Free will -- a beginners look

[TomJrzk]

I wish you would realize that there is nothing else but the conditions in your brain that made you not take that walk.
Hmmm, now I'm quoting myself.

You've already walked through Door #1, that everything has physical causes. So, it seems that you would already have made this realization.

So, is there something in your brain that makes decisions that are free? Free from what?

Hopefully my earlier posts helped resolve this...

[kennethamy]

Yikes, let's keep this one on the 'to do' list.

Do you think that when I say in not taking a walk "you could not have done otherwise" is the same as if I had told you that before you were deciding? In other words, are you implying that you could have proven me wrong by actually taking that walk after I told you what the future held?

No. I haven't made that argument at all. Why do you think I did? I argued that the evidence that I could have done something else, like take a mile walk, when I did not take a walk, would be past experience, together with there being no reason to think that anything had changed since I took the mile walk yesterday.

Thus, for you to give me some reason to think that although I was able to walk a mile yesterday, and (say) everyday for the past two years, I was not able to take a mile walk today (although I did not do so) you would have to present me with some reason for believing that there had been some change which would have prevented me from taking that walk today if I had chosen to do so. Unless you can give me such a reason, your view that I could not have taken that walk today has no support that I can see.

None of this, as you can see, as anything whatsoever to do with what you say in the post to which I am replying.

[TomJrzk]

...you would have to present me with some reason for believing that there had been some change which would have prevented me from taking that walk today if I had chosen to do so.
That reason would be the same reason that 'caused' you to not to take the walk. Someday, maybe we can tease that neuronal signal that made the difference.

The fact remains that you made the decision not to walk. What, in your view, caused you to make exactly that decision?

[kennethamy]

That reason would be the same reason that 'caused' you to not to take the walk. Someday, maybe we can tease that neuronal signal that made the difference.

The fact remains that you made the decision not to walk. What, in your view, caused you to make exactly that decision?

But your view is that if I did not take that walk, it must have been because I could not have taken that walk. What is your reason for that assertion? My view is that unless there was some reason I did not take that walk, I could have done so. So the burden of proof is on you, since you say I could not have done so, without giving any reason except some vague reference to a "neural signal" which is just hand-waving.

If you want to know why I did not take that walk, I thought I already explained it. Some family emergency arose. That's what caused me to make exactly that decision.

[TomJrzk]

But your view is that if I did not take that walk, it must have been because I could not have taken that walk.
There are two senses of could here. You were able to take the walk, I do not dispute that. You did not take the walk because you didn't want to take the walk. I'm saying that at that instant, you could not have wanted to take the walk so you could not have because you didn't want to.

Is that more clear, or less?

[kennethamy]

There are two senses of could here. You were able to take the walk, I do not dispute that. You did not take the walk because you didn't want to take the walk. I'm saying that at that instant, you could not have wanted to take the walk so you could not have because you didn't want to.

Is that more clear, or less?

I suppose it is clear, but I don't see why you think I could not have taken a walk because I did not want to take a walk. If you mean, just because I did not want to, that seems patently false to me. I did, in fact want to take the walk. But I couldn't take the walk because a family emergency came up. Not because I didn't want to. Didn't I already explained that to you?

Apparently you think that wanting to do something is a condition of being able to do that thing. I wonder why you think such a thing. Can you imagine someone saying that he could not have repayed his debt to you. He had the money, and he did not need the money for any other purpose. But what stopped him from repaying his debt to you was that he did not want to do it. He hoped you would understand.

[TomJrzk]

I suppose it is clear, but I don't see why you think I could not have taken a walk because I did not want to take a walk. If you mean, just because I did not want to, that seems patently false to me. I did, in fact want to take the walk. But I couldn't take the walk because a family emergency came up. Not because I didn't want to.
My bad, I'm sorry that I took some shortcuts here.

You did talk of the family emergency but that's a condition that is much more significant than what is used in the classic discussion of this problem. I automatically filtered that out and devised my own conditions: There were no outside considerations, you were standing there deciding whether to walk or not and you just decided not to walk. That's more clear a scenario for discussing free will; a family emergency would certainly prohibit you from walking so that makes the discussion about free will (at least in the major sense) irrelevant.

To address my conditions: at the point where you made a decision, whichever choice you ended up with was predetermined by the state of your brain; a brain can ultimately make one yes/no decision and something, no matter how subtle or unconscious, within that state tipped the scale. And it always would tip the same way. That's my key to Hard Determinism.

When I asked 'what caused you to make that exact decision'; I didn't mean what influenced the decision (the family emergency). I meant what mental or other process caused you to make that decision. I was trying to get into a discussion of the alternates to Hard Determinism so that I might understand your perspective since I had pretty much exhausted my explanation of my perspective.

So, what do I think is the definition of Hard Determinism? That decisions are made by the electro chemistry of the physical brain. And nothing else. The physical brain has a specific state at every given moment of time. A decision made by that brain is entirely dependent on that state. The decision made by that brain would always be the same, given that exact state.

So we have the capability to weigh evidence and make decisions, but not freely. We will do the weighing and make the decision exactly as the state of our brain dictates.

As an example, I heard long ago that some people with OCD might have a module in their brain that doesn't operate normally. This module is tasked with signaling when the brain is 'sure enough'. If this is true, the OCD sufferer can check a lock for the 10th time, but still not get the feedback that the brain is 'sure enough' that the door is locked when most people get the feedback after the 2nd check. They are compelled to check once more...

Those of us with free will wonder why they can't just stop checking. It's because the will is not free.

Do you have time to critique my longest post where I described the 4 reasons why I wear the badge of Hard Determinism?

[kennethamy]

That's more clear a scenario for discussing free will; a family emergency would certainly prohibit you from walking so that makes the discussion about free will (at least in the major sense) irrelevant.



But perhaps that is the trouble. What is the major sense of "free will" which makes my discussion irrelevant? I am referring to our ordinary discourse by which we discuss whether we acted freely or not. In that context, although we believe that certain causes would impede our acting freely, it is not that our actions are caused that impedes our acting freely. Clearly, if the cause of what we do is coercive, or if we act on account of addiction, or hypnosis, then we are doing what we do not want to do, and, hence, do not act freely. But why should it be that the mere fact that our actions (or decisions) have a cause, implies that we are not acting freely?

The kind of "freedom" you are talking about, the kind of freedom which implies that even when we act as we wish, and are under no compulsion, we still do not have freedom, seems to me a theory of freedom (sometimes called "metaphysical freedom") which really poses no problem, since it is settled in that usage of "freedom" that we are not acting freely even if we are acting as we desire, because our desires are caused. And given that determinism is true, we have no freedom even if we do as we want under no compulsion. It is not how we ordinarily use the term "freedom" but it is how some philosophers have used it, perhaps because they infer from the truth that some causes are our actions are incompatible with free action, that all causes of our action are incompatible with free action. If they do that, it is a mistake.

It is clearly false that I could not have walked a mile this morning, since I was clearly capable of walking that mile, and nothing was impeding me from walking that mile. The only reason I did not walk that mile was that I did not choose to walk that mile, and I did not choose to walk that mile because there was a family emergency. I am saying, then, that to say I could have walked a mile this morning neans that I would have walked a mile this morning had I chosen to do so. And I do not see how the fact that I did not choose to walk that mile in anyway impeded me from walking that mile. For it was up to me whether or not to walk that mile this morning. And the fact, if it is one, that there is some theory or other that implies that my choice not to walk that mile had causal antecedents seems to me to be irrelevant unless those causal antecendent were, in some way, coercive.

[fast]

The decision made by that brain would always be the same, given that exact state.
Then why call it a decision?

You make it sound like Ken had a choice of whether to walk the mile or not; how could his 'decision' been anything other than it was?

It would be hypocritical to call his purported choice a product of decision making.

In fact, if hard determinism is true, then he neither makes decisions or choices. Oh yes, he goes through the motions like any good robot would, but the 'choices' he makes (again, if hard determinism is true) is a façade (sp?). It would be like personifying my computer chess programs and calling the computer moves “choices”.

[TomJrzk]

What is the major sense of "free will" which makes my discussion irrelevant?

By 'major sense' I meant that you still could have disregarded the family and walked, that's the free will (and yes, I still acknowledge the non-coerced 'free will' of our common sense; my determinism only handles the fact that that will is actually completely controlled by the state of the brain and thus, is not free at all. So Hard Determinism is correct). My discussion took as fact that your free will would not ignore the family responsibility, if we were to split hairs (my 'minor' sense) then my discussion would apply to that decision (which you ignored).

[fast]

By 'major sense' I meant that you still could have disregarded the family and walked, that's the free will (and yes, I still acknowledge the non-coerced 'free will' of our common sense; my determinism only handles the fact that that will is actually completely controlled by the state of the brain and thus, is not free at all. So Hard Determinism is correct). My discussion took as fact that your free will would not ignore the family responsibility, if we were to split hairs (my 'minor' sense) then my discussion would apply to that decision (which you ignored).:banghead:

What?

Are you saying that his will is completely beyond his control yet he can defy his own will and choose independent of his will?

[TomJrzk]

Then why call it a decision?
Because there's obviously a process we perceive in our brains that weighs evidence and decides A or B; I call that deciding or choosing. I also say that that decision or choice is not free in the micro (neuronal) sense, though it may be thought of as free in the macro sense (uncoerced).

Can we agree on terms to use? If you don't want to talk about a decision or choice that is not free in the micro sense, how would you describe my point?

Also, let me apologize. I've been think of both you and Ken as one person through this discussion, I hope this hasn't caused as much confusion as it might have.

[kennethamy]

Then why call it a decision?

You make it sound like Ken had a choice of whether to walk the mile or not; how could his 'decision' been anything other than it was?

It would be hypocritical to call his purported choice a product of decision making.

In fact, if hard determinism is true, then he neither makes decisions or choices. Oh yes, he goes through the motions like any good robot would, but the 'choices' he makes (again, if hard determinism is true) is a façade (sp?). It would be like personifying my computer chess programs and calling the computer moves “choices”.

Just a point of language:

1. "If hard determinism is true then he neither makes decisions or choices" is analytically true, or "true by definition" since, I suppose that is what "hard determinism" means. "Hard determinism" is just the view that determinism is incompatible with free will (whatever that means).

2. "If determinism is true then there are neither decisions or choices" is not analytically, or definitionally true. Soft determinism (or compatibilism) is the view that is not true, since SD or compatibilism is the view that determinism does not imply that there are no choices or decisions.

The philosophical issue (or one of them) is whether determinism implies hard determinism. You seem to me using "determinism" and "hard determinism" as equivalent. But that is wrong.

Actually, even hard determinism doesn't imply that no one makes decisions or choices. Hard determinism, I suppose, implies that the choices and decisions that people make are bogus, or "make no difference" (whatever that means) because those decisions and choices were determined, and so, not "up to them". The 17th century English philosopher, Thomas Hobbes, was a good example of this hard determinist view that although obviously people make decisions and choices (that's a matter of common experience) the choices and decisions are bogus or fake (or something like that) because Hobbes thought that what the person had already "decided" or "chosen" before he had the experience of deciding or choosing, and that the conscious experience of deciding or choosing was a kind of empty ceremony, a kind of conscious ratification of what the person was determined to do by external causes.

I think you should get your vocabulary straight because it is not only confusing, but it confuses you.

(The analogy with the computer is not a very good one since the computer is not conscious, and, of course, cannot make decisions or choices, anymore than a stone chooses or decides to roll down a hill. But people obviously do make conscious choices and decisions. Whether those choices or decisions are "really" up to them, in the way we all think they are except when discussing philosophy, is a different question)

[fast]

Just a point of language:

1. "If hard determinism is true then he neither makes decisions or choices" is analytically true, or "true by definition" since, I suppose that is what "hard determinism" means. "Hard determinism" is just the view that determinism is incompatible with free will (whatever that means).

2. "If determinism is true then there are neither decisions or choices" is not analytically, or definitionally true. Soft determinism (or compatibilism) is the view that is not true, since SD or compatibilism is the view that determinism does not imply that there are no choices or decisions.

The philosophical issue (or one of them) is whether determinism implies hard determinism. You seem to me using "determinism" and "hard determinism" as equivalent. But that is wrong.

Actually, even hard determinism doesn't imply that no one makes decisions or choices. Hard determinism, I suppose, implies that the choices and decisions that people make are bogus, or "make no difference" (whatever that means) because those decisions and choices were determined, and so, not "up to them". The 17th century English philosopher, Thomas Hobbes, was a good example of this hard determinist view that although obviously people make decisions and choices (that's a matter of common experience) the choices and decisions are bogus or fake (or something like that) because Hobbes thought that what the person had already "decided" or "chosen" before he had the experience of deciding or choosing, and that the conscious experience of deciding or choosing was a kind of empty ceremony, a kind of conscious ratification of what the person was determined to do by external causes.

I think you should get your vocabulary straight because it is not only confusing, but it confuses you.

(The analogy with the computer is not a very good one since the computer is not conscious, and, of course, cannot make decisions or choices, anymore than a stone chooses or decides to roll down a hill. But people obviously do make conscious choices and decisions. Whether those choices or decisions are "really" up to them, in the way we all think they are except when discussing philosophy, is a different question)

I don’t want to sound unappreciative of your clarifying points, but I worry that the tone that I convey may come across that way, so I want to make it clear that I do take your points as gentle kicks in the right direction—they do help me focus, and I do thank you.

You mention that I should get my vocabulary straight, and though I whole heartedly agree (not to mention that I aspire to as well), I’m left wondering “what did I say?” … what did I say this time (as opposed to another time) to make you think that I was using them, the terms—notice the “s”, inappropriately? For that matter, what makes you even think that I was even using them? I mentioned only one: hard determinism.

When I do use them, I probably am not using them as I ought, and yes, I am confusing determinism with hard determinism, but I’m currently only talking about hard determinism because it’s hard determinism that he’s defending. I am coming out against hard determinism—my views are in opposition to hard determinism; I even said, “In fact, if hard determinism is true, then he neither makes decisions or choices,” [and you endorsed it even—or did you agree just to recant?] so let it be known that at no time did I intend to refer to determinism or soft determinism/compatibilism.

Perhaps I am indirectly talking about determinism by virtue of discussing hard determinism, and if I am, let me know, but as it stands, I just don’t understand why you think I’m talking about determinism when I explicitly say hard determinism.

You mention the philosophical issue of whether or not determinism implies hard determinism, and I’m all for agreeing that yes, it’s an issue, and it’s also, I’d add, an issue worthy of discussion, but tell me, when Tom asks me to understand hard determinism before dismissing it, hasn’t the topic of discussion changed somewhat? I don’t mind jumping around (and I’m all for staying focused), but if I’m arguing against hard determinism and making no mention to determinism, and you say things like, “You seem to me using "determinism" and "hard determinism" as equivalent. But that is wrong,” I’m left very perplexed. It’s like I want to say, “yes, I can’t distinguish them, but what makes you seem to think I’m using both the terms at all?”

Oh, and this hurts my head to no end. You said, “But people obviously do make conscious choices and decisions.” Well, yes, it’s obvious, but the implication (as I have shown) to hard determinism is that people don’t make choices and decisions; therefore, it’s crucial that we examine the obvious. Either hard determinism is false and things are as obvious as we think they are, or hard determinism is true and things that seem obviously true are not true.

Next, I move your attention to my analogy. As you have so declared, it is not very good, but why I wonder? You attempted to explain, [I take that back], you did explain, but wait [why should I take it back?]—to say that you attempted to explain isn’t to say that you didn’t, but either way, whether you did or not, not only do I not disagree with your explanation (if it is an explanation), I agree that a computer isn’t conscious or capable of making decisions or choices. Understand my position. If he is going to accept hard determinism as true, then I should use an analogy that equates to the implication of his view, and the implication of his view is that we’re are like non-conscious robots mimicking decision-like behavior.

To fully grasp his view of hard determinism, we have to treat humans like super computers (or so I think it would help), where even consciousness is nothing but a program doomed to follow through the motions like dominoes falling or a film playing for the first time. The argument that you could not have walked the mile during the emergency is the same reason the five ball could have never touched the railing—the person was destined to pick it up; all the transpiring events within your cellular structure were simultaneously converging to a result that could have been no other.

It sounds, I know, like I’m trying to argue in favor of hard determinism, but I do so only so that you can see that what I say ought to be what he should be saying if he is to argue hard determinism, as I understand it.

[TomJrzk]

I don’t want...etc etc.
Wow, that's about the best post I've ever read. You and Ken have posted some great ones in this discussion but this trumps them all. Thanks!

I AM defending the computer-like, robotic, underlying source of everyday decisions. We have the illusion of making choices but the neurons in our brain actually made those decisions and were destined to because there is no supernatural extra something that can have any different effect. That illusion is very important, though.

In the meantime, I'm working on another post that might illuminate the differences but will, again, probably only confuse the issue more...

[kennethamy]

I don’t want to sound unappreciative of your clarifying points, but I worry that the tone that I convey may come across that way, so I want to make it clear that I do take your points as gentle kicks in the right direction—they do help me focus, and I do thank you.



I don't believe that hard determinists say that people don't make choices or decisions, but rather that choices and decisions are not what some philosophers (and other theorists) believe they are. It is the theory of choice and decision, rather than whether they exist, that is at issue. Take Hobbes who I mentioned earlier. His view is that before we make our conscious choice or decision, those choices and decisions have already been made in some way we are unaware of, (he would not have put it this way, but had he been a contemporary, he might have told us it was by means of neurons firing off in our brains) and that our conscious choices and decisions are just formal ratifications of what has already happened. So, first the decision or choice is made, and then we make it, we sort of rubber stamp it. The "rubber stamping" is what we are aware of. The actual occurrence which we rubber stamp has already been made. I think this is a pretty good picture of what several people on this thread have claimed is true, and may, very well, be what at least some hard determinists have in mind when they say, we don't make choices or decisions.

Whether this is an accurate picture of what goes on, I do not know. And I am in the dark of how we would discover whether it is true. It doesn't seem to me to be true, but then, that may be because I have not bought into the "rubber-stamp" theory. One trouble is, I think, and this becomes clear in the thread, is that there are those who do buy into the rubber-stamp picture, who think what they believe is the only alternative to it, is a kind of metaphysical or even, maybe, supernatural theory about people which involves a metaphysical ego or "homunculus" which (who?) is a decider and who supercedes all those neural firing that are constantly going on. But while I don't think much of that theory either, I don't think that the homunculus theory, and the rubber-stamp (Hobbesian) theory are the only alternatives. I think, myself, that some form of compatibilism is true, although, I don't know what that form would take.

[TomJrzk]

This is going to be long enough that I needed to give it a title, but, hey, this is philosophy so I'm feeling pretty free to philosophize.

The answer is that the onus is not on Hard Determinism so, if you agree with that you need to read no further. Of course, you'd be missing an elegant discussion that you might use someday on your soon-to-be-former friends and family.
My view is that unless there was some reason I did not take that walk, I could have done so. So the burden of proof is on you, since you say I could not have done so
To express the feeling I get when I read this quote, I'll have to describe a grammatical analog that I came up with: In the alphabet, I say O is far from A. Q is farther than O from A. Q is different from O. A is more different than Q from O. I don't say Q is different than O any more than I would say O is far than A. It sounds like fingernails on the chalkboard when other people say Q is different than O. I get a similar feeling when you say that the onus is on Hard Determinism to disprove free will; that's just as discordant. I could more easily said that it's wrong but that would not have been as much fun.

Hard Determinism is the null hypothesis. There is the brain, nothing more. If we can't explain something based solely on the brain, we must proffer something else to explain science as we know it.

The reason I know it's the null hypothesis is that it can not be proven. I can run an experiment that shows you making the same decision to not walk for every one if its billions of runs and I would still have to say "it's unlikely that you could have chosen to walk". You, on the other hand, could set up two identical conditions and run them simultaneously; if even the first time, the results are that you choose to walk and choose not to walk, you're done. So, unfortunately, the onus is actually on your shoulders. Can we agree on that?

