this respect...but physical limitations prevent me.

I still hold, what I tried to say earlier, that my will is introduced into a situation to become a 'cause' for my future actions. That decision is 'caused' if you will, by my nature, background, cussedness and other factors that make me 'me'.
I have yet to read the answer to a question I often pose in this debate, (or these debates), 'How do you explain 'origination'? What 'caused' me to write this post? What 'caused' Mozart to compose whatever he did compose that did not exist until he did? My post may not be as great or as original as Mozart's work....but it did not exist ten minutes ago!

Oldal.

[fast]

Lucy, poor girl, still has 'free will'. She is just unable to exercise it. Having free will does not imply that one is able to perform whatever one is 'free' to do. By these lack of limitations, when a big bad person puts a gun to the head of my dearest and tells her to get in the car, you wouldn't expect her to say that she got in the car under her own free will simply because she had the freedom of choice in deciding to resist and risk danger to herself and others.

Tom says Ken is kicking the can. You seem to be standing near Tom kicking it back.

Lucy's freedom was lessened by the locked doors.

I am currently 'free' to perform a double somersault from my chair whilst holding a half full wine glass. But I also am aware that physical constraints prevent me from doing so. (I have just drained the wine glass!). I am 'free' to do so many things in this respect...but physical limitations prevent me. When they pass a law that says you aren't allowed, your freedoms will have just been infringed upon. I agree that there is a difference between a freedom to act and an ability to act. Yes, you have freedom (in one sense) and don't have freedom (in another sense).

Now, which of these is correctly relate to free will, and how can I tell?

[A_M]

So if someone pointed a gun at your head and told you to steal something, would you to be blame for that theft? Not how I understand the word 'blame'. Replace the gun with the irrevocable laws of physics and determinism and we have an equivalent situation in my opinion. Of course, you may feel that you still deserve blame for stealing at gunpoint(I will call this scenario X) - but I doubt many human beings will agree.
No, definitely no scenario X. Rather, I disagree with the claim that the two situations are equivalent. I view morality purely in terms of consequentialism, and from that point of view the difference is obvious. We do not blame the person who steals at gun-point because doing so produces no favourable consequences (we don't want a society where a person is expected to die rather than commit theft).

Let's turn things around for a moment. Suppose we use your definition of free will, and presume it to be true that human beings possess this form of free will. In this case, the exact same circumstances may give rise to different outcomes (choices). This to me sounds like our choices are random. And this is of course not what we want. There would be no point in blaming a murderer if we, when put in the same position, were to have an equal chance of perpetrating the same crime. No, for moral judgement/blame to have any practical use there would have to be some difference between 'us' and 'them' that we wish to point out - we are good (moral) and they are evil (immoral). The standard response is that surely we are good because we chose to be so, and in the same vein they are evil by choice? So then, what made us choose to be good when they chose to be evil? Chance? God? Neither of these seem to me to be a better basis for moral responsibility than determinism.

[TomJrzk]

You mean that Lucy really wasn't trapped in the car?
Her condition was real, her belief that her will was free was an illusion. She has CFW (the 'F' part of which is an illusion) but not LFW; her will depended directly on the state of her brain. Those darn inner circumstances.

[fast]

Her condition was real, her belief that her will was free was an illusion. She has CFW (the 'F' part of which is an illusion) but not LFW; her will depended directly on the state of her brain. Those darn inner circumstances.

Prior to getting in the car, it wasn't false that she could come and go as she pleased. She could have chosen to never even get in the car.

Where I'm starting to get confused at now is whether she has free will once she's in the car. I mean, on the one hand, she's still free to desire a quick and safe exit; hence, no one is altering her internal desires, but on the other hand, she is trapped and prevented from doing as she wishes. And, of course, there's still the other sense you mean whereby she isn't choosing since it's essentially being done for her by virtue of antecedent causes, but then again, we can't allow that usage, for it's incorrect because she is still choosing--as defined by what it means to even say that one even made a choice to begin with.

[kennethamy]

CFW, as defined, is true. .

Could you explain what that means?

[TomJrzk]

And, of course, there's still the other sense you mean whereby she isn't choosing since it's essentially being done for her by virtue of antecedent causes, but then again, we can't allow that usage, for it's incorrect because she is still choosing--as defined by what it means to even say that one even made a choice to begin with.
Seems to me that if there is "the other sense you mean", we ought to have a term for it. But you want only one term for free will when we see two senses. I thought Libertarian Free Will and Compatibilist Free Will were clumsy but adequate. Can you offer different terminology so we can talk in words and not paragraphs on the issue?

[fast]

I do not see the difference between what you refer to as Libertarian Free Will and Compatibilist Free Will. The free will that a libertarian believes in is (or at least ought to be) the same as the free will that a compatibilist believes in, so to talk of either libertarian free will or compatibilist free will is to talk of the same thing.

The free will to which I believe that you hold as false would more aptly be referred to as hard determinist free will—which in my assessment is commensurate with that of indeterminism.

[TomJrzk]

Could you explain what that means?
Sure.
According to Hume, free will should not be understood as an absolute ability to have chosen differently under exactly the same inner and outer circumstances. Rather, it is a hypothetical ability to have chosen differently if one had been differently psychologically disposed by some different beliefs or desires.
I call this CFW, or Compatibilist Free Will. To me, it's obviously true because I could choose to put 3 periods at the end of this sentence rather than the customary 2.. If I wasn't born such a smart-ass, I probably would have put just one period.

So, yes, if I accepted the definition of CFW as my definition of free will, I'd be a Compatibilist. And I suspect that other HDs would as well.

[kennethamy]

"CFW, as defined, is true. ."

Could you explain what that means (other than, in the sense in which it is defined it is true, it is true.) For that sound to me like a trivial tautology. I might say that the statement, that God exists, is, in the sense in which it is defined, is true.

[TomJrzk]

"CFW, as defined, is true. ."

Could you explain what that means (other than, in the sense in which it is defined it is true, it is true.) For that sound to me like a trivial tautology. I might say that the statement, that God exists, is, in the sense in which it is defined, is true.
I see. Yes, I shoulda said "CFW, as defined, exists. .". I'm sorry about the confusion.

[kennethamy]

Sure.

I call this CFW, or Compatibilist Free Will. To me, it's obviously true because I could choose to put 3 periods at the end of this sentence rather than the customary 2.. If I wasn't born such a smart-ass, I probably would have put just one period.

So, yes, if I accepted the definition of CFW as my definition of free will, I'd be a Compatibilist. And I suspect that other HDs would as well.

Now I really do not understand. Would you say that God exists, in the sense (any sense) in which "God" is defined, is true? If so, what is that supposed to show? That God exists.

I might say that Hard Determinist free will, "in the sense in which it is defined" is false. Would that mean that hard determinism is false? I fail to understand what "in the sense in which it is defined" adds to the issue. That you accept the definition of "compatibilism" and that you accept that compatibilism is true, does not make compatibilism true, does it? No more than if you accept some sense of "God" , and if you accept that God exists, does that mean that God exists. Suppose I accepted a sense of "free will" by which "free will" meant a poached egg. Then, I suppose that since there are poached eggs, in the sense in which "free will" means "a poached egg", there is free will in the poached egg sense of "free will". So what?

[kennethamy]

Now I really do not understand. Would you say that God exists, in the sense (any sense) in which "God" is defined, is true? If so, what is that supposed to show? That God exists.

I might say that Hard Determinist free will, "in the sense in which it is defined" is false. Would that mean that hard determinism is false? I fail to understand what "in the sense in which it is defined" adds to the issue. That you accept the definition of "compatibilism" and that you accept that compatibilism is true, does not make compatibilism true, does it? No more than if you accept some sense of "God" , and if you accept that God exists, does that mean that God exists. Suppose I accepted a sense of "free will" by which "free will" meant a poached egg. Then, I suppose that since there are poached eggs, in the sense in which "free will" means "a poached egg", there is free will in the poached egg sense of "free will". So what? If all you mean is that in the sense in which it is true, free will is true, and in the sense in which it is false, free will is false, I agree with you. But that is not particularly news, is it?

[kennethamy]

Sure.

I call this CFW, or Compatibilist Free Will. To me, it's obviously true because I could choose to put 3 periods at the end of this sentence rather than the customary 2.. If I wasn't born such a smart-ass, I probably would have put just one period.

So, yes, if I accepted the definition of CFW as my definition of free will, I'd be a Compatibilist. And I suspect that other HDs would as well.

And if I accepted the poached egg definition of free will, I'd be a poached egg free-willist. So?

[kennethamy]

I see. Yes, I shoulda said "CFW, as defined, exists. .". I'm sorry about the confusion.

Fine. And suppose I define free-will as a poached egg. Now does free will exist? I guess so. Now, I suppose you want to hold that incompatibilist free will does not exist. Am I right? Now, my next question is why do you think so? I suppose your answer is that:

1. All events (including all our actions and choices) have causes.
2. If an event has a cause, then the event is not a free event.

Therefore, 3. actions and choice are not free events.

Fine, now could you please justify premise 2?

[Oldal.]

By these lack of limitations, when a big bad person puts a gun to the head of my dearest and tells her to get in the car, you wouldn't expect her to say that she got in the car under her own free will simply because she had the freedom of choice in deciding to resist and risk danger to herself and others.

Tom says Ken is kicking the can. You seem to be standing near Tom kicking it back.

Lucy's freedom was lessened by the locked doors.

When they pass a law that says you aren't allowed, your freedoms will have just been infringed upon. I agree that there is a difference between a freedom to act and an ability to act. Yes, you have freedom (in one sense) and don't have freedom (in another sense).

Now, which of these is correctly relate to free will, and how can I tell?

I am always 'free' to ignore any law whatever, just so long as I am prepared to accept the consequences of ignoring or flouting the law. I am moving more and more close to Colin McGinn that we are totally incapable of coping with the problem. We are not gifted with the ability to cope with the problem.

Oldal.

[fast]

I am always 'free' to ignore any law whatever, just so long as I am prepared to accept the consequences of ignoring or flouting the law.
Yes, I agree.

This puts us in the predicament of there being three instead of two senses of free will. Just when I thought things were getting easier too!

[kennethamy]

I am always 'free' to ignore any law whatever, just so long as I am prepared to accept the consequences of ignoring or flouting the law. I am moving more and more close to Colin McGinn that we are totally incapable of coping with the problem. We are not gifted with the ability to cope with the problem.

Oldal.

The laws of nature are not like man-made laws. The laws of gravity does not compel me to fall rather than soar when I jump out of a 10 story window. A town ordinance which prohibits me from walking on the grass compels me to keep off the grass even if I wish to do the contrary. I do not "disobey" the law of gravity when I jump out of that window.

The assimilation of the laws of nature to the laws of man reinforces the notion that the former compel as do the latter, and, so, reinforce the idea that we are not free when our actions and choices are caused. That assimilation is a variety of anthropomorphism.

The fact that we have discovered no solution to a problem is not a ground for concluding that there is no solution to the problem. (That argument seems to be just an argument from ignorance). And, it might be that McGinn is "vacuously" correct, if it turns out that there is no problem in the first place, but that the appearance of a problem is the result of thinking that all causes compel-confusing causation with compulsion, and, therefore, thinking that incompatibilism is true. If compatibilism is true, then the solution to the problem is its dissolution.

[Oldal.]

kennethamy,

I am still free to ignore the Law of Gravity, admittedly with 'grave' result. I accept the consequence of such ignoring. Which is what I said.

Yes, I do know the difference between a man-made Law which I take to be prescriptive, and a so-called Law of Nature which I take to be descriptive.

Colin McGinn takes some 156 pages to discuss the idea which I spent a few words on. Should you be interested his book is "Problems in Philosophy, The limits of enquiry." published by Blackwell.

Oldal.

[t.w.]

kennethamy,

I am still free to ignore the Law of Gravity, admittedly with 'grave' result.


No you aren't. You have misunderstood the context of ignore here. We are slaves to gravity, no matter what we do.

[wiploc]

I've read the first two pages. Catching up on this thread is going to be a long slog.

In post 31, when you said, Oh come on! What kind of shit is that? you didn't seem like any kind of determinist at all. But you were definitely a freewilly, which ought to make you a libertarian. If nothing causes your decisions other than the decisions themselves, or if nothing causes your decisions other than your imaginary soul, or if causality stops when you decide and starts up again afterwards, you are a libertarian. The determinists think you believe in magic.

Now I'm going to jump ahead to where you have recently confused me. In post 798 you said So, she had free will to go and come as she pleased, but now because of Denise, she no longer has free will—she cannot do as she will. What she didn't have is freedom, not free will. Free will is something that happens in your head, so to speak. You could sink Lucy in concrete with only her nostrils clear and she would still have free will. She could choose to think good thoughts, for instance, or she could indulge in despair.

Then you say we need a name for Lucy, but I don't know what Lucy is supposed to represent. A woman locked in a car? The intended import of the Lucy story has escaped me entirely.



I do not see the difference between what you refer to as Libertarian Free Will and Compatibilist Free Will.

The determinists think you are a robot.

The hard determinists think you are a robot, and that therefore you do not have libertarian free will, and that---since libertarian free will would be the only real free will---you do not have free will.

The soft determinists think you are a robot that feels like it makes choices. Since that feeling (or illusion) is what we refer to when we talk about making choices and having free will, then it folows that do really do have "free will," even though you are a robot. (It was this opinion that you responded to by saying, "What kind of shit is that.")

The libertarians believe you are not a robot. They believe you actually could have gone on that walk, that your choice was not determined by prior input, that there is a magic little man in your head (or a soul) who makes decisions from scratch, regardless of what came before. They think neurons are not fate, that if the deamon knew the state of your brain, you could still reach a decision contrary to that indicated by your brain-state.

Reverting to my cinema analogy:

The libertarian says the pictures really moved. He saw them move. They moved.
The soft determinist (AKA compatibilist) says the pictures seemed to move. They were really a series of stills, yes, but they really did seem to move. That seeming movement is why we go to the movies; it is the relevant movement; and therefore, since that seeming movement is what we mean when we say movies move, it is true that movies move.
The hard determinist (AKA unfreewilly) says the pictures do not move. There was only a series of stills. There was no "actual" motion, so there was no motion. An illusion of motion is not motion, therefore there was no motion.One thing we see is that the libertarian and the hard determinist are in agreement on the meaning of "free will." The soft determinist has a different definition. And I've seen you, Fast, saying that there is only one legitimate definition, so let me ask you which it is. If you are a libertarian, we can make your grid by saying of soft determinists that "they wrongly believe that 'free will' means" etcetera.



The free will that a libertarian believes in is (or at least ought to be) the same as the free will that a compatibilist believes in, so to talk of either libertarian free will or compatibilist free will is to talk of the same thing.

Maybe it ought to be, but it is not. They are using the same word, but they are not talking about the same thing. If you believe that a given brain-state plus given stimuli results necessarily in a certain choice, then you are a determinist. If you are a determinist and you still believe in free will, then you are not talking about the same kind of free will that libertarians believe in.

crc

[t.w.]

No, definitely no scenario X. Rather, I disagree with the claim that the two situations are equivalent. I view morality purely in terms of consequentialism, and from that point of view the difference is obvious. We do not blame the person who steals at gun-point because doing so produces no favourable consequences (we don't want a society where a person is expected to die rather than commit theft).

My analogy was that in both situations we are forced to do something - the thing that forces us being determinism and a gun respectively.


Let's turn things around for a moment. Suppose we use your definition of free will, and presume it to be true that human beings possess this form of free will. In this case, the exact same circumstances may give rise to different outcomes (choices). This to me sounds like our choices are random. And this is of course not what we want.
Precisely my argument.


There would be no point in blaming a murderer if we, when put in the same position, were to have an equal chance of perpetrating the same crime.
Here is your crucial error. There is every point in blaming the murderer, because we protect society from him, in the same way that there is every point in destroying a rabid dog - despite the dog's actions not being the result of free will.


No, for moral judgement/blame to have any practical use there would have to be some difference between 'us' and 'them' that we wish to point out - we are good (moral) and they are evil (immoral). The standard response is that surely we are good because we chose to be so, and in the same vein they are evil by choice? So then, what made us choose to be good when they chose to be evil? Chance? God? Neither of these seem to me to be a better basis for moral responsibility than determinism.
'What makes us choose to be good?' That sentence presupposes free will. Unless we know whether there is free will, we don't know whether it is possible to 'choose' anything.

[kennethamy]

No you aren't. You have misunderstood the context of ignore here. We are slaves to gravity, no matter what we do.

Sorry you feel that way. I, myself, would rather walk than fly, so I don't mind.

[wiploc]

Yes, I agree.

This puts us in the predicament of there being three instead of two senses of free will. Just when I thought things were getting easier too!

Just ignore the "of her own free will" talk. It is a figure of speech. It is not the subject of discussion.

crc

[kennethamy]

'What makes us choose to be good?' That sentence presupposes free will. Unless we know whether there is free will, we don't know whether it is possible to 'choose' anything.

Whether I choose, and whether I choose freely, seem to me two different issues. When I chose to watch one film rather than a different one, I just chose. But, if someone held a gun to my head at the time, I did not choose freely. But it that was not the case, then, I just chose.

[A_M]

Here is your crucial error. There is every point in blaming the murderer, because we protect society from him, in the same way that there is every point in destroying a rabid dog - despite the dog's actions not being the result of free will.Exactly. And those same reasons for blaming the murderer apply regardless of whether the world is deterministic or not. Which is the point I'm trying to make (I'm sorry if this was not obvious). You earlier argued that we should use the "could have done otherwise" definition of free will because "we all agree as human beings that if I couldn't possibly have done anything else, I can't be blamed.". This is obviously not the case.

[kennethamy]

Exactly. And those same reasons for blaming the murderer apply regardless of whether the world is deterministic or not. Which is the point I'm trying to make (I'm sorry if this was not obvious). You earlier argued that we should use the "could have done otherwise" definition of free will because "we all agree as human beings that if I couldn't possibly have done anything else, I can't be blamed.". This is obviously not the case.

I think there is an equivocation on "blaming" here. We can hold the dog responsible for whatever he does, and kill him, just as we can hold the murderer responsible for everything he does, and kill him, but it is one thing to hold someone (or something) responsible for what it did, and eliminate it, and a different thing to morally to blame the person or thing. To say that X is responsible and the cause of what happened is not to say that X is blameworthy. A typhoon may be responsible for shearing off a roof of a house, and killing the inhabitants, but the typhoon is not blameworthy. We can "blame" the typhoon for the deaths, but that means only that the typhoon caused the deaths, not that the typhoon is worthy of blame.

[Oldal.]

No you aren't. You have misunderstood the context of ignore here. We are slaves to gravity, no matter what we do. Certainly I cannot ignore 'Gravity', but I can ignore the 'Law' . I would have thought a near neighbour (Rochdale) would have known that.

Oldal.

[t.w.]

Sorry you feel that way. I, myself, would rather walk than fly, so I don't mind.

I'm completely missing your point here. We can't choose to live in a world with no gravity, or even a world with slightly more/less gravity than ours, because if we did, we would die. That is my argument.

[TomJrzk]

The determinists think you are a robot.

The hard determinists think you are a robot, and that therefore you do not have libertarian free will, and that---since libertarian free will would be the only real free will---you do not have free will.

The soft determinists think you are a robot that feels like it makes choices. Since that feeling (or illusion) is what we refer to when we talk about making choices and having free will, then it follows that you really do have "free will," even though you are a robot.

The libertarians believe you are not a robot. They believe you actually could have gone on that walk, that your choice was not determined by prior input, that there is a magic little man in your head (or a soul) who makes decisions from scratch, regardless of what came before. They think neurons are not fate, that if the deamon knew the state of your brain, you could still reach a decision contrary to that indicated by your brain-state.

Reverting to my cinema analogy:

The libertarian says the pictures really moved. He saw them move. They moved.
The soft determinist (AKA compatibilist) says the pictures seemed to move. They were really a series of stills, yes, but they really did seem to move. That seeming movement is why we go to the movies; it is the relevant movement; and therefore, since that seeming movement is what we mean when we say movies move, it is true that movies move.
The hard determinist (AKA unfreewilly) says the pictures do not move. There was only a series of stills. There was no "actual" motion, so there was no motion. An illusion of motion is not motion, therefore there was no motion.One thing we see is that the libertarian and the hard determinist are in agreement on the meaning of "free will." The soft determinist has a different definition. And I've seen you, Fast, saying that there is only one legitimate definition, so let me ask you which it is. If you are a libertarian, we can make your grid by saying of soft determinists that "they wrongly believe that 'free will' means" etcetera.

crc
Absolutely amazing. This post is worth laminating and framing; I'll be linking to this one. Is there any chance that you blog stuff like this about other topics that I can read?

Now, if I can just get the 'free will' definition(s) ;).

[fast]

Wiploc,

If my name were Debby, I would tell you that I’m a determinist, and as a determinist, I would tell you that all events have antecedent causes, but, of course, I would only tell you that if my name were Debby.

If my name were Ingrid, I would tell you that I’m an indeterminist, and as an indeterminist, I would tell you that all events do not have antecedent causes, but, of course, I would only tell you that if my name were Ingrid.

If my name were Betty, I would tell you that I’m a believer in free will, and as a believer in free will, I would tell you that I can think what I want, but of course, I would only tell you that if my name were Betty.

If my name were Francis, I would tell you that I’m a disbeliever in free will, and as a disbeliever of free will, I would tell you that it’s not true that I can think what I want, but, of course, I would only tell you that if my name were Francis.

*******

If my name were Cathy, I would be a compatibilist, and as a compatibilist, I would tell you that Debby and Betty are sisters (and their blood was checked), and as the story goes, I’m not Cathy.

If my name were, Istas, I would be an incompatibilist, and as an incompatibilist, I would tell you that Debby and Betty are not sisters, and like before, I’m not Istas.

*******

If my name were Helen, I would tell you that I’m a hard determinist, and as a hard determinist, I would tell you that I’m much like Debby, Istas and Francis. I’d be like Debby in that I’m a determinist. I’d be like Istas in that I believe Debby and Betty are not sisters. I’d be like Francis in that I don’t believe in free will.

If my name were Linda, I would tell you that I’m a libertarian, and as a libertarian, I would tell you that I’m much like Ingrid, Istas, and Betty. I’d be like Ingrid in that I’m an indeterminist. I’d be like Istas in that I’m an incompatibilist, and I would be like Betty in that I’m a believer in free will.

*******

If my name were Sarah, I would tell you that I’m a soft determinist, and as a soft determinist, I would tell you that Debby and Betty are sisters, and as you might have guessed, if I were indeed Sarah, I would simply be Cathy’s identical twin.

If my name were Farah, I would tell you that I’m a fatalist, and well, we don’t have to worry about Farah, for she won’t last too long, for she is the one who just might not get off the tracks when the train comes.

Wiploc,

You will notice that Lucy has left the building. If you would, utilize not the term, “Freewilly,” and instead, could you please tell me who you would change Betty’s name to if you were to give her a name change? Or, is the term “Freewilly” not a joke?

As to your previous posts to me, I appreciate them—thank you. I’m still swimming with all the terms, implications, inferences, multiple uses, bla bla…

I just want to make darn sure that I get the relationships between the terms down pat, and as it stands, we are short on terms to identify the vacancies.

[t.w.]

Exactly. And those same reasons for blaming the murderer apply regardless of whether the world is deterministic or not. Which is the point I'm trying to make (I'm sorry if this was not obvious). You earlier argued that we should use the "could have done otherwise" definition of free will because "we all agree as human beings that if I couldn't possibly have done anything else, I can't be blamed.". This is obviously not the case.

Hold on, you are wrong here. Whilst people believe that if someone couldn't have done otherwise, they don't deserve punishment, the majority of people believe that a murderer could have done otherwise - hence the reason they feel it is just to punish him. The widespread belief in free will has, I believe, evolved precisely because it allows people to justify punishment and assign blame.
When you say 'this is obviously not the case' you are mistaken. You are forgetting that most human beings don't consider the possibility that a murderer 'couldn't have done otherwise'. Our cultural experiences ingrain into us the belief that we could have done otherwise in any situation, in order to maximise the justification for punishment.

[t.w.]

I think there is an equivocation on "blaming" here. We can hold the dog responsible for whatever he does, and kill him, just as we can hold the murderer responsible for everything he does, and kill him, but it is one thing to hold someone (or something) responsible for what it did, and eliminate it, and a different thing to morally to blame the person or thing. To say that X is responsible and the cause of what happened is not to say that X is blameworthy. A typhoon may be responsible for shearing off a roof of a house, and killing the inhabitants, but the typhoon is not blameworthy. We can "blame" the typhoon for the deaths, but that means only that the typhoon caused the deaths, not that the typhoon is worthy of blame.

Exactly.

[kennethamy]

Exactly.

But you wrote in the earlier post,

"You are forgetting that most human beings don't consider the possibility that a murderer 'couldn't have done otherwise'. Our cultural experiences ingrain into us the belief that we could have done otherwise in any situation, in order to maximise the justification for punishment".

Now, do you mean that it is true that the murderer could not have done otherwise? I imagine that would depend on the murderer and the circumstances. If the murder had a brain lesion of some kind, then it is possible that he could not have done otherwise. Otherwise, why couldn't he have?