Regardless, I think is would be interesting to do such a thought experiment. Say you invented a replicator that copied exactly a 4d snapshot of a room and held them both in suspended animation. This room had you, with your preferences, memories, neurons in motion, etc identically copied, reaching into the refrigerator for a drink and there was a bottle of orange soda and a bottle of grape soda. You had not known what was in the fridge so you didn't know which you would choose.

If we then pressed the continue botton on your replicator and both scenes played out I, as a Hard Determinist, say, "the results would be identical" (let's forget the coriolis forces due to any latitude difference; even the positions of the two rooms are identical).

Are you saying (either of you ;)) that they could turn out differently?

Can you set up some other conditions where you'd get different results? Again, without QM, if you can.

[fast]

I understand what you meant by rubber stamping, but the implications of what Tom is saying is far beyond that.

You are looking at the narrowly isolated occurring events surrounding the awareness of a decision, and perhaps that’s normally what the issue is when hard determinism is the issue; Whether Tom has borrowed and pasted the term hard determinism to fit his own ideas, I don’t know, but I highly suspect that what he’s saying is far removed from what you have eluded to with your talk on rubber stamping.

Tom is saying that the deciding events of whether you will be angry at someone in traffic a year and a day from now are already in motion—the seeds of stimulus have been planted. According to his hypotheses, if he were privy to all facets of the data of every smidgen of matter in our universe, he could tell you now, long before you even contemplate the trip, whether you would be angry at a specific moment in time.

Look at cause and effect like a sea of rain drops. Substitute matter in motion for drops of water. Some droplets will affect other drops which in turn will affect others which in turn will yet still affect more, but notice that not every combination is possible—not every drop will molest the other. It’s not possible that you won’t get angry. It’s not possible that you won’t be in traffic. It’s not possible that you will change your mind. The sea of drops didn’t fall in a pattern to allow for that. The cue ball because of how it was hit would not allow for the five to ever hit the railing.

You said, “I don't believe that hard determinists say that people don't make choices or decisions, but rather that choices and decisions are not what some philosophers (and other theorists) believe they are.”

I agree; they don’t say it, but they ought to be saying it if they are going to firmly hold the hard determinist view that says effects stem from cause without exception or control. Why does the intellectual contemplation between choices negate that the ultimate choice that will be chosen is the effect of a preceding cause?

<Hard determinist hat on>

If we trace the eventful chain of cause and effect backwards, will we not expose the truth that our so-called decision to fire the gun at the innocent clerk was not beyond the chain of events that ultimately emerged to that conclusion?

Let me draw your attention to a distinction that you brought to the table. You made the distinction between “what will happen, will happen” and “what will happen, must happen”. The former, if I recall correctly, is tautological and a trivial truism while the other is simply false.

Well, Tom is saying that the choice you make to shoot the clerk can be nothing other than the choice you will ultimately make. He is saying that you must make the choice, for it’s the only alternative available given the sequence of events that are already set in motion … how could the dominoes sway to the left when they turn to the right. He is saying that the contemplation of the choice is an illusion. He calls it a choice, but I say to him that it’s a choice of no alternatives—which begs the question of whether it’s an actual choice at all.

Near the end of post 267, he says, “Are you saying […] that they could turn out differently?” Let’s talk about your mile walk. <hard determinist hat still on> If all matter is where it is (and in the motion that it’s in), and if you decide not to walk, then the very decision itself (the final effect in question) is a consequence of the detailed convergence of matter in motion—the sea of drops will only fall in a particular combination.

Our very thinking—down to our fondest day dreams—including emotions and passing thoughts, that may or may not be apart of the convergence of events in question, are just bits and pieces of the puzzle that explains why at the very moment you changed your mind, and the question of course is, did you change your mind, or was it just an illusion? Were you destined to alter the course of your future, or are you just a puppet succumbing to the ravages of cause and effect?

your soon-to-be-former friends and family. :huh:

[TomJrzk]

I understand what you meant by rubber stamping, but the implications of what Tom is saying is far beyond that.
No, they're not. That the every day sense of free will can be an acknowledgement of a choice actually made in neurons 'deeper' in the brain, in the subconscious, is completely acceptable to me.
Why does the intellectual contemplation between choices negate that the ultimate choice that will be chosen is the effect of a preceding cause?

Because that contemplation is one of the causes. This might also explain why you won't call choices 'choices'. You've made the Fatalism mistake that says with hard determinism our fate is sealed by preconditions so there's nothing our choices can do about it. You've omitted the role of our very powerful intellect, through its choices, being a major cause. Those choices are determined but, they're determined by our personalities, intellects, wants, etc. Again, we still have to make choices (or we've made the choice of not choosing) and it's still fun for a Hard Determinist to make those choices and celebrate making good ones.

As for the "soon-to-be-former", that was a self-deprecating joke that you're free to quote me but your friends are apt to disown you.

[fast]

No, they're not. That the every day sense of free will can be an acknowledgement of a choice actually made in neurons 'deeper' in the brain, in the subconscious, is completely acceptable to me.
Awe, I see (but then again, who knows), so what you're saying instead is not that our choices are destined but rather there's a delay or intermittent gap between our internal choices and our awareness that we even made a choice (between the machine that drives our choice and our perception that we even made a choice); hence, not long after our choice is made by us, we will soon learn and accept of it what it is?

That isn't as cold--I could live with it. It sounds like a neural timing issue.

[kennethamy]

This is going to be long enough that I needed to give it a title, but, hey, this is philosophy so I'm feeling pretty free to philosophize.

The answer is that the onus is not on Hard Determinism so, if you agree with that you need to read no further. Of course, you'd be missing an elegant discussion that you might use someday on your soon-to-be-former friends and family.

To express the feeling I get when I read this quote, I'll have to describe a grammatical analog that I came up with: In the alphabet, I say O is far from A. Q is farther than O from A. Q is different from O. A is more different than Q from O. I don't say Q is different than O any more than I would say O is far than A. It sounds like fingernails on the chalkboard when other people say Q is different than O. I get a similar feeling when you say that the onus is on Hard Determinism to disprove free will; that's just as discordant. I could more easily said that it's wrong but that would not have been as much fun.

Hard Determinism is the null hypothesis. There is the brain, nothing more. If we can't explain something based solely on the brain, we must proffer something else to explain science as we know it.

The reason I know it's the null hypothesis is that it can not be proven. I can run an experiment that shows you making the same decision to not walk for every one if its billions of runs and I would still have to say "it's unlikely that you could have chosen to walk". You, on the other hand, could set up two identical conditions and run them simultaneously; if even the first time, the results are that you choose to walk and choose not to walk, you're done. So, unfortunately, the onus is actually on your shoulders. Can we agree on that?

Regardless, I think is would be interesting to do such a thought experiment. Say you invented a replicator that copied exactly a 4d snapshot of a room and held them both in suspended animation. This room had you, with your preferences, memories, neurons in motion, etc identically copied, reaching into the refrigerator for a drink and there was a bottle of orange soda and a bottle of grape soda. You had not known what was in the fridge so you didn't know which you would choose.

If we then pressed the continue botton on your replicator and both scenes played out I, as a Hard Determinist, say, "the results would be identical" (let's forget the coriolis forces due to any latitude difference; even the positions of the two rooms are identical).

Are you saying (either of you ;)) that they could turn out differently?

Can you set up some other conditions where you'd get different results? Again, without QM, if you can.


Your analogies are too complicated for me (not merely to understand, but to judge).

My reason for saying that the onus of proof is on the hard determinist is that it seems evident that the initial likelihood, or the "default position" is that we sometimes do make choices and decisions. and do actions, which are up to us in that they were not coerced. After all, it is clear that in ordinary circumstances we would deny the suggestion made by a companion that Joe did not marry Mary of his own free will, when Joe is in love with Mary, and Mary's father is not standing there with a shotgun in his hands menacing Joe. And, if my companion dismissed that as not mattering, but, instead, pointed out that Joe's neurons were firing away, I would take that point as irrelevant (if not bizarre). For since I suppose neurons are forever firing away whatever anyone does, and is a kind of "common demoninator" in everything we do, I would have expected that when my companion informed me that Joe was not marrying Mary "of his own free will" that he would have some particular factor in mind, quite apart from the universal factor of neuron firings. So, were I to reply to my companion, my reply would be along the lines of, "Yes, yes, I know about the neuron firings. But is there any unusual factor (like Mary's father toting a shotgun) that you have in mind when you tell me that Joe is not marrying Mary of his own free will? So much for why I would say that the burden of proof is squarely on my companion.

But one further remark: it seems to me that my neuron-firing companion should be able to tell me how all those firing neurons are sufficiently like Mary's father carring a shotgun, to constitute reasons for asserting that Joe is not marrying Mary "of his own free will". Clearly, the reason we say that is that the shotgun pointed at Joe is coercive. In that case, Joe would be literally "under the gun", and be forced to marry Mary. How are neuron firings coercive is the question?

[TomJrzk]

Awe, I see (but then again, who knows), so what you're saying instead is not that our choices are destined but rather there's a delay or intermittent gap between our internal choices and our awareness that we even made a choice (between the machine that drives our choice and our perception that we even made a choice); hence, not long after our choice is made by us, we will soon learn and accept of it what it is?

That isn't as cold--I could live with it. It sounds like a neural timing issue.
I think you're getting closer, but you don't quite have my point.

I don't address how the decision is made so I don't talk about gaps. The decision is made by our neurons, those neurons make decisions but only based on their state. The state can be defined in pure physics and could be predetermined if we had a perfect computer model.

It's not cold because we are a part of that decision because we are those neurons. What we think about and what our principles are directly affect those decisions.

[TomJrzk]

How are neuron firings coercive is the question?
They are ultimately coercive. Their purpose is to be coercive so that we go forth and multiply. We ARE those neuron firings; there's nothing else!

[kennethamy]

They are ultimately coercive. Their purpose is to be coercive so that we go forth and multiply. We ARE those neuron firings; there's nothing else!

To say that they are "ultimately coercive" when my question is how and whether they are coercive does not seem to me to answer the question. Does it seem so to you? To say that we are those neuron firings seems to me either blatently false, or an unhelpful metaphor. You must have better arguments than these to show that when Joe is marrying Mary of (what we would all say out of a philosophy discussion) "of his own free-will", that he is not doing that at all because of his neurons firing away. After all, his neurons are firing away even if Mary's father is pointing a shotgun at Joe. Should we ignore the difference between the case of the shotgun being pointed at Joe, and the case when the shotgun is not being pointed at Joe, and insist that despite that difference, the fact of all those neuron firings erases the difference and makes it irrelevant. Neuron firings are neuron firings. It just seems so implausible to me. Doesn't it really to you? (Hey, maybe the neuron firings when the gun is pointed at Joe are different from those when the gun is not pointed at Joe).

[TomJrzk]

After all, his neurons are firing away even if Mary's father is pointing a shotgun at Joe.
Yes, but the firing is different. The neurons fire away in such a way that Joe interprets a love for Mary and marries her. The neurons fire away in such a way that Joe interprets an otherwise certain death and marries her out of fear. The neurons completely control Joe's thoughts and actions; he's just the legs that move the neurons around the bed trying to catch up to Mary.

[TomJrzk]

(Hey, maybe the neuron firings when the gun is pointed at Joe are different from those when the gun is not pointed at Joe).

I'm sorry I missed this in my first read but Yes! You're starting to understand me.

[kennethamy]

I'm sorry I missed this in my first read but Yes! You're starting to understand me.

I am? Well, in that case, maybe you are beginning to understand that although the difference (if there is one) between the neural firings when there is coercion going on, and when there is no coercion going on, may be a physiological explanation of the difference between the two (coercion and non-coercion) but it doesn't touch why we distinguish between action under coercion as being action which isn't free, and why action without coercion is said to be free action. It certainly isn't because we are able to distinguish between the two kinds of neural firings (supposing they are different). Perhaps we are determined to act under coercion, and perhaps we are also determined to act non-coercively (if this neural-firing story is true). But whether we act freely or not depends on whether the action is coercive or not, and not on the neural firings. And since there are neural firings (according to the story) whether or not we act freely, the neural firings are no explanation of the difference between free and unfree action.They are irrelevant.

[TomJrzk]

But whether we act freely or not depends on whether the action is coercive or not, and not on the neural firings.

Does this, from my post #205 help now?:

There are different levels (OK, degrees) of freedom. You could be completely unfree (tied up), mostly unfree (threatened with death), your version of 'free' (no significant consequences between box A and B) and my version of 'free' (unaffected by neurological physics). Yours is an apparent freedom to weigh choices (no one has a gun to your head, or doped you up, etc). I say 'apparent' because that freedom is an illusion because, ultimately, the decision you made was entirely dependent on the state of your brain. And every time, under the same conditions, you would make the exact same choice.

[fast]

Does this, from my post #205 help now?:

There are different levels (OK, degrees) of freedom. You could be completely unfree (tied up), mostly unfree (threatened with death), your version of 'free' (no significant consequences between box A and B) and my version of 'free' (unaffected by neurological physics). Yours is an apparent freedom to weigh choices (no one has a gun to your head, or doped you up, etc). I say 'apparent' because that freedom is an illusion because, ultimately, the decision you made was entirely dependent on the state of your brain. And every time, under the same conditions, you would make the exact same choice.

Seeing as I don't seem to be "getting it" anymore, I'm just going to comment and let come what may.

I can get in the car with the evil looking stranger--it's my choice (even if it's not my right or my desire), and if he points a gun at me and demands of me that I get in the car and then if I get in the car, I still technically had a choice because I could have chosen to not get in the car and perhaps suffer the negative consequences--it was I who controlled the movement of my legs.

A lady who got in the car after doing so (at gun point) would likely say that she had no choice--even though she clearly did have a choice --even if it means falling victim to his threats, so what is meant when she says "I had no choice"? She meant she was coerced--there was a thinking entity behind the barrel of the gun--though a person would likely characterize such a persuasive gunmen as "not thinking" instead, but they would be wrong as well, for how could a non-thinking entity even hold a gun, threaten and be coercive?

One observation I'd like to make is the difference between cause (as in cause and effect) and cause (as in caused via coercion). In cause and effect, there is no true choice--the dominoes will fall contingent as placed, but in coercion, there is still technically a choice because the coercion doesn't necessarily make it so that's it's impossible to rebel against the force.

Now, the firing neurons are being cast as thinking entities by virtue of calling humans no more than the sum of its parts, and though I'd tend to agree that we are the sum of our parts, that doesn't mean that we can attribute the attributes to our parts as we do to ourselves as a whole. In short, it is I who thinks--not the firing neurons.

I have more, but hey, if I kept typing, it would get longer.

[Canard DuJour]

TomJrzk, are you saying that


(a) the self is separate from and subject to neural activity ?

(b) others here are claiming that neural activity is separate from and subject to the self ?

(c) other ?



We agree that (a) is false.

(b) is demonstrably false.


You vacillate between contradictory claims about choices originating in "our very powerful intellect, through its choices, being a major cause", and in "neurons 'deeper' in the brain, in the subconscious" without any clear idea what (c) could be.


As fast points out, "hard determinism" is not the disbelief in an acausal self, but a more general claim about physical reality. It's a physics question on which the jury is still out, but it's not looking good for hard determinism.

[kennethamy]

Does this, from my post #205 help now?:

There are different levels (OK, degrees) of freedom. You could be completely unfree (tied up), mostly unfree (threatened with death), your version of 'free' (no significant consequences between box A and B) and my version of 'free' (unaffected by neurological physics). Yours is an apparent freedom to weigh choices (no one has a gun to your head, or doped you up, etc). I say 'apparent' because that freedom is an illusion because, ultimately, the decision you made was entirely dependent on the state of your brain. And every time, under the same conditions, you would make the exact same choice.


I would have thought that the state of my brain would depend on whatever choice I made.

[TomJrzk]

You vacillate between contradictory claims about choices ...
I seem to vacillate because I'm jumping between everyday terms about 'choice' and the fact that I think 'choice' is deterministic and therefore not really choice. And I don't have a term that distinguishes between them.

I'll give this more thought later...

I'm not really vacillating, though. It's clear to me but I understand how it would be nonsensical to most that we 'make' decisions that are already made by virtue of the state of the brain we use to 'make' decisions.

[sweetiepie]

A lady who got in the car after doing so (at gun point) would likely say that she had no choice--even though she clearly did have a choice --even if it means falling victim to his threats, so what is meant when she says "I had no choice"? She meant she was coerced--there was a thinking entity behind the barrel of the gun--though a person would likely characterize such a persuasive gunmen as "not thinking" instead, but they would be wrong as well, for how could a non-thinking entity even hold a gun, threaten and be coercive?
I'm not sure if there has to be a thinking entity here. Pretty sure if someone is hungry-- and has the choice to steal or starve-- they might similarly say "I had no choice". What they actually mean is, one of my choices (not stealing) was accompanied by an unexpected negative consequence, that makes the other option clearly optimal.
They also might, I suppose, be simply referring to death.

Now, the firing neurons are being cast as thinking entities by virtue of calling humans no more than the sum of its parts, and though I'd tend to agree that we are the sum of our parts, that doesn't mean that we can attribute the attributes to our parts as we do to ourselves as a whole. In short, it is I who thinks--not the firing neurons. There's definitely something messy going on. A computer is not the sum of its circuits. It's not even all its circuits put together. It's also teh software. Which itself is not just a matter of the position of a million on-off switches, it's those switches interpretted first by the machine and then by the user.

Ultmiately, the emotions coded into my personal collection of mp3s is quite some distance away from the manufacture's blue print of the motherboard.


One of the tricky parts is when you talk about cause and effect and when you talk about soemthing being embodied in something else. Meanings are embodied in words, and words are embodied in letters. The letters determine a book, they don't cause a book. You can write any words you want, but your words will never be free of their letters.
The other tricky part, is that it SHOULD come as no surprise that you can't choose to be not you. You can, at most, choose to change yourself, and this choice adn this changing is still a part of you.

[kennethamy]

Seeing as I don't seem to be "getting it" anymore, I'm just going to comment and let come what may.

I can get in the car with the evil looking stranger--it's my choice (even if it's not my right or my desire), and if he points a gun at me and demands of me that I get in the car and then if I get in the car, I still technically had a choice because I could have chosen to not get in the car and perhaps suffer the negative consequences--it was I who controlled the movement of my legs.

A lady who got in the car after doing so (at gun point) would likely say that she had no choice--even though she clearly did have a choice --even if it means falling victim to his threats, so what is meant when she says "I had no choice"? She meant she was coerced--there was a thinking entity behind the barrel of the gun--though a person would likely characterize such a persuasive gunmen as "not thinking" instead, but they would be wrong as well, for how could a non-thinking entity even hold a gun, threaten and be coercive?

One observation I'd like to make is the difference between cause (as in cause and effect) and cause (as in caused via coercion). In cause and effect, there is no true choice--the dominoes will fall contingent as placed, but in coercion, there is still technically a choice because the coercion doesn't necessarily make it so that's it's impossible to rebel against the force.

Now, the firing neurons are being cast as thinking entities by virtue of calling humans no more than the sum of its parts, and though I'd tend to agree that we are the sum of our parts, that doesn't mean that we can attribute the attributes to our parts as we do to ourselves as a whole. In short, it is I who thinks--not the firing neurons.

I have more, but hey, if I kept typing, it would get longer.

We often say, "I had no choice" when we mean, "I had no good choice". "There was something else I could have done, if I had chosen, but that would have had worse consequences than what I actually did."