[wiploc]

Absolutely amazing. This post is worth laminating and framing; I'll be linking to this one.

Thanks. And that's just from reading to page two. Think how smart I'll be when I get to page six!



Is there any chance that you blog stuff like this about other topics that I can read?


No blog, sorry.




Now, if I can just get the 'free will' definition(s) ;).


Well, if I think of one ...

crc

[wiploc]

’m still swimming with all the terms, implications, inferences, multiple uses, bla bla…

I'm sympathetic. I'm reminded of Enrico Fermi, frustrated by the multiplicity of subatomic particles being discovered. He, like you and I, was searching for simplicity but discovering complexity. He said something like, "If I wanted to have to memorize all these, I would have become a botanist."



Or, is the term “Freewilly” not a joke?
At first it was a joke. Then I realized it's me. I absolutely believe in free will. That makes me either a libertarian or a compatibilist. And that's my position.

Like you, I don't want to believe that my decisions are all preprogrammed. I value my belief that I have volition. So I'm not about to be a hard determinist. (Okay, I realize that's not a real argument, no more than saying, "I don't want to believe that mugging you is wrong, because then I'd have to work for a living, so I'm not about to be an anti-mugger." Nonetheless.)

Like the compatibilists and hard determinists, I'm not comfortable with the libertarian notion of a little man in my head who makes all my decisions for me. (If the decisions aren't determined, are they random? How would random decisions help me have free will? What would it mean to say that my decisions were independent of my mental state? Would it mean I decide to do things that I didn't want to do? And if my decisions aren't determined by anything, doesn't that mean they are random? How does that explain free will?)

Like the libertarians and hard determinists, I'm not perfectly happy with the idea that free will is an illusion. Can free will be separated from consciousness? If not, who's being deluded into thinking he has free will?

Since our perception that we have free will is every bit as powerful and ubiquitous as the perceptions that support our belief in determinism, why should we simply throw out one belief in favor of the other? Why don't we be compatibilists?

In other words, I'm a mess. But I do know I'm a freewilly: I belong in the supercategory comprising both the compatibilists and libertarians.

I suspect that simplicity comes from selecting a single viewpoint, from selecting a single definition of free will, and then saying that people who don't agree with that definition are talking about something else.

Since you haven't said which definition you buy into, I'll pick one for you, just to see what happens. You (or some other guy of the same name) are a libertarian. These, then, are our categories:

Liberarians: We're right. We believe that decisions are made freely, independently of prior conditions and causes.

Determinists: Determinists are wrong. There are things, our decisions, which are not determined by any antecedents.

Compatibilists (aka soft determinists): These people are wrong on three counts. First, they are wrong about everything being determined by antecedent causes. Second, they are wrong to keep pretending their "illusion of free will" is free will itself. That keeps everybody confused. There's only one kind of free will, and that's the real kind, libertarian free will. Third, they are wrong about real free will not existing. And for a bonus, they are wrong to bother insisting that their illusion of free will exists. If it's an illusion, who cares whether it "exists."

Now, with these categories in mind, let's examine our players:

Debby's a determinist, be we don't know which subcategory (hard or soft) she belongs in.

Ingrid's an indeterminist, but that doesn't tell us whether she's a libertarian. She may just believe in the randomness of quantum physics, without believing in the non-random non-determined free will of the libertarians. But, if she doesn't believe in libertarian free will, I'm tempted to class her with the determinists even though all we know about her is that she isn't one. That's because ... why? It's because so many people argue against libertarianism on deterministic grounds---and nobody argues against it on largely deterministic grounds with a little bit of small-scale chaos thrown in---that I imagine that those who self identify as determinists are often really people who have heard of quantum randomness, and believe in it, and just don't want to mention it for fear it will muddy their argument without benefit. So, as far as I can tell, Ingrid the indeterminist is either a libertarian or an indeterminist, and I can't tell which, which is interesting since that covers everything: she's almost totally undefined.

Betty's a wuss like wiploc. She won't come out and say whether she believes in real libertarian free will or only in the compatibilist illusion of free will. She's a fence-sitting freewilly.

Francis is like Betty. She says she doesn't believe in free will, but we don't know which free will she doesn't believe in. Probably whether she's talking about real libertarian free will, or bogus compatibilist pseudo-free will. Wait, she certainly doesn't believe in libertarian free will, and she she wouldn't self-identify as an unfreewilly if she believed in CFW. Because even the hard determinists believe in CFW, right? They just don't believe CFW is really FW. So, Francis is a hard determinist. Ha!

Cathy's a compatibilist. She believes CFW exists. She wrongheadedly argues that CFW is the "real" free will, rather than LFW. She says that's because CFW exists and LFW doesn't exist, so of course CFW is the real free will. That's so obnoxious.

There's a rumor that Cathy thinks Debby and Betty are sisters. I don't see why she thinks that. We seem to have three categories (hard determinist, soft determinist, and libertarian), and while Debby goes in the first or second category, Betty goes in the second or third. I don't see that that makes them sisters.

Istas is an incompatibilist. That puts her in category one or category three. If Debby and Betty are sisters because they may both be in the same category, then Istas is sister to both of them by the same reasoning. But she says they aren't sisters, which is okay with me.

Helen the hard determinist: Rumored to be much like Debby, Istas, and Francis, the determinist, the incompatibilist, and the unfreewilly, respectively. Helen is like Debby because they are both determinists, but she is unlike Debby because Debby hasn't rejected CFW as a stupid thing to be calling "free will." Helen is like Istas because they are both incompatibilists, but she is unlike Istas because Istas hasn't rejected LFW as nonexistent. She is like Francis in that they both believe LFW to be non-existent, and they both believe CFW isn't really free will. There isn't any sense in which Helen is not like Francis. They are the same.

Linda is a libertarian. She is "much like Ingrid, Istas, and Betty. [She's] like Ingrid in that [she's] an indeterminist ... like Istas in that [she's] an incompatibilist, and like Betty in that" she's a freewilly. She's unlike ingrid because she (Linda) believes in LFW. She's unlike Istas because Linda has declared for libertarianism, and Istas hasn't decided between libertarianism and hard determinism. Linda is unlike Betty because Linda knows that it's LFW that she believes in, but Betty (like wiploc) knows only that she believes in either LFW or CFW.

Yes, Sara and Cathy are the same. A compatibilist is a soft determinist, and vice versa.

Farah the fatalist, as far as I can tell, isn't part of our grid. Maybe she's a depressed determinist, I'm not sure.




Wiploc,

You will notice that Lucy has left the building.
Off having coffee with Farah, perhaps.

I hope I made sense. I felt that I developed the catagories a bit as I went. I hope that I wasn't contradicting at the end what I wrote at the beginning.




I just want to make darn sure that I get the relationships between the terms down pat, and as it stands, we are short on terms to identify the vacancies.




I think we've got everybody covered now. Nobody doesn't fit in a category. The reason we have so many names is that the subcategories belong to more than one category; as a Floridian might be both a Southerner and an Easterner, so a libertarian might be both an incompatibilist and a freewilly.

The supercategory is people with opinions about free will and determinism.

The categories are freewillys, determinists, and incompatibilists (which translate as "not a hard determinist," "not a libertarian," and, "not a compatibilist," respectively).

The subcategories are hard determinists, libertarians, and compatibilists. I want to say that the subcategories are exhaustive and exclusive (everybody fits in a box, and nobody fits in more than one box) but that won't be true unless everybody makes up their minds. Some determinists don't know whether they are hard or soft, for instance. And if they don't know, then they aren't either one; they are just determinists.

An unfreewilly is a hard determinist. (Generally speaking, at least. What if you thought free will was an illusion, but didn't happen to be a determinist? Is that possible?) A non-determinist is a libertarian. (Generally speaking anyway. I've touched on this above. You don't have to believe in LFW in order to believe in uncaused events.) And a compatibilist is a soft determinist. (Generally speaking? Well, I suppose there's still poor undecided wiploc, who, if LFW turns out to be true will no longer feel that FW is compatible with determinism.)

Hope this helps, because I'm ending this post. That's enough self-contradiction for one post.

crc

[fast]

Holy shit!

I hope to have a response by the weekend.

Wow!

I have a lot to sort out.

Just remember this (as I pick apart your post). If a libertarian is both a believer of free will and believes that determinism is false, then not all believers of free will are libertarians.

[kennethamy]

Compatibilists (aka soft determinists): These people are wrong on three counts. First, they are wrong about everything being determined by antecedent causes. Second, they are wrong to keep pretending their "illusion of free will" is free will itself. That keeps everybody confused. There's only one kind of free will, and that's the real kind, libertarian free will. Third, they are wrong about real free will not existing. And for a bonus, they are wrong to bother insisting that their illusion of free will exists. If it's an illusion, who cares whether it "exists."



crc

Eh, what makes "libertarian free will" "real free will"? What is real about it? Compatibilist free will is what you and I, and Fast, mean when we say Joe is marrying Sue of "his own free will" and we are denying that Sue's father is pointing a shotgun at Joe to make sure that Joe makes an honest woman of Sue. We are certainly not then saying that Joe's action is uncaused, are we? At least, I am not, and that is not how I would understand you and Fast if the three of us were attending the wedding. So what makes you think that as soon as we start talking in philosophese that "real free will" means uncaused action? If it did mean that, how would we ever know when someone acted of his own free will? We'd have to find out whether his action was uncaused. How do we go about doing that? It would be a peculiar meaning of a term which precluded anyone from ever knowing whether it was applied correctly. So according to you, someone acts of his own (real) free will only when no one can ever tell that he did (including him). But someone does not act of his own (real) free will when we have perfectly good criteria for determining whether whether he did so. Very strange, but pretty typical of philosophy. Heaven forfend that we should use terms so that we know when to apply them.

[TomJrzk]

Fine. And suppose I define free-will as a poached egg. Now does free will exist? I guess so. Now, I suppose you want to hold that incompatibilist free will does not exist. Am I right? Now, my next question is why do you think so? I suppose your answer is that:

1. All events (including all our actions and choices) have causes.
2. If an event has a cause, then the event is not a free event.

Therefore, 3. actions and choice are not free events.

Fine, now could you please justify premise 2?
I'm sorry, but I know in advance that my response will not be the justification you request. Premise 2 is just self-evident to the engineer in me. Of course a caused event is not free, the event depends on the cause. Otherwise, the event just comes out of nowhere, and I don't believe in nowhere...yet.

Empirically, I have to go back to the link I posted earlier in this thread on 'repression vindicated'. If the brain is actively affecting our 'will' (or at least the perception of reality on which the will is based) to that extent, I have a hard time believing any part of our will is free from the brain. And if I believed it to be free from the brain, I would have to force myself to define (or at least speculate) the mechanism that effects this supra-brain phenomenon.

[t.w.]

But you wrote in the earlier post,

"You are forgetting that most human beings don't consider the possibility that a murderer 'couldn't have done otherwise'. Our cultural experiences ingrain into us the belief that we could have done otherwise in any situation, in order to maximise the justification for punishment".

Now, do you mean that it is true that the murderer could not have done otherwise? I imagine that would depend on the murderer and the circumstances. If the murder had a brain lesion of some kind, then it is possible that he could not have done otherwise. Otherwise, why couldn't he have?

Because of determinism. Surely you've picked up that that's my key argument here. Determinism means that we only have one choice. (If we have several, they are random, which is even worse, and aren't counted as choices).

[wiploc]

Eh, what makes "libertarian free will" "real free will"?

As I hope I made clear, I was adopting the libertarian point of view to write that post.



What is real about it?
Everybody would agree that it's the real deal, but many people don't agree that it exists. If you programmed a computer to simulate free will, you would know that its "free will" was just an illusion. You would know it wasn't doing the real thing.

Compatibilists would say that there is no real thing, we are computers ourselves, so we should admit that the only free will that really exists is computer simulations.

Hard determinists say that computer simulations of free will, even when they take place in human brains, are not real free will. They are just simulations, and therefore free will does not really exist.

Libertarians say that the HDs are right about what real free will would be, but that they are not right about it not existing. They think the real deal exists, that the free will we perceive in our minds is really there; it isn't a simulation. (What would it be a simulation of, after all?)



Compatibilist free will is what you and I, and Fast, mean when we say Joe is marrying Sue of "his own free will" and we are denying that Sue's father is pointing a shotgun at Joe to make sure that Joe makes an honest woman of Sue.
I don't agree. I think the "of his own free will" talk is a snare and a distraction. Acting of your own free will means that you are doing what you want to do, no shotgun necessary. Free will is the wanting itself. The issue is whether that wanting is a mechanistic illusion, or whether it is, if you'll pardon me for using the word again, real.

How does that wanting happen. Determinists think the brain is like a candy machine. If you put in the right money, and push the right buttons, you get the Almond Joy. If do it again and get something different, it doesn't mean that the machine changed its mind; it means that there was a Milky Way in the Almond Joy slot. There is no mind, really, there is only mechanism.

Soft determinists (compatibilists) say that mechanism is the only mind that exists. It's perfectly acceptable to say that the machine changed its mind, that it decided it wanted to give you a Milky Way, because that's what we mean by "mind" and "decided." All minds and decisions are of that nature. The human brain is more complex and mystifying than a candy machine, but what happens is of the same nature.

The libertarian says, no, there is something different going on in the brain than in a candy machine. There is really something free in there, something that can find a Milky Way in the Almond Joy slot and say, "No, I'm giving him an Almond Joy anyway."

If that doesn't convey why the libertarian believes that libertarian free will is the real free will, I'm at a loss to explain it. Let us know if I've still failed to convey the idea, and maybe I'll try again, or maybe someone else will jump in.




We are certainly not then saying that Joe's action is uncaused, are we?
Libertarians, apparently, are. They say that nothing outside the mind was determinative of whether Joe said, "I do." And the mind itself? It's a free thing. No antecedent condition or caused determined what Joe decided to say.



At least, I am not, and that is not how I would understand you and Fast if the three of us were attending the wedding. So what makes you think that as soon as we start talking in philosophese that "real free will" means uncaused action?
I'm not really comfortable with that myself. Because doesn't "uncaused" mean the same as random? But I'm not convinced either way. I'm a freewilly: If we have libertarian free will, whatever that is, then that's cool; but if all that exists is the compatibilist simulation of libertarian free will, then that's cool too. I experience one of the two kinds of free will, and I like what I experience. Free will exists, regardless of whether it is libertarian or compatibilist. I'm a freewilly.



If it did mean that, how would we ever know when someone acted of his own free will?
That's why we aren't going to resolve that argument today. Science can't answer the question, so we get to philosophize. Our goal here isn't to determine whether libertarian free will exists; it is to define our terms.



We'd have to find out whether his action was uncaused. How do we go about doing that? It would be a peculiar meaning of a term which precluded anyone from ever knowing whether it was applied correctly. So according to you, someone acts of his own (real) free will only when no one can ever tell that he did (including him). But someone does not act of his own (real) free will when we have perfectly good criteria for determining whether whether he did so. Very strange, but pretty typical of philosophy. Heaven forfend that we should use terms so that we know when to apply them.
That's why I'm an undifferentiated freewilly. I'm not a compatibilist or a libertarian, because I can't tell which is right.

crc

[wiploc]

Holy shit!

I hope to have a response by the weekend.

Wow!

I have a lot to sort out.

But we're making progress, I think.



Just remember this (as I pick apart your post). If a libertarian is both a believer of free will and believes that determinism is false, then not all believers of free will are libertarians.

I don't know what you mean by that, since you keep insisting that there is only one kind of free will. Certainly compatibilists think they believe in free will, but if you think LFW is the only free will, then you think compatibililists really don't believe in free will. In which case, libertarians are the only ones who believe in free will, right?

And if you think CFW is the only real free will, then you think there are no libertarians who believe in free will.

crc

[kennethamy]

Everybody would agree that it's the real deal,
crc

I wouldn't, Fast wouldn't, and lots of philosopher called "compatibilists" wouldn't. So I think you are wrong. One reason it isn't is that people cannot be responsible for random behavior, and if the choices and the behavior that flows from them is random, then "real free will" does not imply responsibility for action, and that is the point of it, I thought.

Another reason is that there is no way of telling whether an event like choice or action is undetermined. And what's the good of a theory of free will, when we have not idea when it can be applied?

[kennethamy]

I'm completely missing your point here. We can't choose to live in a world with no gravity, or even a world with slightly more/less gravity than ours, because if we did, we would die. That is my argument.

I would think that we can choose both these things, but that it would be a futile choice since we cannot effect the choice. Whether a futile choice is a choice seems to me a verbal matter. Whether such a choice would be imprudent (even if it weren't futile) is a different matter, but I suppose you are right that if it were a choice we could effect, it would be imprudent to make it.

[Gundulf]

Hold on, you are wrong here. Whilst people believe that if someone couldn't have done otherwise, they don't deserve punishment, the majority of people believe that a murderer could have done otherwise - hence the reason they feel it is just to punish him. The widespread belief in free will has, I believe, evolved precisely because it allows people to justify punishment and assign blame.
When you say 'this is obviously not the case' you are mistaken. You are forgetting that most human beings don't consider the possibility that a murderer 'couldn't have done otherwise'. Our cultural experiences ingrain into us the belief that we could have done otherwise in any situation, in order to maximise the justification for punishment.

Wasn't there a movie about a time cop who would arrest people because they knew that the person was going to commit murder? Tom Cruise or something? I need to hunt it down and see it. Anyone who saw it want to comment? Did it offer anything for the conversation?

---
Plus, I learned some new terms today (ah, the things I learn on this site.)

I guess I'm a compatablist at heart. But I won't tell some of my friends that. The way the words sounds they'd probably call the police...

[fast]

Okay, I finally have the foundation for the Punnett Square that I have sought to put together. In order to grasp the symmetrical undertone that has went into what I’ve put together, I think that a visual is definitely in order.

First, what do I mean by Punnett Square? Essentially, it’s nothing more than a 2x2 matrix. Imagine drawing a large square on a sheet of paper—don’t do it; just imagine it, for we’ll draw one a little later. Then, imagine drawing two lines within the box so that you now have four equal sized quadrants. Here’s a visual (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Punnett_square). You’ll see that it’s actually a 3x3 matrix; however, the top row and left column is designated for headings only, so all that needs to be added to your matrix are lines for headings.

Second, the headings are critically important. Recall, I have been dealing with a fair amount of terms, and I was looking for a way to encapsulate the entirety of terms from a bird’s eye view. The issue can be affectionately characterized as the determinism versus free will debate. Either you are or are not a determinist, and you either believe in or do not believe in free will, so it’s that which needs to be incorporated and thus occupy the space for labels.

Third, let’s go ahead and draw the 3x3 matrix (allowing for the labels and all else). We’ll have nine boxes to label and talk about. I’ll refer to each cell as box numbers to keep things simple and down to Earth. The top row from left to right will be numbered 1, 2, and 3 respectively (or at least, they will be referred to as such.) The middle row will be box number 4, 5, and 6. Finally, the bottom row will be 7, 8, and 9. It’ll look like the following:

123
456
789

You don’t have to write the number in the boxes—just remember which boxes are which (i.e that the middle box is Box #5)

Box #1 is simply the title to the Punnett Square. Let’s write, “Determinism versus Free Will” in box #1.

Since determinism is the major issue that brings rise to whether we would even question whether or not free will exists, I’ll let determinism be the issue that needs to be captured by labels along the top row.

I will not be using isms but instead ists. In other words, I want to talk about the label to which describes the people. I suppose I could do it the other way around, but I choose ists because I think people may be able to relate to it a little better.

For example, Box 2 will be labeled “Determinist” and box 3 will be labeled “Indeterminist.” When you ask yourself which you are, it’s easier to refer to yourself as an ist rather than whether you believe in a particular ism, but either way, it’s the route I chose.

So, the top row will be 1) Determinism versus Free will, 2) Determinist, and 3) Indeterminist.

Before moving on to the remainder of the labels, I think it’s important that we hone in a bit on exactly what this means in a short and concise manner. I’m a little shaky on this part, so bear with me, and if you know how it can be worded better, chime in, but whether I hit it on the head or not, I do not feel as though I’m jeopardizing the foundation upon which the Punnett square is based.

If you believe that it’s true that for the most part, events have antecedent causes, then you ought to say that you more so belong to the determinist camp than you do the indeterminist camp. So, you need to ask yourself, do you more so fit in the middle column or the right column? If you for the most part do not believe that events have antecedent causes, then, of course, you more so belong in the indeterminist camp than you do the determinist camp.

When I started this thread, I denied that I belonged to the determinist camp, but as I began to understand what it’s about, I realized that I was making a mistake. There are plenty of people out there that are indeterminists whether they realize it or not, and most here, I believe, do agree that we live in a deterministic world. Either way, the classification scheme separating the two ideas are important and serve as two major pillars upon which this Punnett square will stand.

Now, let’s direct our attention to the left column—the source of much debate. The first thing I want to bring to everyone’s attention is the lack of terms. Everywhere we turn, there was an ist label to describe someone, but in this very critical leg of the race, I was stunned to learn (and apparently it’s the case) that there simply isn’t any terms that encapsulate the counterpart to the determinism and indeterminism side of the issue.

What I have done is created phrases (not labels) to substitute for the terms to which does not (but ought to in my opinion) exist. There’s a vacancy (or void) that needs to be looked into more critically and it cries out for us to examine it more thoroughly, but for now, the phrases for box 4 is “Believer of Free Will” and box 7 is “Not a Believer of Free Will”

What I want to point out at this juncture is the unfolding symmetry. We started out with box 1 being Determinism versus Free Will. Think of it as the battlefield from which the two warring faction would ensue in battle.

Just like we asked of ourselves earlier if we believed that all events have antecedent causes (hence, to ask, am I a determinist); hence, I support the troops in the determinism camp, we can also ask ourselves if we believe in free will.

Now, I’ve been asked a few times now which free will to which I believe in, and I have yet to give a satisfactory answer. I do know that my answer is yes in that I do believe in free will, so I’m going to wind up in the middle row when I answer, but that really doesn’t do much to answer which one I believe in; however, I feel that I need to take a stand and say that there truly isn’t but one free will. It’s the one that is purportedly at odds with determinism. It’s the one that is clearly at odds with the hard determinist view. It’s the one that most users of our language think of when they hear of free will. If I act upon a decision of my own making, then I have free will; however, If I act upon a coerced decision, then my decision is not entirely of my own. In short, if I am coerced or compelled to do as I would not otherwise do, then I am not acting in accordance to how I would have acted if I were to act of my own free will.

Here’s a recap of the structure so far:

1 Determinism versus Free will
2 Determinist
3 Indeterminist
4 Believer of Free Will
7 Not a Believer of Free Will

So, as you can see, we have to ask ourselves two very important questions. Do we believe that all events have antecedent causes (and that tells us to whether we are or are not a determinist), and the second question is whether we believe that we have sufficient control over the decisions leading to our subsequent acts? Hence, are we acting of our own free will, or are we being coerced or tricked into doing what we would not have done if not for the coercion or trickery?

Again, I’d like to iterate that I really don’t know the precise wording of the questions; hell, I can’t honestly say that I have a firm grasp for what the hell the term “antecedent” means, but I get this foggy picture that it has to do with “preceding” in some way, but none of this matters. All that is decoration right now. I’m interested in insuring that the foundation upon we continue and build is secure.

I have this premonition that someone will want to create another Punnett Square whereby another differing understanding of free will is had. I think that’s a mistake that needs to be avoided. For example, the term “Hard Determinist” belongs to box 8. It makes sense that hard determinists do not believe in free will, so if there so happens to be a free will of a particular variety that a hard determinist might believe in, it won’t be of the kind that is in opposition to determinism, and it shouldn’t be that a hard determinist isn’t in opposition to free will.

I’ve already clued everyone in to who belongs to box 8, but before I delve in deeper then branch out to the other cells, I think it’s time to see the insidious level of symmetry ( to which I sought out and demanded) that is lurking just beneath the surface. Notice what happens when we lightly write (in pencil) a yes or no to the implicit questions posed before us in the labels.

In Box 8, we get a yes and a no. Likewise, in box 6, we get a yes and a no. In box 5 on the other hand, we are left with a yes and a yes. You’ll notice that boxes who get an answer of the same are compatibilists while those who do are incompatibilists.

For example, look at box 8. Do I self identify as a determinist? Yes. Do I self identify as a not a believer of Free Will? No. A yes isn’t a no and therefore one who is a hard determinist is an incompatibilist.

I bring this up because I’m about to move to box 5 which is commonly referred to as a compatibilist, (and I have no qualms with that) but notice that this is an after-thought inference—not on the same level of symmetry. There’s still the symmetry of determinism before the compatibilist conclusion. What I mean is that you should see the label hard determinist in box 8 and the soft determinist label in box 5; then (hence, then), you should see the incompatibilist label listed after the hard determinist label and the compatibilist label after the soft determinist label.

Before I recap, let me touch on box 6. Clearly since we have a yes and no answer, the title to which rightly belongs in that box will be an incompatibilist, and such a person is called a libertarian, for it’s the libertarian who does believe in free will but also is definitely an indeterminist.

Now, as I write this, I’m internally battling the potential objection as to why I think one set of labels is an after thought versus the other way around. I might be willing to give a little on this issue. In fact, it seems that we have the higher order thought of compatibilism and incompatibilistm cowering just beneath the possibly subsequent names. This may be getting a little esoteric and confusing, so let me recap the boxes and the labels so that it’s clear for all to see who belongs where.

1 Determinism versus Free will

2 Determinist
3 Indeterminist
4 Believer of Free Will
7 Not a Believer of Free Will

5 Compatibilist (Soft Determinist)
6 Incompatibilist (Libertarian)
8 Incompatibilist (Hard Determinist)
9

Now, if you are not a believer in free will nor are you a believer in determinism, I don’t rightly know what the single term is or would be to capture both facts simultaneously, but I sure as hell would know where you belonged on my Punnett Square, and folks, that’s why I’ve went through these lengths to cover this issue. I want you to see that I am creating a categorization that is not only mutually exclusive but collectively exhaustive as well. I don’t feel that I’ve quite gotten there yet, because we still have issues like fatalism and uncaused effects that haven’t been found a home yet, but it’s something. It would be nice if something could come from it.

Wiploc,

I’m going to address your post in context to this Punnett Square.

[wiploc]

I wouldn't, Fast wouldn't, and lots of philosopher called "compatibilists" wouldn't.

They don't, because they don't think it exists, but they would if they did think it existed.



One reason it isn't is that people cannot be responsible for random behavior, and if the choices and the behavior that flows from them is random, then "real free will" does not imply responsibility for action, and that is the point of it, I thought.
LFW isn't random. And it isn't determined. It's something else, something ... abstruse. And that's, for many people, sufficient reason to think it doesn't exist. But if they thought it did exist, they would think that was free will, not that cheap CFW knockoff.



Another reason is that there is no way of telling whether an event like choice or action is undetermined. And what's the good of a theory of free will, when we have not idea when it can be applied?
That's a good argument for being an undifferentiated freewilly like me.

crc

[fast]

At first it was a joke. Then I realized it's me. I absolutely believe in free will. That makes me either a libertarian or a compatibilist. And that's my position. Then you are a “believer of free will” who is undecided on the determinism issue.

Like you, I don't want to believe that my decisions are all preprogrammed. I value my belief that I have volition. So I'm not about to be a hard determinist. (Okay, I realize that's not a real argument, no more than saying, "I don't want to believe that mugging you is wrong, because then I'd have to work for a living, so I'm not about to be an anti-mugger." Nonetheless.)Understood. You do not belong to box 8 or 9.

You are full blown box 4! So am I. So is Ken. I’m not sure about Tom yet. He claims to be a box 8 resident. Ken is clearly a hard core box 5er. Notice, that with the Punnett Square, we can visually see so many things.

For example, if I’m in box five, then I am a 4 and a 2; hence, one being a soft determinist infers that one is a determinist; additionally, it infers that one is a “believer of Free will” (aka your use of the term “free willy”. )

Like the compatibilists and hard determinists, I'm not comfortable with the libertarian notion of a little man in my head who makes all my decisions for me. (If the decisions aren't determined, are they random? Uncaused events escape the scope of my Punnett Square. If you belong in box 4, and if you do not adhere to box 3, and as you seem to claim not being a proponent of box 6, then it seems as though you are a 5 as well.

Like the libertarians and hard determinists, I'm not perfectly happy with the idea that free will is an illusion.Libertarians are in box 6, and box 6 is in the middle row. What’s important is that all of the second row people are believers of free will. Libertarians believe in free will. It’s hard determinists that don’t believe in free will.

In other words, I'm a mess. But I do know I'm a freewilly: I belong in the supercategory comprising both the compatibilists and libertarians. But, you can’t be both a determinist and an indeterminist. Remember, libertarians hold that determinism is false.

I suspect that simplicity comes from selecting a single viewpoint, from selecting a single definition of free will, and then saying that people who don't agree with that definition are talking about something else.
What? Please rephrase.

Since you haven't said which definition you buy into, I'll pick one for you, just to see what happens. You (or some other guy of the same name) are a libertarian. These, then, are our categories:

Liberarians: We're right. We believe that decisions are made freely, independently of prior conditions and causes.
To talk of what it is to be a libertarian is not to confine the topic to free will. To talk of a libertarian is to say two (not one) things about her.

Determinists: Determinists are wrong. There are things, our decisions, which are not determined by any antecedents. According to the libertarian, sure.

All libertarians are indeterminists.

Compatibilists (aka soft determinists): These people are wrong on three counts. First, they are wrong about everything being determined by antecedent causes. The libertarians think compatibilists are wrong on the deterministic issue, but they agree on the “believer of free will” issue.

Second, they are wrong to keep pretending their "illusion of free will" is free will itself. That keeps everybody confused. There's only one kind of free will, and that's the real kind, libertarian free will. Third, they are wrong about real free will not existing. And for a bonus, they are wrong to bother insisting that their illusion of free will exists. If it's an illusion, who cares whether it "exists." In my Punnett Square, free will is the same thing by all members.

Debby's a determinist, be we don't know which subcategory (hard or soft) she belongs in. Exactly. We can put her name in box 2, and though her name will also go in either box 5 or box 8, we don’t know which one.

Ingrid's an indeterminist, but that doesn't tell us whether she's a libertarian. She may just believe in the randomness of quantum physics, without believing in the non-random non-determined free will of the libertarians. Her name goes in box 3. Also, it’ll go in either box 6 or 9 (and we’re not sure which).

But, if she doesn't believe in libertarian free will, I'm tempted to class her with the determinists even though all we know about her is that she isn't one. That's because ... why? It's because so many people argue against libertarianism on deterministic grounds---and nobody argues against it on largely deterministic grounds with a little bit of small-scale chaos thrown in---that I imagine that those who self identify as determinists are often really people who have heard of quantum randomness, and believe in it, and just don't want to mention it for fear it will muddy their argument without benefit. So, as far as I can tell, Ingrid the indeterminist is either a libertarian or an indeterminist, and I can't tell which, which is interesting since that covers everything: she's almost totally undefined. All libertarians are indeterminists, but not all indeterminists are libertarians.

Betty's a wuss like wiploc. She won't come out and say whether she believes in real libertarian free will or only in the compatibilist illusion of free will. She's a fence-sitting freewilly.To be a believer in Free Will is to be a believer in free will. It tautological. There is no distinction between free wills in my matrix.

Francis is like Betty. She says she doesn't believe in free will, but we don't know which free will she doesn't believe in. Probably whether she's talking about real libertarian free will, or bogus compatibilist pseudo-free will. Wait, she certainly doesn't believe in libertarian free will, and she she wouldn't self-identify as an unfreewilly if she believed in CFW. Because even the hard determinists believe in CFW, right? They just don't believe CFW is really FW. So, Francis is a hard determinist. Ha! She might be a hard determinist, assuming of couse she’s a determinist. She might not be.

Cathy's a compatibilist. She believes CFW exists. She wrongheadedly argues that CFW is the "real" free will, rather than LFW. She says that's because CFW exists and LFW doesn't exist, so of course CFW is the real free will. That's so obnoxious. There is no distinction between that of CFW and LFW.

I’m going to stop and send as is. If you wrote out the punnett square on paper and got an ink-on-paper visualization (as opposed to picturing it in your mind), I think you’ll get a good overview of my opinion on the subject.

[kennethamy]

They don't, because they don't think it exists, but they would if they did think it existed.




LFW isn't random. And it isn't determined. It's something else, something ... abstruse. And that's, for many people, sufficient reason to think it doesn't exist. But if they thought it did exist, they would think that was free will, not that cheap CFW knockoff.




That's a good argument for being an undifferentiated freewilly like me.

crc

I have no idea whether or not libertarian free-will exists. But that has nothing to do with its inadequacy as a theory of free-will, which I have already explained by giving two reasons for it. So, you are wrong. Even if it existed, Libertarian contra-causal free will would be inadequate. You keep asserting that if people thought that LFW existed, they would fasten it to their heart, but you are wrong. However, thinking it does not exist would, it seems to me, a pretty good reason for discarding it. Doesn't it seem so to you?

LFW is not random, but something else, abstruse? Well, I don't see that AFW (abstruse free will) is much of an improvement. Whatever that is. Even if I thought that LFW existed, I would not think that AFW existed, for I have no idea what that is.

Perhaps you should think about this a little more.

[wiploc]

Then you are a “believer of free will” who is undecided on the determinism issue.


Yes.




Understood. You do not belong to box 8 or 9.

You are full blown box 4!
Yes. And I just figured out that the same OCD (obsessive compulsive disorder---though I'm using that term as a layman, which is to say wrongly) which required you to seek a one-word way to say "with true premises" to match the one word "valid" is why I prefer "freewilly" to "Believer in free will." "Freewilly" matches "determinist."



Uncaused events escape the scope of my Punnett Square.
Believers in uncaused events are indeterminists: they go in box 3, and possibly in 6 or 9.



If you belong in box 4, and if you do not adhere to box 3, and as you seem to claim not being a proponent of box 6, then it seems as though you are a 5 as well.

You might just as well put me in box six because I don't fit in box five as put me in box five because I don't fit in box six. Where I belong is box four. I'm an undifferentiated freewilly.

I am a compatibilist in the sense that I believe IF compatibilist free will is the only kind that really exists, THEN compatibilist free will counts as free will. That is, I'm for the soft determinists over the hard determinists, even though I'm not a legitimate determinist. But, for the purposes of your diagram, you don't want to call me a compatibilist unless I believe that CFW is the only FW. Otherwise you'll be calling some libertarians compatibilists. So, I'm a box 4 freewilly. You can't put me in box 5 or 6 unless I make up my mind and adopt one of those positions.




Libertarians are in box 6, and box 6 is in the middle row. What’s important is that all of the second row people are believers of free will. Libertarians believe in free will.
This finally answers the question of what you mean when you say that there is only one kind of free will. You aren't saying that LFW is the only free will, and you aren't saying that CFW is the only free will. You're saying you can't tell them apart. Better: you're saying they both look like free will to you. You're like one of those people who can't tell the difference in blue and gray, so you think people should settle on a single name for both colors.




But, you can’t be both a determinist and an indeterminist.
Right, but you can be neither, if you haven't made up your mind. I'm an indeterminist, since quantum physics tells us there are uncaused events. But that doesn't make me a libertarian, since I don't know whether LFW exists.

Put another way, I'm an indeterminist who may be happy to be classed with the determinists since uncaused events don't explain LFW any better than caused events do.

I'm not trying to break your system. I recommend that you just ignore this part of this post, all except the first sentence: You can be neither a determinist nor an indeterminist if you haven't made up your mind.



What? Please rephrase.
No, I'd rather you just ignore that incoherency. We're beyond that now.



In my Punnett Square, free will is the same thing by all members.

I hear you. But---regardless of the fact that they share the same name---CFW doesn't resemble LFW.




Exactly. We can put her name in box 2, and though her name will also go in either box 5 or box 8, we don’t know which one.

Maybe she doesn't go in either 5 or 8. We can't force her into a box if she hasn't made up her mind about free will.



I have this premonition that someone will want to create another Punnett Square whereby another differing understanding of free will is had. I think that’s a mistake that needs to be avoided.

How about a Venn diagram?



9

Now, if you are not a believer in free will nor are you a believer in determinism, I don’t rightly know what the single term is or would be to capture both facts simultaneously, but I sure as hell would know where you belonged on my Punnett Square, and folks, that’s why I’ve went through these lengths to cover this issue. I want you to see that I am creating a categorization that is not only mutually exclusive but collectively exhaustive as well.
Box 9 is one box too many.

Are you ready for this? Take a notecard or piece of paper. Turn so that it's wider than it is high, and lable it
People with Opinions on Determinism and/or Free WillNow draw two circles, one to the left and one to the right. They have to overlap. Lable the left circle
Deterministsand the right circle
FreewillysOr, if you prefer, "Believers in Free Will."

I'd put those lables just above the circles instead of inside, because our subcatagory lables go inside.

In the left subcatagory, the non-overlapped part of the left circle (determinist but not freewilly) write
Hard DeterministIn the center subcategory, the union of the two circles, put
Compatibilist AKA Soft DeterministAnd in the right category, the non overlapped part of the right circle (non-determinist freewilly), write
LibertarianThere you go. It's perfect, right? Exhaustive. No unlabled areas. No square corners. Simple. Perfect.

crc

[fast]

Yes.I just figured out that you are not sitting on the fence.

You are treating the two groups determinism and indeterminism as they are not collectively exhaustive, and you imply that you recognize that you sit on the fence between them.

To illustrate your thoughts, I'm going to use the ole belief in God example. But, I'm going to use a running metaphor to help drive home this point. Anytime I say that a person has a belief, you must imagine that a belief is heavy, so to say of someone that she believes something is to say that she is carrying around weight.

So, we have theists who believe in God, and as a believer, she is carrying around weight, and we have those strong atheists who believe that there is no God, and they too are carrying around weight. To believe is to be a weight carrier.

So, on one side of the fence, we have believers, and on the other side of the fence, we have believers, and both are carrying weight, but then, there's the fence sitters that carry no weight at all. They lack belief in God. Thus, we have three categories instead of two categories to make the thing appear collectively exhaustive.

A Venn Diagram would show that. And, I'm careful not to use them because it fails to show the forth (albeit absurd) position of contradiction.

So, the two groups: I believe yes and I believe no are not collectively exhaustive and allow for lack of belief (non weight carrying) fence sitters.

But, the determinist and indeterminist group doesn't allow for fence sitters. You have envisioned the categorization incorrectly. You have this A, B, not AB paradigm like that of the believe there is a God, believe there is not a god, lack belief there is a God trilogy-like thing going.

For example, take the A & not A mindset and superimpose it over the believer in god example. We would have theists and not theists. Both strong atheists and weak atheists would belong to the group of not theists.

So, if you don’t believe in determinism, then you’re an indeterminist—not because you believe determinism is false but because it’s not true that you are a determinist; hence, I equate indeterminist with not a determinist. In other words, indeterminist includes both believers that determinism if false and those that lack belief that determinism is true.

In conclusion, no fence.

I’ll get to the remainder of your post shortly.

[wiploc]

So, on one side of the fence, we have believers, and on the other side of the fence, we have believers, and both are carrying weight, but then, there's the fence sitters that carry no weight at all.

Perfect.



A Venn Diagram would show that. And, I'm careful not to use them because it fails to show the forth (albeit absurd) position of contradiction.


The position of contradiction is where people believe X and also believe not X. That doesn't show up on your chart either. Nobody on your chart is classed as both determinist and non-determinist.



But, the determinist and indeterminist group doesn't allow for fence sitters. You have envisioned the categorization incorrectly. You have this A, B, not AB paradigm like that of the believe there is a God, believe there is not a god, lack belief there is a God trilogy-like thing going.

For example, take the A & not A mindset and superimpose it over the believer in god example. We would have theists and not theists. Both strong atheists and weak atheists would belong to the group of not theists.

So, if you don’t believe in determinism, then you’re an indeterminist


If you want to set up your grid that way, you can do that. But then you don't get to call your non-determinist freewillys "libertarians." Because some of them aren't. Some of them, like me, are on the libertarian/compatibilist fence. So, doing this your way, we now have to add one box for libertarian non-determinist freewillys, and another for non-libertarian non-determinist freewillys.

crc

[kennethamy]

I just figured out that you are not sitting on the fence.

You are treating the two groups determinism and indeterminism as they are not collectively exhaustive, and you imply that you recognize that you sit on the fence between them.



Since determinism and indeterminism are contradictories of each other, if either one is true. the other must be false. "To sit on the fence" can mean only that you do not know which one is true (for necessarily, one of them is true); it is not to be searching for a third alternative since determinism and indeterminism are exhaustive and there is no third alternative. Determinism implies that every event has a cause, and Indeterminism implies that some events have no causes.
All statements of the form, all x is y, contradict statements of the form, some x's are not y's.

[fast]

Yes. And I just figured out that the same OCD (obsessive compulsive disorder---though I'm using that term as a layman, which is to say wrongly) which required you to seek a one-word way to say "with true premises" to match the one word "valid" is why I prefer "freewilly" to "Believer in free will." "Freewilly" matches "determinist."
:notworthy:

If Lucy were real, she's be sittin' in ya lap.

Recall, I openly admitted that I was pouting trying to come up with an already established name for believers of free will. What would you call the mirror image of freewilly? - box 7

Believers in uncaused events are indeterminists: they go in box 3, and possibly in 6 or 9. I wasn't sure about this. For now, I'll treat them as if they do. I had this fear that most people who believed in uncaused events wouldn't deny the deterministic nature of our universe. In other words, I felt there was a mutual exclusitivity problem.

You might just as well put me in box six because I don't fit in box five as put me in box five because I don't fit in box six. Where I belong is box four. I'm an undifferentiated freewilly. You do indeed belong to box 4--no question. But, you juggle between 5 & 6 because you think there's a fence. Recall, no fence.

You belong in one or the other whether you choose or not. You, given the nature of my matrix, are a libertarian.

But, I'm really not convinced that you would in fact be a fence sitter even if I had a 3 way categorization.

People have a tendency to say they lack belief when in fact they do have a belief. One may lack conclusive proof that there's a God, so what they're lacking is evidence that proves one group over the other, but to lack evidence directing you to one group or the other isn't to say that there hasn't been an internalized feeling that draws one closer to one side or the other. I think only that has had little to no exposure to the issues ought to latch on to the phrase “I lack belief”. Beyond a little exposure, people start to think, and as a result, the true internalized feeling draw people to group or the other.

I tried to keep things not so rigid. For example, if you are more compelled in the story that most events have preceding causes, then you could side with the determinists. It's really up to you to tell us what you think. The fence sitting position may be safe, but is it truly representative to what you hold as true?

I'm 80% there in all that determinist jive. I feel that I belong better with the determinist group than I do with the indeterminist group. Just because I'm not 100% confident doesn't mean that I need to hold onto a fence sitting position that would still put me in the indeterminist group.

[kennethamy]

I'm 80% there in all that determinist jive. I feel that I belong better with the determinist group than I do with the indeterminist group. Just because I'm not 100% confident doesn't mean that I need to hold onto a fence sitting position that would still put me in the indeterminist group.

As I have already pointed out, "sitting on the fence" between determinism and indeterminism, can mean only that you don't know which is true, since one must be true, and the other must be false. It certainly would not "put" anyone into the indeterminist group. An indeterminist is simply someone who holds that some events are not caused. Determinism and Indeterminism are contradictories

Determinism and "Chaoticism" (my word) are only contraries which means both may be wrong and there may be a third alternative. Chaotisism is that view that No events have causes. Indeterminism is the view that some events have no causes. And Determinism, that every event has a cause. Determinism is the contradictory of Indeterminism, but the contrary of chaoticism.

[fast]

Thanks Ken. I'm glad you mentioned the view regarding no events having causes. It adds to my overall understanding.

If you want to set up your grid that way, you can do that. But then you don't get to call your non-determinist freewillys "libertarians." Why not?

Because some of them aren't.Like who?

Some of them, like me, are on the libertarian/compatibilist fence. Okay, so why not is because some aren't, and an example of someone is you. But, there you go with that fence again.

No fence. If you don't know whether you're a determinist or not, then you will still either be a determinist or not.

Which do you hold as true?

1) All events have causes
2) Some events have causes
3) No events have causes

4) All events have no causes
5) Some events have no causes
6) No events have no causes

[TomJrzk]

I’m not sure about Tom yet. He claims to be a box 8 resident.
Mark Tom somewhere floating below your chart, since, for him, your definitions do not depict reality. Better yet, mark me as a quantum superposition of boxes 5 and 8; once you ask me to measure myself, you'll need to specify the measuring stick, which must include a definition of free will that we can agree on. I've already said that I'm a Compatibilist if I accepted the definition of free will as the Compatibilists', as you have, and a Hard Determinist if I stubbornly refuse to reject my definition.

Toward that end, I think the reason that you and wiploc are fence sitters is that you have one of Ken's cognitive dissonances: your brains accept the clarity, simplicity, and strength of position that determinism grants. But your hearts long for the feeling of fastness and wiplocness that you feel might be compromised in fully accepting the total ramifications.

If either or both of you would like to explore those contradictions, I might be able to help a very little (most probably, you've considered and rejected all my conclusions); hopefully others on this forum can help you further...

If you're game: I suspect that both of you have very well thought out positions on why 93% of criminals are male. Can you share with me how you reconcile that with free will? Are men's free wills just not as good as women's? If not, how much of a person's free will depends on the hormones soaking their brain, or whatever?

Oh, the movie was called Minority Report and seemed more like soap opera than science experiment.

[wiploc]

:notworthy:

If Lucy were real, she's be sittin' in ya lap.


How old is she?



What would you call the mirror image of freewilly? - box 7


Those in box 7 are the unfreewillys.



You belong in one or the other whether you choose or not. You, given the nature of my matrix, are a libertarian.


That's unfortunate for your matrix, since I don't belive in LFW.




But, I'm really not convinced that you would in fact be a fence sitter even if I had a 3 way categorization.

People have a tendency to say they lack belief when in fact they do have a belief.

I understand what you're saying. And I run up against similar problems often enough: people who, because they can't prove god doesn't exist, won't admit to being strong atheists. (Christians are often happy to admit they believe without proof, but strong atheists are often less candid.) But that's not my problem. My problem is when we talk about libertarianism, I think compatibilism sounds way better; but when we talk about compatibilism, I think libertarianism is the cat's pajamas. I genuinely don't believe either way. You may have noticed that I'm much better at making fun of both positions than at defending either.



But, there you go with that fence again.

No fence. If you don't know whether you're a determinist or not, then you will still either be a determinist or not.


The way you're defining it now, Okay.




Which do you hold as true?

1) All events have causes
2) Some events have causes
3) No events have causes

4) All events have no causes
5) Some events have no causes
6) No events have no causes


I pick 2 and 5. But that doesn't do you any good at all. You have a box for indeterminist freewillies, and you want to call that box "libertarians." That's a wrong label if you dump fence sitters into the box with the libertarians.

If you want to label that box "libertarians," you should only put libertarians in the box.

crc

Edited to add:

Do you recognize the arbitrariness of throwing the fence sitters into the libertarian box for not being compatibilists? You could just as logically throw them into the compatibilist box for not being libertarians. One works exactly as well as the other.

crc

[kennethamy]

Which do you hold as true?

1) All events have causes
2) Some events have causes
3) No events have causes

4) All events have no causes
5) Some events have no causes
6) No events have no causes

1 is logically equivalent to 6 (they say the same thing)
3 is logically equivalent to 4 (they say the same thing)
2 and 5 are different propositions.

[kennethamy]

If you're game: I suspect that both of you have very well thought out positions on why 93% of criminals are male. Can you share with me how you reconcile that with free will? Are men's free wills just not as good as women's? If not, how much of a person's free will depends on the hormones soaking their brain, or whatever?



How come, though, that 7% are female? And how come that males are not criminals?

Are you saying that hormones are selective in who they compel to be criminals?

[TomJrzk]

Are you saying that hormones are selective in who they compel to be criminals?
Depends on what you mean. No, I don't think everyone has the same hormones and those hormones are selective, make choices.

I believe that the amount of testosterone (and all its ramifications, especially in regards to mate selection) makes men tend to be more criminal. What's your explanation for the descrepency?

[sweetiepie]

No fence. If you don't know whether you're a determinist or not, then you will still either be a determinist or not.

I don't like this statement. Beliefs are terribly fuzzy.

If he has little evidence either way, or too much evidence in both ways, then why should he act as though he knows what's going on. You can force him to choose the most likely scenario, but this choice represents a belief only to the degree to which he is confident...
Maybe a better question is how much evidence does he have on eihter side and what is the nature of that evidence?

[kennethamy]

Depends on what you mean. No, I don't think everyone has the same hormones and those hormones are selective, make choices.

I believe that the amount of testosterone (and all its ramifications, especially in regards to mate selection) makes men tend to be more criminal. What's your explanation for the descrepency?

Exactly yours. But I don't think it has anything much to do with the freedom of will, since I don't think that in normal circumstance hormones compel anyone to do anything (although they may in certain cases) anymore than I think that neurons compel anyone to do anything (except in certain cases). When I was growing up, a lot of music was played in my house, and I grew up liking music a lot. But, I was not forced to like music. If someone thought that was the case, then I would reply that, no, I was not forced to like music. I do so of my own free will.

[TomJrzk]

Exactly yours. But I don't think it has anything much to do with the freedom of will
The 'much' is telling. I think this is only one level of the brain's complete control over will and if you think it has anything to do with the freedom of will, that's a step. I'm more interested in what wiploc and fast think, since I think you're not in their predicament.

[fast]

I pick 2 and 5. But that doesn't do you any good at all. You have a box for indeterminist freewillies, and you want to call that box "libertarians." That's a wrong label if you dump fence sitters into the box with the libertarians.

The fact that you pick 5 infers that you are not a determinist, and if you're not a determinist, then you must be an indeterminist.