If someone tied me up so I could not move, threw me out of the window, and I hit a passer-by and killed him, then, of course, I had no choice but to have killed the passer-by. Quite literally, "I had no choice". But then, of course, I did not choose at all. Of course, I suppose that since I did not want to fall on the passer-by (or, for that matter, be thrown at him) I was coerced, since that is what "coercion" is, to be forced to do something you do not want to do. On the other hand, a heavy boulder that was thrown out of the window and did the same damage, would not have been coerced, since the rock was not forced, "against its will" to fall on the passer-by.

Now, what about when I do something like (say) eat a piece of apple pie? It is something I want to do. Therefore, I could not be coerced (forced) to do something I want to do. Of course, if I am to believe what I am told, there are neurons firing merrily away which are causing me to choose to eat the apple pie, and, also, I suppose, eat it. But, as I just pointed out, whatever those neurons are doing, they are not forcing me (against my will) to eat that apple pie.

So, am I eating that apple pie "of my own free will"? Yes, I am.

Here I anticipate an objection. "But wasn't your choice to eat that apple pie caused by those merry little neurons?" Again, if I am to believe what I am told, yes, it was. But what should we infer from that? Not that my choice to eat the apple pie was coerced. I can be coerced only against my will. And, it was not against my will that I chose to eat the apple pie, just as it wasn't against my will that I ate the apple pie. I wasn't forced to choose to eat the apple pie rather than (say) the pumpkin pie which was lying there right beside the apple pie. No. I didn't want the pumpkin pie. I wanted the apple pie.


So, why should the fact (if it is one) that those neurons were causing (not "making", "not forcing", but "causing") me to choose the apple pie, or actually eat the apple pie, "depriving me" of my free will? Or, in English, why should that have caused me to eat the apple pie against my will?

[untermensche]

In anatomical and physiological terms, what does it mean to choose?

[kennethamy]

In anatomical and physiological terms, what does it mean to choose?

What does that question mean? Are you asking what happens anatomically and physiologically when we choose to do something? I don't know whether any anatomist or physiologist would know the answer to that, but it is a cinch that philosophers don't.

[untermensche]

What does that question mean? Are you asking what happens anatomically and physiologically when we choose to do something? I don't know whether any anatomist or physiologist would know the answer to that, but it is a cinch that philosophers don't.
A philosopher is allowed to know, and many do know, a bit of science.

Science is an applied philosophy. A philosophy applied to the universe.

But if we casually throw around concepts, like choosing, without even knowing what they are, is that philosophical?

[fast]

So, why should the fact (if it is one) that those neurons were causing (not "making", "not forcing", but "causing") me to choose the apple pie, or actually eat the apple pie, "depriving me" of my free will? Or, in English, why should that have caused me to eat the apple pie against my will?I do not hold that electrochemical signals are causing us to do anything against our wishes.

[untermensche]

I do not hold that electrochemical signals are causing us to do anything against our wishes.
What are our "wishes"?

Specifically, in terms of brain activity.

[kennethamy]

I do not hold that electrochemical signals are causing us to do anything against our wishes.

So why do you think that we don't act freely because of them?

[kennethamy]

What are our "wishes"?

Specifically, in terms of brain activity.

What a strange question? I have no idea what it is asking?

[kennethamy]

A philosopher is allowed to know, and many do know, a bit of science.

Science is an applied philosophy. A philosophy applied to the universe.

But if we casually throw around concepts, like choosing, without even knowing what they are, is that philosophical?

The term "to choose" is an ordinary term in English. All of us have and use the concept of choice. And that concept doesn't have anything to do with physiology or anatomy. I wonder what it is that you think that physiology or anatomy could tell us about making choices. A philosophical analysis of the concept of choosing is, of course, appropriate, but I don't see how physiology would be involved in that.

Some philosophers, I think, have the idea that when someone chooses to do something two things happen: there is, first the act of choosing, and then, second, there is the action that has been chosen. As a result they think that we can simply examine the "choosing" itself. And ask a question like what is the choosing. But is that really what happens? If I take a piece of apple pie off the table, have I first chosen the pie, and then taken it. First the mental act, then the physical act? Or, do I just take the pie? Isn't choosing the pie the same as just taking the pie? Of course, other times, there is something that takes place called choosing before acting on the choice. I may hesitate when there are three kinds of pie, and say, "Let's see, which one will I have?" And, then take the apple pie. But that doesn't mean that whenever I take a piece of pie, there is first the choosing, and then the taking. Choosing is generally not a separate thing from the action. I chose the apple pie doesn't mean, first I did something mental called "choosing" (which some might want to identify with some neural activity) and then I did something physical like moving my arms and fingers, which resulted in picking up the pie.

[fast]

So why do you think that we don't act freely because of them?You'll be pleased to learn that I think so such thing. I believe the confusion surrounding what it is that I think involves my grappling with Tom as I tried to understand his position.

Thus far, I believe that my position is that we have free will that may possibly be compatible with determinism. I highly suspect that hard determinism is not true and flat out believe that fatalism is simply absurd.

[untermensche]

The term "to choose" is an ordinary term in English. All of us have and use the concept of choice. And that concept doesn't have anything to do with physiology or anatomy. I wonder what it is that you think that physiology or anatomy could tell us about making choices. A philosophical analysis of the concept of choosing is, of course, appropriate, but I don't see how physiology would be involved in that.
It just has to do with everything about making a so-called "free" choice.

Until we know exactly what making a choice is, in anatomical and physiological terms, there is no way for us to determine if any choice is made freely or not.

We cannot quess ourselves to the truth here.

And to simply rely on ordinary usage is not a rational argument.

[fast]

What are our "wishes"?

Specifically, in terms of brain activity.

I have conjured up an image that describes what I think you're asking.

Imagine electrodes hooked up to a sleeping patient's brain (that is not yet in REM sleep); imagine that the electrodes are hooked to a machine that gives us a mental picture of the activity that occurs while dreaming. Now, we stand in witness of the patient as she starts to dream. We see activity on the screen, and the doctor points and says, "that's the dreaming".

Of course, what he points to really isn't the dreaming but instead a computer representation of the activity occurring while the patient dreams. I suspect that you are asking me what our wishes are from a neurological perspective, but given the constraints imposed (the terms requested), what else can I say other than a collection of neural activity?

In other words, I have no idea … I’d imagine they look a lot like, well, neural activity.

[kennethamy]

It just has to do with everything about making a so-called "free" choice.

Until we know exactly what making a choice is, in anatomical and physiological terms, there is no way for us to determine if any choice is made freely or not.

We cannot quess ourselves to the truth here.

And to simply rely on ordinary usage is not a rational argument.

What would it be like to know what choice is "in anatomical and physiological terms"? Explain what happens anatomically and physically when we make a choice? Why would that be knowing what making a choice is? Would you say the same thing about something else, say, hoping. Would you say that unless we know exactly what happens anatomically and physically when we hope for something, we cannot know what hoping for something is. I think my problem is with the notion that there is some "is" that we don't know about in the case of choice, or (in my case) hope. As if there were some essential nature of choosing (or hoping) which we could discover with science. Would you say the same about knowledge: that we cannot tell whether we know that there is a table in front of us unless we have some anatomical and physiological explanation of what happens when we know things? So that, in principle, only an anatomist or physiologist can tell me whether I know that Quito is the capital of Ecuador?

Let's concede that choices are explained by the neural activity. Does it matter what the details that a neurophysiolgist can provide us with, are? So what does that tell us about when we can choose freely? Nothing, so far as I can tell.

[untermensche]

I have conjured up an image that describes what I think you're asking.

Imagine electrodes hooked up to a sleeping patient's brain (that is not yet in REM sleep); imagine that the electrodes are hooked to a machine that gives us a mental picture of the activity that occurs while dreaming. Now, we stand in witness of the patient as she starts to dream. We see activity on the screen, and the doctor points and says, "that's the dreaming".

Of course, what he points to really isn't the dreaming but instead a computer representation of the activity occurring while the patient dreams. I suspect that you are asking me what our wishes are from a neurological perspective, but given the constraints imposed (the terms requested), what else can I say other than a collection of neural activity?

In other words, I have no idea … I’d imagine they look a lot like, well, neural activity.
That is not at all what neural activity looks like. It is like a cloud. A moving of electrons all over the place and chemicals across synapses, and internal cell activity as well.

It is an incredibly complex thing.

But in the midst of all this seeming chaos, a thing is desired.

What exactly, within this seeming chaos, is this thing called desire? Unless some think it has nothing to do with this seeming chaos.

[untermensche]

What would it be like to know what choice is "in anatomical and physiological terms"? Explain what happens anatomically and physically when we make a choice? Why would that be knowing what making a choice is? Would you say the same thing about something else, say, hoping. Would you say that unless we know exactly what happens anatomically and physically when we hope for something, we cannot know what hoping for something is....
If we are looking for cause and effect of hoping, then of course knowing what it is is needed first before knowing how it was caused.

Instead of just crudely saying, "I caused it". What is I, and what is causing? The two things that need absolute definitions before anything definitive can be said about the process of I causing.

What exactly is choosing, and how is it caused?

Not the subjective experience of being conscious as a choice is made. Which is the most that can be claimed subjectively.

I was aware that this choice was made. I was aware that the arm was motivated to move. Aware that the whole body ran ten miles.

[kennethamy]

That is not at all what neural activity looks like. It is like a cloud. A moving of electrons all over the place and chemicals across synapses, and internal cell activity as well.

It is an incredibly complex thing.

But in the midst of all this seeming chaos, a thing is desired.

What exactly, within this seeming chaos, is this thing called desire? Unless some think it has nothing to do with this seeming chaos.

You think that someone can look into this "seeming chaos" and pick out what you call this "thing called desire" and this will tell us anything about the concept of desiring something works in ordinary life? That, for example it will make us understand why we can desire what is not advantageous for us? Of course, the term "desire" is just one of a whole family of terms, like "want" . We don't talk (except as a joke) about desiring blueberry pie.

You seem to think that there is some essential nature of wanting or desiring, which can be revealed by the study of the nervous system. But, wanting is a concept in ordinary life, which existed way before neuroscience was even thought of.

[untermensche]

You think that someone can look into this "seeming chaos" and pick out what you call this "thing called desire" and this will tell us anything about the concept of desiring something works in ordinary life? That, for example it will make us understand why we can desire what is not advantageous for us? Of course, the term "desire" is just one of a whole family of terms, like "want" . We don't talk (except as a joke) about desiring blueberry pie.

You seem to think that there is some essential nature of wanting or desiring, which can be revealed by the study of the nervous system. But, wanting is a concept in ordinary life, which existed way before neuroscience was even thought of.
The desire defined by this seeming chaos is the desire of "ordinary life".

[kennethamy]

The desire defined by this seeming chaos is the desire of "ordinary life".

How do you know that?? How is the correlation made between the two?

[untermensche]

How do you know that?? How is the correlation made between the two?
Are the things we see created by the seeming chaos? The things we hear?

Are our sensations of heat and cold created by the seeming chaos?

All this and more.

But not the desires?

[fast]

That is not at all what neural activity looks like. It is like a cloud. I gathered that, but I thought you were asking about a specific part of the 'cloud', and I had hoped that your envisioning specific activity of dreaming (one of many activities of the brain) would give rise to the notion that an effort on my part to describe what you seemed to be asking of me (one specific thing in terms of neural activity) would require describing a minute fraction of said 'cloud'.

It is an incredibly complex thing.Yes, I gathered that too.

I really don't understand how isolating the active neurons or synaptic activity triggered during a certain thought process is going to help us learn anything new about the thought process in question. Knowing how a battery works, for example, isn't going to help anyone know how to tell time from the clock hooked to the battery. There's too much of a disconnect between what we're looking at and what we want to know.

What exactly, within this seeming chaos, is this thing called desire? Unless some think it has nothing to do with this seeming chaos.I don't know. Even though I think I have a foggy notion of what you're asking, I have no clue how to answer it, nor do I even know if it is answerable. Heck, it may not even be a meaningful question--I just can't tell.

[untermensche]

I really don't understand how isolating the active neurons or synaptic activity triggered during a certain thought process is going to help us learn anything new about the thought process in question. Knowing how a battery works, for example, isn't going to help anyone know how to tell time from the clock hooked to the battery. There's too much of a disconnect between what we're looking at and what we want to know.
Bad analogy.

I am saying there is a one to one relationship between the exact brain activity of choosing, and the consciousness of choosing.

Just like there is a one to one relationship between the brain activity that creates colors and presents them to consciousness, and being conscious of color.

There is no relation between a battery and the workings of a clock, except to provide energy.

The chemical processes which create the energy the brain uses are not the same processes which create consciousness. That is the process which uses that energy.

[kennethamy]

Are the things we see created by the seeming chaos? The things we hear?

Are our sensations of heat and cold created by the seeming chaos?

All this and more.

But not the desires?

I didn't say desires have no cause, or, at least, that the feeling of desire has no cause. However, the concept of desire is not the same as the feeling of desire, for concepts are not feelings.
In any case, why should the neural causes of desires be what desire "is". We don't (I hope) think that the neural correlate of knowledge is the same thing as knowledge, or the neural correlates of hope the same thing as hope. Science cannot tell us what knowledge is. How can science tell us what desire is?

I asked you how you think it would be possible to pick out from the neural firings (I don't know what you are talking about when you talk of "chaos") that which we call "desire"? There is, without doubt, things that happen in the brain that are correlated with that part of desire which is a feeling, but that would not be the "essence" of desire (or as you put it, "what desire is"). It would just be the neural correlates which cause us to have a particular kind of feeling.

Your quest for essence is metaphysical, but you think you give it a kind of scientific respectability by identifying it with brain activity.

[untermensche]

In any case, why should the neural causes of desires be what desire "is". We don't (I hope) think that the neural correlate of knowledge is the same thing as knowledge, or the neural correlates of hope the same thing as hope. Science cannot tell us what knowledge is. How can science tell us what desire is?
The neural correlate of knowledge is what it is to have and experience knowledge.

The neural correlate of hope is what it is to have and experience hope.

What else could these experiences be?

[kennethamy]

The neural correlate of knowledge is what it is to have and experience knowledge.

The neural correlate of hope is what it is to have and experience hope.

What else could these experiences be?

But knowledge is not just some experience. Having an experience of knowing doesn't mean that you know. You might have that experience and be wrong. Would you know then? (Suppose I tell you that I have the experience of knowing that Quito is the capital of Costa Rica. Does that mean I know that Quito is the capital of Costa Rica?)

And neither is hoping just some experience. Suppose I tell you that I hope that 3+2 will =11 tomorrow. You tell me that makes no sense. You can't hope that sort of thing. And I reply, well, I have the experience of hoping that 3+2 will =11, so I must be hoping it.

[Canard DuJour]

What are our "wishes"?

Specifically, in terms of brain activity.

You mean by what specific neural processes do we anticipate and evaluate?

A squirt of dopamine here for coffee, an extra femtovolt there for milk?

I think we're a long way from anything like that yet, but no one's claiming that anything supernatural is going on. Here (http://www.ecs.soton.ac.uk/~harnad/Papers/Py104/dennett.memory.html) is some more general speculation.

.

[kennethamy]

You mean by what specific neural processes do we anticipate and evaluate?



.

Why do you suppose he means that? What he seems to mean is that we can identify wishing for something with some species of brain activity. So that, for instance, when someone wishes upon a star, that's the same thing as some brain activity going on.

I would doubt that, since as Wittgenstein might have said, wishing has consequences that go beyond the consequences of a brain event. Just to begin with, a person can wish for different things. Would that mean that for each wish there is a different brain activity? Sounds implausible to me.

[untermensche]

But knowledge is not just some experience. Having an experience of knowing doesn't mean that you know. You might have that experience and be wrong. Would you know then? (Suppose I tell you that I have the experience of knowing that Quito is the capital of Costa Rica. Does that mean I know that Quito is the capital of Costa Rica?)

And neither is hoping just some experience. Suppose I tell you that I hope that 3+2 will =11 tomorrow. You tell me that makes no sense. You can't hope that sort of thing. And I reply, well, I have the experience of hoping that 3+2 will =11, so I must be hoping it.
For a consciousness, everything is experience. There is nothing except experience. And knowledge is something consciousness experiences.

Unless you are simply talking about knowledge then that is a language experience.

[kennethamy]

For a consciousness, everything is experience. There is nothing except experience. And knowledge is something consciousness experiences.

Unless you are simply talking about knowledge then that is a language experience.

Is this some kind of objection? I can be truly said to know that Quito is the capital of Ecuador even when I am sound asleep and experiencing nothing. And, even when I am conscious, what sort of experience do I have to have in order to know that some proposition is true? And, if I have that experience (if there is one) and I find out that although I had that experience, what I thought I knew turned out to be false, did I know it anyway just because I had that experience?

What is "language experience"? And I thought we were talking about knowledge, or "simply knowledge". If we were talking about anything at all, and now, I am not at all sure we were.

Just what is your point? You keep hopping about so I cannot tell.

[untermensche]

Is this some kind of objection? I can be truly said to know that Quito is the capital of Ecuador even when I am sound asleep and experiencing nothing. And, even when I am conscious, what sort of experience do I have to have in order to know that some proposition is true? And, if I have that experience (if there is one) and I find out that although I had that experience, what I thought I knew turned out to be false, did I know it anyway just because I had that experience?

What is "language experience"? And I thought we were talking about knowledge, or "simply knowledge". If we were talking about anything at all, and now, I am not at all sure we were.

Just what is your point? You keep hopping about so I cannot tell.
It is an objection. And if you can see it and respond to it, fine.

But all consciousness is is the ability to experience.

The kind of consciousness you have determines how you experience your universe.

[fast]

Bad analogy.Par for the course I suppose.

I'm just going to keep holding the "I havn't a clue sign," and let it go ... sorry.

[untermensche]

Par for the course I suppose.

I'm just going to keep holding the "I havn't a clue sign," and let it go ... sorry.
This is not anything that requires a responce.

Do you think you have a point? If so, make it.

[kennethamy]

It is an objection. And if you can see it and respond to it, fine.

But all consciousness is is the ability to experience.

The kind of consciousness you have determines how you experience your universe.

I certainly agree that consciousness gives one the ability to have experiences, if that is what you mean. But that seems to me no news. You certainly cannot have experiences unless you are conscious. Who would deny that? Is that all you are getting at? What happened to all that brain-neural stuff you were on about? Where did that vanish to? Gone with the wind.

I don't know what a kind of consciousness is. How many kinds are there. Could you list a few? (Maybe you mean something like animal as compared with human consciousness? Very opaque! I guess you'll just have to take pity on my lack of acuity, and try to explain a little more).

[untermensche]

I certainly agree that consciousness gives one the ability to have experiences, if that is what you mean. But that seems to me no news. You certainly cannot have experiences unless you are conscious. Who would deny that? Is that all you are getting at? What happened to all that brain-neural stuff you were on about? Where did that vanish to? Gone with the wind.

I don't know what a kind of consciousness is. How many kinds are there. Could you list a few? (Maybe you mean something like animal as compared with human consciousness? Very opaque! I guess you'll just have to take pity on my lack of acuity, and try to explain a little more).
If everything is experience. And everything we experience is a creation of our brain. Then everything we experience, from colors, to hopes, to dreams, to our use of language, WILL, must have a neural explanation.

So we cannot say if 'will' is something free or not without first having that neural explanation which correlates to all we experience as our will.

I am saying 'will' is a creation of the brain just like 'color' is a creation of the brain.

We experience 'will', we do not direct or create it.

[kennethamy]

If everything is experience. And everything we experience is a creation of our brain. Then everything we experience, from colors, to hopes, to dreams, to our use of language, WILL, must have a neural explanation.

So we cannot say if 'will' is something free or not without first having that neural explanation which correlates to all we experience as our will.

I am saying 'will' is a creation of the brain just like 'color' is a creation of the brain.

We experience 'will', we do not direct or create it.

How could everything be experience. If someone interviews me and asks me, do you have computer experience, even if I say yes, don't there also have to be computers as well as my experience of computers. How could I have computer experience unless there were computers?