So, we know you belong to box 3 (indeterminist) and box 4 (Free Willy).

So, you must most certainly be sitting in box 6. The conflict, now, is whether or not the term libertarian ought to occupy that space.

Because you feel that libertarians ought not occupy any space given the labels given gives me pause because it says something about the foundation upon which the matrix is built, but I don’t see the problem.

This is a Determinism versus Free Will issue, and I'm very concerned about altering the matrix or adding layers of difficulty without good reason.

There are not two free wills. If a person says that she has free will, she is meaning it in the only way that it's normally meant. If she did happen to mean it in some other manner, then it wouldn't be free will to which she was speaking about.

Do you recognize the arbitrariness of throwing the fence sitters into the libertarian box for not being compatibilists? You could just as logically throw them into the compatibilist box for not being libertarians. One works exactly as well as the other.

No. I don't recognize that. You stated that you believed that some events have no cause. You are an indeterminist because of that.

1. Indeterminists believe that some events have no causes
2. You believe that some events have no causes.
Therefore, 3. You are an indeterminist.

[fast]

I don't like this statement. Beliefs are terribly fuzzy.

If he has little evidence either way, or too much evidence in both ways, then why should he act as though he knows what's going on. You can force him to choose the most likely scenario, but this choice represents a belief only to the degree to which he is confident...
Maybe a better question is how much evidence does he have on eihter side and what is the nature of that evidence?
Group 1: I am a determinist
Group 2: I am not a determinist (aka indeterminist)

A person will be a determinist or indeterminist despite a commitment to which group he belongs. I’m either a duck or I’m not a duck even if I don’t which I am.

He has made the claim that some events have no cause, so it cannot be that he belongs to Group 1, for only determinists believe that all events have a cause.

There is no fence between the groups.

Here's an example of where there would be a fence:
Group 1: I believe there is a God
Group 2: I believe there is no God

The missing group is the I lack belief there is (or isn't) a God.

So, unless a person has a belief that all events have a cause, the person will not belong to the group.

[fast]

Mark Tom somewhere floating below your chart, since, for him, your definitions do not depict reality.

1 Determinist -- a person who believes that all events have antecedent causes
2 Indeterminist -- a person who believes that some events have no antecedent causes

Those are two terms pulled out of a group of 4

The other two are:

3 a person who believes that some events have causes

Note #1: if that is the extent of the persons belief, then it's not the case that such a person believes that all events have causes; therefore, the person would be an indeterminist

Note #2: if that is not the extent of the persons belief, then it may be the case that the person is a determinist; it depends. If the person who believes that some events have causes also happens to believe that all events have causes, then the person is a determinist; if not, then the person is an indeterminist.

4 a person who believes that no events have causes.

Note #3: if a person believes that no events have causes, then the person does not believe that all events have causes, so it's not the case that such a person is a determinist, and if a person is not a determinist, the person is an indeterminist.

[wiploc]

No. I don't recognize that. You stated that you believed that some events have no cause. You are an indeterminist because of that.

1. Indeterminists believe that some events have no causes
2. You believe that some events have no causes.
Therefore, 3. You are an indeterminist.


Fine. But that doesn't make me a libertarian.

Nor, technically speaking, would it necessarily prevent me from being a compatibilist. Suppose I believed that there are uncaused events in the universe, but that none of them had to do with minds. Then I'd believe the universe as a whole to be indeterminist, but minds themselves to be determinist. I'd be a compatibilist.



The fact that you pick 5 infers that you are not a determinist, and if you're not a determinist, then you must be an indeterminist.


Only if you define it that way. And if you define it that way, you don't get to say that indeterminist freewillies are libertarians.




So, we know you belong to box 3 (indeterminist) and box 4 (Free Willy).

So, you must most certainly be sitting in box 6. The conflict, now, is whether or not the term libertarian ought to occupy that space.


Agreed.




Because you feel that libertarians ought not occupy any space given the labels given gives me pause because it says something about the foundation upon which the matrix is built, but I don’t see the problem.


So, though I know you hate this, lets add a column: Now we have determinists on the left, undecideds in the middle, and, what, for your benefit, I'll call strong indeterminists on the right. The strong indeterminist freewillies are libertarians, we agree. And the determinist freewillies are compatibilists; we agree on that too.

What we don't agree on is how to class the undecideds. You want to dump them in with the libertarians, and put the libertarian label on them. I don't know why. It seems clear to me that the libertarians are the people who believe in LFW. The undecideds don't believe in LFW any more than they believe in CFW.

Let's have another analogy! You tell three people that your car has five hundred horsepower. The libertarian says, "Of course it does. I see the car move, so there must be five hundred invisible horses pulling it. The compatibilist says, "No, there must be something else going on, something purely mechanistic---but hey, it's fine with me if we call it 'horsepower.'" And the undecided guy says, "One of you loonytunes is wrong, but I'm not sure which."

Whereupon you say to the undecided guy, "Since you don't think the compatibilist is right, that means you believe in invisible horses."




This is a Determinism versus Free Will issue, and I'm very concerned about altering the matrix or adding layers of difficulty without good reason.

The reason is that we want the grid to be right. If we label people as libertarians even though they don't believe in LFW, what good is the grid?




There are not two free wills.

I hear you saying that.



If a person says that she has free will, she is meaning it in the only way that it's normally meant.

Normally, she means either CFW or LFW, and we can't tell which without more information.

crc

[wiploc]

Hey, Fast, if we add undecideds between determinists and indeterminists, and also add an undecided category between the freewillies and unfreewillies, then we can change the title of the chart. We no longer have to say it's a chart of people who have opinions about free will and determinism. It becomes truely exhaustive. It describes everybody.

crc

[fast]

Nor, technically speaking, would it necessarily prevent me from being a compatibilist. Yes it would. If you are an incompatibilist, you can't wear the compatibilist hat.

Suppose I believed that there are uncaused events in the universe, but that none of them had to do with minds. Then I'd believe the universe as a whole to be indeterminist, but minds themselves to be determinist. I'd be a compatibilist.The mind doesn't have anything to do with it. If you believe that all events have antecedent causes, then you're a determinist. There's no wishy washiness about it.

If you are undecided (or if you outright reject) that all events have antecedent causes, then you have not earned the right to wear the determinist hat. If you are not a determinist hat wearer, then you are an indeterminist.

Only if you define it that way. And if you define it that way, you don't get to say that indeterminist freewillies are libertarians. But I'm being stubborn, for it's the libertarians that are believers of free will who are also indeterminists! A libertarian is a libertarian even if we can further differentiate between them.

So, though I know you hate this, lets add a column:

:mad:

:D

Now we have determinists on the left, undecideds in the middle, and, what, for your benefit, I'll call strong indeterminists on the right.
NO!

An undecided is an indeterminist.

The strong indeterminist freewillies are libertarians, we agree. The term indeterminist is already broad enough to encompass the
the undecided.

And the determinist freewillies are compatibilists; we agree on that […]We agree.

What we don't agree on is how to class the undecideds. But why? A libertarian is a freewilly indeterminist. (uh, an indeterminist that believes in Free will) -- um, either way--it's all good.

You want to dump them in with the libertarians, and put the libertarian label on them. I don't know why. It seems clear to me that the libertarians are the people who believe in LFW. The undecideds don't believe in LFW any more than they believe in CFW. There is only one free will. You're the one who keeps talking about LFW and CFW as if they are two different things. :)

Let's have another analogy! You tell three people that your car has five hundred horsepower. The libertarian says, "Of course it does. I see the car move, so there must be five hundred invisible horses pulling it. The compatibilist says, "No, there must be something else going on, something purely mechanistic---but hey, it's fine with me if we call it 'horsepower.'" And the undecided guy says, "One of you loonytunes is wrong, but I'm not sure which."I don't get it.

The reason is that we want the grid to be right. If we label people as libertarians even though they don't believe in LFW, what good is the grid?
Please define free will, then contrast between LFW and the CFW.

Or, contrast between LFW and CFW.

Normally, she means either CFW or LFW, and we can't tell which without more information.If CFW is FW, then LFW is not FW despite the implication of the label.

[kennethamy]

1. Indeterminists believe that some events have no causes
2. You believe that some events have no causes.
Therefore, 3. You are an indeterminist.

Fast:
That just like arguing:

All dogs are not cats.
Fast is not a cat

Therefore, Fast is a dog.

That's just an awful argument.

[sweetiepie]

Group 1: I am a determinist
Group 2: I am not a determinist (aka indeterminist)

A person will be a determinist or indeterminist despite a commitment to which group he belongs. I’m either a duck or I’m not a duck even if I don’t which I am.

He has made the claim that some events have no cause, so it cannot be that he belongs to Group 1, for only determinists believe that all events have a cause.

There is no fence between the groups.

Here's an example of where there would be a fence:
Group 1: I believe there is a God
Group 2: I believe there is no God

The missing group is the I lack belief there is (or isn't) a God.

So, unless a person has a belief that all events have a cause, the person will not belong to the group.
err. nope sorry. dead wrong

If you don't know, you don't know. This applies to "causal relationships between all events" just as it does to God. You can force him to choose a door, but just like forcing an agnostic, it's really not much of a door... More of a nearly horizontal vector.

[wiploc]

If CFW is FW, then LFW is not FW despite the implication of the label.

True. However, the compatibilists think CFW is the real free will. They think LFW is a fantasy. And the libertarians think LFW is the real free will; they think CFW is the fantasy. So you're right, there's only one, but we don't know which it is.




If you are undecided (or if you outright reject) that all events have antecedent causes, then you have not earned the right to wear the determinist hat. If you are not a determinist hat wearer, then you are an indeterminist.


You can build your grid that way if you want, but then you're putting some compatibilists into the libertarian box.





But I'm being stubborn, for it's the libertarians that are believers of free will who are also indeterminists! A libertarian is a libertarian even if we can further differentiate between them.

If you want to call a box "libertarians," you ought to only put libertarians in that box.




But why? A libertarian is a freewilly indeterminist.

Not by definition. Only by propensity. If you want to find a libertarian, you should look in the indeterminist freewilly box. For the purposes of our grid, we're hoping almost everyone in there is a libertarian. But that's not going to be true if you dump the undecideds in with them.




There is only one free will. You're the one who keeps talking about LFW and CFW as if they are two different things. :)


And there's only one automobile, and I'm the one who claims to be able to distinguish between Ford and Chevy. Tell me, does anyone agree with your claim that there is only one thing meant by the term "free will"?




I don't get it.

Please define free will, then contrast between LFW and the CFW.


I'd be famous.





Or, contrast between LFW and CFW.


Okay, that I can do. I've done it several times before, so I don't expect it to take this time either, but I'll try again.

If you can't see the works inside the candy machine, and you punch the button for Almond Joy but get a Milky Way, then you are likely to say the candy machine is being difficult today. You say it is ornery. If it happens twice in a row, you say it is stubborn. You attribute emotion to a machine.

But, if you can see the innards, instead of attributing personality to the machine, you say, "Here's the problem: Somebody put Milky Ways in the Almond Joy slot." The better you understand a machine, the less you think of it as having will.

The hard determinist position is that if we knew how the brain worked, we would recognize that people are really automata, robots. We have no personality really, but only the appearance of personality and free will, and that only because of our diminishing ignorance of how the brain works. As our increasing knowledge makes the god of the gaps diminish in importance until eventually he will be gone altogether, so our increasing knowledge of brain function makes the illusion of free will less and less compelling, until eventually the illusion will fail completely. Since one day everyone will recognize that free will doesn't really exist, why don't we admit that today? That's the only logical thing to do.

But the compatibilist has a different attitude. He agrees on the facts, but not on the linguistics. The compatibilist says we talk of mirages even though we know that nothing is really there. Free will is like that. A mirage is an illusion with a name. We aren't fooled by mirages; we don't get out our canteens and swimsuits when we see one, but it is still nice to have a name, "mirage," for the-appearance-of-a-lake-where-there-is-no-lake. Why shouldn't we have a name for the impression that people act in ways undetermined by mechanism? We talk about IT all the time. Why can't we have a name for IT. We should recognize that free will isn't what the libertarians say it is; but that's no reason we can't use the term "free will" to refer to the mental mirage that makes us think people have feelings. We do have feelings, we do. We have desires. Fundamentally, these desires are based on mechanism, just like hurricanes are funamentally based on quarks, but that doesn't mean we shouldn't get to have word, like "wind" or "mind" that faciliate discussion of large scale phenomena which would be more difficult to contemplate if we were forced to speak only in quarks and neurons.

The libertarians are a different breed altogether. They disagree on the facts, not just the words. They say that there is no way you could build a mind out of neurons. What they experience at all times when they're awake is something that seems totally unlike mechanism. If the hard determinists say that you can't build a mind out of matter, and matter is all there is, so minds don't really exist, then the libertarians say you can't build a mind out of matter, but minds do exist, so therefore they are made of something else.

Hope this helps.

crc

[TomJrzk]

1 Determinist -- a person who believes that all events have antecedent causes
2 Indeterminist -- a person who believes that some events have no antecedent causes
That's all well and good, even correct, if you ask me. And it would have been useful had I said that I'm in a superposition of 5 and 6. But I didn't.

I'm pretty sure I said that I'm in a superposition of 5 and 8, so you should have discussed free will or not free will. Or am I totally confused by my inability to follow directions?

[fast]

Okay, that I can do. I've done it several times before, so I don't expect it to take this time either, but I'll try again. [...] Hope this helps.

It's helping. I'm just being cautious.



We have the hard determinist who sees that I was not compelled to commit the crime despite the peer pressure to do otherwise, yet he'll nevertheless deny that I have free will--because he happens to have a mental picture of the mechanics underlying transpiring events.

We have the soft determinist who sees that I was not compelled to commit the crime despite the peer pressure to do otherwise, and he'll correctly acknowledge that I have free will—and he too will happen to have a mental picture of the mechanics of the transpiring events.

We have the libertarian who sees that I was not compelled to commit the crime despite the peer pressure to do otherwise, and all he’s doing is denying the mechanics of it.

I see one free will, not two, not three--one!

In the first case, it's a denial of free will. In the second case, it's an acknowledgement of it. So far, we're talking about the same free will. Next up is the libertarian. All he's doing is denying the mechanics that allows for the very same free will. He still sees that I was not compelled to commit the crime despite the peer pressure to do otherwise.

[fast]

Fast:
That just like arguing:

All dogs are not cats.
Fast is not a cat

Therefore, Fast is a dog.

That's just an awful argument.

The argument quoted above is an awful argument. I hope what I had written that prompted you to write this isn't truly "just like" or even near that.

[fast]

If you don't know, you don't know.
I can't argue with that.

In fact, I say that it's as trivially true as the trivial truth that if you believe that all events have antecedent causes, then you believe that all events have antecedent causes. In fact, if you don't believe that all events have antecedent causes, then it's not true that you believe that all events have antecedent causes.

I bet that those that don't know also don't believe. Whatcha think?

[fast]

[... Y]ou should have discussed free will or not free will. [...]

Yeah, but I would have stumbled trying, so I preferred to answer the easier question you never asked :D

[wiploc]

It's helping. I'm just being cautious.


Cool.




We have the hard determinist who sees that I was not compelled to commit the crime despite the peer pressure to do otherwise,

Like a computer isn't compelled to say 4 when you type in 2+2.




yet he'll nevertheless deny that I have free will--because he happens to have a mental picture of the mechanics underlying transpiring events.


Like a cave man faced with a Cray computer. He says, I think it's a mechanism. It didn't say "4" because it's thought 4. It said it because that is the output of the program it was running. It didn't have a choice.





We have the soft determinist who sees that I was not compelled to commit the crime despite the peer pressure to do otherwise, and he'll correctly acknowledge that I have free will—and he too will happen to have a mental picture of the mechanics of the transpiring events.


Like a psychiatrist dealing with the Eliza program, or some other simulated intelligence that she (the psychiatrist) doesn't understand because she isn't a computer programmer. She says, "Why can't we say that Eliza thinks? It's a handy way to talk. And for all I know, I'm a mechanism like Eliza, so Eliza really is doing what I do when I say that I am thinking." But though Eliza seems whimsical, or sad, or perky, what she says is still determined by the program.





We have the libertarian who sees that I was not compelled to commit the crime despite the peer pressure to do otherwise, and all he’s doing is denying the mechanics of it.


It's magic, man! Could have done it, could have not done it, it was up to the person who did the crime. It was a genuine free choice, not determined by anything.





I see one free will, not two, not three--one!


Five is right out. I ask again, is it your impression that anyone agrees with you on this point?




In the first case, it's a denial of free will. In the second case, it's an acknowledgement of it. So far, we're talking about the same free will.

Not the same. The compatibilist only denies LFW. The hard materialist denies both.




Next up is the libertarian. All he's doing is denying the mechanics that allows for the very same free will.

He denies only CFW. The compatibilist denies only LFW. The hard determinist denies both.

The hard determinist says, "That's not a mirage. That's just the color of the sky reflected off a layer of hot air." The compatibilist says, "That is a mirage, because that's what we call a mirage." The libertarian says, "Screw you guys, I'm going swimming." And Fast says, "You guys are all in agreement."

crc

[kennethamy]

Cool.







The hard determinist says, "That's not a mirage. That's just the color of the sky reflected off a layer of hot air." The compatibilist says, "That is a mirage, because that's what we call a mirage." The libertarian says, "Screw you guys, I'm going swimming." And Fast says, "You guys are all in agreement."

crc

I don't know why you think the HD would say that, but if he did, he would be silly to say of a mirage that it is not a mirage because he could say what caused it. It would be as if a physicist were to say, "That's not heat, that's the motion of molecules". Heat is (caused by) the motion of molecules, and mirages are caused by the color of the sky reflected off a layer of hot air. So why would anyone think that one (of each pair) excluded the other?

[fast]

I don't know why you think the HD would say that, but if he did, he would be silly to say of a mirage that it is not a mirage because he could say what caused it.
Just as silly as it would be for a hard determinist to say that he doesn't love his dearest.

I can hear the hard determinist crying out that he doesn't truly love, for love is an event spawned by antecedent causes.

[fast]

I ask again, is it your impression that anyone agrees with you on this point?Agreement is not a necessary condition of being correct.

And Fast says, "You guys are all in agreement."Never said that.

Earlier, I gave very short definitions of the terms determinist and indeterminist (to which Tom agreed); provide a commensurately short definition of Compatibilist's Free Will and Libertarian's Free Will. No examples, illustration, comparisons, etc... just a down and dirty definition for each.

[t.w.]

Perhaps a believer in free will could explain how a human being is different from a computer/robot in terms of having free will.

[kennethamy]

Perhaps a believer in free will could explain how a human being is different from a computer/robot in terms of having free will.

1. The decisions of a computer or robot do not affect what the computer or robot "does". The reason is that computers and robots make no decisions. The opposite is true of people. (Computers and robots also do not change their minds).

2. Computers and robot do not want to do what they do, and neither do they not want to do what they do. Consequently, they are not they are not compelled to do anything, nor, are they restrained from doing anything they want to do. They have no wills, and therefore, their wills are neither free nor not-free. You can see that case is quite different with people.

[wiploc]

I don't know why you think the HD would say that, but if he did, he would be silly to say of a mirage that it is not a mirage because he could say what caused it. It would be as if a physicist were to say, "That's not heat, that's the motion of molecules". Heat is (caused by) the motion of molecules, and mirages are caused by the color of the sky reflected off a layer of hot air. So why would anyone think that one (of each pair) excluded the other?

Any illustration I use is going to have the weakness that we already know what's going on. We already know how candy machines work, and what mirages are, etcera, so there's no real mystery. To make the mirage analogy really work, you have to imagine that there is some danger that the liberarian may come back wet from swimming. Then the hard determinist can say, "Oops, this one was a real mirage; it wasn't just a reflection of the sky off a layer of hot air."

The HD is in agreement with the compatibilist on the facts, and he's in agreement with the libertarian on the nomenclature.

crc

[wiploc]

Perhaps a believer in free will could explain how a human being is different from a computer/robot in terms of having free will.

A compatibilist believer in free will is happy to say that human free will is more complex and mysterious than the apparent free will of a robot. But they may be of the same nature. Or, if there is something different going on, then it is an "emergent property."

Illustration of emergent properties: One bee can't swarm. Two bees can't swarm. But enough bees can swarm, can do a thing that couldn't be done by a smaller collection of bees. In like manner, a simple computer program may not be able to have free will; but if it can't then a more complicated program can, because of some emergent property, like unto the swarming of bees. And compatibilists hold this position because the hard determinists are wrong about free will not existing. Free will is an obvious and undeniable part of all waking experience.

Libertarian free will is harder to explain. But the essense of it is that the compatibilists are wrong. We aren't just machines-so-complex-as-to-be-mysterious. There is something else going on.

crc

[wiploc]

Agreement is not a necessary condition of being correct.


It is when you are dealing with "social truths." Which side of the road do we drive on in the United States, what is the price of a share of IBM stock, and what is meant by the term "libertarian free will" are social truths. Attempting to produce a "correct" definition of libertarian free will, without reference to what people mean by the word, is an exercise in pointlessness.

But it does free you up to design your grid any way you want. Nobody can say you are wrong unless you intend to have reference to common language.




Never said that.

I understand. It was parody. Your position would me more like, "Hey, regardless of whether you can swim in it, you guys are looking in the same direction, and using the same word, 'mirage,' and therefore you (the compatibilist and the libertarian) are in essential agreement. There's only one thing referred to by the word 'mirage.'"

crc

[wiploc]

Just as silly as it would be for a hard determinist to say that he doesn't love his dearest.

I can hear the hard determinist crying out that he doesn't truly love, for love is an event spawned by antecedent causes.

Good. I agree with you. You have expressed the freewilly position well. We may not know much, but we know the hard materialists are wrong. Love exists. Regardless of whether it is the doings of deterministic meat computers or something more mysterious, love exists.

crc

[sweetiepie]

I can't argue with that.

In fact, I say that it's as trivially true as the trivial truth that if you believe that all events have antecedent causes, then you believe that all events have antecedent causes. In fact, if you don't believe that all events have antecedent causes, then it's not true that you believe that all events have antecedent causes.

I bet that those that don't know also don't believe. Whatcha think?
Yes.. well..
If you don't believe that all events have antecedent causes,
it is not necessarily the case
that you believe that not all events have antecedent causes....


know is a dumb word, just like free will. it shouldn't be used in philosophy.

[A_M]

Hold on, you are wrong here. Whilst people believe that if someone couldn't have done otherwise, they don't deserve punishment, the majority of people believe that a murderer could have done otherwise - hence the reason they feel it is just to punish him. The widespread belief in free will has, I believe, evolved precisely because it allows people to justify punishment and assign blame.
When you say 'this is obviously not the case' you are mistaken. You are forgetting that most human beings don't consider the possibility that a murderer 'couldn't have done otherwise'. Our cultural experiences ingrain into us the belief that we could have done otherwise in any situation, in order to maximise the justification for punishment.
Sorry about the late response, I'm in the middle of moving.

"Most human beings" are wrong. Forget about the beliefs of the majority for a while. Does blame still serve a purpose even in a deterministic world? That's a big YES from me. In fact, I'd go as far as saying that the common belief in libertarian free will (hope I'm using that term in the same way everyone else is now) and in its supposed necessity for moral justification occasionally has detrimental effects on our society. It leads to a tendency to single out and punish individuals as scapegoats, and ignore systemic changes that might do a better job of preventing future wrongdoings.

[fast]

If you don't believe that all events have antecedent causes, it is not necessarily the case that you believe that not all events have antecedent causes

I agree.

What makes one a determinist is if one believes that all events have antecedent causes. If a person doesn't do that, then they have not met the necessary conditions to wear the determinist hat.

Look at it like this. There are indeterminists of two kinds: 1) the one that flat disbelieves that all events have antecedent causes, thereby rendering it false that they believe all events have antecedent causes and thus an indeterminist, and 2) the one that can't decide and therefore doesn't believe that all events have antecedent causes thereby rendering it false that they believe all events have antecedent causes and thus an indeterminist.

There is no fence. There is no river running between the determinist bank and indeterminist bank. The banks are slap dab up against one another.

If, however, we were pitting theists up against strong atheists, then there would be; contrariwise, if we were pitting theists up against atheists, there would not be—despite the crys of the agnostics.

My biggest gripe is that we may not treat the collectively exhaustive determinist, indeterminist group as if it’s not by insinuating there’s a fence rendering it not collectively exhaustive. It is. If you don’t belong to one group, then you belong to the other. If you don’t know which you belong to, then remember that it’s not an issue about knowledge; it’s issue about belief. Either you do or you do not believe that all events have antecedent causes.

Bark, Bark :)

[fast]

Good. I agree with you. You have expressed the freewilly position well. We may not know much, but we know the hard materialists are wrong. Love exists. Regardless of whether it is the doings of deterministic meat computers or something more mysterious, love exists.

crcYou've used the term "hard materialist" a couple times now. What does that mean? It's not in my list. Is it an aka for hard determinist?

[t.w.]

1. The decisions of a computer or robot do not affect what the computer or robot "does". The reason is that computers and robots make no decisions. The opposite is true of people. (Computers and robots also do not change their minds).
There is no difference between not having a decision and having only one possible choice. Having no decision is defined as we are only able to choose one option. I feel that both computers and humans could make only one possible decision, both for deterministic reasons, however it is possible for them to do something else due to random reasons. The phrase 'changing one's mind' is an irrelevant, superficial phrase that bears no relevance to this discussion. The process of changing one's mind could just as easily be part of the chain of unavoidable deterministic events.



2. Computers and robot do not want to do what they do, and neither do they not want to do what they do.
Irrelevant. Again, the chemical processs that cause the emotions 'to want' or 'to not want' would be included in the chain of unavoidable deterministic processes.


Consequently, they are not they are not compelled to do anything,'
They are compelled to do what they are programmed to do.


nor, are they restrained from doing anything they want to do. They have no wills, and therefore, their wills are neither free nor not-free. You can see that case is quite different with people.
My argument is that humans have no free will. Will and free will are quite different things, and the fact that free will includes the word will does not mean that the two are intrinsically related. The 'will' could certainly be the result of deterministic chemicals, and so is essentially, in relation to our discussion, no more significant or relevant to free will as the colour of the computer.

[t.w.]

Sorry about the late response, I'm in the middle of moving.
No problem.


"Most human beings" are wrong. Forget about the beliefs of the majority for a while.
It is true, however, that the vast majority of humans believe in free will. In fact, most would ridicule the suggestion we don't have it - such is our conviction we do. This un-warranted convinction (especially considering the majorty have never looked at free will philosophically) needs explaining.


Does blame still serve a purpose even in a deterministic world? That's a big YES from me.
I absolutely agree. This was my explanation for belief in free will's existence.


In fact, I'd go as far as saying that the common belief in libertarian free will (hope I'm using that term in the same way everyone else is now) and in its supposed necessity for moral justification occasionally has detrimental effects on our society. It leads to a tendency to single out and punish individuals as scapegoats, and ignore systemic changes that might do a better job of preventing future wrongdoings.
Sure, it may have detrimental effects. So do doctor's have detrimental effects when one of them decides to use his expertise to kill hundreds of innocent people. Lots of beneficial, even necessary things for an efficient society have occassional drawbacks. I don't see what relevance this point has. Doctors are still necessary depite Harold Shipman - free will belief is still necessary despite occassional miscarraiges of justice.

[t.w.]

A compatibilist believer in free will is happy to say that human free will is more complex and mysterious than the apparent free will of a robot. But they may be of the same nature. Or, if there is something different going on, then it is an "emergent property."

Illustration of emergent properties: One bee can't swarm. Two bees can't swarm. But enough bees can swarm, can do a thing that couldn't be done by a smaller collection of bees. In like manner, a simple computer program may not be able to have free will; but if it can't then a more complicated program can, because of some emergent property, like unto the swarming of bees. And compatibilists hold this position because the hard determinists are wrong about free will not existing. Free will is an obvious and undeniable part of all waking experience.
This bolded part is held by almost all human beings, most of whom have never considered the arguments for free will anyway. Why is this? My hypothesis, that free will emerged as a method of allowing human society to operate, explains this unwarranted conviction.


Libertarian free will is harder to explain. But the essense of it is that the compatibilists are wrong. We aren't just machines-so-complex-as-to-be-mysterious. There is something else going on.
crc

Another manifestation of our in-built conviction.

[wiploc]

You've used the term "hard materialist" a couple times now. What does that mean? It's not in my list. Is it an aka for hard determinist?

I mean hard determinist. I'm not offering it as another way to say the same thing, I'm simply making a mistake. When I write "hard materialist," I want you to read, "had determinist." :)

crc

[TomJrzk]

Earlier, I gave very short definitions of the terms determinist and indeterminist (to which Tom agreed); provide a commensurately short definition of Compatibilist's Free Will and Libertarian's Free Will. No examples, illustration, comparisons, etc... just a down and dirty definition for each.
I know that you addressed this request to wiploc (and he didn't seem to fulfill it) but I feel like I'm typing in a font that is invisible to you. Should I type in all CAPS? I REALLY don't want to repeat myself so I won't here, but you could do a lot toward rescuing my sanity if you would grant me a post that diagrams the sentence describing Hume's definition of free will. No, diagraming the sentence is not necessary, if you could just tell me how "an absolute ability to have chosen differently under exactly the same inner and outer circumstances" is not a perfect definition of LFW then I'll drop it. Heck, maybe I'll just drop it anyway, since this idea must carry leprosy or something.

BTW, the last post you sent to me actually did have me laughing out loud (which has my family also questioning my sanity). Thanks!

[sweetiepie]

Look at it like this. There are indeterminists of two kinds: 1) the one that flat disbelieves that all events have antecedent causes, thereby rendering it false that they believe all events have antecedent causes and thus an indeterminist, and 2) the one that can't decide and therefore doesn't believe that all events have antecedent causes thereby rendering it false that they believe all events have antecedent causes and thus an indeterminist.
ooooh, you just have crappy definitons. I have no problem with that. :)


If, however, we were pitting theists up against strong atheists, then there would be; contrariwise, if we were pitting theists up against atheists, there would not be—despite the crys of the agnostics.
For the last time, beliefs are FUZZY. but. ok. at least you're not totally insane.

[sweetiepie]

If you don’t know which you belong to, then remember that it’s not an issue about knowledge; it’s issue about belief. Either you do or you do not believe that all events have antecedent causes.

Although I'm not quite sure what you mean by this, you might want to consider it a step of toward disbelief in libertarian free will.
It might suggest that choices that are represented by beliefs are decided before you face them.

[wiploc]

Earlier, I gave very short definitions of the terms determinist and indeterminist (to which Tom agreed); provide a commensurately short definition of Compatibilist's Free Will and Libertarian's Free Will. No examples, illustration, comparisons, etc... just a down and dirty definition for each.

If I read Tom right, he says says this was a request that I define CFW and LFW. I don't know that anybody can do that. I've been happy enough with Tom's Hume definition of LFW, which is not to say that I agree with it, but rather that I'm happy to use it until something better comes along.

You say you offered your own definitions. Could you reproduce them or point me at them? I'm only on page two of the thread.

Having said that I can't do it won't stop me from trying. It just means that I know going in that I'll make a bad job of it.

LFW: Making decisions independently of brain-state.

CFW: An phenomenon dependent entirely on brain-state, and therefore ultimately determinist, but which creates the appearance that what's going on is personality independent of brain-state. We look like we have moods, opinions, and desires, but these illusions---illusions that fool even ourselves---are the product of sophisticated but deterministic brain chemistry.

The hard determinist agrees with the compatibilist on what is going on, but agrees with the libertarian that the term "free will" ought to be reserved for what the libertarian thinks is going on.

I don't expect these definitions to satisfy anybody, but I've been asked to make the effort, so I did.

crc

[fast]

No, diagraming the sentence is not necessary, if you could just tell me how "an absolute ability to have chosen differently under exactly the same inner and outer circumstances" is not a perfect definition of LFW then I'll drop it.

The difference between CFW and LFW is not a difference of FW; it's a spitting match between whether or not we live in a deterministic world.

Separate your quote above into two sections:

1) an absolute ability to have chosen differently
2) under exactly the same inner and outer circumstances

Section 1 attempts to encapsulate free will
Section 2 attempts to encapsulate indeterminism

The free will to which the libertarian has is identical to that of the compatibilist. The difference isn't a matter of free will; it's a matter of the nature of the universe--in that it is or isn't deterministic.

Here's something for ya. When the libertarians define LFW, what they're not doing is redefining FW. They are simply coming up with a new term that differentiates themselves from soft determinists.

So, the soft determinist has the very same Free will as does libertarians. It's just that each group tries to encapsulate their view of FW in terms of their deterministic beliefs. The bottom line, however, is that neither CFW nor LFW is FW. It's a term of a different sort.

I think that the matrix that I have put together clearly shows that the FW between them is identical. The difference between the groups is that of their beliefs in regards to the deterministic nature of our world.

BTW, the last post you sent to me actually did have me laughing out loud (which has my family also questioning my sanity). Thanks! Want humor? Otay:

Wiploc has asked twice now if anyone agrees with me; I normally make people ask 10 times before answering--like I did to you with the particular question above. But, I'll save everyone the suspense and answer instead of avoiding the question like I did before.

Yes, someone does agree with me. Ken does. See post # 693. There are implications in that post that he does agree with me, even though he doesn’t address the terms specifically.

If it so happens that Ken doesn’t agree, I’ll could always find someone else. Perhaps I could talk Oldal into agreeing. I’ll find someone. If not, then I suppose I could concede that I’m wrong—but where would the fun be in that.

Perhaps I should do as the hallmark of a true philosopher and maintain my stance until having to face a gun as depicted in the great hit “Faster Horses” by the country singer Tom T. Hall.

[fast]

but. ok. at least you're not totally insane.Not for a lack of trying it would on occasion seem.

[fast]

I'm not quite sure what you mean by this
If you know something, then you believe it too. However, just because you believe something, it doesn't therefore mean that you know it. For example, you know that you are typing on the computer, and if you know that you are typing on the computer, you therefore believe that you are typing on the computer.

So, knowledge is a subset to belief while beliefs are, of course, a superset to knowledge. Now, let's say that you believe that the mailman will bring mail on Sunday. The mere fact that you have that belief doesn't therefore mean that you know, and as I've already demonstrated, if you know something, you therefore believe it.

In conclusion, and like it or not, there is a distinction between that of a belief and that of knowledge.

Now, Wiploc had the pressing concern that he does not know which is true of our universe. He doesn't know whether or not we do or do not live in a deterministic world.

Well, “so what” I exclaim. Knowing (or not knowing) isn't at issue. It's another issue to which is not on the table. The issue is that of belief (as opposed to knowledge), and remember, there is a difference--I just showed that.

But, then there's still the problem of whether or not we're talking about two or three categories. He suggested that there is a third category between that of determinism and indeterminism by stating that he's sitting on the fence. To say that one is sitting on the fence is to say that he either 1) doesn't know which category he belongs or 2) doesn't belong in either category.

Well, for one thing, whether he knows or doesn't know isn't at issue (as I've shown). The only other concern, then, is if there is two or three categories. If there are two categories like I say, then he must belong to the indeterminist camp because 1) the 2 groups are collectively exhaustive and 2) he doesn’t believe that all events have antecedent causes.

I have shown (and Ken has agreed) that the deterministic and indeterministic categories are collectively exhaustive--meaning that there cannot be a third category.

Your question then is, if one category is a believer, and if another category is a disbeliever, then where do we put the lack of believers (the one's not carrying any weight--like my long lost metaphor). The mistake is to think that the second category (indeterminists) are disbelievers. They also include lack of believers. By default, if one is not a determinist, one is an indeterminist.

[fast]

If I read Tom right, he says this was a request that I define CFW and LFW. I don't know that anybody can do that.
I think I can.

The compatibilist has this idea of what they think is free will, and the libertarian has an idea (a different idea) of what they think is free will, so each with their own ideas set out to explain what they each think is free will from the perspective of their respective camp.

But, their ideas are not that of free will but rather what they think of as free will in light of how they view the world. This doesn’t mean that there are 2 (CFW and LFW) nor are there 3 free wills (FW, CFW, and LFW) .

There is only one FW. (FW).

LFW is not FW. CFW is not FW. There is LFW and there is CFW, but neither is FW. Again, LFW and CFW is a belief (or lack thereof) of their take on FW in terms of their respective deterministic view.

Yes, LFW and CFW is definitely different, but the only discernable difference isn’t in terms of free will but rather on their deterministic stance.

I've been happy enough with Tom's Hume definition of LFW, which is not to say that I agree with it, but rather that I'm happy to use it until something better comes along.All he’s doing is combining the idea of FW with that of indeterminism. Yes, he’s coming up with a conclusion that is is stark contrast to that of CFW, but the difference isn’t in terms of FW but rather determinism.

Notice the last section of Hume’s definition. He took innocent FW and molested it with indeterminism. The compatibilist free will is the same free will as that of libertarians; the only difference is tracable to the determinist, indeterminist distinction.

You say you offered your own definitions. Could you reproduce them or point me at them? I'm only on page two of the thread. That’s once. Nine more to go.

[fast]

Could you reproduce them or point me at them? I'm only on page two of the thread.

This is currently (with 909 posts) the forth longest thread (in terms of post count) in the philosophy forum since it’s conception. 1st place is 1,413 posts; 2nd place is 936 posts, and 3rd place is 926 posts. That means (and not to say we’re undergoing record breaking attempts) we’re going to be participants in the second largest thread in less than 30 posts.

The fact that this is a long thread brings me to my upcoming point about my consistency (or lack thereof). One of things I try to do is remain consistent in a thread. I was once questioned about something I said in one thread that didn’t jibe with something I said in another thread. I quickly pointed out that I promised to at least try and remain consist in any particular thread I participate in, but such a promise doesn’t extend among threads.

In other words, (and to be funny), you might find that I’m not only a theist at the beginning of a thread, but you will also note that I’m still a theist at the end of it; however, in another thread next door, I might be a full blow fire breathing atheist.

But, not in this one. I haven’t been able to stay in character in this thread, and I have most definitely been all over the map. One minute I’m a determinist, one minute an indeterminist, and the next minute I’m lost as can be typing away like my hair is on fire. Hell, if you look close enough, you’ll see that I actually left IIDB. I didn’t self ban, but I was like so “out of here”.

This topic has been a bit of a struggle for me, so if you do go through the pains of scouring this entire thread, you will have a headache if you try to make sense of everything I’ve said.

Oh, almost forgot. Check out post 878 for them definitions.

[kennethamy]

All he’s doing is combining the idea of FW with that of indeterminism. Yes, he’s coming up with a conclusion that is is stark contrast to that of CFW, but the difference isn’t in terms of FW but rather determinism.

Notice the last section of Hume’s definition. He took innocent FW and molested it with indeterminism. The compatibilist free will is the same free will as that of libertarians; the only difference is tracable to the determinist, indeterminist distinction.

That’s once. Nine more to go.

I don't understand why you say what you do about Hume. Hume was a compatibilist. He thought that indeterminism was false. I don't understand how you get your comment about his view from the following in Wiki:

"According to Hume, free will should not be understood as an absolute ability to have chosen differently under exactly the same inner and outer circumstances. Rather, it is a hypothetical ability to have chosen differently if one had been differently psychologically disposed by some different beliefs or desires."

Actually, I think Wiki has Hume's view wrong too. I think his view should be expressed as saying that free will is the hypothetical ability to have done (not chosen) differently, if one had chosen differently. And, one might have chosen differently if one had had different beliefs or desires.

Very briefly, Hume's view was this: he thought that people who thought that free will was not possible if an action or choice was caused had a confused idea of the nature of causation. They confused causation with necessitation. But, although it is true that if an event occurs, then its cause occurred, it is not true that if an event occurred it was impossible that the cause should not have occurred. And, on top of that, incompatibilists have a mistaken view of freedom. They think that freedom is the absence of causation. It isn't. Freedom is the absence of compelling causes-the absence of compulsion. Those two confusions; the confusion of causation with necessitation, and the confusion of causation with compulsion; combine to cause the confusion of incompatibilism. And create the pseudo-problem of freedom of the will.

[fast]

Can you explain why you say what you do about Hume's view?
Yes.

I based my account of his view on the incomplete picture as quoted, "an absolute ability to have chosen differently under exactly the same inner and outer circumstances"

Hume is a compatibilist.Got it; looks like I need to stick his name in box 5 so it doesn't escape me.

According to Wiki:

"According to Hume, free will should not be understood as an absolute ability to have chosen differently under exactly the same inner and outer circumstances. Rather, it is a hypothetical ability to have chosen differently if one had been differently psychologically disposed by some different beliefs or desires."Notice the bolding. That was not an inclusion in the quote to which I gave my assessment.

How did Hume molest anything with determinism?
He did the very opposite. :)


Hume held that people were incompatibilists because they misunderstood the nature of causal connection and thought that causes necessitate so that it is impossible for the cause to occur and its event not to occur. Hume argued that although such a thing does not occur, that doesn't mean it is impossible that it should occur. And, on top of that, he thought that people were incompatibilists because they misunderstood the notion of free will, which is the absence of compulsion, but not the absence of causation. I don't think the Wiki account of what Hume thought is right. I think that Hume held that freedom of the will is the hypothetical ability to have done differently if one had chosen differently, and that is not what Wiki says.By the way, and I was going to ask this before, but what is the counterpart term for compulsion. I'm not compelled to fall because of gravity; instead, ???

[kennethamy]

Yes.

I based my account of his view on the incomplete picture as quoted, "an absolute ability to have chosen differently under exactly the same inner and outer circumstances"

Got it; looks like I need to stick his name in box 5 so it doesn't escape me.

Notice the bolding. That was not an inclusion in the quote to which I gave my assessment.

:)


By the way, and I was going to ask this before, but what is the counterpart term for compulsion. I'm not compelled to fall because of gravity; instead, ???

Caused.

[fast]

Caused.

Knock me and show me where to fall! I finally get it.

The robot’s actions are caused (but not compelled). The human’s actions are caused (and may or may not be compelled).

The robots actions are caused and thus determined (and never compelled)
The human actions are caused and thus determined (and may be compelled).

The laws of nature cause me to fall (but never compel me to fall)
The laws of man cannot cause me to drive slow (but can compel me to).

A key component in understanding compatibilist versus incompatibilist is to have an understanding between compulsion and cause.

[kennethamy]

Knock me and show me where to fall! I finally get it.

The robot’s actions are caused (but not compelled). The human’s actions are caused (and may or may not be compelled).

The robots actions are caused and thus determined (and never compelled)
The human actions are caused and thus determined (and may be compelled).

The laws of nature cause me to fall (but never compel me to fall)
The laws of man cannot cause me to drive slow (but can compel me to).

A key component in understanding compatibilist versus incompatibilist is to have an understanding between compulsion and cause.

That's what I have been saying for lo, these many posts.

[fast]

Oh, almost forgot. Check out post 878 for them definitions.Dang it. I just went and reviewed the definitions. The indeterminist definition isn't quite right. It's close, but as worded, it does leave room for a fence. For now, I'll just define indeterminist as not a determinist--no fence that way.

[kennethamy]

Dang it. I just went and reviewed the definitions. The indeterminist definition isn't quite right. It's close, but as worded, it does leave room for a fence. For now, I'll just define indeterminist as not a determinist--no fence that way.

Your's and Wiploc's interest in the topology of free will puzzles me. But if it amuses you, don't let me stand in the way.

[Canard DuJour]

Knock me and show me where to fall! I finally get it.

The robot’s actions are caused (but not compelled). The human’s actions are caused (and may or may not be compelled).

The robots actions are caused and thus determined (and never compelled)
The human actions are caused and thus determined (and may be compelled).
[...]

No. Caused =/= determined. Fire a photon at a half silvered mirror and you *cause* one of two equally likely outcomes. Worse, it seems that macroscopic resolution into one specific outcome only happens when a macroscopic observation is made. That's a particulary stark example, but it seems that all macroscopic (not quantum) events are, to some extent, indeterminable.

The false assumption underlying the whole debate is that there is necessarily a discrete linear progression of events "out there" mechanically resolving itself with or without the participation of observers. We've known for a while that it's not that simple. Given "exactly the same inner and outer circumstances" it's not that a different outcome is impossible. It is, in fact, impossible to guarantee the same outcome - though it may be overwhelmingly likely (or not) depending on the circumstances.

[TomJrzk]

The hard determinist agrees with the compatibilist on what is going on, but agrees with the libertarian that the term "free will" ought to be reserved for what the libertarian thinks is going on.
Thanks! Now, if you can create a box with that label, I'll gladly confine myself to it and shut up for a while.

[TomJrzk]

Want humor? Otay: ...
I think you missed the tone of my 'laugh out loud' and maybe because you didn't know what quote of yours I was referring to? I meant that it was very funny when you wrote something to the effect of "I didn't want to answer the question you asked, so I answered the easier question that you didn't ask". I found that frank and hilarious. I'm sorry if, in the unlikely possibility, you didn't mean it to be funny.

Beyond that, you're insisting that I describe my idea of free will as a mixture of common beliefs (we make choices) plus determinism instead of what I think of as more common beliefs (our spirits/souls are free from physics). While I can't go there, I understand your (and Compatibilists') need to be there and did promise to drop it, so I'll make my best effort to do so.........

I'll label myself as wiploc so concisely defined HD, but stop badgering you about your definitions.

[fast]

The hard determinist agrees with the compatibilist on what is going on, but agrees with the libertarian that the term "free will" ought to be reserved for what the libertarian thinks is going on.

Thanks! Now, if you can create a box with that label, I'll gladly confine myself to it and shut up for a while.

What the libertarian thinks is going isn't about free will. In other words, what's going on is about causation not compulsion. The libertarian fails to believe that all events have antecedent causes while maintaining the stance that his thoughts are not compelled.

ETA: likewise, the compatibilist maintains the stance that his thoughts are not compelled. The difference between them is that of what's going on. The deterministic nature of the universe.

MORE: The hard determinist is like the compatibilist in regards to what's going on but disagree on the free will issue. The Hard Determinist holds that there is no free will. That mistake is brought on by the failure to distinguish the fact that causation and compulsion.

[fast]

Beyond that, you're insisting that I describe my idea of free will as a mixture of common beliefs (we make choices) plus determinism instead of what I think of as more common beliefs (our spirits/souls are free from physics). While I can't go there, I understand your (and Compatibilists') need to be there and did promise to drop it, so I'll make my best effort to do so.........

I'll label myself as wiploc so concisely defined HD, but stop badgering you about your definitions.

I do not have a definition of free will, though I think I'm honing in on it quite quickly. I just haven't put it together yet. I have one for determinism; you quoted it and agreed with it.

I don't know what you mean by I'm insisting. You can create an idiosyncratic definition; I have no qualms with that. But, you can't rightly call such a definition free will.

I don’t think any definition of free will ought to mention or otherwise elude to whether or not we live in a deterministic world or not. It’s a separate issue, and because it’s a separate issue, it’s listed across the top of my matrix. The other issue, (the separate and distinct issue) of free will is listed along the left of my matrix. The terms at the heart of the matrix are the only places where the issues are combined.

I had tomatoes, okra, and corn last night. The compatibilist likes tomatoes and okra, and the libertarian likes tomatoes and corn. When one combines tomatoes and corn, what one would have is something different than what the libertarian has, but at no time are there different types of tomatoes. Yes, what the compatibilist has on his plate is something different than what the libertarian has, but the difference is attributable to the distinction between okra and corn—not tomatoes! NOT TWO DIFFERENT FREE WILLS!!!

[kennethamy]

What the libertarian thinks is going isn't about free will. In other words, what's going on is about causation not compulsion. The libertarian fails to believe that all events have antecedent causes while maintaining the stance that his thoughts are not compelled.

ETA: likewise, the compatibilist maintains the stance that his thoughts are not compelled. The difference between them is that of what's going on. The deterministic nature of the universe.

MORE: The hard determinist is like the compatibilist in regards to what's going on but disagree on the free will issue. The Hard Determinist holds that there is no free will. That mistake is brought on by the failure to distinguish the fact that causation and compulsion.

Thus, both the hard determinist, and the libertarian, are making the very same mistake. That all causation is compulsion. (Of course, all compulsion is causation).

Thus, we can say, without being too unfair, that both the hard determinist and the libertarian are committing the fallacy of illicit conversion; namely. both of them think that because all X is Y, all Y must be X.

[fast]

Your's and Wiploc's interest in the topology of free will puzzles me. But if it amuses you, don't let me stand in the way.
Does my matrix accurately (and without mistake) capture the relationships between all the applicable terms?

1) Free will versus Determinism

2) A determinist -- a person who believes that all events have antecedent causes.
3) An indeterminist --not a determinist (and thus includes people who does not know which group he/she belongs).

4) A believer of free will (the only free will)
7) A person that doesn't belong in cell #4

5) A soft determinist (aka a compatibilist); all compatibilists believe in free will; all compatibilists are determinists; if one is a compatibilist, then one is a determinist; if one is a compatibilist, then one is a believer of free will.

6) A libertarian (one type of incompatibilist) believes in free will (the same damn free will that compatibilists do). A libertarian rejects the idea that we live in a deterministic universe. All libertarians are indeterminists. All libertarians believe in free will.

8) A hard determinist (the second type of incompatibilist) believes we live in a deterministic world. The hard determinist is not a believer of free will.

Note, I didn't say that the HD isn't a believer in a particular type of free will. I didn't say that no more than I said that of soft determinists and libertarians. There are not particular types of free will's. There are, however, terms that attempt to combine the idea of what free will is with something else (where that something else is the groups respective view of the nature of our universe, in terms of determinism), but that isn't a type of free will; that's a term that encapsulates free will in terms of a particular view.

What am I wrong about? I have Tom and Wiploc and who knows whom else in disagreement with what I'm saying. If anyone ought to be incorrect, it ought to be me, yes, but let's hear it from you. Tell me that I've made a mistake.

<ducks for cover :) >

[fast]

Thus, both the hard determinist, and the libertarian, are making the very same mistake. That all causation is compulsion. (Of course, all compulsion is causation).