Something else I don't quite get. If all our experiences have neural explanations, are those neurons also experience? Or are they just plain old neurons. And, if the neurons, in terms of which we explain experience, are themselves just experience, then I suppose that experience, itself, must have an explanation. Right? Now, that explanation will be in terms of neural experience too? And that also will be experience (for "everything is experience") And the peculiar thing is, I keep wondering what it is we experience when we experience, if everything is experience? Are we experiencing experiences? There it is again. My lack of acuity. I am sure you will make everything clear in a moment.

[untermensche]

How could everything be experience. If someone interviews me and asks me, do you have computer experience, even if I say yes, don't there also have to be computers as well as my experience of computers. How could I have computer experience unless there were computers?
Everything to the individual is experience. That is all the individual has.

Be it experience of some present moment, or experience of a memory, or experience of dreaming.

[kennethamy]

Everything to the individual is experience. That is all the individual has.

Be it experience of some present moment, or experience of a memory, or experience of dreaming.

Not to me. I have had computer experience on computers, and the computers were not experience, although I guess they were experienced by me. They were, however, made by Dell. I think you need to distinguish between having an experience, and what that experience is of, which is not an experience. To have experience of computers is not to have an experience of experience.

[untermensche]

Not to me. I have had computer experience on computers, and the computers were not experience, although I guess they were experienced by me. They were, however, made by Dell. I think you need to distinguish between having an experience, and what that experience is of, which is not an experience. To have experience of computers is not to have an experience of experience.
I do not need to make any distinctions I have not already made.

I perhaps need to express them again.

To the individual, all there is is experience.

Your above statement does not refute this in any way.

[TomJrzk]

I would have thought that the state of my brain would depend on whatever choice I made.
With what did you make your choice, if not the brain???

The state of your brain made your choice.

So, Hard Determinism to me allows for what we call in everyday language 'free will' but only if it's understood that the brain creates that will and its state completely controls it.

Philosophers can talk about wanting apple pie and being coerced into marrying but every choice you make is made by our physical brain.

I noticed that no one wanted to discuss my replicator thought experiment. Why?

[fast]

This is not anything that requires a responce.

Do you think you have a point? If so, make it.Ouch!

Easy there pistol; I didn't know you were loaded.

I'll be clear. You asked a question. I don’t know the answer. That’s my point.

Again, when you say, “What are our "wishes"? Specifically, in terms of brain activity,” my response is I don’t know.

[untermensche]

With what did you make your choice, if not the brain???

The state of your brain made your choice.

So, Hard Determinism to me allows for what we call in everyday language 'free will' but only if it's understood that the brain creates that will and its state completely controls it.

Philosophers can talk about wanting apple pie and being coerced into marrying but every choice you make is made by our physical brain.

I noticed that no one wanted to discuss my replicator thought experiment. Why?
The hard determinist says that all the individual ever has is the experience of "will", they do not actually have it. It is a creation of the brain, just like color.

[kennethamy]

I do not need to make any distinctions I have not already made.

I perhaps need to express them again.

To the individual, all there is is experience.

Your above statement does not refute this in any way.

Not to this individual. There are lots of things I don't experience that I know exist. I have never been to Japan, but I know that Japan exists. I have never experienced (whatever that means) Mt. Everest, but I know that Mt. Everest exists. And let me give you a hit. No matter how many times you express something, that won't make it true, or even comprehensible. Particularly if it is false or incomprehensible.

You sound like the Bellman in Lewis Carroll's. The Hunting of the Snark. "What I say three times is true".

[untermensche]

Not to this individual. There are lots of things I don't experience that I know exist. I have never been to Japan, but I know that Japan exists. I have never experienced (whatever that means) Mt. Everest, but I know that Mt. Everest exists. And let me give you a hit. No matter how many times you express something, that won't make it true, or even comprehensible. Particularly if it is false or incomprehensible.

You sound like the Bellman in Lewis Carroll's. The Hunting of the Snark. "What I say three times is true".
All that you have of these other things that exist are your experiences of them.

You do not have THEM. You have the experience of them.

You do not see the chair. You see the representation of the chair your brain creates. You experience the representation your brain creates.

[fast]

You do not see the chair.False
You see the representation of the chair your brain creates.True

[kennethamy]

All that you have of these other things that exist are your experiences of them.

You do not have THEM. You have the experience of them.

You do not see the chair. You see the representation of the chair your brain creates. You experience the representation your brain creates.

But I have never experienced Japan or Mt. Everest. (Didn't you read what I said). So, according to you, I "have" nothing of either of them. Whatever that means. But I know they exist, and so do you, whether you have "experienced" them or not. I repeat, I have no experience of either one. What it would mean to "have" them I have no idea.

Of course I see the chair. And I have never in my life seen a representation of a chair in my brain. I have, I think, seen pictures of chairs in books, if that is what you mean. But what makes you think I don't see chairs. Do I sit on chairs, or are what I sit on also representations of chairs created by my brain?

When I experience (see) a chair, the chair is no more what I experience (my seeing of the chair) than than when I kick a chair, the chair is my kicking of the chair.

What argument have you for such a bizarre view?

[TomJrzk]

As fast points out, "hard determinism" is not the disbelief in an acausal self, but a more general claim about physical reality.
Could you explain this to an engineer like myself. I certainly have a disbelief in an acausal self and to know the distinction could be helpful.

[untermensche]

But I have never experienced Japan or Mt. Everest. (Didn't you read what I said). So, according to you, I "have" nothing of either of them. Whatever that means. But I know they exist, and so do you, whether you have "experienced" them or not. I repeat, I have no experience of either one. What it would mean to "have" them I have no idea.

Of course I see the chair. And I have never in my life seen a representation of a chair in my brain. I have, I think, seen pictures of chairs in books, if that is what you mean. But what makes you think I don't see chairs. Do I sit on chairs, or are what I sit on also representations of chairs created by my brain?

What argument have you for such a bizarre view?
You have experienced a lot of language about both places. That is your experience of them.

If you read the first hand account of a person who has experienced something, you experience the account, not the original experience.

You must have asolutely no knowledge of the neuroscience behind the visual system.

ALL you ever see is a representation of objects created by the brain.

[fast]

Of course I see the chair.Absolutely! I, as well as you, do indeed see the chair. I’d even declare too that he, himself, sees it; after all, why is it that he walks around it? His brain told him so? Don’t think so.

We do see the chair.

And I have never in my life seen a representation of a chair in my brain.Technically, I agree with that, but I hope you notice that what you just said isn't precisely what I referenced as true earlier.

You just mentioned "a chair in my brain", and obviously, I too have never seen one located there myself—not so sure it would even fit.

What I think he means is that we don't see the chair, for only our brains could accomplish such a feat, and where I think his mistake lies is in trying to explicate (um, differentiate) between what he sees and what his brain sees. I’m not so sure we should even be trying to make such a distinction.

Of course, there's also the very notion that I don't like: that a brain can see at all, but I'm allowing a little slack in that area in hope of progress … an issue plagued by multiple issues.

[kennethamy]

You have experienced a lot of language about both places. That is your experience of them.

system.

ALL you ever see is a representation of objects created by the brain.

All you have to do is to say it twice more, and that will make it true.

You mean that the existence of Japan is reducible to what I have heard about Japan? Does that mean that Japan would not exist unless I had heard of it? Or is that question attributable to my lack of knowledge of neuroscience. (Do you really believe all this stuff?)

[untermensche]

All you have to do is to say it twice more, and that will make it true.

You mean that the existence of Japan is reducible to what I have heard about Japan? Does that mean that Japan would not exist unless I had heard of it? Or is that question attributable to my lack of knowledge of neuroscience. (Do you really believe all this stuff?)
Your knowledge of Japan is reduced to what you have heard or read, or the pictures still or moving, you have seen.

I am talking about the individual human consciousness, and the reality of the individual consciousness, not all of reality.

And I have to keep telling you that over and over.

[fast]

Tom,

If I were to stop time, rewind, and place everything back like it was yesterday, would you make the same choices all over again?

[kennethamy]

Your knowledge of Japan is reduced to what you have heard or read, or the pictures still or moving, you have seen.

I am talking about the individual human consciousness, and the reality of the individual consciousness, not all of reality.

And I have to keep telling you that over and over.

No, that is how I acquired my knowledge of Japan. That is not my knowledge of Japan. And more than that, that is not what I mean when I say that Japan exists. For, let me admit, here and now, that Japan would exist not only if I didn't know anything about Japan, and had never heard of Japan, but even if I had never been born. What do you think of that? Does that startle you?

What are you saying about "ndividual human consciousness, and the reality of the individual consciousness". Let me rephrase that: what are you saying?

[untermensche]

False
True
YOU do not see the chair. YOU do not see the light reflecting off the chair.

All YOU see is the mental representation of the chair your brain creates for YOU to see.

Your eye does not see. It gathers light. YOU see.

After your brain creates something for YOU to see.

Whatever YOU are.

[untermensche]

No, that is how I acquired my knowledge of Japan. That is not my knowledge of Japan. And more than that, that is not what I mean when I say that Japan exists. For, let me admit, here and now, that Japan would exist not only if I didn't know anything about Japan, and had never heard of Japan, but even if I had never been born. What do you think of that? Does that startle you?

What are you saying about "ndividual human consciousness, and the reality of the individual consciousness". Let me rephrase that: what are you saying?
How did you get any knowledge of Japan?

[TomJrzk]

Tom,

If I were to stop time, rewind, and place everything back like it was yesterday, would you make the same choices all over again?
If I knew then what I knew then, yes. Absolutely.

In other words, if you rewound my brain and everyone else's I (and you) wouldn't notice any difference.

[untermensche]

If I knew then what I knew then, yes. Absolutely.

In other words, if you rewound my brain and everyone else's I (and you) wouldn't notice any difference.
Who can say for certain.

There are different ways for a system to be deterministic.

One way is for every specific cause to have one and only one possible effect.

Another way would be that a specific cause could have two or more equally likely effects.

Both systems are deterministic.

[TomJrzk]

Another way would be that a specific cause could have two or more equally likely effects.
Maybe that's where our rub is. I don't agree with this. (Unless, you're allowing other causes to have any effect.) Whenever a decision is made, a scale tilts in one direction or the other. Whatever caused that tilt would do so every time.
Who can say for certain.

I can not, but that's why this is philosophy and not hard science. It would surely help, though, if someone could tell me what they think would tip the scale differently in the same situation. Engineers have a real hard time going there...

[fast]

YOU do not see the chair. Yes I do, and I even know what color it is. I suppose if I were blind, then perhaps I would not see the chair, but I am not blind (thank the Lord), and I do see the chair, and it's blue by the way.

YOU do not see the light reflecting off the chair.Why? Is it dark in the room?

All YOU see is the mental representation of the chair your brain creates for YOU to see.What's the difference? Isn't that what seeing the chair is all about? Haven't you just in a round about way simply said, "I see the chair?"

[fast]

If I knew then what I knew then, yes. Absolutely.

In other words, if you rewound my brain and everyone else's I (and you) wouldn't notice any difference.

So, if I had twenty cereal's to choose from this morning, and if I had a very hard time making up my mind this morning which I would choose, and suppose that I finally chose the seventeenth box from the left, and let's say that I decided to have two bowls instead of my usual one bowl, and suppose that I dropped my spoon on the floor, which is an unusual event, then the choices and happenings of this morning would identically repeat if somehow you were able to stop time and rewind and let loose time again to see what may come the next go around.

And the reason it would all happen again precisely as it happened before is because life and all that exists (all matter in motion) is like a raging convergence of cause and effect forever forging forward to its eventual destiny?

Isn't what I just said consistent with your engineering training, and how is a choice indeed a choice if my choice can be nothing other than what is destined to happen? I know this isn’t consistent with Ken’s take on hard determinism, but what I’m talking about is perhaps something slightly different that yet still goes to the heart of whether we indeed have free will or not—maybe.

[TomJrzk]

And the reason it would all happen again precisely as it happened before is because life and all that exists (all matter in motion) is like a raging convergence of cause and effect forever forging forward to its eventual destiny?
Yes. And I think I'll believe that until someone can explain what could change that might cause you to choose the 18th box.

But still, our intelligence and our neurology's choices are a part of that destiny.

[fast]

Part 1:
Yes. And I think I'll believe that until someone can explain what could change that might cause you to choose the 18th box.

Part 2:
But still, our intelligence and our neurology's choices are a part of that destiny.I've broken your comments into two parts and they will be referred to as such.

Part 1, I hope is false. I hope that the choices I make tomorrow are not destined as part 1 infers. The implications of part 1 being true is that the choices I make tomorrow must happen...it means Ken cannot choose not to take that walk. It means he's fooled into thinking he made the choice...fooled into thinking he had alternatives...fooled into thinking he could have walked despite the emergency.

Part 2 brings no comfort or solace, so long as part 1 is true.

Special note. I feel that I am not conflating what I’m talking about with fatalism, assuming fatalism is what it’s been declared to be. I’m still saying that the choices made influences what comes as a result of our choices whereas the fatalist would say that no matter what choices are made, the result will be the same, so I’m not saying what the fatalist would say. I’m simply saying that if part 1 is true, then the choices that we do make (the same choices that serve as causes to subsequent effects) are not true choices since the there’s no true alternatives in face of the choices we make.

[TomJrzk]

no comfort or solace

So, the fact that were you a different person, you would make different decisions does not offer some comfort? Your personality is still fully engaged. So are your ideals and what you think about. So is your intelligence and learning. It's really no different to me. Your day to day existence is not changed. (Your perspective on criminals and your effect on others probably would be changed as have mine.)

Sure, it's less of a mind bender to believe that you have choices other than what your brain 'computes'. But don't we know this is not true? Don't we know the effects of a stroke or drugs? Don't we accommodate the insane? Don't we accept evidence of a repression module in the brain? Don't we think we're completely gone when our brain stops functioning?

[untermensche]

Yes I do, and I even know what color it is. I suppose if I were blind, then perhaps I would not see the chair, but I am not blind (thank the Lord), and I do see the chair, and it's blue by the way.

Why? Is it dark in the room?

What's the difference? Isn't that what seeing the chair is all about? Haven't you just in a round about way simply said, "I see the chair?"
Nope.

The chair YOU see is the chair your brain creates for YOU to see. Not the chair that is in front of YOU.

Seeing is when the brain creates an image, not when light hits the eyes.

That's why some people with perfectly functioning eyes can still be blind.

[fast]

So, the fact that were you a different person, you would make different decisions does not offer some comfort?Well, I'm not saying it's a total shambles, but if part 1 is true must choose a particular choice] (the part you say is true and that I hope is false), then my entire idea of what a person is changes, and my idea of what a decision is just became meaningless.

A person is supposed to be not just different but special. If part 1 is true, then I'm just like the next candy bar out of the machine--different but not of my own choosing--succumbing to the imperfections of the machine that made me--succumbing to the whim of cause and effect. I have no volition in my choices if part 1 is true. Your brilliant computer houses the answers as to what my choices of the future will be.

You come back at me with the idea that I have different decisions. Big deal! You even said, "you would make different decisions" and clearly you must have meant different decisions than "others". Fact is though, and supposing part 1 is true, the decisions I will be making are 'set in stone' --they must come to be.

These so-called decisions are cloaked under the guise of being real--they are not, if part 1 is true!

If you were suspended in time and were able to witness me choosing the cereal choice, it would be like watching a movie; you would turn to your friend and say, “watch this, this is where he decides which cereal to get.” Your friend says, "The suspense is killing me ... what decision will Fast make?" You say, "Hold on, let me check my machine; awe, it's cereal box 17"--it could be no other--the fury of cause and effect is in motion and will not be stopped by no great force -- man nor beast.

[Hoodoo Ulove]

The chair YOU see is the chair your brain creates for YOU to see. Not the chair that is in front of YOU.Where is the chair my mind creates? Surely there is not a chair in my brain; there's not enough room.

[fast]

Nope.

The chair YOU see is the chair your brain creates for YOU to see. Not the chair that is in front of YOU.

Seeing is when the brain creates an image, not when light hits the eyes.

That's why some people with perfectly functioning eyes can still be blind.
I refuse to say that I don't see the chair in front of me. I see it, I see it, I see it!

You say that I don't see it, but I do see it. I do, I do, I do!

What you're talking about that I see (I believe) is the percept of a chair--similar to but different than the concept of a chair.

This thing to which you say that my brain is perceptually aware of is the percept of the chair. I think--I get all this stuff confused, but I'm sticking with, "I see the chair."

[Hoodoo Ulove]

Your brilliant computer houses the answers as to what my choices of the future will be.Fast, is it any consolation that chaotic systems, such as your mind, are unpredictable in principle? That is, the computer to predict your behavior cannot work? That there is no movie of the past and future? If this matters to you, why does it? Does the cereal taste any different?

[fast]

Fast, is it any consolation that chaotic systems, such as your mind, are unpredictable in principle? That is, the computer to predict your behavior cannot work? That there is no movie of the past and future? Yes, yes, and yes.

If it is such that there are cases that makes it impossible (no matter what information is available) to predict the intimate choices that I will make, then I just feel better about the choices that I (really me) made.

If this matters to you, why does it? Well, I guess because it would mean that my actions are warmly a function of the emotionally tender me and not coldly the consequence of my uncaring parts.

Does the cereal taste any different?The trophy doesn't look any better whether I cheated or not, but the feeling of knowing that I didn't cheat makes the twinkle in my eye just a tad bit sharper.

[TomJrzk]

Fact is though, and supposing part 1 is true, the decisions I will be making are 'set in stone' --they must come to be.
Technically, yes; practically, there is no difference. That determined outcome was based solely on the box you would have chosen if your personality was in exactly that position/condition. But, day to day, the decisions you make are important.
If you were suspended in time and were able to witness me choosing the cereal choice, it would be like watching a movie; you would turn to your friend and say, “watch this, this is where he decides which cereal to get.”
If you overheard the movie watchers say 'box 17', you could fool them every time by grabbing #18. Does that help at all. The fact remains, your personality decides the future.

[Hoodoo Ulove]

Well, I guess because it would mean that my actions are warmly a function of the emotionally tender me and not coldly the consequence of my uncaring parts.The people who claim to understand what determinism means assure us that events which are determined may nonetheless not be determinable, so don't be too consoled.

[untermensche]

Where is the chair my mind creates? Surely there is not a chair in my brain; there's not enough room.
It is in your visual field.

Your brain creates a visual field.

It bases this visual field on the stimulation of cells in the retina.

Do you have any knowledge of the phsiological basis of vision?

It is available on-line.

[TomJrzk]

A person is supposed to be not just different but special.
I'm certainly special, so are you. We can think about the future and make decisions based on that thinking. Only I think and feel as I do (isn't that painfully obvious at this point??? ;) ).

[Hoodoo Ulove]

It is in your visual field.

Your brain creates a visual field.

It bases this visual field on the stimulation of cells in the retina.The stimulation of cells in the retina is indeed part of the process of seeing. Seeing is not looking at the retina.Do you have any knowledge of the phsiological basis of vision?

It is available on-line.Do you have any knowledge of the meaning of "condescension"?

It is available on-line.

[TomJrzk]

Well, I guess because it would mean that my actions are warmly a function of the emotionally tender me and not coldly the consequence of my uncaring parts.
I don't feel at all that my choices are cold or uncaring. The deterministic universe must accommodate the squishy emotions of our personalities, we ARE the deterministic universe.

[fast]

Technically, yes; practically, there is no difference. That determined outcome was based solely on the box you would have chosen if your personality was in exactly that position/condition.What other position or condition could it have been in?

But, day to day, the decisions you make are important.You mean those decisions between non-alternatives? Are you saying that I actually could have chosen box 18? Wouldn't that be an engineering conundrum?

If you overheard the movie watchers say 'box 17', you could fool them every time by grabbing #18.Impossible.

Does that help at all.No, because it's impossible.