Thus, we can say, without being too unfair, that both the hard determinist and the libertarian are committing the fallacy of illicit conversion; namely. both of them think that because all X is Y, all Y must be X.

You think one’s recognition of that will stir things up? Just wait until we drop the news to Tom that free will is classified as an abstract existent thereby rendering Hard Determinism even more of a problematic position to hold.

[wiploc]

Thanks! Now, if you can create a box with that label, I'll gladly confine myself to it and shut up for a while.

It turns out that I can do it. Well, it's not a box, but it has a shape. :)

Take three circles, each of which overlaps the other two. Lable them "Determinists," "Freewillies," and, "Those who believe that LFW is the only legitimate meaning of "free will."

We get this interesting result. Nobody is in the union of all three circles. (When I say nobody, I mean nobody with a logical position. There may be people in there, but they need straightening out.)
Compatibilists are the intersection between determinsts and freewillies (but excluding the intersection of all three circles).
Libertarians are the intersection between freewillies and TWBTLFWITOLMoFW (but excluding the intersection of all three circles).
Hard determinists are the intersection of determinists and TWBTLFWITOLMoFW (but excluding the intersection of all three circles). This is your requested box.I'm a pure freewilly. I'm don't have an opinion on determinism (as it relates to free will), nor on TWBTLFWITOLMoFW, which puts me in the part of the Freewilly circle that doesn't intersect with the other circles.

I predict that this diagram will catch on like ... oh, like ... what's a good analogy ... like people tying dead dogs to their car when they go to pick up a girl for a first date.

crc

[TomJrzk]

I predict that this diagram will catch on like ... oh, like ... what's a good analogy ... like people tying dead dogs to their car when they go to pick up a girl for a first date.
Yes, I am quite good at running off first dates ;).

This does not jibe with Ken's world. Compatibilists define free will like I wouldn't, then say I make an error of illicit conversion when I say I believe in their free will but don't think they should call it free will, since it's not....um.... free!

So, what do I think about causation and compulsion? They are different in kind, given CFW. Given LFW and rejecting it as not deterministic, they are different only in degree; the compulsion supplied is just another of the many inputs to the causation.

[fast]

So, what do I think about causation and compulsion? They are different in kind, given CFW. Given LFW and rejecting it as not deterministic, they are different only in degree; the compulsion supplied is just another of the many inputs to the causation.

I think a further examination of causation and compulsion might shed some additional light on the subject. I'm not up to par on what you mean by "they are different in kind, given CFW". Are you implying that there are additional types of causation and compulsion--a CFW type and a LFW type?

Picture a circle, and call that causation; then, picture a smaller circle sitting inside the bigger circle; call that compulsion. All I see is one is type of causation and one type of compulsion. I see it such that all compelled events are caused, but not all caused events are compelled.

This is similar in form to that of belief and knowledge where one is a subset and the other is a superset.

I hope this post postitively contributes to the thread.

fast

[wiploc]

This does not jibe with Ken's world.

I'm still on page two of this thread. (It's dead week. I'm in college. Plus it has been suggested that I shouldn't bother to re-read the entire thread.) So maybe you could tell me about Ken's world, or refer me to a post that tells.



Compatibilists define free will like I wouldn't, then say I make an error of illicit conversion when I say I believe in their free will but don't think they should call it free will, since it's not....um.... free!


That makes you either a hard determinist or a libertarian.




So, what do I think about causation and compulsion?

I didn't really understand. Believing in that our decisions are caused is believing in determinism, right? And believing in compulsion is believing that people's wills can be coerced?



They are different in kind, given CFW. Given LFW and rejecting it as not deterministic, they are different only in degree; the compulsion supplied is just another of the many inputs to the causation.

Okay, I guess that works. Maybe not. How are they different in kind for the compatibilists?

crc

[TomJrzk]

How are they different in kind for the compatibilists?
Well, when Compatibilists stipulate that Free Will (CFW) excludes deterministic causal effects, they have to have something besides causation to identify phenomena that affect CFW; compulsion is a fine word for that. That, to me, is different in kind.

When I deny Free Will (LFW) because of determinism, then that compulsion is merely an effect from some other human, who is also deterministic. So, compulsion is actually causal, but through another human. That, to me, is different in degree only.

So, when Compatibilists force, through definition, a larger distinction between causation and compulsion, then accuse those who don't share that distinction of not being able to understand such an obvious concept and having defective thinking that conflates the terms, I'm not that happy a camper.

I do have defective thinking. I do, I do, I do... No, sorry, I'm not as convinced as the cowardly lion.
I hope this post positively contributes to the thread.

I guess that first date didn't go very well, since it's obvious that you don't much care for dead dogs. .....Or, is this in reference to something I've posted???

[fast]

Well, when Compatibilists stipulate that Free Will (CFW) excludes deterministic causal effects,

What? When do they do that? The compatibilists (in addition to the other determinists; hence, I’m including the hard determinists) say that all events have antecedent causes. So, it's such the case that both the hard determinist and soft determinist agree that there's nothing (including free will) that is excluded from the stronghold of our deterministic world. So, it's not true what you said. It's not true that "Compatibilists stipulate that Free Will (CFW) excludes deterministic causal effects."

[kennethamy]

Well, when Compatibilists stipulate that Free Will (CFW) excludes deterministic causal effects, they have to have something besides causation to identify phenomena that affect CFW; compulsion is a fine word for that. That, to me, is different in kind.



Why do you think that Compatibilists think that when someone is compelled to do something, he is not caused to do that thing?

To repeat (for the nth time) All compulsions are causes. Some causes are not compulsions.

If I compel you at the point of a gun to hand me your wallet, then, certainly, I am causing you to hand over your wallet.

[TomJrzk]

What? When do they do that? The compatibilists (in addition to the other determinists; hence, I’m including the hard determinists) say that all events have antecedent causes. So, it's such the case that both the hard determinist and soft determinist agree that there's nothing (including free will) that is excluded from the stronghold of our deterministic world. So, it's not true what you said. It's not true that "Compatibilists stipulate that Free Will (CFW) excludes deterministic causal effects."
I'm saying that their definition of Free Will explicitly excludes determinist causal effects, per the bolded of "According to Hume, free will should not be understood as an absolute ability to have chosen differently under exactly the same inner and outer circumstances. Rather, it is a hypothetical ability to have chosen differently if one had been differently psychologically disposed by some different beliefs or desires."

To me, removing "an absolute ability to have chosen differently under exactly the same inner and outer circumstances" is a way of dismissing the effects of determinism for the sake of the definition. Determinism explicitly prohibits "an absolute ability to have chosen differently under exactly the same inner and outer circumstances"; you will make the same choice every time.

[TomJrzk]

Why do you think that Compatibilists think that when someone is compelled to do something, he is not caused to do that thing?
I don't. I'm saying that compatibilists add the extra step (because of their definition of CFW) that I don't. So they say A -> B -> C, while I say B -> C. Or Compulsion leads to causation, which leads to event vs cause leads to event. Compulsion, in Tom's world, is only an intermediate step through the definition of CFW. Compulsion is a type of causation, so I think nothing of the kind, and I'm sorry if I've led you to believe that.

[fast]

Tom,

I'm trying buddy, and I do see what you're saying; I'm just struggling here, so bare with me.

If this doesn’t make a lick of sense to anyone, just remember, that is apparently what fits well with philosophy.

Just speculating here, but what if we considered incorporating a dash of Pitman’s shorthand to the equation. What would happen if we made things a tad longer by describing the referent of the pertinent terms in terms of existence? Would that shed things in a different light?

For example, if an event is caused, and if the cause reduces to being physical in nature, then when we speak of a cause, we're actually referring to an event with a physical cause (where physical is one of the three states of existence).

When we look at compulsion (as opposed to a cause, now referred to as physical cause--hence the Pitman remark), could it be that compulsion is an animal of a different sort—not only because there are differences but because of the difference in the nature of the type of existence.

For example, I may choose not to speed because of the law, and it's not the law that causes me not to speed, but it is the law that compels me not to speed, so notice, that it's not compulsion of a physical nature.

Could the recognition that compulsion and causation being two different forms of existence possibly be of some importance?

So, we had cause and compulsion without Pitman, and now with Pitman’s guidance, we have physical cause and abstract compulsion. Since physical is not abstract, then that may (or may not) put a damper on your objections.

Grasping for straws.

[TomJrzk]

I'm just struggling here, so bare with me.
I'm not sure our date went well enough that I bare with you; I will try to bear with you, though ;). And thanks for your efforts.

I think I understand compulsion and causation in the CFW world. Beating these terms further into my head will not change my feelings toward free will.

I think we will continue to have these term problems until we agree on the basic definition of Free Will. That's the root of the problem.

I don't think I can accept CFW since I think it's a bad idea to hide the truth from deluded people so they can feel better. I think it's more important to be clear than to be politically correct.

If one is a Determinist then a lot of things follow from that. One of the things that I think should follow is that we really don't have free will. "Spiritual" people studying compatibilist determinists will forget the determinist caveat and think that many people on IIDB support free will, and their idea of it at that.

And, yes, I know that we have thinking brains that make choices (and it's important in many venues to discuss those choices), but those choices are determined.

[kennethamy]

I don't. I'm saying that compatibilists add the extra step (because of their definition of CFW) that I don't. So they say A -> B -> C, while I say B -> C. Or Compulsion leads to causation, which leads to event vs cause leads to event. Compulsion, in Tom's world, is only an intermediate step through the definition of CFW. Compulsion is a type of causation, so I think nothing of the kind, and I'm sorry if I've led you to believe that.

And all the compatibilist is saying is that just because an action (choice) is caused, it doesn't follow that the action isn't free. But that the action is not free only if the cause of the action is of a particular kind, namely a cause that is a compelling cause. So, it isn't that because my action is caused that it isn't a free action; it is because my action is caused in a certain way, that it isn't a free action.
Freedom is not freedom from causation, but freedom from compulsion.

You ask for a definition of "free will". When a person is not acting under compulsion, but doing as he pleases, the person is acting "of his own free will". (Now there are caveats. If his pleasing to do what he does is caused in a certain way: e.g. post-hypnotic suggestion, or drugs, or, in general, if under normal circumstances, he would not have pleased to do what he is doing, but is pleased to do what he is doing because he is under a special influence, then the person is not acting of his own free will even if he is pleased to do what he is doing).

Of course, compulsion is a particular type of causation, and it is when that particular type of causation occurs that the individual is not acting freely. The question for you is why you think that just the fact that the action was caused alone negates the freedom of the action. David Hume diagnosed that view as partly based on a skewed view of causation.

[TomJrzk]

Freedom is not freedom from causation, but freedom from compulsion.
Is that written in stone somewhere? Does everyone in the world except for me accept that as obvious?

If not, I think it's important to clarify that at the outset of a discussion on free will; you can argue apples against oranges for quite a long time.

[wiploc]

I'm saying that their definition of Free Will explicitly excludes determinist causal effects, per the bolded of "According to Hume, free will should not be understood as an absolute ability to have chosen differently under exactly the same inner and outer circumstances. Rather, it is a hypothetical ability to have chosen differently if one had been differently psychologically disposed by some different beliefs or desires."

To me, removing "an absolute ability to have chosen differently under exactly the same inner and outer circumstances" is a way of dismissing the effects of determinism for the sake of the definition. Determinism explicitly prohibits "an absolute ability to have chosen differently under exactly the same inner and outer circumstances"; you will make the same choice every time.

I don't read the bolded language the way you do. I think libertarians think (depending on what is meant by "inner") that free will means neither inner nor outer circumstances determine your choices. Hume is saying that compatibilists reject that notion, that they believe our choices are determined.

crc

[kennethamy]

Is that written in stone somewhere? Does everyone in the world except for me accept that as obvious?

If not, I think it's important to clarify that at the outset of a discussion on free will; you can argue apples against oranges for quite a long time.

It is not written in stone anywhere. But so what? Have you some argument or some objection? At least that is how we ordinarily talk and think, when we believe that someone has acted of his own free-will. Have you some reason to think that is wrong? That is the apple. What is your orange?

[kennethamy]

Is that written in stone somewhere? Does everyone in the world except for me accept that as obvious?

If not, I think it's important to clarify that at the outset of a discussion on free will; you can argue apples against oranges for quite a long time.

It is not written in stone anywhere. But so what? Have you some argument or some objection? At least that is how we ordinarily talk and think, when we believe that someone has acted of his own free-will. Have you some reason to think that is wrong? That is the apple. What is your orange?

[wiploc]

Is that written in stone somewhere? Does everyone in the world except for me accept that as obvious?

I think compatibilists will tend to agree with it.

crc

[kennethamy]

I think compatibilists will tend to agree with it.

crc

Well, they should, since it is a cornerstone of compatibilism. But, it is obvious that it is not obvious that freedom is freedom from compulsion, not from causation, since so many people disagree with it, and they would not if it were obvious. Obviously. But I don't think that compatibilists (like me) maintain that the view that freedom is freedom from compulsion, not from causation, is obviously true, but only true.

As a matter of fact, the great philosopher, Kant, (commenting on Hume's compatibilism) called it, "a wretched subterfuge". So, Kant did not find it true, much less obviously true.

[wiploc]

Well, they should, since it is a cornerstone of compatibilism. But, it is obvious that it is not obvious that freedom is freedom from compulsion, not from causation, since so many people disagree with it, and they would not if it were obvious. Obviously. But I don't think that compatibilists (like me) maintain that the view that freedom is freedom from compulsion, not from causation, is obviously true, but only true.

As a matter of fact, the great philosopher, Kant, (commenting on Hume's compatibilism) called it, "a wretched subterfuge". So, Kant did not find it true, much less obviously true.

So, was Kant a compatibilist? Because libertarians and hard determinists aren't going to agree that it's true, but they might be able to agree that compatibilists think it's true. Even as compatibilists can agree that they (libertarians and hard determinists) think compatibilism is a wretched subterfuge.

crc

[kennethamy]

So, was Kant a compatibilist? Because libertarians and hard determinists aren't going to agree that it's true, but they might be able to agree that compatibilists think it's true. Even as compatibilists can agree that they (libertarians and hard determinists) think compatibilism is a wretched subterfuge.

crc

Obviously not, since Kant called compatibilism "a wretched subterfuge". That would not indicate agreement with compatibilism to me. Kant was a kind of libertarian (although his position is hard to classify). Kant certainly thought that freedom required the absence of causation not merely compulsion.

Of course, hard determinists and libertarians will agree that compatibilists think that freedom is the absence of compulsion, not causation. If they don't, then they are ignorant of what compatibilism is. Compatibilists think that compatibilism is true, just as Republicans think that republicanism is true. If they did not think compatibilism was true, they would not be compatibilists. I don't understand what you are trying to say. Everyone who thinks something is true, thinks that something is true. That's an empty tautology. But, of course, there is a big difference between thinking that A is true, and A being true.

[wiploc]

Obviously not, since Kant called compatibilism "a wretched subterfuge". That would not indicate agreement with compatibilism to me. Kant was a kind of libertarian (although his position is hard to classify). Kant certainly thought that freedom required the absence of causation not merely compulsion.

Of course, hard determinists and libertarians will agree that compatibilists think that freedom is the absence of compulsion, not causation. If they don't, then they are ignorant of what compatibilism is. Compatibilists think that compatibilism is true, just as Republicans think that republicanism is true. If they did not think compatibilism was true, they would not be compatibilists. I don't understand what you are trying to say. Everyone who thinks something is true, thinks that something is true. That's an empty tautology. But, of course, there is a big difference between thinking that A is true, and A being true.

I'm not sure this isn't more trouble explaining than it's worth. I'll just say that maybe I misunderstood what Tom asked, and the intent of your answer.

crc

[kennethamy]

I'm not sure this isn't more trouble explaining than it's worth. I'll just say that maybe I misunderstood what Tom asked, and the intent of your answer.

crc

I think that Tom believes that when we in ordinary life and conversation say that someone acted of his own free will, when we mean, he did as he pleased, we are simply ignorant of , and ignoring the fact, that determinism is true, and that although we can often do as we please, we cannot please as we please. Now, it may very well be true that ordinary conversation and ordinary thought is ignorant of, or ignores determinism. But, it seems to me that the more important question is whether that makes any difference. Suppose it is true that we cannot please as we please (and I am not sure that it is true, and that sometimes we cannot change what we please to do in the light of how we feel about it) that obviously does not mean that we cannot often do as we please, and if we can, why isn't that acting freely. And, then, as I just mentioned, it doesn't really seem true that we cannot sometimes change our minds about what we please to do.

[TomJrzk]

I think that Tom believes that when we in ordinary life and conversation say that someone acted of his own free will, when we mean, he did as he pleased, we are simply ignorant of , and ignoring the fact, that determinism is true, and that although we can often do as we please, we cannot please as we please.
Yes, very well put. Thank you.

I think with "wretched subterfuge" Kant was referring to the change in definition that created CFW. It seems so dishonest to me. I think Compatibilists were hard determinists that got tired of being called "grumpy" as some people like to call what's left of the hard determinists, who are put into an incredibly small box. Determinism really does have some impact on people's feeling of control, I think determinists shouldn't hide that.

Now, I would have less of a problem if the first mention of Compatibilism in a thread included the definition of CFW. At any rate, maybe Fast might see some chance to be more helpful in his matrix.

[kennethamy]

Yes, very well put. Thank you.

I think with "wretched subterfuge" Kant was referring to the change in definition that created CFW. It seems so dishonest to me. I think Compatibilists were hard determinists that got tired of being called "grumpy" as some people like to call what's left of the hard determinists, who are put into an incredibly small box. Determinism really does have some impact on people's feeling of control, I think determinists shouldn't hide that.

Now, I would have less of a problem if the first mention of Compatibilism in a thread included the definition of CFW. At any rate, maybe Fast might see some chance to be more helpful in his matrix.

But aren't you ignoring the rest of my post, namely: (Sorry I am quoting myself).

"Now, it may very well be true that ordinary conversation and ordinary thought is ignorant of, or ignores determinism. But, it seems to me that the more important question is whether that makes any difference. Suppose it is true that we cannot please as we please (and I am not sure that it is true, and that sometimes we cannot change what we please to do in the light of how we feel about it) that obviously does not mean that we cannot often do as we please, and if we can, why isn't that acting freely. And, then, as I just mentioned, it doesn't really seem true that we cannot sometimes change our minds about what we please to do."

I don't think there was any "change of definition" on the part of compatibilism. Aristotle wrote about freedom of the will quite a long time ago. And he meant by it, doing as one pleased. He examined the various kind of ways that we sometimes cannot do as we please such as when we do something out of ignorance, or we make a mistake. The idea of scientific determinism had not then arrived, of course, but Aristotle did raise something akin to it. If anything, it was the incompatibilists who suggested a change of definition from the original sense of "acting freely". Anyway, unless I am mistaken, even you would say that if acting freely were only a matter of doing as one pleases, then people would have be able to act freely, but that acting freely is not just a matter of doing as one pleases, but also of pleasing as one pleases. And you think that scientific determinism prevents us from pleasing as we please. But is that really true? Suppose, for example that I not only pleased to marry Mary, but that it also pleases me that I am pleased to marry Mary. Why does the fact that my being pleased to be pleased to marry Mary is causally determined, matter?

I think that it was Kant who was grumpy when he called Hume's compatibilism a "wretched subterfuge". Kant was a libertarian because he thought that on some level, the actions of people were undetermined, but to hold that view, Kant had to posit a very implausible theory of bifurcation of reality and of people. So maybe he was grumpy about Hume's neater solution.

[A_M]

I think with "wretched subterfuge" Kant was referring to the change in definition that created CFW. It seems so dishonest to me. I think Compatibilists were hard determinists that got tired of being called "grumpy" as some people like to call what's left of the hard determinists, who are put into an incredibly small box. Determinism really does have some impact on people's feeling of control, I think determinists shouldn't hide that.I think the key point here is "feeling of control". I think that many compatibilists believe we have all the control we want, and whatever extra "control" would be enabled by having non-deterministic free will is not a particularly desirable form of control.

I also disagree that the CFW definition is dishonest. I think most discussions of free will arise from the fear of losing moral responsibility, and I still don't think anyone so far has come up with a good argument for claiming that LFW is required for moral responsibility. So it may well be that most will offer the LFW version when asked for a definition of free will, but what they really want is CFW.

[kennethamy]

I think the key point here is "feeling of control". I think that many compatibilists believe we have all the control we want, and whatever extra "control" would be enabled by having non-deterministic free will is not a particularly desirable form of control.

I also disagree that the CFW definition is dishonest. I think most discussions of free will arise from the fear of losing moral responsibility, and I still don't think anyone so far has come up with a good argument for claiming that LFW is required for moral responsibility. So it may well be that most will offer the LFW version when asked for a definition of free will, but what they really want is CFW.

"I think most discussions of free will arise from the fear of losing moral responsibility...."

Well, maybe, but I hear a lot of talk about people not wanting to be "robots" or "just machines". In any case, whether or not it has to do with "feeling control" that's only a matter of motive for rejecting determinism, and has nothing to do with the philosophical issue.

[TomJrzk]

And, then, as I just mentioned, it doesn't really seem true that we cannot sometimes change our minds about what we please to do.
That doesn't sound logical, coming from a determinist. Seems like the mind changes itself, and so does what we please. I doubt that you're going to offer a mechanism that contains this ability to change the mind, which would have to be outside the mind (brain) to not mean the mind changing itself.

I didn't comment on the rest of your post because I thought that wiploc's definition of me as someone who agrees with the facts of Compatibilism but the nomenclature of the Libertarian showed that I agreed with most of what you wrote so eloquently. Yes, I believe in the Compatibilist's will; it's all we know about, all we get, and all we'd ever want. But it's not free.

I've tried, but I can't accept the definition of CFW. Not because it's wrong, but because it's terribly misleading, and probably intentionally so. Especially the way it was introduced in this thread; it seemed much more like a political maneuver than science. Early on, Fast talked of the robot feeling that he was not fond of. You could have come right out and said that we can not please what we please, so Fast will have to come to his own terms with that feeling. You could have recited earlier the definition of CFW, but you didn't. You already knew of Kant's indictment of CFW as a wretched subterfuge, yet you were a proponent of it. (OK, maybe you don't accept it as an indictment.)

I thought my analogy of dizziness was subtly closer to free will than was wiploc's analogy of mirages, since dizziness is real while that water is not. Everything is deterministic (even QM, in my opinion though I can not prove it). Part of that determinism is our feeling of free will, just like the illusion of the room still spinning, which we call dizziness, is real, so too is this illusion of the free will of the brain. It's real and it's all we'd want; even if ('especially since', for some) it's deterministic. We can still choose corn flakes over fruit loops because that's what our determinitic brain wants; why would we want it to be otherwise? Why would we not want our personality to dictate our choices?

The feeling of free will is not diminished by a belief in determinism; in fact, it's heightened. I feel much more free now that when I was at the mercy of the whims of unknowable gods. We ought to confront the loss of free will with the facts, not hide it as Compatibilists seem to strive to do.

[kennethamy]

That doesn't sound logical, coming from a determinist. Seems like the mind changes itself, and so does what we please. I doubt that you're going to offer a mechanism that contains this ability to change the mind, which would have to be outside the mind (brain) to not mean the mind changing itself.

I didn't comment on the rest of your post because I thought that wiploc's definition of me as someone who agrees with the facts of Compatibilism but the nomenclature of the Libertarian showed that I agreed with most of what you wrote so eloquently. Yes, I believe in the Compatibilist's will; it's all we know about, all we get, and all we'd ever want. But it's not free.

I've tried, but I can't accept the definition of CFW. Not because it's wrong, but because it's terribly misleading, and probably intentionally so. Especially the way it was introduced in this thread; it seemed much more like a political maneuver than science. Early on, Fast talked of the robot feeling that he was not fond of. You could have come right out and said that we can not please what we please, so Fast will have to come to his own terms with that feeling. You could have recited earlier the definition of CFW, but you didn't. You already knew of Kant's indictment of CFW as a wretched subterfuge, yet you were a proponent of it. (OK, maybe you don't accept it as an indictment.)

I thought my analogy of dizziness was subtly closer to free will than was wiploc's analogy of mirages, since dizziness is real while that water is not. Everything is deterministic (even QM, in my opinion though I can not prove it). Part of that determinism is our feeling of free will, just like the illusion of the room still spinning, which we call dizziness, is real, so too is this illusion of the free will of the brain. It's real and it's all we'd want; even if ('especially since', for some) it's deterministic. We can still choose corn flakes over fruit loops because that's what our determinitic brain wants; why would we want it to be otherwise? Why would we not want our personality to dictate our choices?

The feeling of free will is not diminished by a belief in determinism; in fact, it's heightened. I feel much more free now that when I was at the mercy of the whims of unknowable gods. We ought to confront the loss of free will with the facts, not hide it as Compatibilists seem to strive to do.

I don't know what you mean by "the compatibilist's will" (what a curious phrase!) but I suppose you mean when you say that compatibilist's will "is not free" that when the compatibilist (and if the compatibilist is right, then not only the compatibilist, but everyone) wants to do something, and he does it, that his wanting to do what he did was caused. Isn't that right. But the part I still don't agree with is your assumption that if what is want to do is the result of being caused, that it is not free. I keep asking you to argue for that assumption, but you never do so. But, that is the crux of the matter, isn't it? Why do you say that if, for instance, my wanting to marry Mary is caused by my belief that she is pretty, and intelligent, and kind, that my wanting to marry Mary "is not free"? What's not free about it? I know, that it is caused. But that is what I am asking you: why if it is caused by the factors I just mentioned, is my wish to marry Mary (say "marry Mary" three times, fast) not free? Not just because it is caused. If you think so, then why do you think so. Is it "set in stone" (to use your words) that just because an action or a want for an action is caused, it is not free?

[fast]

Fast will have to come to his own terms with that feeling.And so too does anyone else who can feel and appreciate the thorny implications of determinism as you and I can.

I am free, and I am free because my mind is free, and what it is that my mind is free from is the compulsion of others, and because I am free (thus my mind is free) from such compulsion, I therefore have free will. Call me your friendly can kicker.

I am free, like I said, and like I said, I have free will, but to say of me that I have free will is not to say of me that I am still not within the clutches of the wretched deterministic world of causation. Woe is me in that I am not free from causation--I AM NOT FREE from the seeming whims of the deterministic universe. <not to personify of course>.

It may be (or it may not be) a kicking of the can to talk of free will as a freedom from compulsion instead of as a freedom from causation, but be it a kicking (or not a kicking--as the case may or may not be), the feeling is brought on by the implications of being a determinist--irrespective of the soft or hard distinction.

When I flip a coin over, I see tails, and when I flip it back, I see heads. When you flip over determinism, you see lack of free will--and where that kicked can rightfully belongs is anyone’s guess, but for the sake of argument, assume (if you will) that free will is a matter of compulsion and not a matter of causation. Once that has happened, you will no longer see lack of free will when determinism has been flipped on its head.

You'll then see what I see--indeterminism. Clearly, they are not compatible: we cannot live both in a deterministic world and an indeterministic world, and it's only being in the deterministic world that creates the woe in our long lost, early-on fast.

[kennethamy]

And so too does anyone else who can feel and appreciate the thorny implications of determinism as you and I can.

I am free, and I am free because my mind is free, and what it is that my mind is free from is the compulsion of others, and because I am free (thus my mind is free) from such compulsion, I therefore have free will. Call me your friendly can kicker.



I know what it feels like to be free of compulsion. Suppose someone is restraining me by holding my arms very tightly so I cannot move them, and then I am released. That is the feeling of freedom from compulsion. And, of course, I know, by contrast, what it feels like to be compelled (in this case, restrained). So, that is the kind of feeling of freedom (and restraint) I am familiar with.

But another kind of feeling of freedom is what is being referred to by Tom, and (maybe) by you. This is supposed to be the feeling of acting without cause (which according to Tom, we never have, since all our actions are determined). And, I suppose, by contrast, since we are determined, we are never acting without being caused to act. Now it is this kind of feeling of either not being determined, or of being determined, that I am puzzled about. What, I wonder, would the feeling of not being determined, or of my action not being caused, feel like? Suppose I reach for something on a shelf. Now, according to Tom (and others) my action is caused, and, therefore, I am not acting freely. Isn't that right? But, on the other hand, according to Tom and others, I have the "illusion" of freedom. So, although I am not free, i.e. I am caused to reach for something on the shelf, and so, I am not free. So, I suppose that this "illusion" of freedom, is the illusion of feeling uncaused. Isn't that right? But is, for example,the feeling of reaching for something on the shelf the feeling of acting without a cause ("contra-causally")? Is that what it would feel like to act contra-causally (even if, remember, I am not acting contra-causally)?

I would have thought that when I just reach for the shelf, the feeling I am experiencing is just the feeling of not being compelled, not the feeling of not being caused.

So, I am just trying to figure out how this "illusion" of freedom, which Tom and others say is the illusion of not being caused, different from the feeling of freedom which is the feeling of not being compelled. How is the feeling of not being compelled (I can recognize that feeling) different from the feeling of just not being caused (which, of course, if determinism is true, I never have). In other words, how can I have the illusion of a feeling which I have never experienced?

[TomJrzk]

But the part I still don't agree with is your assumption that if what is want to do is the result of being caused, that it is not free. I keep asking you to argue for that assumption, but you never do so.
I thought I made it clear that there are 2 definitions of 'free will'. You keep asking me questions based on your definition of free will. I don't share your definition, if I did then I would have no argument with you. Though I know exactly what you mean, I do not share your definition because I think it's unfair and confusing to the general population. If you're still teaching, it might be interesting to poll your students on the first day to find out what they think of as free will. Do they think free will means they can make different choices given the same conditions (LFW) or they can make choices based on their personality, even though those choices are caused (CFW)? I'll vote for Door #1, which I think would make my case.

I also understand Fast's point about determinism accounting for the LFW part of the definition; I actually typed in the point myself before I erased it so as to not put words in his mouth. But that's useful only once you're neck deep in it. It's not what I would assume anyone entering a thread about free will already understands. In fact, there is another thread that I saw recently where someone asked if free will and something else are mutually exclusive (?) and they were deluged with thoughts coming from both directions, without defining free will.

Again, I agree with Compatibilist's thoughts on the matter but prefer the LFW definition so people can understand. So my answer is 'yes, if you think free will is CFW, then whom you choose to marry is probably a free choice but, if you think as I do that free will is LFW, then no, what you think is intelligent and the value you put on intelligence is determined; you will always choose Mary, so it's not REALLY a choice'.

Oh, and you didn't address my inclusion of the work 'intentionally' in my earlier post.

[TomJrzk]

How is the feeling of not being compelled (I can recognize that feeling) different from the feeling of just not being caused (which, of course, if determinism is true, I never have). In other words, how can I have the illusion of a feeling which I have never experienced?
Libertarians reject determinism. Their choices are not made by a deterministic brain, they are made by a spirit or soul that lies somewhere beyond the brain. Their choices are not caused by anything, they just pop into their heads, or soul, or whatever. Now, THAT'S freedom!!!!!

[kennethamy]

Libertarians reject determinism. Their choices are not made by a deterministic brain, they are made by a spirit or soul that lies somewhere beyond the brain. Their choices are not caused by anything, they just pop into their heads, or soul, or whatever. Now, THAT'S freedom!!!!!

But I thought we were talking about the feeling of freedom. You said that what people say is that they "feel" free. And, according to you, that is only an illusion. But what is it an illusion of? Feeling uncaused? But, what does the feeling of being uncaused feel like? Is it anything like the feeling of not being compelled? How could there be the feeling of our being uncaused, if we are not never uncaused. The question is not of being uncaused, but of feeling uncaused. I agree with you that Libertarianism is mysterious. But I don't think we have such a thing as the illusion of freewill. And if any non-philosophers believe they have free will, what they believe is that they are not being compelled. Not that their actions are uncaused. And, if you explained to such people that their actions or preferences were caused, they might agree, but wonder why that mattered, as long as the causes were not of a certain kind.
The Libertarian seems to me a straw-man. Libertarians agree with you more than they agree with me. For they also agree that freedom is the absence of causation. And isn't that the issue?

[kennethamy]

I thought I made it clear that there are 2 definitions of 'free will'. You keep asking me questions based on your definition of free will. I don't share your definition, if I did then I would have no argument with you. Though I know exactly what you mean, I do not share your definition because I think it's unfair and confusing to the general population. If you're still teaching, it might be interesting to poll your students on the first day to find out what they think of as free will. Do they think free will means they can make different choices given the same conditions (LFW) or they can make choices based on their personality, even though those choices are caused (CFW)? I'll vote for Door #1, which I think would make my case.

I also understand Fast's point about determinism accounting for the LFW part of the definition; I actually typed in the point myself before I erased it so as to not put words in his mouth. But that's useful only once you're neck deep in it. It's not what I would assume anyone entering a thread about free will already understands. In fact, there is another thread that I saw recently where someone asked if free will and something else are mutually exclusive (?) and they were deluged with thoughts coming from both directions, without defining free will.

Again, I agree with Compatibilist's thoughts on the matter but prefer the LFW definition so people can understand. So my answer is 'yes, if you think free will is CFW, then whom you choose to marry is probably a free choice but, if you think as I do that free will is LFW, then no, what you think is intelligent and the value you put on intelligence is determined; you will always choose Mary, so it's not REALLY a choice'.

Oh, and you didn't address my inclusion of the work 'intentionally' in my earlier post.

I don't know how the students would vote, since before they had been initiated into the arcana of the freewill debate, I don't think they would know what I was talking about. But, you know that theorizing about something is one thing, and very different, from how something is actually dealt with. Lexicographers (dictionary editors) for instance never ask informants what the meanings of words are, because native speakers have the most peculiar theories about what the meanings of words are. For instance, a lot of people will say that the word "understand" has something to do with standing under a concept or an idea. Even if that meant anything, it would have nothing to do with how speakers of English actually use the term understand. So, if you asked anyone who was a speaker of English what "freewill" meant, they might offer a host of peculiar theories. But those would have nothing to do with how they actually used the phrase, "I did it of my own freewill". If you asked the students the kind of question you suggested, you would be asking them to be philosophers (which is pretty dangerous) and not trying to discover how they actually use phrases like, "I did it of my own free will". There may be a number of philosophical definitions of "free-will", but what would that tell us about how people actually use the term? Not much. But I bet that compatibilism reflects pretty accurately how the phrase, "I did it of my own freewill" is actually used, as contrasted with how it is theorized about. As you say, that may be because people who speak ordinary language are ordinary people, and are ignorant of the fact that our preferences are caused. But then, that raises the question of why that matters, particularly since, as I have been arguing, causes are not all the same, and insofar as it matters that our preferences are caused, it also matters what sort of causes are operating.

"You could have come right out and said that we can not please what we please"

True, I could have done so. But why should I when I don't believe that is true? We sometimes reflect on what we please to do, and then we please to do something else. Otherwise, we act on impulse, and I, for one, try not to act on impulse. And, I suppose, neither do you. (When I wrote that although we can do as we please, we cannot please as we please, I was characterizing the view of hard determinism. I can characterize a view without espousing the view. You can expound without espousing.

[TomJrzk]

And if any non-philosophers believe they have free will, what they believe is that they are not being compelled. Not that their actions are uncaused.
Maybe in your world that is always true.

But some people reject determinism. They say that their choices ARE uncaused, by the brain or anything else but (maybe) their 'soul'. Compatibilists don't seem to believe that, but, luckily, they can whitewash right over that with talks of walks and marriages that ignore the uncaused. That bottomless cake must be quite good.

[kennethamy]

Maybe in your world that is always true.

But some people reject determinism. They say that their choices ARE uncaused, by the brain or anything else but (maybe) their 'soul'. Compatibilists don't seem to believe that, but, luckily, they can whitewash right over that with talks of walks and marriages that ignore the uncaused. That bottomless cake must be quite good.

It's not a question of anyone's world. It is a question of observing how a phrase, "Joe married Mary of his own free will" (with the implied, "No one made him") is actually used in common discourse, rather than how people (theologians, or philosophers, or psychologists, etc. ) theorize about what it means to say "Joe married Mary of his own free-will" . Maybe we should not talk that way because determinism is true, but that is the way people who are not theorists (or are not trying to be theorists) do talk. (Maybe people should not say, "the Sun will rise at 5 am tomorrow morning" in view of the fact that Copernicus was right, and Ptolemy was wrong: but people do talk about sunrise, and sunset, even when they believe that Copernicus was right). Of course, there is a difference. It is true that the phrase that the sun will rise tomorrow morning is just a manner of speaking, and all educated people know that it is the Earth that is rotating on its axis, and the Sun is not (relatively) moving. But I am not so sure as you are that determinism (which is, not itself, the name of anything very clear) implies that it is never true that people do anything of their own free will. You still have not presented any argument to show that it follows from the mere fact that my action was caused, that my action is not done freely.

[TomJrzk]

We sometimes reflect on what we please to do, and then we please to do something else. Otherwise, we act on impulse, and I, for one, try not to act on impulse.
Yikes, another illogical statement coming from a determinist. With what do we reflect if it's not a part of the deterministic brain?

I, as a Hard Determinist, do not necessarily act always on impulse. I do, however, understand that reflecting on what we please to do is deterministic; we could not do otherwise. Are you saying that you don't believe that? Are you really a Compatibilist who believes in determinism?

Also, I think it would make your lexicon argument meaningless if you posed the question to the students as the two possibilities I listed; even more so if you answered any questions about the terms.

[TomJrzk]

You still have not presented any argument to show that it follows from the mere fact that my action was caused, that my action is not done freely.
How many times must I say this? Is wiploc's 10 the appropriate limit? Given your definition of 'freely' I do NOT argue what you want me to show. I agree with you.

[kennethamy]

Yikes, another illogical statement coming from a determinist. With what do we reflect if it's not a part of the deterministic brain?

I, as a Hard Determinist, do not necessarily act always on impulse. I do, however, understand that reflecting on what we please to do is deterministic; we could not do otherwise. Are you saying that you don't believe that? Are you really a Compatibilist who believes in determinism?

Also, I think it would make your lexicon argument meaningless if you posed the question to the students as the two possibilities I listed; even more so if you answered any questions about the terms.

Sure it is "deterministic" if that means that my reflection was caused. Of course it was caused. But now, so what? Does that mean it was not reflection on my preferences, and that, as a result of the reflection I did not change my mind and did not act impulsively? You use the term "deterministic" as a kind of mantra. The fact that my reflection was caused does not show that the reflection was not something I did. Slipping on the ice and falling down is not something I did. It is something that happened to me, and something I did not want to happen. But having an impulse to say something insulting to someone, and reflecting on the consequences of doing that, and refraining from doing it, is something I did, and wanted to do. You talk as if everything I do is like slipping on the ice. Something that just happens to me.

Sure, I could pose the two possibilities to the students, and turn them into innocent theorists by stacking the deck. But would that mean that I would discover not what they willy-nilly philosophize about free will (and why should I care about that, any more than a lexicographer would care about what an informant believes the meaning of "understand" is?) but learn how they actually use the term in ordinary discourse?

[TomJrzk]

It's not a question of anyone's world. It is a question of observing how a phrase, "Joe married Mary of his own free will" (with the implied, "No one made him") is actually used in common discourse, rather than how people (theologians, or philosophers, or psychologists, etc. ) theorize about what it means to say "Joe married Mary of his own free-will" .
Yes, it is a question of which world. Because your world contains your definition of 'free will'. My world does not.

I actually believe that your statement is pretty hard to prove:
And if any non-philosophers believe they have free will, what they believe is that they are not being compelled. Not that their actions are uncaused.
I believe that some people believe their actions are uncaused by the deterministic brain.

And, yes, determinism is something I must repeat pretty often, and it makes a pretty comforting mantra. With my LFW definition, everything we do is like slipping on the ice, it's deterministic.

[kennethamy]

Yes, it is a question of which world. Because your world contains your definition of 'free will'. My world does not.

I actually believe that your statement is pretty hard to prove:

I believe that some people believe their actions are uncaused by the deterministic brain.

And, yes, determinism is something I must repeat pretty often, and it makes a pretty comforting mantra. With my LFW definition, everything we do is like slipping on the ice, it's deterministic.

I'll drop the "different worlds" talk, since I don't understand it. But don't you think there is a difference between pretending to slip on the ice (as a circus clown might pretend to slip on a banana peel) and actually slipping on the ice (as a person might actually slip on a banana peel) Or pretending to sneeze, and sneezing. Sure, both kinds of things are determined, but that doesn't mean there is no difference between them. For instance, how they are determined? The clown intends to slip, the poor guy who slipped and broke his leg did not intend to slip. He slipped accidentally. Why does the fact that both kinds of events are determined erase the obvious difference between them?

[TomJrzk]

But don't you think there is a difference between pretending to slip on the ice (as a circus clown might pretend to slip on a banana peel) and actually slipping on the ice
Sure. I don't call the latter free will, though. I call that CFW, which is not free; it's totally dependent on the state of the brain.

[kennethamy]

Sure. I don't call the latter free will, though. I call that CFW, which is not free; it's totally dependent on the state of the brain.

Well, forgetting the word "free" what do you think is the difference between accidentally slipping on a banana peel, and intentionally slipping on a banana peel (like a circus clown)? Suppose the person who accidentally slips on the peel falls, and crashes against a child, and harms the child. And the clown also does the same thing intending to harm the child. Now, both of their actions are, as you say, determined. Do you think there's a difference?

You may be hung up on the term "free will", but don't be. One person's action was intentional. The other's was unintentional. Both were causally determined by all those brain states firing away. So, we won't call one of them an act of free-will, After all, "what's in a name?" If the term "free will" has all sorts of connotations for you; theological, perhaps, then that does not really matter. The issue is not the name but the facts of the case. Do you think we should distinguish between intentional and unintentional behavior?

[TomJrzk]

Do you think we should distinguish between intentional and unintentional behavior?
Sure. We already have the term 'willfully', even in law. We don't really need the 'free' to describe the difference (which I understand and accept) in your examples.

[kennethamy]

Sure. We already have the term 'willfully', even in law. We don't really need the 'free' to describe the difference (which I understand and accept) in your examples.

So, what is the difference between intentionally slipping on a banana peel, and slipping on a banana peel?

[TomJrzk]

So, what is the difference between intentionally slipping on a banana peel, and slipping on a banana peel?
OK, I'll bite: 'intention'? When someone's brain decides to weigh alternatives, then chooses one alternative, we say he willfully did something, he did it intentionally. That brain is deterministic, so it's decision to weigh alternatives and choose one was in the cards that were dealt. There's no free will.

But, we continue to repeat ourselves. We both are obviously stubborn, and at most one of us is right. I doubt we'll change each other's mind but wiploc said it pretty well: (I'm paraphrasing) the easier goal is not so much to change the mind of the arguer, it's to plant seeds of alternatives into the spectator; preferably ones with fertile, uncalcified minds. Philosophy is a very slow process.

So, here's my nutshell: you call lack of compulsion 'free will' (CFW); I call it will that is not free. I call lack of causation (determinism) 'free will' (LFW). So, to me, there will always be at least two definitions of 'free will'.

That's our only difference in opinion, if you are a Compatibilist.

[fast]

I know what it feels like to be free of compulsion. Suppose someone is restraining me by holding my arms very tightly so I cannot move them, and then I am released. That is the feeling of freedom from compulsion. And, of course, I know, by contrast, what it feels like to be compelled (in this case, restrained). So, that is the kind of feeling of freedom (and restraint) I am familiar with.To be imprisoned and then later released would be a good example to illustrate the point that you are making.

But another kind of feeling of freedom is what is being referred to by Tom, and (maybe) by you. This is supposed to be the feeling of acting without cause (which according to Tom, we never have, since all our actions are determined). I'm not so sure such a feeling can even be felt; moreover, I doubt there could be such a feeling.

If it so happened that some of our actions are uncaused, I doubt we would be able to differentiate between those that are and those that are not.

Tom's issue is the suspicion that things could not have happened in any other way than they did—since events are caused. When he looks at the current state of physical affairs (or envisions the precise arrangement of all matter), he acknowledges that a series of events took place to arrive at such a current state (as do you), but where you and he differs is that you think things could have turned out differently if something different had occurred, and though that's true, he doesn't think anything different could have occurred (but you do).

What, I wonder, would the feeling of not being determined, or of my action not being caused, feel like? Suppose I reach for something on a shelf. Now, according to Tom (and others) my action is caused, and, therefore, I am not acting freely. Isn't that right? Tom says we don't have free will, but he doesn't mean that. He agrees that we have free will--he can't admit it because he disagrees with the referent of the term, but that’s merely a semantic issue. What he means is that things could not have happened in any other way than they did, which makes him a hard determinist--no possibility that things could occurred differently.

He strongly agrees with determinism as opposed to libertarianism (and holds a view that definitely ought not be confused with fatalism), and his view is distinguished from compatibilism in that before mentioned distinction.

In essence, and to put things simply, he holds that the facts of the future are set in stone.

So, what’s the illusion talk all about? Well, I’ll tell ya, but first a caveat using your very own words which you can officially consider stolen by the way, “I can expound without espousing”. You think that things could have turned out differently if you had made different choices, and it’s true, things would have turned out differently had you made different choices, and it’s true that you may have made different choices, but all of this insinuates that the future is not set in stone, and if it’s such that the future is set in stone, then the thought that it’s not is the illusion.

[wiploc]

What he means is that things could not have happened in any other way than they did, which makes him a hard determinist--no possibility that things could occurred differently.

I thought that just made him a determinist, not a hard determinist. A hard determinist, if I understand, is one who is a determinist (per the statement quoted above) and who also doesn't think the term "free will" properly applies to that situation.

crc

[Cel]

Knock me and show me where to fall! I finally get it.

The robot’s actions are caused (but not compelled). The human’s actions are caused (and may or may not be compelled).

The robots actions are caused and thus determined (and never compelled)
The human actions are caused and thus determined (and may be compelled).

The laws of nature cause me to fall (but never compel me to fall)
The laws of man cannot cause me to drive slow (but can compel me to).

A key component in understanding compatibilist versus incompatibilist is to have an understanding between compulsion and cause.

Of course a determinst would argue that there isn't any true difference between compelled and caused. They would say that the laws of nature actually do cause you to drive slow, only people used the word "compelled" because they cannot readily observe the causes of a person's particular velocity.

[kennethamy]

Of course a determinst would argue that there isn't any true difference between compelled and caused. They would say that the laws of nature actually do cause you to drive slow, only people used the word "compelled" because they cannot readily observe the causes of a person's particular velocity.

Anything can be argued, but that need not make the argument sound, nor the conclusion of the argument true. All compulsion is, of course, causation. But the question is whether all causation is compulsion.
Clearly, for something (or someone) to be compelled to do something, it must be true that what is compelled does not want to do that thing. Otherwise, why call it "compulsion"? But, it is not true that, for instance, the Earth does not want to rotate on its axis. The Earth is an inanimate thing, and it has no wants or desires. However, the Earth is caused to rotate on its axis. Therefore, causation need not be compulsion. So, it has nothing to do with the observation of causes. It has to do with what the term "compulsion" means. If we turn to the case of a person, there may be a number of causes for Joe's choosing Mary to marry. Joe may cite Mary's beauty, her intelligence, her kindness, and last, but not least, her money. But all of those things are the causes of Joe's desire to marry Mary. But since Joe did not want not to desire to marry Mary, those causes did not compel Joe either to desire to marry Mary, or even to marry Mary.

[fast]

Tom says we don't have free will, but he doesn't mean that. He agrees that we have free will--he can't admit it because he disagrees with the referent of the term, but that’s merely a semantic issue.

What he means is that things could not have happened in any other way than they did, which makes him a hard determinist--no possibility that things could occurred differently.

Wiploc,

This is some complicated stuff, so let me go over it again to make sure I'm not tripping over myself.

I still stand by the idea that to be a hard determinist, one must be a determinist and not believe in free will, but just because one utters that one does not believe in free will does not mean that one doesn't believe in free will (certainly not to insinuate anyone's lying of course), for example, one could be mistaken about what ought to be called free will, but that's a semantic issue, and the real (non semantic) issue is still confusing in itself, so let me get to that.

Tom (in heart of hearts) regards freewill as the antichrist of determinism, in such that "if determinism, then no free will" and "if free will, then no determinism", and because of that, and because he believes in determinism, he is therefore a hard determinist. [the epitome of box 8].

The above holds true regardless of what semantic turmoil follows, but first, let me recap in a special kind of way--a way that captures the essence of what's truly going on. The implications of determinism (his view of it) are the actual crux of the matter. It's not free will...it's the implications of what it means to live in a deterministic world. To him (and the real free will notwithstanding), he views our current state of affairs as being on a timeline to which could not have ever become something other than it is. There's a sort of singularity going on where other possibilities do not exist. To him, it's not possible that Ken could have walked the mile this morning (if Ken did not walk this morning); it's no more possible that than when the dice is thrown that there's really truly a 1 in 6 chance that it'll land on a particular number. What it'll land on is "set in stone". The events are already in motion. What will happen will happen but only in the one way that it can...which is not the same as Ken's way of thinking. [remember my caveat Ken].

Back to you Wiploc,

Tom believes that we have what we call free will (which is something different), but it's more complicated, because what this means is that he both believes that we have free will and that we don't have free will, but it's only complicated--it's not contradictory, for the free will that he believes in is a free will of a different sort--not to say that there truly are two different free will's of course. I still stand by the fact that we can call something free will and it not be free will.

It's a little deeper than that even. The free will that he does believe in is the same free will that us compatibilists believe in (the real free will :) ), but even though he believes in that free will, he thinks it's an illusion--which is consistent with his hard determinist view. An illusion to what, Ken cries out, and so the snowball of confusion continues.

We have to remember the slope to which we have slid. The real issue isn't that of free will. The real issue is the implications of determinism (in terms of true possibilities). Ken believes (and I do hope he remembers my caveat) that there's a difference between a circus clown who intentionally hurts someone and that doesn't hurt someone, and he's correct, and the difference (beyond that of intentionality) boils down to free will, but free will (I scream--but a light scream it is :) ) isn't the issue. The issue is “could the clown truly have done other than what he done?”