The thought experiment of going back in time may be impossible too, but that's only done to make a point about how things really are if hard determinism is true. You make a point too with the use of the thought experiment, but since it's impossible to overhear it, there's no negation (in reality) to what I had said. <I hope that made sense>

The fact remains, your personality decides the future.Yeah, well, if part 1 is true, there is no surprise in store for us when it comes to our future children's personality. It's a surprise to us only because we don't have the super computer to analyze all given data, but if we did have such a computer, whether there would be a surprise or not would be in relation as to whether or not it's part 1 or free will that is true.

Free will -> surprise
Part 1 -> no surprise

[untermensche]

The stimulation of cells in the retina is indeed part of the process of seeing. Seeing is not looking at the retina.Do you have any knowledge of the meaning of "condescension"?

It is available on-line.
All I am saying is that it seems I am having trouble explaining how vision works to you.

You do not see the object. You see a representation of the object created by the brain.

I cannot make it simpler for you.

[Hoodoo Ulove]

You do not see the object. You see a representation of the object created by the brain.Analogously, would you say I am not run over by a truck, I am run over by a representation of a truck created by my brain?

[fast]

I don't feel at all that my choices are cold or uncaring. The deterministic universe must accommodate the squishy emotions of our personalities, we ARE the deterministic universe.Sometimes, things I say don't come out as I wish they would.

I am not meaning to be negative by implying that your or my decisions are cold and uncaring; in fact, I'd wager that we're both very thoughtful (at least at times.)

It's just if I viewed hard determinism as true where I viewed our micro causes as responsible for our choices that leads to macro effects, then I'd have to look at people a little differently than I do. Instead of looking at people who actually made compassionate choices of their own free will, I'd have to look at them as robots exhibiting compassionate like choices succumbing to the micro causes that flush their decisions down the destined pipes they go.

It's not that one just sounds better than the other--there's an actual difference. With hard determinism, the choices are between non-alternatives, but with free will, the choices are between alternatives. With hard determinism, my response is, "of course you chose that cereal; did you expect otherwise?", but with free will, there's a wow about it.

Hard determinism -- Duh!
Free will -- Wow!

[untermensche]

Analogously, would you say I am not run over by a truck, I am run over by a representation of a truck created by my brain?
No.

The representation is a representation of a real truck.

But what we see is the representation, not the truck.

[TomJrzk]

Instead of looking at people who actually made compassionate choices of their own free will, I'd have to look at them as robots exhibiting compassionate like choices succumbing to the micro causes that flush their decisions down the destined pipes they go.

I look at them as people with good personalities that (vs who) choose to suffer for the benefit of others. I like those people and aspire to become that which I like. And I still get a squire of seratonin when I think of those people or do something noble.

I understand the difference you express but I don't feel the difference, that's why it still sounds like Fatalism to me. You'd be all 'woe is me' if determinism was actually proved; I'm not.

[Hoodoo Ulove]

No.

The representation is a representation of a real truck.

But what we see is the representation, not the truck.Is the truck invisible? After all, according to you, we don't see it.

[untermensche]

Is the truck invisible? After all, according to you, we don't see it.
We do see a representation of it. A mental image. We do not see the actual thing. We see what our brain has evolved to make out of the light that reflects off the actual thing.

[kennethamy]

We do see a representation of it. A mental image. We do not see the actual thing. We see what our brain has evolved to make out of the light that reflects off the actual thing.

I have never seen a mental image of anything in my life. I think you need a special instrument to do that. Since I have no eyes looking inward into my head, I don't see how I could possibly see a mental image. I think you must mean that when we see objects, we have certain inward states which cause us to see what we see. For instance, particular (inverted) images (which physiologists can detect with special instruments) do appear on our retina. But none of us has ever looked at his own retina. How could he do such a thing, anyhow? The light bounces off the object, and impinges on our visual faculties. But we do not, of course, ever see that process. What we see is the object. The trouble is that you are giving a philosopher's metaphorical description of a physiological process. No physiologist would say that we "see" the retinal image. That's simple nonsense.

[dongiovanni1976x]

Take Hobbes who I mentioned earlier. His view is that before we make our conscious choice or decision, those choices and decisions have already been made in some way we are unaware of, (he would not have put it this way, but had he been a contemporary, he might have told us it was by means of neurons firing off in our brains) and that our conscious choices and decisions are just formal ratifications of what has already happened. So, first the decision or choice is made, and then we make it, we sort of rubber stamp it. The "rubber stamping" is what we are aware of. The actual occurrence which we rubber stamp has already been made. I think this is a pretty good picture of what several people on this thread have claimed is true, and may, very well, be what at least some hard determinists have in mind when they say, we don't make choices or decisions.

Sorry to miss out on so much. I am still reading to catch up. As I could not have done otherwise I assume at least Tom will forgive me for my absence. ;-)

Anyways…as to your rubber stamp example Ken...researchers have shown, and I believe we have touched on this before (I know I have many times) that there is a characteristic pattern of brain activity that precedes the physical movement associated with voluntary action occurring at time t by approximately 550 milliseconds. This pattern is detectable by the use of an EEG. The fact that there is preceding brain activity should not be surprising but what is surprising is the amount of time that the EEG records the activity before actual physical movement and that it precedes the “rubber stamping” of conscious awareness. [The researchers predicted on average one-half second before voluntary movement that it would occur. Even more surprising was that the test patients reported conscious intention of their putative choice only 200 milliseconds before acting out their respective choice.]

The results of the test resemble the following diagram:

time (t)

t -550ms----------------------------------t -200ms------------------------------t
Characteristic EEG Pattern -----------------conscious awareness-------------------movement


If you were put to this test when chose to take a walk the testers could tell you 350 milliseconds before you yourself were even aware.

What is it that makes you think that had everything been exactly the same you could have chosen to TAKE your walk if you weren’t even aware of your CHOICE until AFTER the responsible neuron actualized, cascading the effect(s) which eventually led to your rubber stamped feeling of being in charge? (I stress the word EXACTLY)

Source: Albert Camus "An Absurd Reasoning" in The Myth of Sisypus, 21

[dongiovanni1976x]

Your analogies are too complicated for me (not merely to understand, but to judge).

My reason for saying that the onus of proof is on the hard determinist is that it seems evident that the initial likelihood, or the "default position" is that we sometimes do make choices and decisions. and do actions, which are up to us in that they were not coerced. After all, it is clear that in ordinary circumstances we would deny the suggestion made by a companion that Joe did not marry Mary of his own free will, when Joe is in love with Mary, and Mary's father is not standing there with a shotgun in his hands menacing Joe. And, if my companion dismissed that as not mattering, but, instead, pointed out that Joe's neurons were firing away, I would take that point as irrelevant (if not bizarre). For since I suppose neurons are forever firing away whatever anyone does, and is a kind of "common demoninator" in everything we do, I would have expected that when my companion informed me that Joe was not marrying Mary "of his own free will" that he would have some particular factor in mind, quite apart from the universal factor of neuron firings. So, were I to reply to my companion, my reply would be along the lines of, "Yes, yes, I know about the neuron firings. But is there any unusual factor (like Mary's father toting a shotgun) that you have in mind when you tell me that Joe is not marrying Mary of his own free will? So much for why I would say that the burden of proof is squarely on my companion.

But one further remark: it seems to me that my neuron-firing companion should be able to tell me how all those firing neurons are sufficiently like Mary's father carring a shotgun, to constitute reasons for asserting that Joe is not marrying Mary "of his own free will". Clearly, the reason we say that is that the shotgun pointed at Joe is coercive. In that case, Joe would be literally "under the gun", and be forced to marry Mary. How are neuron firings coercive is the question?

If your companion is to believe you when you say you know about neurons firing then he would assume you would not need to ask your question in the first place since neurons fire in linear sequence in accord with chronological time and once the potential for a neuron is actualized and time has expired it becomes the cause of all the neurons that are activated as a result of its firing. In fact it is so UNUSUAL that this is why the burden is upon the compatabilits who says Ken in room 1 picks grape soda and Ken in room two picks orange soda. There is nothing different in the test subject, his neurons, brain state, environment etc so what is the NEWLY INSERTED VARIABLE that would give credibility to the person who wants to assert that one would choose grape and the other orange? That certainly IS unusual.

[Hoodoo Ulove]

We do not see the actual thing.If you hold that to be true, do you recognize that you are using the word "see" differently than others use it? And are you convinced that people who claim to see things are mistaken, and if only they had your knowledge of the physiology of vision they would know better?

[TomJrzk]

As I could not have done otherwise I assume at least Tom will forgive me for my absence. ;-)

Of course, I forgive everybody; I would do the exact same thing if I were in your position, by definition.

Source: Albert Camus "An Absurd Reasoning" in The Myth of Sisypus, 21
But, I have been known to place in the icky bucket people who have committed much less egregious crimes than making me read the name of one of my heroes, Sisyphus, as "Sissy Puss"!

[fast]

I understand the difference you express but I don't feel the difference, that's why it still sounds like Fatalism to me.

I'd maybe grant that it's fatalistic sounding, but it's not fatalistic as described.

I believe the fatalist would say that an effect would occur despite the cause. I'm saying that your view is not like that at all. The only way, according to you, for an effect to occur is if there is a precipitating cause...and I'm not actually disagreeing with that, exactly ... it's just that the implications of that taken to the extreme precludes the possibility of making actual choices with alternatives.

[Hoodoo Ulove]

The only way, according to you, for an effect to occur is if there is a precipitating cause...Not so, according to you? Doesn't the idea of effect presuppose the idea of cause? . . . and I'm not actually disagreeing with that, exactly ... it's just that the implications of that taken to the extreme precludes the possibility of making actual choices with alternatives.What's the difference between a choice and an actual choice?

[TomJrzk]

I'd maybe grant that it's fatalistic sounding, but it's not fatalistic as described.
So, if you knew that someone knew what your children's personalities would be like, you'd still have children? If yes, then I agree that it's not Fatalism. But I'm wondering if the discomfort you're conveying is enough to nudge you ever closer to Catatonia. Catatonia being the capitol of Fatalism ;).

[untermensche]

I have never seen a mental image of anything in my life. I think you need a special instrument to do that. Since I have no eyes looking inward into my head, I don't see how I could possibly see a mental image. I think you must mean that when we see objects, we have certain inward states which cause us to see what we see. For instance, particular (inverted) images (which physiologists can detect with special instruments) do appear on our retina. But none of us has ever looked at his own retina. How could he do such a thing, anyhow? The light bounces off the object, and impinges on our visual faculties. But we do not, of course, ever see that process. What we see is the object. The trouble is that you are giving a philosopher's metaphorical description of a physiological process. No physiologist would say that we "see" the retinal image. That's simple nonsense.
Everything you "see" is a mental representation. Really you are simply conscious of this mental image your brain creates and presents.

You cannot "see" anything else. You do not have the ability.

[untermensche]

If you hold that to be true, do you recognize that you are using the word "see" differently than others use it? And are you convinced that people who claim to see things are mistaken, and if only they had your knowledge of the physiology of vision they would know better?
They are using shorthand.

To "see" something is to be aware of the image of something your brain creates in responce to light.

You, your personality, does not create this image. Your brain does.

[Hoodoo Ulove]

Everything you "see" is a mental representation.What's the difference between "seeing" a truck and seeing a truck?

Is "seeing" a truck the same as seeing a "truck"?

[Hoodoo Ulove]

You, your personality, does not create this image. Your brain does.Doesn't the object (that thing I see, but don't "see") have just a little part in the creation of this image?

[kennethamy]

What's the difference between "seeing" a truck and seeing a truck?

Is "seeing" a truck the same as seeing a "truck"?

You can "see" a truck without there being truck, but you cannot see a truck unless there is a truck. I don't know what a "truck" is. Some vehicle that looks like a truck, but isn't?

[untermensche]

Doesn't the object (that thing I see, but don't "see") have just a little part in the creation of this image?
Yes. It either absorbs or reflects light.

If it reflects light to your eye, your brain will create an representative image of this light.

[untermensche]

You can "see" a truck without there being truck, but you cannot see a truck unless there is a truck. I don't know what a "truck" is. Some vehicle that looks like a truck, but isn't?
What you don't have a clue of is how the visual system works.

A philosopher without scientific knowledge is like a surgeon without a scalpel.

[Hoodoo Ulove]

What you don't have a clue of is how the visual system works.

A philosopher without scientific knowledge is like a surgeon without a scalpel.What you don't have a clue of is how the english language works.

A philosopher without linguistic knowledge is like a scalpel without a surgeon.

[untermensche]

What you don't have a clue of is how the english language works.

A philosopher without linguistic knowledge is like a scalpel without a surgeon.
Where have I used language incorrectly?

I know what I am talking about here.

I understand at least a little about how vision works.

You do not "see" an object. Your brain creates a presentation, a representation of the object.

That is what you "see".

[Hoodoo Ulove]

Where have I used language incorrectly?

I know what I am talking about here.

I understand at least a little about how vision works.

You do not "see" an object. Your brain creates a presentation, a representation of the object.

That is what you "see".As long as by saying I do not "see" an object, you are not saying I do not see an object, then I do not disagree. Which is not to say I agree (or "agree").

[untermensche]

As long as by saying I do not "see" an object, you are not saying I do not see an object, then I do not disagree. Which is not to say I agree (or "agree").
You DO NOT ever ever ever ever see an object.

All you have the ability to see is the mental representation of the object your brain creates.

[Hoodoo Ulove]

All you have the ability to see is the mental representation of the object your brain creates.I don't really like this side of the idealist/realist argument, but if by our senses we can never perceive the objects causing the so-called mental representations, then it follows that the there is no evidence for the existence of objects. Are you ready to go there? Your position is a metaphysical view masquerading as a scientific view. We differ on no physiological fact that you have mentioned.

[kennethamy]

I don't really like this side of the idealist/realist argument, but if by our senses we can never perceive the objects causing the so-called mental representations, then it follows that the there is no evidence for the existence of objects. Are you ready to go there? Your position is a metaphysical view masquerading as a scientific view. We differ on no physiological fact that you have mentioned.

What 'mental representations"? Once you concede those, you are well on your way to some form of Idealism. What is the argument that there are those "mental representations" in the first place. Much less than that they are all we perceive.

Of course, some of those who have conjured up these mental representations also argue that they are (the only) evidence for the existence of objects. And that we infer the existence of objects from them. The idea then becomes that the existence of objects (which we never perceive) is the best explanation for those mental representations which we do perceive (and indeed are the only things we perceive). That theory is known as "Representative Realism" and is, traditionally, the great rival of Idealism. Both, of course, begin with this notion that we perceive not objects, but mental representations of those objects, and it is that which needs to be nipped in the bud. Why let the argument even get started?

[untermensche]

I don't really like this side of the idealist/realist argument, but if by our senses we can never perceive the objects causing the so-called mental representations, then it follows that the there is no evidence for the existence of objects. Are you ready to go there? Your position is a metaphysical view masquerading as a scientific view. We differ on no physiological fact that you have mentioned.
My view IS the scientific view.

You simply don't know the science of vision.

[untermensche]

What 'mental representations"?
Explain to me what happens to light after it excites cells in the retina.

Does the light continue to travel into the brain, or do neural impulses travel down the optic nerves to the brain?

[kennethamy]

Explain to me what happens to light after it excites cells in the retina.

Does the light continue to travel into the brain, or do neural impulses travel down the optic nerves to the brain?

What on earth has that to do with the question? What is a "mental representation" supposed to be? How do we know they exist? When I see a horse, don't I see a horse? And vision aside, when I touch a horse, or I smell a horse (or what the horse produces) what is it I touch or smell? Let's get away from the visual sense: if you are right, there should be touching a "mental representation" when we touch a horse; or when we smell what horses produce. What of that? When I feel a horse, what am I feeling, the feeling of a horse? Or when I smell a horse, what am I smelling? The smell of a horse? Or am I feeling a horse in the first case, and smelling a horse in the second case? Are "mental representations" there as well?

[untermensche]

What on earth has that to do with the question? What is a "mental representation" supposed to be? How do we know they exist? When I see a horse, don't I see a horse?
Can you answer the question or not?

[kennethamy]

Can you answer the question or not?

This isn't a test. I suppose it is the latter. But what difference does it make? You are talking about how we see. What has that to do with what we see? And now, why don't you try dealing with touching and smelling? And don't confuse the questions how we touch, or how we smell, with what we touch or smell. At least, try not to.

If you kick a rock, and I ask you what you kicked, are you going to answer me my informing me about the anatomy of the leg involved in kicking? Or are you going to answer by telling me you kicked a rock? Don't you see that telling me what happens when you kick something has noting to do with telling me what it was you kicked. And telling me how you see, or how you touch, or how you smell, or how you taste, something, has nothing whatever to do with telling me what it was you saw, or smelled, etc.? The questions have nothing to do with each other.

[untermensche]

This isn't a test. I suppose it is the latter. But what difference does it make? You are talking about how we see. What has that to do with what we see?
If you have patiece I will get to it. You obviously don't have a clue, so I have to go slow.

So do you understand it is not light that enters the brain down the optic nerves?

No light enters the brain.

Yet you still think the brain sees light.

[kennethamy]

If you have patiece I will get to it. You obviously don't have a clue, so I have to go slow.

So do you understand it is not light that enters the brain down the optic nerves?

No light enters the brain.

Yet you still think the brain sees light.

Look, I am not going to discuss the physiology of seeing with you just because you happen to have read a textbook lately. Why not just answer the question: do I touch a horse, or do I touch a mental representation of a horse? (And if you answer that question, please let me know what the hell a mental representation is) Remember, no more physiology.

I never said "the brain sees light". How could the brain see anything? The brain has no eyes. So no. I don't think such an idiotic thing as that the brain sees light. Who in his right mind would even say such a thing? Whether or not the light enters the brain the brain could not see light any more than my big toe could see light.

The word is "patience".

[untermensche]

Look, I am not going to discuss the physiology of seeing with you just because you happen to have read a textbook lately. Why not just answer the question: do I touch a horse, or do I touch a mental representation of a horse? (And if you answer that question, please let me know what the hell a mental representation is) Remember, no more physiology.

I never said "the brain sees light". How could the brain see anything? The brain has no eyes. So no. I don't think such an idiotic thing as that the brain sees light. Who in his right mind would even say such a thing? Whether or not the light enters the brain the brain could not see light any more than my big toe could see light.

The word is "patience".
I thought we were discussing vision.

But obviously you have no interest in the facts of vision.

Wallow in your ignorance for all I care.

[kennethamy]

I thought we were discussing vision.

But obviously you have no interest in the facts of vision.

Wallow in your ignorance for all I care.

No, I thought we were discussing your view that whenever we see something (or, I suppose feel, or smell, or hear) something we were not seeing, etc. an object like a horse, but something you call a "mental representation". And I wanted to know what that term meant, and why you think such bizarre view is true. That means, have you any reasonable argument for it? Now, there is no doubt a board somewhere that is devoted to the physiology of vision, and, if you think you are up to it, you can participate on it. But the physiology of vision has nothing whatever to do with this "mental representation" kick you seem to be on. Why should it? Anymore (to repeat my earlier analogy) than the physiology of kicking has anything to do with the question, what is it you kicked? Or the physiology of eating has anything to do with the question, what did you eat? I can answer the question, what did you eat (a delicious hamburger) without knowing a thing about the physiology of eating. And I can know what it is I am seeing (a horse) without caring a bit about the physiology of seeing.

You are just confusing issues.

[untermensche]

No, I thought we were discussing your view that whenever we see something (or, I suppose feel, or smell, or hear) something we were not seeing, etc. an object like a horse, but something you call a "mental representation". And I wanted to know what that term meant, and why you think such bizarre view is true. That means, have you any reasonable argument for it? Now, there is no doubt a board somewhere that is devoted to the physiology of vision, and, if you think you are up to it, you can participate on it. But the physiology of vision has nothing whatever to do with this "mental representation" kick you seem to be on. Why should it? Anymore (to repeat my earlier analogy) than the physiology of kicking has anything to do with the question, what is it you kicked? Or the physiology of eating has anything to do with the question, what did you eat? I can answer the question, what did you eat (a delicious hamburger) without knowing a thing about the physiology of eating. And I can know what it is I am seeing (a horse) without caring a bit about the physiology of seeing.