Of course he could have, Ken claims. He could have chosen differently, but notice how free will sneaks back into the picture. Tom says, well, yeah, maybe--are you sure though, for it's seems like an illusion to think things could have turned out differently (the key point of contention).

It all boils down to the question of whether or not our current state of physical affairs (down to the microscopic level—including but not limited to the inner workings of our brains while we’re contemplating decisions) could have turned out differently than it did. It's as if the future was written ever since (and even before) the big bang. Nothing could have turned out differently--or so says the hard determinist. Ken's "what-if" objections faze the hard determinists not one bit, for the decisions themselves are all apart of the causal link. The implication is that there’s no true moral culpability, but this is the implications of determinism—so says the hard determinist, and it’s that that’s makes them hard determinists, which again is not to say that I am denying what I said in the beginning; after all, Tom does say that the free will he believes in is an illusion.

[TomJrzk]

Fast, that was yet another great post.

I'll just clarify my thoughts on:
The implication is that there’s no true moral culpability, but this is the implications of determinism—so says the hard determinist, and it’s that that’s makes them hard determinists, which again is not to say that I am denying what I said in the beginning; after all, Tom does say that the free will he believes in is an illusion.
We must still be held responsible for the decisions our brains choose, we can not allow anti-social behavior. And that's the basis for my morality: social instincts that have kept us from eating ourselves into extinction.

[fast]

retracted

[kennethamy]

Fast, that was yet another great post.

I'll just clarify my thoughts on:

We must still be held responsible for the decisions our brains choose, we can not allow anti-social behavior. And that's the basis for my morality: social instincts that have kept us from eating ourselves into extinction.

If I mind your saying that people do not choose, because their actions are determined, I really don't even understand how brains can choose (or not choose, for that matter). The sentence, "my brain chose to eat an egg-roll" seems to me either nonsense, or a strange way of saying "I chose to eat an egg-roll". Brains don't make choices, people do. Just as wills are not free, people are. (Maybe you have in mind that brains are necessary conditions for making choices?) It is saying things like that our brains choose our decisions, that gets us into the philosophical messes we get into.

[TomJrzk]

How is it that we cannot allow anti-social behavior if it's such that things are going to happen in the only single way that things can happen?
But that single way it will happen depends on the environment. If we have laws against anti-social behavior, the deterministic minds (people, for Ken) will choose differently than if we have none. And we can hold those who don't accountable (though I would treat everything as different degrees of insanity).

[TomJrzk]

If I mind your saying that people do not choose, because their actions are determined, I really don't even understand how brains can choose (or not choose, for that matter).
Would it help if I said that the state the person was in made the 'choice'? The brain still weighs alternatives and 'chooses' one; but that choice is determined because the state of the brain is determined.

[fast]

Fast, that was yet another great post.Thanks :)

we can not allow anti-social behavior.

This assumes that we can alter how things will happen, and if it's true that we can alter how things will happen, then it's not true that things have happened in the only way they could have, and if that's true, then there's a flaw with the hard determinist perspective of determinism.

[kennethamy]

I thought I made it clear that there are 2 definitions of 'free will'. You keep asking me questions based on your definition of free will. I don't share your definition, if I did then I would have no argument with you. Though I know exactly what you mean, I do not share your definition because I think it's unfair and confusing to the general population. If you're still teaching, it might be interesting to poll your students on the first day to find out what they think of as free will. Do they think free will means they can make different choices given the same conditions (LFW) or they can make choices based on their personality, even though those choices are caused (CFW)? I'll vote for Door #1, which I think would make my case.

I also understand Fast's point about determinism accounting for the LFW part of the definition; I actually typed in the point myself before I erased it so as to not put words in his mouth. But that's useful only once you're neck deep in it. It's not what I would assume anyone entering a thread about free will already understands. In fact, there is another thread that I saw recently where someone asked if free will and something else are mutually exclusive (?) and they were deluged with thoughts coming from both directions, without defining free will.

Again, I agree with Compatibilist's thoughts on the matter but prefer the LFW definition so people can understand. So my answer is 'yes, if you think free will is CFW, then whom you choose to marry is probably a free choice but, if you think as I do that free will is LFW, then no, what you think is intelligent and the value you put on intelligence is determined; you will always choose Mary, so it's not REALLY a choice'.

Oh, and you didn't address my inclusion of the work 'intentionally' in my earlier post.

Are you saying that it is a matter of definition that when an action is caused, it is not free? Whose definition? It is surely not a tautology that a caused action is not free, like people without siblings are not brothers or sisters. You cannot simply make something true by defining in such a way that it is true. If you are going to hold that a caused action is not free in any sense in which you do not simply mean "free of causes" (and I will agree that a caused action is not free of causes, but so what?) you have to present some argument for it. You cannot, as I said, just define it into being true. Or, rather, you can. But that, to paraphrase Bertrand Russell "would have all the advantages of theft over honest toil." Philosophical issues cannot be settled by definition anymore than can any other issues. I cannot decide that whales are mammals simply by defining them as mammals. I have to give reasons for saying that they are mammals. It is not up to me whether whales are mammals. It is up to the world. And it is not up to you whether a caused action is a free action, or not, it is up to you to explain why you say it is not.

[fast]

But that single way it will happen depends on the environment. If we have laws against anti-social behavior, the deterministic minds (people, for Ken) will choose differently than if we have none. And we can hold those who don't accountable (though I would treat everything as different degrees of insanity).
You make it sound like we have real control--as if things can be altered.

Isn't it true that you hold that whatever laws we have now was set in stone eons ago--a byproduct of a fully deterministic world--a world to which we merely play a part--but with no true power to alter (even in the slightest) of what will happen? Aren't we and the decisions we make being set on the same level playing field as the tiny rocks that gradually move over millions of years?

[kennethamy]

Thanks :)



This assumes that we can alter how things will happen,

It is interesting how Tom talks (as all of us do) the language of freewill, but philosophizes hard determinism. And it isn't like an atheist who says, "God damn", or "thank God" either. As I said before, "cognitive dissonance".

[TomJrzk]

Isn't it true that you hold that whatever laws we have now was set in stone eons ago--a byproduct of a fully deterministic world--a world to which we merely play a part--but with no true power to alter (even in the slightest) of what will happen? Aren't we and the decisions we make being set on the same level playing field as the tiny rocks that gradually move over millions of years?
It's the 'merely' and 'level' that I disagree with. Our brains can sense the environment and move its legs along what it sees as the road safer traveled. Rocks can not. We add feedback to the deterministic world.

Our personalities DO alter what will happen; those personalities just happen to be deterministic, so you feel a loss of control.

[wiploc]

Wiploc,

This is some complicated stuff, so let me go over it again to make sure I'm not tripping over myself.


I should disclaim too. I came into this thread with no opinions other than that I believe in free will. So how I define terms is based on what I learned from you guys, only I don't necessarily agree with you guys. So ... whereever that leaves us.




I still stand by the idea that to be a hard determinist, one must be a determinist and not believe in free will,
The hard determinist doesn't believe LFW exists; he believes CFW exists, but he doesn't believe that it should be called "free will."

If you are going to keep saying that there's only one free will, then it's misleading for you to say that hard determinists don't believe in free will. They think it's obvious that the thing compatibilists call free will is happening; they just don't think it should be called "free will."



but just because one utters that one does not believe in free will does not mean that one doesn't believe in free will
You can imagine how clear that isn't.



(certainly not to insinuate anyone's lying of course), for example, one could be mistaken about what ought to be called free will, but that's a semantic issue, and the real (non semantic) issue is still confusing in itself, so let me get to that.

Semantics is all that stands between hard and soft determinism.




Tom (in heart of hearts) regards freewill as the antichrist of determinism, in such that "if determinism, then no free will" and "if free will, then no determinism", and because of that, and because he believes in determinism, he is therefore a hard determinist. [the epitome of box 8].

The above holds true regardless of what semantic turmoil follows, but first, let me recap in a special kind of way--a way that captures the essence of what's truly going on. The implications of determinism (his view of it) are the actual crux of the matter. It's not free will...it's the implications of what it means to live in a deterministic world. To him (and the real free will notwithstanding), he views our current state of affairs as being on a timeline to which could not have ever become something other than it is.
The soft determinists agree with this.



There's a sort of singularity going on where other possibilities do not exist. To him, it's not possible that Ken could have walked the mile this morning (if Ken did not walk this morning); it's no more possible that than when the dice is thrown that there's really truly a 1 in 6 chance that it'll land on a particular number. What it'll land on is "set in stone".
The soft determinists agree. The only thing they disagree about is whether CFW is FW.




Tom believes that we have what we call free will
I'd have sworn you said he was a hard determinist.



(which is something different),
?



but it's more complicated, because what this means is that he both believes that we have free will and that we don't have free will,
?



but it's only complicated--it's not contradictory, for the free will that he believes in is a free will of a different sort
But you keep saying there is only one sort.



--not to say that there truly are two different free will's of course.
See.



I still stand by the fact that we can call something free will and it not be free will.

Compatibilists say LFW isn't the real free will. Libertarians and hard determinists say CFW isn't the real free will. You agree with them all that somebody is calling something free will that isn't really free will.

But you also insist that there's only one free will. When you say that, it sounds like you don't distinguish between CFW and LFW, as if you think they are the same thing. It just confuses people. If you want to change your line to, "There's only one real free will," then everybody (yes, everybody) will agree with you, and nobody will be confused.




It's a little deeper than that even. The free will that he does believe in is the same free will that us compatibilists believe in (the real free will :) ), but even though he believes in that free will, he thinks it's an illusion--which is consistent with his hard determinist view.
All hard determinists believe this.



An illusion to what, Ken cries out,
An illusion of LFW, obviously. The illusion is what makes libertarians believe LFW exists.



and so the snowball of confusion continues.

We're past most of the confusion, I think. Though there remains the question of why you want to call all non-determinists "indeterminists," and why you want to call some people libertarians despite the fact that they don't believe in LFW.




We have to remember the slope to which we have slid. The real issue isn't that of free will.
That's as real as the other issue.



It all boils down to the question of whether or not our current state of physical affairs (down to the microscopic level—including but not limited to the inner workings of our brains while we’re contemplating decisions) could have turned out differently than it did. It's as if the future was written ever since (and even before) the big bang. Nothing could have turned out differently--or so says the hard determinist.
Along with the soft determinist. The soft determinist believes that free will exists in spite of that. He believes that part of the predetermined history of the universe some of us will be deceived into thinking LFW exists, and that this appearance of LFW is CFW.



Ken's "what-if" objections faze the hard determinists not one bit, for the decisions themselves are all apart of the causal link. The implication is that there’s no true moral culpability,
I don't know that that follows. Maybe that's because I'm a freewilly, but I don't think so. If it is true, then do we have to start talking about pseudo-moral pseudo-culpability when we talk to hard determinists? Because they surely know there is a subject matter there that needs discussing, and that we need names for it in order to be able to discuss it.

crc







[quote]

[TomJrzk]

It is interesting how Tom talks (as all of us do) the language of freewill, but philosophizes hard determinism. And it isn't like an atheist who says, "God damn", or "thank God" either. As I said before, "cognitive dissonance".
I try to talk the language of the illusion of freewill. I'm sorry that I sometimes take short-cuts, I don't like to write long posts.

[PlatosProgeny]

I try to talk the language of the illusion of freewill. I'm sorry that I sometimes take short-cuts, I don't like to write long posts.

I would certainly not advocate destroying the common notion of "acting freely". However, when the notion is analyzed, I think it's quite clear that the notion has no sense to it.

[sweetiepie]

We have to remember the slope to which we have slid. The real issue isn't that of free will. The real issue is the implications of determinism (in terms of true possibilities). Ken believes (and I do hope he remembers my caveat) that there's a difference between a circus clown who intentionally hurts someone and that doesn't hurt someone, and he's correct, and the difference (beyond that of intentionality) boils down to free will, but free will (I scream--but a light scream it is :) ) isn't the issue. The issue is “could the clown truly have done other than what he done?”

Of course he could have, Ken claims. He could have chosen differently, but notice how free will sneaks back into the picture. Tom says, well, yeah, maybe--are you sure though, for it's seems like an illusion to think things could have turned out differently (the key point of contention).

It all boils down to the question of whether or not our current state of physical affairs (down to the microscopic level—including but not limited to the inner workings of our brains while we’re contemplating decisions) could have turned out differently than it did. It's as if the future was written ever since (and even before) the big bang. Nothing could have turned out differently--or so says the hard determinist. Ken's "what-if" objections faze the hard determinists not one bit, for the decisions themselves are all apart of the causal link. The implication is that there’s no true moral culpability, but this is the implications of determinism—so says the hard determinist, and it’s that that’s makes them hard determinists, which again is not to say that I am denying what I said in the beginning; after all, Tom does say that the free will he believes in is an illusion.
Hi fast! just dropping in to see what's become of your massive thread...

I think moral culpability is something that can be done away with pretty easily. Much like free will, the more you think about it the less sense it makes. Why should someone be held accountable? What is punative justice about? Revenge.

It helps to note that removing moral culpability doesn't take morals out of the picture. It could be the case, in a deterministic universe, that there is good and bad, that people are good and bad, and that people should strive to be good. It's just that their success is written in the stars, so it's not (necessarily) a good idea to kick their ass when they are not good, and do not try to be good.

[TomJrzk]

Are you saying that it is a matter of definition that when an action is caused, it is not free? Whose definition? It is surely not a tautology that a caused action is not free, like people without siblings are not brothers or sisters. You cannot simply make something true by defining in such a way that it is true. If you are going to hold that a caused action is not free in any sense in which you do not simply mean "free of causes" (and I will agree that a caused action is not free of causes, but so what?) you have to present some argument for it. You cannot, as I said, just define it into being true. Or, rather, you can. But that, to paraphrase Bertrand Russell "would have all the advantages of theft over honest toil." Philosophical issues cannot be settled by definition anymore than can any other issues. I cannot decide that whales are mammals simply by defining them as mammals. I have to give reasons for saying that they are mammals. It is not up to me whether whales are mammals. It is up to the world. And it is not up to you whether a caused action is a free action, or not, it is up to you to explain why you say it is not.
I'll try to tackle this one, but I don't think it'll be to your liking:

It depends on what you mean by 'free'. If it's free from compulsion (your and CFW's version of free), then, yes, a caused action can be free, just as you talk about. If it's free from causation, then, no, a caused action can not be free; it's caused. And, yes, I include everything imaginable as a possible cause; including one's personality and the amount of cloud-cover.

[fast]

The hard determinist doesn't believe LFW exists; he believes CFW exists, but he doesn't believe that it should be called "free will."

FW exists. LFW exists. CFW exists. Three things exist.

FW is FW. LFW is not FW. CFW is not FW. There is only one FW.

The mistake it to think that LFW (and CFW) are types of FW. They are not. They are no more types of FW than is a toy car a type of car. A toy car is a type of toy.

FW, again, is FW, but LFW and CFW are not types of FW. They are perspectives. Perspectives aren’t FW, and FW aren’t perspectives--no more than a term is the referent of a term or that the referent of a term is the term.

There is and has only been one single type of free will. We can read the definitions of LFW and CFW to see that each is simply a perspective combining FW (the only FW) with the appropriate perspective (of which there are two) regarding determinism.

If you are going to keep saying that there's only one free will, then it's misleading for you to say that hard determinists don't believe in free will.But, they don't, though they likely would, or at least might, once they realize that the argument "if determinism then no free will" is a bad argument.

They think it's obvious that the thing compatibilists call free will is happening; they just don't think it should be called "free will."What's in a name? Free will continues to be free will regardless of what they call it.

but just because one utters that one does not believe in free will does not mean that one doesn't believe in free will
You can imagine how clear that isn't.
I have a penny in my hand, and I'm going to call it a nickel, and you realize that what it is that I am calling a nickel, so when I say that I am holding a nickel, you know exactly what I mean. You know that I am holding a penny, yet no matter what I call what I'm holding, it's still a penny. There are not now two types of pennies.

What Tom holds as FW isn't FW. What Tom holds as FW is indeterminism--and that explains why he's sees them as incompatible--they have to be.

Semantics is all that stands between hard and soft determinism.There is more, and I pointed out what it is. It is the hidden premise that things must happen in a certain way.

Tom believes that we have what we call free will
I'd have sworn you said he was a hard determinist.
Okay, fine. He believes that we believe that we have free will, but he believes it's an illusion. Oh, and yes, he is a hard determinist--88% and dropping.

But you keep saying there is only one sort.

See.
ROFL!!!!!

Hopefully, I explained this enough towards the beginning of the post.

Compatibilists say LFW isn't the real free will.The free will espoused prior to the combining of it with the indeterminist perspective is believed to be real. The okra that I put in my corn is the very same okra that you put in your tomatoes, and just because you're eating okra and tomatoes whereas I'm eating something different (okra and corn), that doesn't mean that there are two (nor three) different types of okra.

Again, you can't think of LF as a Ford whereas LFW and CFW are types of Fords. It's not like that. That is the confusion of others, and no matter how confused people get or how many terms people come up with, there is only one type of FW--well, um, in this context anyhow.

Libertarians and hard determinists say CFW isn't the real free will. You agree with them all that somebody is calling something free will that isn't really free will. Hard determinist’s don't believe in free will, but the free will to which they think does not exist is the same free will that libertarians think they have, and what's so ironic is that it's true that the libertarians have the free will they think they have; it's just that their perspective is corrupt (assuming it is) because they don’t think all events have antecedent causes.

But you also insist that there's only one free will. When you say that, it sounds like you don't distinguish between CFW and LFW, as if you think they are the same thing.There is only one FW, and I do distinguish between CFW and LFW. It's two different perspectives. The distinction isn't in terms of free will but rather in terms of whether one group does or does not believe that all events have antecedent causes.

We're past most of the confusion, I think. Nope, I'm still confused :)

Though there remains the question of why you want to call all non-determinists "indeterminists,"If a person believes that all events have antecedent causes, then such a person is classified as a determinist. If you are not in that Group (group A), then you're in (group not A), and the two groups: 1) group A and 2) group not A are collectively exhaustive, and let's not forget that the label applied to the second group is indeterminists; therefore, the two groups: 1) determinists and 2) indeterminists are collectively exhaustive groups; thus, there is no third on-the-fence perspective. Yes, it is true that one who doesn't know isn't espousing the view that it's not true, but that doesn't matter, for if one doesn't know, then it's still true that one doesn't believe, and that's very important: a determinist is one who believes that all events have antecedent causes.

Does this mean that we can have different types of libertarians? You bet.

and why you want to call some people libertarians despite the fact that they don't believe in LFW.Believing or not believing in LFW is inconsequential. What matters is if they do or do not believe in FW and whether they do or do not fit the requirement of being a determinist. If they are not a determinist, then they are an indeterminist. If they are not a “believer of free will,” then they are a “not believer of free will.” If one is an indeterminist and if one is a believer of free will, then one is a libertarian.

[wiploc]

There is and has only been one single type of free will. We can read the definitions of LFW and CFW to see that each is simply a perspective combining FW (the only FW) with the appropriate perspective (of which there are two) regarding determinism.


I suddenly realize that we aren't anywhere close to being on the same page. You wouldn't have surprised me more if you had said that scientists will search for freewillons as soon as they find gravitons. If you think that CFW and LFW are two perspectives of the same thing, then I have no idea what you think FW is. We've probably been talking past each other for a long time.




I have a penny in my hand, and I'm going to call it a nickel, and you realize that what it is that I am calling a nickel, so when I say that I am holding a nickel, you know exactly what I mean. You know that I am holding a penny, yet no matter what I call what I'm holding, it's still a penny. There are not now two types of pennies.


I follow this example perfectly, but I no longer suspect that I know what you think it's an example of.




What Tom holds as FW isn't FW. What Tom holds as FW is indeterminism

I doubt that, though I assume he believes FW is incompatible with determinism.




There is more, and I pointed out what it is. It is the hidden premise that things must happen in a certain way.


That premise is hardly hidden. It's what determinism (both hard and soft) is.




ROFL!!!!!

Hopefully, I explained this enough towards the beginning of the post.


Nope, I'm back at square one, totally confused.



Nope, I'm still confused :)


You and me both.




If a person believes that all events have antecedent causes, then such a person is classified as a determinist. If you are not in that Group (group A), then you're in (group not A), and the two groups: 1) group A and 2) group not A are collectively exhaustive, and let's not forget that the label applied to the second group is indeterminists; therefore, the two groups: 1) determinists and 2) indeterminists are collectively exhaustive groups; thus, there is no third on-the-fence perspective.

This I understand. I just don't know why you say it. I decided some pages ago to let it go, but you keep insisting on it as if it is a truth rather than a viewpoint. It is a fact that people can be broken down into groups in various ways. Your way (lumping all non-determinists into one group) is as good as any other (as an example, one could lump the libertarians and hard determinists into a single group called "non-compatibilists"). The decision of how we want to group people is arbitrary, so the question is which ways are useful for which purposes. Your way (lumping the fence sitters in with the libertarians, and then calling them all libertarians) seems to me fundamentally misleading. That's not, in my opinion, what anyone but you means by "libertarian."

crc

[fast]

Gee Wiploc, your post to me reads like a sad story. You make me feel as though I've disappointed you. Feel comforted, however, in that it's not true that we have been talking past each other. I have understood you all the while, so it's not a total loss.

[kennethamy]

I'll try to tackle this one, but I don't think it'll be to your liking:

It depends on what you mean by 'free'. If it's free from compulsion (your and CFW's version of free), then, yes, a caused action can be free, just as you talk about. If it's free from causation, then, no, a caused action can not be free; it's caused. And, yes, I include everything imaginable as a possible cause; including one's personality and the amount of cloud-cover.

I don't mind. Free from causation, just means not caused. But it doesn't follow that it is free. But, free compulsion is what is ordinarily meant by "free".

[fast]

Hi fast! just dropping in to see what's become of your massive thread...Other than being in second place in the philosophy forum history books, not much.

Oh, did I say hi? Hi, btw!

I'm becoming much more acclimated to the discussion and the surrounding issues, but I have a lot to work out; for instance, to actually be talking about what others are talking about—apparently.

I don't mean to take people on wild goose chases, but uh, hey, what can I say?

[TomJrzk]

I don't mind. Free from causation, just means not caused. But it doesn't follow that it is free. But, free compulsion is what is ordinarily meant by "free".
I don't mind, either. Free from compulsion, just means not compelled. But it doesn't follow that it is free; it's fully dependent, still, on the state of the brain. But, free from causation is what is ordinarily meant by "free".

;)

Did I sound as authoritarian?

[fast]

I don't mind, either. Free from compulsion, just means not compelled. But it doesn't follow that it is free; it's fully dependent, still, on the state of the brain. But, free from causation is what is ordinarily meant by "free".

;)

Did I sound as authoritarian?

Uh, Houston, we have a problem (but nice try though). I was with you until you said the second "it" in that sentence; I wasn't quite in tune with you when you said, "free" in that sentence either, but I'll let that go.

Ken is viewing compulsion as a subset to causation, so I don't think what you're trying to do works well.

I've used this illustration before, and I think it's a good picture of what's going on, so let me try again. Imagine a large circle called causation and a smaller circle within it called compulsion. The consequences (if it's correct) are that “all that's compelled is caused” but “not all that's caused is compelled.”

Your trying to mimic him as you did doesn't work because you fail to see the subservient [there's probably a better word] position of compulsion to causation.

[kennethamy]

I But, free from causation is what is ordinarily meant by "free".



So when King said,

Let freedom ring from the mighty mountains of New York.
Let freedom ring from the heightening Alleghenies of Pennsylvania!
Let freedom ring from the snowcapped Rockies of Colorado!
Let freedom ring from the curvaceous peaks of California!
But not only that; let freedom ring from Stone Mountain of Georgia!
Let freedom ring from Lookout Mountain of Tennessee!
Let freedom ring from every hill and mole hill of Mississippi.
From every mountainside, let freedom ring.

He meant freedom from causation? I had not heard that interpretation before.

[TomJrzk]

He meant freedom from causation? I had not heard that interpretation before.
He wasn't involved in a discussion of determinism. The fact remains that some people, once they are neck deep in determinism, feel a loss of freedom. I know I did, until I worked through it. In the context of a discussion between determinism and free will, I think it's important to clarify which free will someone is talking about.

I was pretty much lost in this thread until you showed Hume's definition, which included a 'free will is not what Tom thinks, it's this other thing', which throws up a red flag that there actually are 2 views. Once I knew what you meant by free will, I understood exactly where you were coming from.

I would have liked to avoid that confusion.

[sweetiepie]

I'm becoming much more acclimated to the discussion and the surrounding issues, but I have a lot to work out; for instance, to actually be talking about what others are talking about—apparently.

I don't mean to take people on wild goose chases, but uh, hey, what can I say?
Oh, don't stress about it. I stand by what I said on my first post... The term "free will" is total rubbish. The world would be a lot better off without it.

Good to see you know what's going on though :)