You are just confusing issues.
My view is the view of science, whether you know it or not.

The brain does not recieve light from the optic nerve, so it does not experience even the light that reflects from the object, no less the object itself.

[kennethamy]

My view is the view of science, whether you know it or not.

The brain does not recieve light from the optic nerve, so it does not experience even the light that reflects from the object, no less the object itself.

How does that have anything at all with this bit about "mental representations" and what we see. I am not interested in what the brain experiences. What makes you think that the brain experiences anything anyway? Would you like to discuss what my right big toe experiences? And what would anything I found out about the brain have to do with whether when I see a horse, I see a horse, or a "mental representation" of a horse, whatever that might be. Don't you think it is peculiar that here lots of people, in fact, most people have grown up thinking they see horses, and now Untermenche has come along to tell them that no one has ever seen a horse? (Or a cow, for that matter). Aren't you embarrassed?

[untermensche]

How does that have anything at all with this bit about "mental representations" and what we see. I am not interested in what the brain experiences. What makes you think that the brain experiences anything anyway? Would you like to discuss what my right big toe experiences? And what would anything I found out about the brain have to do with whether when I see a horse, I see a horse, or a "mental representation" of a horse, whatever that might be. Don't you think it is peculiar that here lots of people, in fact, most people have grown up thinking they see horses, and now Untermenche has come along to tell them that no one has ever seen a horse? (Or a cow, for that matter). Aren't you embarrassed?
If you are not interested in what the brain experiences, then you are not interested in knowing about vision.

Vision is something that occurs due to brain activity.

Do you think you would still see if the parts of the brain that created the images you see stopped functioning?

[fast]

What 'mental representations"? Once you concede those, you are well on your way to some form of Idealism. What is the argument that there are those "mental representations" in the first place. Much less than that they are all we perceive.

[...]

Both, of course, begin with this notion that we perceive not objects, but mental representations of those objects, and it is that which needs to be nipped in the bud. Why let the argument even get started?

I would say that we do perceive objects; for example, I see the chair upon which I am sitting. I want that clear from the start.

I would also say that my brain is not directly sensing the chair. I would also say my brain is not directly perceiving the chair. I would say that I am directly sensing the chair, and I would say that I am directly perceiving the chair. Hopefully, you (and Hoodoo Ulove) would be in agreement with all that as well.

Now, I don't want to fall into any traps here, but I do want to give some credence to the idea that there are mental representations of the chair. For example, when I look at the chair, I do see the chair, but when I close my eyes, I can still picture the chair in my mind--wouldn't I call that a mental representation of the chair? In fact, wouldn't I call that a percept of the chair?

I'm not trying to draw any other inferences that give rise to the notion that we don't perceive objects, but I just don't want to dismiss the possibility that there are mental representations off hand.

[kennethamy]

If you are not interested in what the brain experiences, then you are not interested in knowing about vision.

Vision is something that occurs due to brain activity.

Do you think you would still see if the parts of the brain that created the images you see stopped functioning?

Well, I don't see images. I have images, but I never see them. What I see are horses and cows. What makes you think that what I see are images?
As I mentioned, the inverted image of a horse that is on my retina is not something I can see. How could I possibly? My eyes don't turn inwards toward my retina. And no, if my brain stopped functioning, I could not see. What has that to do with it whether I see horses and cows or images (representaions?) I am getting confused, because with each message you toss up a new term I don't understand rather than using the former term (which I did not understand as well). And yes, I am aware that vision occurs partly on account of brain activity. But what has that to do with the issue of what it is I see (or hear, or feel, etc.)?

[untermensche]

Well, I don't see images. I have images, but I never see them. What I see are horses and cows. What makes you think that what I see are images?
As I mentioned, the inverted image of a horse that is on my retina is not something I can see. How could I possibly? My eyes don't turn inwards toward my retina. And no, if my brain stopped functioning, I could not see. What has that to do with it whether I see horses and cows or images (representaions?) I am getting confused, because with each message you toss up a new term I don't understand rather than using the former term (which I did not understand as well). And yes, I am aware that vision occurs partly on account of brain activity. But what has that to do with the issue of what it is I see (or hear, or feel, etc.)?
You experience a representation of the object, created by your brain.

You do not experience the objects themselves.

[kennethamy]

I would say that we do perceive objects; for example, I see the chair upon which I am sitting. I want that clear from the start.

I would also say that my brain is not directly sensing the chair. I would also say my brain is not directly perceiving the chair. I would say that I am directly sensing the chair, and I would say that I am directly perceiving the chair. Hopefully, you (and Hoodoo Ulove) would be in agreement with all that as well.

Now, I don't want to fall into any traps here, but I do want to give some credence to the idea that there are mental representations of the chair. For example, when I look at the chair, I do see the chair, but when I close my eyes, I can still picture the chair in my mind--wouldn't I call that a mental representation of the chair? In fact, wouldn't I call that a percept of the chair?

I'm not trying to draw any other inferences that give rise to the notion that we don't perceive objects, but I just don't want to dismiss the possibility that there are mental representations off hand.

Not only is your brain not directly perceiving the chair, your brain isn't even indirectly perceiving the chair. The reason is that your brain no more perceives than your right big toe perceives. The difference, of course, is that although your right big toe plays no role in perception, your brain plays an important role in perception. But that doesn't mean that it is your brain that perceives. It is you who perceive whatever it is you perceive. That hunk of stuff in your head perceives nothing, and could no more than your big toe. To say that you perceive with your eyes (or more metaphorically, with your brain) is not the same thing as to say that your eyes perceive, or that your brain perceives. The latter, insofar as they make any sense at all, are false. If used in some clear way, I could certainly make sense of the notion that there are mental representations. What stops me is the notion that what we see are mental representations. We have mental representations when we see is true (depending on what is meant by "mental representation), and that without these mental representations we could not see may be true too (again, depending). But what is not true is that it is the mental representations that we see.

[untermensche]

I would say that we do perceive objects; for example, I see the chair upon which I am sitting. I want that clear from the start.
You are experiencing a mental representation of the light reflecting off the chair.

This representation is a creation of your brain. It is not the chair. You are not experiencing the chair directly.

[untermensche]

It is you who perceive whatever it is you perceive.
You are as much a creation of your brain as the mental representations of things your brain presents to you.

Do you think "you" are somehow seperate from your brain?

[kennethamy]

You are as much a creation of your brain as the mental representations of things your brain presents to you.

Do you think "you" are somehow seperate from your brain?

As much as I am separate from my big toe.

Here is a proof:

1. I have a right big toe.
2. My brain does not have a right big toe.

Therefore, 3. I am not my brain.

The premises are both true. The argument is valid. Therefore, the conclusion is true. Any objection to the argument?

[untermensche]

As much as I am separate from my big toe.

Here is a proof:

1. I have a right big toe.
2. My brain does not have a right big toe.

Therefore, 3. I am not my brain.

The premises are both true. The argument is valid. Therefore, the conclusion is true. Any objection to the argument?
So if I cut off your big toe, you would cease to be?

How about if I cut out your brain?

What would YOU be then?

You do not exist until your brain creates you.

[untermensche]

As much as I am separate from my big toe.

Here is a proof:

1. I have a right big toe.
2. My brain does not have a right big toe.

Therefore, 3. I am not my brain.

The premises are both true. The argument is valid. Therefore, the conclusion is true. Any objection to the argument?
By the way, all your proof proves is your brain is not your big toe.

[kennethamy]

By the way, all your proof proves is your brain is not your big toe.

Really? Where did you get that from?

The argument in summary is that I have a property (namely, a right big toe) that my brain does not have. Therefore, by Leibniz's Law, if X and Y have different properties, then they must be different entities.

I didn't prove my right toe was not identical with my brain. Why should I have? You really should learn a little logic. It might help (maybe).

[untermensche]

Really? Where did you get that from?

The argument in summary is that I have a property (namely, a right big toe) that my brain does not have. Therefore, by Leibniz's Law, if X and Y have different properties, then they must be different entities.

I didn't prove my right toe was not identical with my brain. Why should I have? You really should learn a little logic. It might help (maybe).
First define YOU.

[kennethamy]

First define YOU.

Why? Will that help you learn any logic?

I cannot define you, anyway, since you is not a term, and I can define only terms. But here:

"you"

The second person pronoun in English. There you go!

By the way, the term "you" is an indexical expression, and so obviously has a different referent depending on what it denotes. When I say to Joe, "You are stupid" "You refers to Joe". But when Joe says to Tom, "You are smart", the "you" refers to Tom. But you (and now I am referring to Untermenche) see what I (and of course, here the reference is to Kennethamy, for "I" is another indexical expression) see what I mean. Don't you.

And I hope that now you see that the demand, define you, makes no sense at all.

[untermensche]

Why? Will that help you learn any logic?

I cannot define you, anyway, since you is not a term, and I can define only terms. But here:

"you"

The second person pronoun in English. There you go!
I am asking you to define what you are.

Because if I say you are a creation of your brain, you will say that you are your big toe.

Your big toe is a part of your body, just like your brain.

But you, your consciousness, is a creation of your brain, not a creation of your big toe.

[kennethamy]

I am asking you to define what you are.

Because if I say you are a creation of your brain, you will say that you are your big toe.

Your big toe is a part of your body, just like your brain.

But you, your consciousness, is a creation of your brain, not a creation of your big toe.

I have no idea even how to begin to "define what I am" since there are so many different answers to that sort of question. I think you must be assuming that I have some essential nature which is me. I don't. One of the things I am is a poster on this board. But you won't accept that. I suppose the only thing you would accept is, "I am my brain". But, that is obviously false. I could not possibly be identical with my brain because I have all sorts of properties that my brain has, and my brain has all sorts of properties that I don't have.

I have no reason to believe that my consciousness is a "creation of my brain" although I am fairly sure I would not be conscious unless I had a brain. But I don't know that my consciousness is a creation of anything. But the fact that the existence of my brain is a necessary condition of my consciousness does not imply that my brain "created" my consciousness. As far as I can tell, my brain is not capable of creating anything at all. And I am not my consciousness, since: and here is another argument:

I may exist, but I may be unconscious. Therefore, I could not be identical with my consciousness.

But look, untermenche, really, what has all this to do with the price of eggs?

The original point was that when I perceive anything, I perceive mental images and not objects. Look how far away we have gotten from that. So, why do you believe that is true? Have you really ever seen a mental image. Well, I think you have. Probably you have seen after-images (after you stare at a bright light, and look away in a dark room, you stll have an after-image of the light). Now that is one of the only times when it is true that we see images, and not objects. But that isn't what happens when I see a horse, is it? It is very different. I do see mental images, but very rarely, and under special conditions. For the most part, whenever I see anything, I see objects. Not mental images.

[comiezapr]

Ken!

Why dignify an off topic comment with such a response? Ive got a great catch-all response: what you say is irrelevant.

This post isnt like road, focused and narrow, nor even like a network of roads, with interconnecting arguments going various ways. This is a like gravel dropped around the countryside at random; there isnt a focus and there dont seem to be interconnections, lets alone articulations of the connections.

What are we arguing here anyway?

[untermensche]

I have no idea even how to begin to "define what I am" since there are so many different answers to that sort of question. I think you must be assuming that I have some essential nature which is me.
The question really was rhetorical. But there is your body, and there is you.

If I am in a room with you, I experience an image of your body, and you.

That's why I can experience something of you from this remove. It is not any part of your body I am experiencing. But I am none the less experiencing you.

And this you I experience is created by brain activity.
I have no reason to believe that my consciousness is a "creation of my brain" although I am fairly sure I would not be conscious unless I had a brain. But I don't know that my consciousness is a creation of anything. But the fact that the existence of my brain is a necessary condition of my consciousness does not imply that my brain "created" my consciousness. As far as I can tell, my brain is not capable of creating anything at all. And I am not my consciousness, since: and here is another argument:

Careful study has demonstrated that you are a creation of brain activity.

When you see, certain areas of the brain become active in a way that they are not active when you are not seeing. This activity is what creates the images you see. This is the accepted hypothesis of the neurosciences. And they are not moving away from this hypothesis in the least.

[untermensche]

Ken!

Why dignify an off topic comment with such a response? Ive got a great catch-all response: what you say is irrelevant.

This post isnt like road, focused and narrow, nor even like a network of roads, with interconnecting arguments going various ways. This is a like gravel dropped around the countryside at random; there isnt a focus and there dont seem to be interconnections, lets alone articulations of the connections.

What are we arguing here anyway?
Thats what his questioning leads to.

My point is that the brain creates the images we experience.

We do not experience the things themselves. We experience the brain created representation of the thing. As far as vision is concerned.

Are you able to comprehend that?

[fast]

Not only is your brain not directly perceiving the chair, your brain isn't even indirectly perceiving the chair. WOW!

That came as a shock.

I'm going to have to let that one soak in for a while before I even attempt to move on. I never thought of it like that before--and I am intrigued by what you have said. If asked, I probably would have said that the brain indirectly perceives the chair. I suppose I would have been wrong.

The brain indirectly senses the chair though, right?

My Big toe on my left foot directly touches the cold water when I get in the lake, but does it directly sense (as oppose to perceive) the cold water? Does it even sense at all? I would suppose that it does sense since it has sensory cell receptors, and though it may be of a physiological discussion, the statement itself is still either true or false--and thus can be used as a premise in an argument in a philosophical discussion.

Assuming that it does sense, the question still stands, does it directly or indirectly sense the cold water? Of course, to ask if it senses the water isn't necessarily to imply that my big toe (or any other toe for that matter) could possibly make sense of the cold water (make sense as in understanding), but still, is the sensing, if there is a sensing, a direct or an indirect one?

It's not necessary to answer the question of whether my big toe directly senses or indirectly senses the cold water, but I would be interested in knowing whether the brain senses the cold water. I certainly sense the cold water, and if I do (which I hope you would agree that I do), then how could it be that I sense the cold water if it were not for my brain sensing it too?

Now, I don't suspect that the cold water itself has somehow managed to make contact with the brain (though that might be questionable given this post); thus, I do not suspect that the brain has directly sensed the water, but if I have sensed the water, and If I can't know that I have sensed the water without the brain, then I'd like to make the leap of faith determination and conclude that my brain has indirectly sensed the cold water from the Lake that I put my big toe in.

In any regards, I got an awful lot out the post you wrote. I just wanted to hammer around the edges a little.

[untermensche]

The brain indirectly senses the chair though, right?

The brain recieves cellular signals from the retina, down the optic nerve about the chair.

All the brain gets from the chair is cellular signals.

[fast]

The brain recieves cellular signals from the retina, down the optic nerve about the chair.

All the brain gets from the chair is cellular signals.

Cellular signal path?

Chair -> Retina -> Optic nerve -> Brain ?

[untermensche]

Cellular signal path?

Chair -> Retina -> Optic nerve -> Brain ?
Chair -> light reflecting off chair -> Retina -> optic nerve -> brain -> image of chair you experience

[Hoodoo Ulove]

if by our senses we can never perceive the objects causing the so-called mental representations, then it follows that the there is no evidence for the existence of objects. What 'mental representations"? Once you concede those, you are well on your way to some form of Idealism. . . . Why let the argument even get started?Sir, I take umbrage! How dare you infer from a conditional construction that I believe the antecedent clause to be true? I conceded nothing.

[fast]

Chair -> light reflecting off chair -> Retina -> optic nerve -> brain -> image of chair you experience

The implications of what you're saying is staggering.

Judge says, did you not see the stop sign, the guard that held it, and the children whom you left in a mangled mess? Did you not see the officer and the blue lights, and do you not see the tears of the motherless child sitting before you in this courtroom today?

What would experiencing the image of the chair mean if not meaning that you did in-fact see the chair? I just cannot get past the implications. Even if true, you could mislead people immensely. Did you not see my keys when I needed them during the emergency? No--I only see images! <bang bang>

How can you say in all seriousness that you, I, those that have come before us, and those that have yet to come, has never, doesn't, and will never, ever, see a thing? How can we accept that no one on this planet is correct when they say, "I watched a movie last night?"

We have to show some concern and be careful about what we say means.

[dongiovanni1976x]

kennethamy: It is you who perceive whatever it is you perceive.

Untermensche: You are as much a creation of your brain as the mental representations of things your brain presents to you.

Do you think "you" are somehow seperate from your brain?

Kennthamy: As much as I am separate from my big toe.

Here is a proof:

1. I have a right big toe.
2. My brain does not have a right big toe.

Therefore, 3. I am not my brain.

The premises are both true. The argument is valid. Therefore, the conclusion is true. Any objection to the argument?

Untermensche: By the way, all your proof proves is your brain is not your big toe.

Kennethamy: Really? Where did you get that from?

The argument in summary is that I have a property (namely, a right big toe) that my brain does not have. Therefore, by Leibniz's Law, if X and Y have different properties, then they must be different entities.

I didn't prove my right toe was not identical with my brain. Why should I have? You really should learn a little logic. It might help (maybe).

Untermensche: First define YOU.

Kennethamy: Why? Will that help you learn any logic?

I cannot define you, anyway, since you is not a term, and I can define only terms. But here:

"you"

The second person pronoun in English. There you go!

By the way, the term "you" is an indexical expression, and so obviously has a different referent depending on what it denotes. When I say to Joe, "You are stupid" "You refers to Joe". But when Joe says to Tom, "You are smart", the "you" refers to Tom. But you (and now I am referring to Untermenche) see what I (and of course, here the reference is to Kennethamy, for "I" is another indexical expression) see what I mean. Don't you.

And I hope that now you see that the demand, define you, makes no sense at all.

Untermensche: I am asking you to define what you are.

Because if I say you are a creation of your brain, you will say that you are your big toe.

Your big toe is a part of your body, just like your brain.

But you, your consciousness, is a creation of your brain, not a creation of your big toe.

Kennethamy: I have no idea even how to begin to "define what I am" since there are so many different answers to that sort of question. I think you must be assuming that I have some essential nature which is me. I don't. One of the things I am is a poster on this board. But you won't accept that. I suppose the only thing you would accept is, "I am my brain". But, that is obviously false. I could not possibly be identical with my brain because I have all sorts of properties that my brain has, and my brain has all sorts of properties that I don't have.

I have no reason to believe that my consciousness is a "creation of my brain" although I am fairly sure I would not be conscious unless I had a brain. But I don't know that my consciousness is a creation of anything. But the fact that the existence of my brain is a necessary condition of my consciousness does not imply that my brain "created" my consciousness. As far as I can tell, my brain is not capable of creating anything at all. And I am not my consciousness, since: and here is another argument:

I may exist, but I may be unconscious. Therefore, I could not be identical with my consciousness.

I was hoping we might stay on this topic as I have felt from the beginning that this is where the compatibalist and the incompatibalist part ways. Since they both agree with determinism but one thinks that free will is compatible WITH determinism I have always assumed that it is due to the concept of SELF and untermenche was attempting to clarify this but I think the discussion took a turn somewhere and has yet to return.

In order to say that “YOU” are the one with free will deciding between orange soda or grape soda in those two identical rooms like Tom suggested, we must have a definition of YOU. Obviously your big toe is not making choices but likewise you are right to say that your brain is not wholly who YOU are as far as physiology is concerned. But in the context of the question regarding your WILL, the YOU in question most certainly must be a product of your brain…right Ken?

[untermensche]

What would experiencing the image of the chair mean if not meaning that you did in-fact see the chair?
What I am saying is that when we casually say we are "seeing" the chair, what we are in fact doing is experiencing a fabricated image of the chair. And that image of the chair is fabricated by the brain.

I am trying to not be casual, and sloppy. That is all.

[fast]

I was hoping we might stay on this topic as I have felt from the beginning that this is where the compatibalist and the incompatibalist part ways. Since they both agree with determinism but one thinks that free will is compatible WITH determinism I have always assumed that it is due to the concept of SELF and untermenche was attempting to clarify this but I think the discussion took a turn somewhere and has yet to return.

In order to say that “YOU” are the one with free will deciding between orange soda or grape soda in those two identical rooms like Tom suggested, we must have a definition of YOU. Obviously your big toe is not making choices but likewise you are right to say that your brain is not wholly who YOU are as far as physiology is concerned. But in the context of the question regarding your WILL, the YOU in question most certainly must be a product of your brain…right Ken?

I am me, all of me. If I loose my arm, then I have a lost a part of who I am--not a mental part, but a part nonetheless. If I should suffer an accident and damage my frontal cortex, then I will have a lost a part of me, a mental part of me, but I am still me, but I would be different, much different, than if I had only lost an arm, but the greatness of that difference doesn't change that I am me, all of me, and not just a part; therefore, I am more than merely the sum of what my brain can deliver (i.e. I'm more than just my personality and memories, etc); My toe is part of me as well.

In short, I am both my mind and body.

[untermensche]

I am me, all of me. If I loose my arm, then I have a lost a part of who I am--not a mental part, but a part nonetheless. If I should suffer an accident and damage my frontal cortex, then I will have a lost a part of me, a mental part of me, but I am still me, but I would be different, much different, than if I had only lost an arm, but the greatness of that difference doesn't change that I am me, all of me, and not just a part; therefore, I am more than merely the sum of what my brain can deliver (i.e. I'm more than just my personality and memories, etc); My toe is part of me as well.

In short, I am both my mind and body.
What you are is your brain, all the extensions, the nerves, the receptor cells, and the functioning of this nervous system in bodily form.

[fast]

What I am saying is that when we casually say we are "seeing" the chair, what we are in fact doing is experiencing a fabricated image of the chair. And that image of the chair is fabricated by the brain.

I am trying to not be casual, and sloppy. That is all.

I don't get all this image stuff. You said the light reflected off the chair and that the signal made it to our brain, so why can't we say that we saw the chair? I am not aware of any images that I have experienced--least not in the way you have described.

[fast]

What you are is your brain, all the extensions, the nerves, the receptor cells, and the functioning of this nervous system in bodily form.Ewww; now I feel dirty. I liked it better when I was me.

[untermensche]

I don't get all this image stuff. You said the light reflected off the chair and that the signal made it to our brain, so why can't we say that we saw the chair? I am not aware of any images that I have experienced--least not in the way you have described.
We can casually say we "saw" the chair. And any human will understand.

But if we want at all to be precise, what is going on is we are experincing an image, a representation, of the chair created by the activity of the brain.

The chair is removed from what we are experiencing, but it's nature is expressed accurately by what we are experiencing because that is the obvious evolutionary advantage. There is no advantage to an organism if it creates innacurate representations of the world.

[Hoodoo Ulove]

What I am saying is that when we casually say we are "seeing" the chair, what we are in fact doing is experiencing a fabricated image of the chair. And that image of the chair is fabricated by the brain.

I am trying to not be casual, and sloppy. That is all.Whether I say it formally or casually, I do not say I am "seeing" a chair when asked if I see a chair. I say that I see a chair (or I don't see a chair, if there happens to be no chair in front of me or my eyes are closed, etc.). This statement is neither casual or sloppy. The physiological processes involved are worthy of study, but irrelevant to the question of what I see: a chair.

[untermensche]

Ewww; now I feel dirty. I liked it better when I was me.
Your feelings cannot change what you are.

[untermensche]

Whether I say it formally or casually, I do not say I am "seeing" a chair when asked if I see a chair. I say that I see a chair (or I don't see a chair, if there happens to be no chair in front of me or my eyes are closed, etc.). This statement is neither casual or sloppy. The physiological processes involved are worthy of study, but irrelevant to the question of what I see: a chair.
You are not experiencing the chair itself.

You are experiencing the representation of the chair your brain has created.

[dongiovanni1976x]

In short, I am both my mind and body.
This kind of Cartesian-esque dualism is usually the culprit for why people cling to free will (compatabilism or otherwise).

The cells that were "you" at conception no longer even exist as even a "part" of you, so the only "part" of you that has continuity from one moment to the next is your memory and since this memory houses your past experiences and thus plays a significant role in your decision making processes it must be the essential factor in determining the YOU we are discussing when it comes to whether you have FREE WILL or not.

Your arm need not even be mentioned since it simply reacts to commands from the central nervous system that sends the signal to grab the grape soda or the orange soda...

But here is where it gets interesting...the central nervous system itself is just a PART too...and its parts (i.e. neurons etc) simply REACT to previous stimuli as well by either firing or not firing when the presence of a specific electro/chemical is encountered....

So in those two INDENTICAL (hypothetical) rooms, with grape and orange sodas, with cloned Ken's in each one, what variable would be the reason one might choose grape and the other orange if the parts that make up each Ken are identical and each of those parts only fires or doesn't fire based upon the same presets (according to its DNA)...?

[fast]

We can casually say we "saw" the chair. And any human will understand. Of course most humans would understand ... it's plain English, whether casually mentioned or not.

But, the undertones that you imply (this go around) are that though they understand, they are incorrect, but I'm saying that not only do they understand, they are correct--technically correct even.

But if we want at all to be precise, what is going on is we are experincing an image, a representation, of the chair created by the activity of the brain.I am precisely correct when I say that I see the chair. I'm dead-on correct. I'm not merely close; I'm precisely correct. I see the chair!

I'm still unaware (by the way) of any images or representations. I mean, you keep saying it--you keep saying they are there, but I just don't see 'em.

[untermensche]

Of course most humans would understand ... it's plain English, whether casually mentioned or not.

But, the undertones that you imply (this go around) are that though they understand, they are incorrect, but I'm saying that not only do they understand, they are correct--technically correct even.
I am saying this understanding of what is going on is innacurate.

You are not seeing THE CHAIR. You are experiencing a representation of the chair that your brain has created for you to experience. This representation is not the chair. You are not experiencing or "seeing" THE CHAIR.

[fast]

Your arm need not even be mentioned since it simply reacts to commands from the central nervous system that sends the signal to grab the grape soda or the orange soda...
Well, don't hit my arm just the same please, for the judge will believe me when I say "yes" when he asks, "Fast, did he hit you".

So in those two INDENTICAL (hypothetical) rooms, with grape and orange sodas, with cloned Ken's in each one, what variable would be the reason one might choose grape and the other orange if the parts that make up each Ken are identical and each of those parts only fires or doesn't fire based upon the same presets (according to its DNA)...?I'm not going to fight you on this one. I'm still very perplexed over that.

[untermensche]

I do not know if this will help.

Color is not a property of objects.

Objects absorb and reflect various wavelengths of light.

The brain turns a specific, or an average wavelength, into color.

The brain creates color, it does not exist as a property of things in the external world. Their property is simply their light absorbing and reflecting property.

[wiploc]

What you are is your brain, all the extensions, the nerves, the receptor cells, and the functioning of this nervous system in bodily form.

Sometimes you say that the brain is the you, as if they are the same thing.
Other times you say that the brain creates the you, as if they are different things.

crc

[untermensche]

Sometimes you say that the brain is the you, as if they are the same thing.
Other times you say that the brain creates the you, as if they are different things.

crc
I try to be consistent.

The brain creates consciousness. The activity of the brain creates consciousness.

And I believe YOU are your consciousness.

[kennethamy]

We can casually say we "saw" the chair. And any human will understand.

But if we want at all to be precise, what is going on is we are experincing an image, a representation, of the chair created by the activity of the brain.

The chair is removed from what we are experiencing, but it's nature is expressed accurately by what we are experiencing because that is the obvious evolutionary advantage. There is no advantage to an organism if it creates innacurate representations of the world.

What does "experiencing an image" mean. That I see an image? I just don't. Does it mean that there is a brain-event that occurs in the visual cortex (Brodmann area 17) ? I have no doubt that is true. But I do not "experience" that in any sense of "experience" that I am familiar with. The term "experience" is tricky. Weather people sometimes actually say that the weather, the weather, mind you, has experienced a radical change from cold to hot in the last 24 hours. Now, how can the weather experience anything at all? It can't. What they mean is that there has been a change in the weather. Similarly, when someone asks whether I have ever experienced having a flat tire, he is clearly not interested in my feelings when I had a flat tire. All he wants to know is whether I have ever had a flat tire. He isn't talking about any subjective experiences which I may have had when my tire went flat. So, we often use the term "experience" not to refer to some subjective sensation or feeling, but to refer to something objective that happened to something or to someone.

So, if you mean by "experiencing an image" that something you call an image in occurring in my visual cortex, then, sure. That's right. But that is nothing I am aware of, no one is aware of it, although a brain-physiologist presumably can detect it. What I experience in the ordinary sense in which it means something I am aware of, is just seeing the chair. I don't see what is going on in my visual cortex, and neither do you. But I think you are confusing the two things, because they can both be called "experiences".

[wiploc]

I am saying this understanding of what is going on is innacurate.

You are not seeing THE CHAIR. You are experiencing a representation of the chair that your brain has created for you to experience.

Surely that experience of the representation is what we mean by the word "seeing."

I understood what you were after, I think, when you said that your brain doesn't see the chair (you see it, your brain doesn't). And it was for me a fascinating epiphany to realize that color happens entirely in the brain (or, as you would have it, in the mind) so there is an important, though specialized, sense in which we can say that the chair is not brown (or any other color). But when you get to the point of re-defining sight to the extent that nobody ever sees anything, I think you are obscuring your own point.

crc

[wiploc]

I try to be consistent.

The brain creates consciousness. The activity of the brain creates consciousness.

And I believe YOU are your consciousness.

That makes sense.

crc

[dongiovanni1976x]

Well, don't hit my arm just the same please, for the judge will believe me when I say "yes" when he asks, "Fast, did he hit you".
I seriously doubt YOU would be able to tell that I even touched your arm had not the cells in your arm cascaded a signal to your brain. But I must stress that when I was talking about rain drops a while back I was merely trying to illuminate this unquestioned assumption of SELF that we all have. When we are talking philosophically we need to really dissect this assumption for what it is...where does this sense of self come from and how does this sense of self influence our understanding of free will...
If Fast's arm will not grab a grape soda unless neuron gamma5 is activated then we need to ask, what cases neuron gamma5 to activate...and if we see that it is activated byt he signal it recieved from neuron delta2 and neuron delta2 only can send a signal if it itself is activated it begs the question, well what activated neuron delta2? If we keep tracing this back no where along this chronologically backward, linear timeline would we see FAST initiating anything, since Fast is the nominal term we use to describe all these neurons together, just like rain drops are a collective name for all the temporal hydrogen and oxygen molecules that bond and fall to the gound.

If there is no other part to YOU than the parts that make you up, (unless you want to argue for an emergent property that sits on a throne above this linear chain of events) and those parts all react to previous stimuli according to certain presets, then the collective FAST (i.e. YOU) likewise will react in a similar fashion.

Therefore if we had two identical Fast's with identical brain states (i.e. thirsty) frozen in time, in two separate but indentical rooms, in indentical environments with a fridge with grape and orange soda in them, and then we unfroze time what differences would we see happening in each room?

The burden would be upon the compatibilist to assert that there would be a difference since there are no differing variables to account for something DIFFERENT happening.

[untermensche]

What does "experiencing an image" mean. That I see an image? I just don't. Does it mean that there is a brain-event that occurs in the visual cortex (Brodmann area 17) ? I have no doubt that is true. But I do not "experience" that in any sense of "experience" that I am familiar with.
You mean you actively must do something except point your eye at an object, and focus the lens, for the image of the object to appear?

You experience the image. You do not actively create it with your will.

[fast]

I am saying this understanding of what is going on is innacurate.I gathered that much at least.

To be very clear, I gather that you are indeed saying it, but I have not gathered that my understanding is inaccurate. I'm not able to go from "you saying that it is true" to "it actually being true," for I still think that I am technically, precisely, and actually, seeing the chair. That sounds funny, maybe, for I'd rather say that I see the chair, or that I saw the chair, but either way, I'm seeing the darn thing.

You are not seeing THE CHAIR. I do see the chair.

You are experiencing a representation of the chair that your brain has created for you to experience.Created? Is there another substance that exists that did not exist before?

This representation is not the chair. Yes, I have also gathered that you are making a distinction between the chair (that we both believe exists) and the chair-rep (that you say we see and that I say I have no reason think I've experienced it at all).

You are not experiencing or "seeing" THE CHAIR.Well, that's because you think I'm experiences the chair-rep -- the same chair-rep that I still do not believe that I have experienced.

[untermensche]

Created? Is there another substance that exists that did not exist before?
I did not say a substance was created. An image of the chair you experience is created.

Just like YOU, your consciousness, is created by brain activity.

[kennethamy]

Surely that experience of the representation is what we mean by the word "seeing."

I understood what you were after, I think, when you said that your brain doesn't see the chair (you see it, your brain doesn't). And it was for me a fascinating epiphany to realize that color happens entirely in the brain (or, as you would have it, in the mind) so there is an important, though specialized, sense in which we can say that the chair is not brown (or any other color). But when you get to the point of re-defining sight to the extent that nobody ever sees anything, I think you are obscuring your own point.

crc

Where does this representation you say we "experience" and is what we call "seeing"? In the brain, the visual cortex. Can we actually "experience" things that occur in our brains? How do we do such a thing? And what sort of "experience" is that supposed to be? That word "experience"; we all think we know how to use it, and we really do, in ordinary discourse when we say things like, "I just had a terrible experience while in the supermarket, let me tell you about it". Where we mean that something terrible happened to us in the supermarket of which we were aware. "The experience of listening to great music is edifying" which means, when I listen to great music I feel edified. That talk is something we all understand. But then we carry over the term "experience" into these peculiar philosophical contexts, and it is then, when we seem to lose our way. We claim to "experience" "mental representations". And these "mental representations" take place some place in the brain. So, according to you, when we "experience" these "mental representations" that is what we call "seeing a chair". But what does that all really mean? And most importantly, what is it we see when, according to you we experience these mental representations and "call" it "call it seeing a chair". What should we call it? Since you suggest that somehow calling it "seeing a chair" is really not what is going on? I mean, wiploc, is it seeing a chair or is it not seeing a chair? Never mind what we call it. The question is just this: are we seeing a chair when we "experience a mental representation" or are we not seeing a chair? Can you answer that simple question? I ask it because you say that this is what we call seeing a chair. So I don't know whether you think it is seeing a chair, or something else that we just "call" "seeing a chair". I would be really interested in hearing what you say about that?

[untermensche]

Can we actually "experience" things that occur in our brains? How do we do such a thing?
That is the hypothesis that neuroscience operates under. That all so called "mental" states, be they images, or sounds, or sensations, or thoughts, or emotions, are in fact states of brain activity.

To know how this occurs is what is fueling enormous research to discover just that.

[fast]

I seriously doubt YOU would be able to tell that I even touched your arm had not the cells in your arm cascaded a signal to your brain. So. What does my awareness (or lack of) that you touched me have to do with whether or not you touched me?

I can softly brush up against her ponytail as she prettily sits in front of me, and one can stare from across the room and bear witness to my deed. I touched her whether she knows it or not.

There was a case not long ago where a catatonic paraplegic gave birth to a baby (I guess I have the story correct); either way, the fact that she was penetrated is in no way contingent upon her awareness (or memory) of the event.

As to the rest of your post (an intriguing one at that), I'm not sure what to say, but I'd still like to think that I am me, all of me, which includes more than just my mind (or brain functions).

[breezanne]

Just like YOU, your consciousness, is created by brain activity.
Be careful... consciousness corresponds with brain activity, as often dominating it as being dominated by it. Like those monks who change their brain wave patterns by years of meditation... like each conscious and meaningful decision we make.

[dongiovanni1976x]

So. What does my awareness (or lack of) that you touched me have to do with whether or not you touched me?
Because we are talking about a PART of you, the part that pertains to the question about the topic of this thread - the part that does or doesn't have free will. And I think your awareness, your conscious, your brain functions, your memory...all these things are tied to a specific area- the brain...thus don't you think that THIS is the area of YOU that we should be analyzing?

When you (Fast) decide to drink grape soda instead of orange soda, at what point in time do you think the DECISION was made?

(WARNING, this is a gross simplification, but this simplification may make this more intelligible) Light travels to a cell in your eye....that cell fires and cascades a signal (X345g2386h) to neighboring cells...those neighboring cells which have a DNA preset to fire when they encounter the presence of X345g2386h FIRE and in turn cascade their own signals to yet more cells...eventually when cells alpha5, delta7, gamma2 (etal) are active YOU (FAST) having a feeling (X) (say X is a parrticular feeling of warmth, from the sunlight, one that you have never EXACTLY felt before but one that is similar to others you have experienced in the past) The fact that you feel X causes a secretion of dopamine which activates several other cells triggering you to remember (i.e. a memory activates a set of cells that are recorded form the past) a moment when your grandmother made you some homemade sun tea while you were laying in a hammock...that ACTIVATED memory of lying in the hammock activates cells that send a signal to other cells (via the exact same process) to your leg/muscle cells to walk over to the cabinet to begin making tea.
At what point in the process of cell 1 to cell 2 to cell 3 to cell 4 to cell 5 etc etc was a decision made by FAST? This person who is neither his brain, nor his arm, nor just his arm and his brain?

[kennethamy]

That is the hypothesis that neuroscience operates under. That all so called "mental" states, be they images, or sounds, or sensations, or thoughts, or emotions, are in fact states of brain activity.

To know how this occurs is what is fueling enormous research to discover just that.

Neuroscience says that sensations are states of brain activity, but does it say that to have a sensation is to be aware of a brain activity? And that leaves the question of whether the awareness of a brain activity is, itself, a brain-activity.

But, leaving all this to one side, does that mean that when I "casually" say, "I see a chair in the next room", that what I "really" see is something different? A brain-activity? In other words, do I see chairs, or do I see brain-activities? I have never seen a brain-activity, and neither, I bet, have you.
You might want to say that when I see a chair, I see a brain-activity, but I don't see that it is a brain-activity (the way someone might say that when people see the Sun in the sky, they are seeing a star, but they do not see that the Sun is a star? So, when I see a chair, I am seeing a brain-activity, but I don't see that it is a brain-activity?

The trouble is, though that although the Sun is a star, the chair is certainly not a brain-activity. The fact, if it is a fact, that when I see a chair, I am having a brain-activity doesn't mean the chair is a brain-activity, nor does it mean that I don't see chairs, but only brain-activities.

[dongiovanni1976x]

Neuroscience says that sensations are states of brain activity, but does it say that to have a sensation is to be aware of a brain activity? And that leaves the question of whether the awareness of a brain activity is, itself, a brain-activity.

But, leaving all this to one side, does that mean that when I "casually" say, "I see a chair in the next room", that what I "really" see is something different? A brain-activity? In other words, do I see chairs, or do I see brain-activities? I have never seen a brain-activity, and neither, I bet, have you.
You might want to say that when I see a chair, I see a brain-activity, but I don't see that it is a brain-activity (the way someone might say that when people see the Sun in the sky, they are seeing a star, but they do not see that the Sun is a star? So, when I see a chair, I am seeing a brain-activity, but I don't see that it is a brain-activity?

The trouble is, though that although the Sun is a star, the chair is certainly not a brain-activity. The fact, if it is a fact, that when I see a chair, I am having a brain-activity doesn't mean the chair is a brain-activity, nor does it mean that I don't see chairs, but only brain-activities.

Ken you have quoted Kant several times so I think you will certainly see the distinction that he would suggest to clear this up. The Chair as a noumena is NEVER seen but your filter CREATES a chair phenomena; a unique one that is VERY similar to other FILTERED PHENOMENAE that either untermensche or myself might "see"/create/experience (even if we are LOOKING at the same object).
The point we need to understand is that the brain activity that an EEG could read is what is producing the phenomena you call a chair, the noumenal "objective" chair is not experienced directly. We all construct our own internal reality of the objective world.

[fast]

Because we are talking about a PART of you, the part that pertains to the question about the topic of this thread - the part that does or doesn't have free will. But I thought we were talking about whether we have free will. Now, instead, we are talking about whether a part of us has free will, but if we talk about only a part of us, then we are no longer talking about all of us, because we aren't merely part of us; we are all of us. In other words, I am me; it's not that I am only part of me--and I am arguing against the idea that my body is not apart of me.

However, and to keep this sane, I would contend that I have free will, and I would agree that my arm does not have free will, but only because it doesn't have a will. If it did, I'd imagine that it would be free as well.

I am still not able to handle the drink scenario, so you still have me boxed in pretty tight on that one--sorry.

<fast, thinkin' this is one of my dumber posts> :(

[dongiovanni1976x]

But I thought we were talking about whether we have free will. Now, instead, we are talking about whether a part of us has free will, but if we talk about only a part of us, then we are no longer talking about all of us, because we aren't merely part of us; we are all of us. In other words, I am me; it's not that I am only part of me--and I am arguing against the idea that my body is not apart of me.

However, and to keep this sane, I would contend that I have free will, and I would agree that my arm does not have free will, but only because it doesn't have a will. If it did, I'd imagine that it would be free as well.

I am still not able to handle the drink scenario, so you still have me boxed in pretty tight on that one--sorry.

<fast, thinkin' this is one of my dumber posts> :(
How about we talk about this word "will" then...the possessive pronoun your can be the collective YOU that possesses this WILL, but since we have excluded your arm from having a will what else can we lop off before all is left but just a brain in a jar? I want to narrow in on this "will" and what you think it is?
Is it you, a part of you, somethign you control, something controlling you, somethign that reacts to previous stimuli...etc???

[fast]

I want to narrow in on this "will" and what you think it is?

Is it you, a part of you, somethign you control, something controlling you, somethign that reacts to previous stimuli...etc???

I'm caught in the middle logically, yet whatever common sense I have about me demands that I lean with free will.

On the one hand, I don't think there can be an effect without a precipitating cause, and I completely smirk at ideas like the uncaused, yet I would be inclined to believe in free will despite my agreement that there can be no effect without a cause.

I do believe that I have choices, and I believe that without a brain, I couldn't make choices, yet I believe in cause and effect (which seems to imply on a deep level that I have no true choices), and though I believe there's an interaction of some sorts happening that allows me to be fooled into thinking that I have really made choices, I actually do believe that I am making choices and that they are real.

It's a blur actually. It's like I believe in free will, but when it's pitted up against this powerful idea that implies I don't have free will, it's like I want to throw my hands up with it all.

[dongiovanni1976x]

I'm caught in the middle logically, yet whatever common sense I have about me demands that I lean with free will.

On the one hand, I don't think there can be an effect without a precipitating cause, and I completely smirk at ideas like the uncaused, yet I would be inclined to believe in free will despite my agreement that there can be no effect without a cause.

I do believe that I have choices, and I believe that without a brain, I couldn't make choices, yet I believe in cause and effect (which seems to imply on a deep level that I have no true choices), and though I believe there's an interaction of some sorts happening that allows me to be fooled into thinking that I have really made choices, I actually do believe that I am making choices and that they are real.

It's a blur actually. It's like I believe in free will, but when it's pitted up against this powerful idea that implies I don't have free will, it's like I want to throw my hands up with it all.:notworthy:
You are making perfect sense. This is the paradox we all share. Common sense tells us we have free will but logically when you dissect this belief it's weaknesses are exposed. I felt the same way for a while too when I thought about how absurd the idea of hard determinism is when compared to how I "feel"...my feelings contradicted my logic but this cognitive dissonance did not lost forever.

[Hoodoo Ulove]

The Chair as a noumena is NEVER seen but your filter CREATES a chair phenomena; a unique one that is VERY similar to other FILTERED PHENOMENAE.Noumena is the plural form of the singular noun noumenon. Phenomena is the plural form of the singular noun phenomenon. Phenomenae is not a word.

I would agree that I have never seen a chair as a noumenon. Likewise, I have never seen a chair as a grapefruit. I've seen a lot of chairs, though.We all construct our own internal reality of the objective world.My ideas of the objective world (objective being here redundant) may indeed be to a greater or lesser degree idiosyncratic or distorted or filtered, but they do not constitute an internal reality. The world is reality.

[Hoodoo Ulove]

I believe in cause and effect (which seems to imply on a deep level that I have no true choices) . . . I actually do believe that I am making choices and that they are real.Maybe this seeming implication is mistaken, or maybe your idea of a true choice (is this different than either a real choice or a choice?) is confused.

[kennethamy]

Ken you have quoted Kant several times so I think you will certainly see the distinction that he would suggest to clear this up. The Chair as a noumena is NEVER seen but your filter CREATES a chair phenomena; a unique one that is VERY similar to other FILTERED PHENOMENAE that either untermensche or myself might "see"/create/experience (even if we are LOOKING at the same object).
The point we need to understand is that the brain activity that an EEG could read is what is producing the phenomena you call a chair, the noumenal "objective" chair is not experienced directly. We all construct our own internal reality of the objective world.

Sorry. But that Kant says something like this doesn't make it true. I am far from convinced that there is a "noumenal chair". Very far. And, if "we all construct our own internal reality of the objective world." how does it happen that we agree as much as we do? Indeed, to ask a further question, since whether we agree is just as much an objective matter, is that noumenal too? The notion that the world is forever inaccessible seems to me just a variant on "the worst argument in the world" or, as David Stove said, it is "very warm" i.e. close to the worst argument in the world. I realize you don't know what I am referring to, so I offer the following site to you.

http://72.14.207.104/search?q=cache:87-Ua6l_cPAJ:www.jennifermarohasy.com/blog/archives/000754.html+the+worst+argument+in+the+world&hl=en&gl=us&ct=clnk&cd=3&ie=UTF-8

[dongiovanni1976x]

Noumena is the plural form of the singular noun noumenon. Phenomena is the plural form of the singular noun phenomenon. Phenomenae is not a word.

I would agree that I have never seen a chair as a noumenon. Likewise, I have never seen a chair as a grapefruit. I've seen a lot of chairs, though.My ideas of the objective world (objective being here redundant) may indeed be to a greater or lesser degree idiosyncratic or distorted or filtered, but they do not constitute an internal reality. The world is reality. Thank you for the clarification. I have misused those two words more times than I can count by now and it is rather embarrassing. :blush:

I am not trying to argue that the world is NOT reality, but since none of us ever experience it directly then all we have to rely on is our own distorted construction in our heads. The reality of all this is that there is no major difference between a cell experiencing a chemical that makes it fire and a person experiencing a chair that contructs a representation of the chair. Matter is interpreting matter in each case.

[Hoodoo Ulove]

I am not trying to argue that the world is NOT reality, but since none of us ever experience it directly then all we have to rely on is our own distorted construction in our heads.I really don't understand what it means that we don't experience it directly. What would it mean to experience it directly, in contrast to the way we experience it?The reality of all this is that there is no major difference between a cell experiencing a chemical that makes it fire and a person experiencing a chair that contructs a representation of the chair. Matter is interpreting matter in each case.No major difference between you and I and a single cell? Are there any single cells posting on this board? Or is that a minor difference?

[dongiovanni1976x]

Sorry. But that Kant says something like this doesn't make it true. I am far from convinced that there is a "noumenal chair". Very far. And, if "we all construct our own internal reality of the objective world." how does it happen that we agree as much as we do? Indeed, to ask a further question, since whether we agree is just as much an objective matter, is that noumenal too? The notion that the world is forever inaccessible seems to me just a variant on "the worst argument in the world" or, as David Stove said, it is "very warm" i.e. close to the worst argument in the world. I realize you don't know what I am referring to, so I offer the following site to you.

http://72.14.207.104/search?q=cache:87-Ua6l_cPAJ:www.jennifermarohasy.com/blog/archives/000754.html+the+worst+argument+in+the+world&hl=en&gl=us&ct=clnk&cd=3&ie=UTF-8

Thanks for the link...I still do not see how it is the worst argument in the world. It seems fair to say that if we have to filter info about an object that there are going to be minor differences in each interpretation etc (beauty is in the eye of the beholder etc) but the similar filters we use to experience the world accounts for a great deal of the similarity there is between individuals experiences of objects and how we can tell teh difference between chairs and grapefruits.

[wiploc]

Where does this representation you say we "experience" and is what we call "seeing"? In the brain, the visual cortex. Can we actually "experience" things that occur in our brains? How do we do such a thing? And what sort of "experience" is that supposed to be? That word "experience"; we all think we know how to use it, and we really do, in ordinary discourse when we say things like, "I just had a terrible experience while in the supermarket, let me tell you about it". Where we mean that something terrible happened to us in the supermarket of which we were aware. "The experience of listening to great music is edifying" which means, when I listen to great music I feel edified. That talk is something we all understand. But then we carry over the term "experience" into these peculiar philosophical contexts, and it is then, when we seem to lose our way. We claim to "experience" "mental representations". And these "mental representations" take place some place in the brain. So, according to you, when we "experience" these "mental representations" that is what we call "seeing a chair". But what does that all really mean? And most importantly, what is it we see when, according to you we experience these mental representations and "call" it "call it seeing a chair". What should we call it? Since you suggest that somehow calling it "seeing a chair" is really not what is going on? I mean, wiploc, is it seeing a chair or is it not seeing a chair? Never mind what we call it. The question is just this: are we seeing a chair when we "experience a mental representation" or are we not seeing a chair? Can you answer that simple question? I ask it because you say that this is what we call seeing a chair. So I don't know whether you think it is seeing a chair, or something else that we just "call" "seeing a chair". I would be really interested in hearing what you say about that?

Wow! I just dipped a toe in the water, and suddenly I'm over my head.

The tone of your post suggests that emotions are running high. I'll not go thru your post line by line, but I will say this: When we think we see a chair, we are in fact seeing a chair, because that's what we mean by "seeing a chair," which is why we call it seeing a chair.

I'll cop to the possibility that I may have used the word "experience" unadvisedly.

I don't know where we experience things. I'm not sure the question even makes sense, but it certainly is interesting. I imagine that mental states depend on brain states, and I know where my brain is, but I never stopped to wonder whether minds have physical location. Here, let me offer this as a trial balloon: Everything we experience, we expeience in the mind.

Hope I've helped. I have no idea whether I've answered your questions or totally mis-guessed what you're after.

crc

[dongiovanni1976x]

I really don't understand what it means that we don't experience it directly. What would it mean to experience it directly, in contrast to the way we experience it? If we were not part of nature itself. Since we are attempting to experience things while being experienced things ourselves we cannot talk of what such a thing would mean. All we can say is that it is our own distorted constructions that account for the varying degrees of interpretation of events external to our mind and unfortunately there is no way to be certain that any explanation I would have to give you would not get lost in your filter, if I had such a perfect explanation to give to begin with...

No major difference between you and I and a single cell? Are there any single cells posting on this board? Or is that a minor difference?
I am talking about the cause and effect process not the complexity of the two subjects being discussed.

[untermensche]

Neuroscience says that sensations are states of brain activity, but does it say that to have a sensation is to be aware of a brain activity? And that leaves the question of whether the awareness of a brain activity is, itself, a brain-activity.
You are not aware of brain activity. Your awareness is brain activity.

Everything about your consciousness is brain activity.

The things you "see" are brain activity, the sounds you "hear" are brain activity.

Your hopes, dreams, ambitions, are brain activity.

[TomJrzk]

It seems fair to say that if we have to filter info about an object that there are going to be minor differences in each interpretation etc (beauty is in the eye of the beholder etc) but the similar filters we use to experience the world accounts for a great deal of the similarity there is between individuals' experiences of objects and how we can tell the difference between chairs and grapefruits.
Great point. This is a rather interesting fact about 'filters', at least as pertains to smell and taste; not so much seeing a chair:

A while back, they found a correlation between whether subjects liked/disliked the taste of pork and the what they thought of the smell of a chemical extracted from pork. It wasn't surprising that those that thought the extract smelled like dirty socks tended to like pork less than those that thought it smelled pleasant or not at all.

It WAS surprising to me at the time that everyone doesn't smell the same things (we actually have different odor receptors, though I doubt anyone is missing the one for ammonia). Like, I thought preferences for taste were merely personal preferences, not that there would be a different perception of 'reality' (does pork smell like dirty socks or not?).

That's the study that actually started me on this whole Hard Determinism thing. Like, what other perceptions might differ due to physical/neuronal variances? We know that some people perceive numbers as colors, to the point that they can much more easily count the number of '5's than mere mortals because they are a different color! Wow.

So, yes, I think we might well perceive things differently but all, through feedback, call a chair 'chair' even though they might (though doubtfully) 'look' drastically different. (If your 'blue' looked just like my 'red' but I taught you the name of your red was 'blue' we could be seeing completely different colors yet always agree that the sky is 'blue'.)

The net effect is that I don't become unglued when people don't see things my way; they may actually see something completely different. (And we have to deal with those obnoxious repression modules that do more than just filter perceptions.)

[fast]

Maybe this seeming implication is mistaken, or maybe your idea of a true choice (is this different than either a real choice or a choice?) is confused.

If we have free will, then we can choose which cereal we will eat, but if we don't have free will, then we cannot choose which cereal we will eat, but when I say free will, I'm not talking about it as if it is something that is opposed to coercion. Obviously, I'm not being coerced into choosing one box over the other. The type of free will to which I am talking of is a type of free will that is of a totally different nature.

But, before I explain myself, let me address your concern above. I wholeheartedly agree that there is no readily discernable difference between that of a choice and that of a real choice, for if a choice is a choice at all, then it's clearly a real choice; likewise, a real choice is a choice, so why be redundant by characterizing a choice as real?

Well, I wanted to be clear (and perhaps failed) as I attempted to contrast between two things: a choice and a non-choice (or a real choice as I had put it and what seems to be a choice but may indeed not be a choice).

When we non-coercively choose cereal box number 17 from our line of 18 cereal box choices, why on Earth would it not be a choice and merely seem like a choice, especially if it's non-coercive?

I (while temporarily wearing my hard determinism hat) have attempted to explain that. To illustrate, imagine that all that exists is matter in motion -- reality would be like a movie; now, imagine stopping time -- reality would now no longer be like a movie and instead be like a snapshot. Imagine that I did not stop time (and thus, life is like a movie), and assume that this morning, you chose cereal number 17 to eat.

Now, with my magical powers, not only do I stop time and make things no longer like a movie but instead like a picture, I hit the rewind button and rewind time to fifteen minutes ago, so there you are, once again sitting there wondering if she saw you pick your nose :D

Guess what? After I set things back to the way things were fifteen minutes ago, things were then like the snapshot that it would have been like if I had taken a snapshot fifteen minutes ago, so clearly then, all particles of matter that's is the universe were placed back like they were fifteen minutes ago. Everything that has happened in the last fifteen minutes (memories, neural firings, birds flying, … everything) is back like it was.

Then, I hit the play button, and you once again put the little booger under your seat just like last time (and yes, she did see you do it—again). Life as you know it is once again forging forward powered by the engine of cause and effect, and all particles of matter that's in the universe have once again converged and like before when you had contemplated on which cereal to choose from, you yet again chose box number 17. Why? Was it coincidental that you chose the very same cereal box?

All the activity in your brain, and all the particles of the universe down to the dust on the lamp is the same ... the neural firings in your brain, no different. The steps you made and the bird that happened to fly by the window all happened again just like it happened before I had stopped time. Why should it happen differently? Why shouldn't life be like a movie playing out in the only way it's destined to happen ... why isn't it like a special design of dominoes destined to fall as it lays itself out?

The implications of this view that I've simply dubbed the hard determinist view (and I could be wrong about that as well) is not that you were coerced into a choice, but rather that the choice you made must have become the choice, and like I said, if it must become the choice, then it's not truly a choice at all and instead an illusion--it's a choice between non-alternatives; hence, not a choice at all.

Am I confused? Are you ready to spring into action using the “F” word? Are you going to say it like those that have come before you? Will I be accused of confusing the F word “fatalism” once again? <I like drama> :)

Anyhoots, the view that I’ve expressed is indeed that what will happen, must happen (but only while I wear this hat mind you), but I’m not saying what a fatalist would say.

A fatalist would say that what will happen must happen regardless of the preceding events that led to the effect, but what I’m saying is contrasted to that view in that what will happen, must happen, yet dependent on preceding events that lead to the effect.

Anyhow, I hope this brings a little more clarity to the view that I don’t even endorse. :banghead:

me,

fast

[sweetiepie]

The implications of this view that I've simply dubbed the hard determinist view (and I could be wrong about that as well) is not that you were coerced into a choice, but rather that the choice you made must have become the choice, and like I said, if it must become the choice, then it's not truly a choice at all and instead an illusion--it's a choice between non-alternatives; hence, not a choice at all.
Fine story, but it still all comes down to this paragraph.

The choice (like all others) was inevitable-- but it was still a choice. It was what Fast decided. It was what Fast wanted. It was the only possible choice-- specific to the time, the place, and to Fast. What makes something a choice is when it is dependent on a knowledgeable chooser.

You really did want that cereal. That's why you chose it. If you didn't want it, you wouldn't have chosen it. That's why it's a choice. Because you're part of the equation.

What you're asking is for Fast to make a choice that Fast wouldn't make. Or for Fast to want something that Fast doesn't want. Fast can't want something Fast doesn't want, and Fast can't choose a choice that Fast wouldn't choose. If he did, he would hardly be very Fast.

[Hoodoo Ulove]

The type of free will to which I am talking of is a type of free will that is of a totally different nature.Understood. And I am not saying you are using the term wrongly. . . . if it must become the choice, then it's not truly a choice at all and instead an illusion--it's a choice between non-alternatives; hence, not a choice at all.This I simply deny. You are a reasoning being. You make your choices for reasons. A billiard ball does not make choices. Its actions have no moral dimension.Are you ready to spring into action using the “F” word?Not the "F" word you're thinking of.

[sweetiepie]

You are a reasoning being. You make your choices for reasons. A billiard ball does not make choices. Its actions have no moral dimension. huh? A billiard ball is not a reasoning being?

[Hoodoo Ulove]

huh? A billiard ball is not a reasoning being?If I'm wrong, that would explain why I'm so bad at pool.

Really, though, consciousness and reason put the hunk of stuff we are in a different relationship to events than the usual hunk of stuff. It doesn't exempt us from causality, but it's definitely different.

[TomJrzk]

Am I confused? Are you ready to spring into action using the “F” word? Are you going to say it like those that have come before you? Will I be accused of confusing the F word “fatalism” once again?
No, you're not confused on the facts. Just the sentiment. Why are you so bothered that you would make the same choice again? You, with that choice, wrote the script that everyone else must follow.

Like I asked, if you would still live your life regardless of someone else knowing how your kids' personalities will come out, you're not a Fatalist. But you sounded like that would bother you.

Great thoughts and questions, though.

[untermensche]

Be careful... consciousness corresponds with brain activity, as often dominating it as being dominated by it. Like those monks who change their brain wave patterns by years of meditation... like each conscious and meaningful decision we make.
This is just an ability of consciousness.

The ability to assume different "levels" of consciousness.

The ability to concentrate on that difficult putt.

That changes brain activity too.

But consciousness, with all it's abilities, is created by brain activity.

[fast]

Fine story Thank you.

You are starting to get through to me, but I'm so so so resistant.

The choice (like all others) was inevitable-- but it was still a choice. It was what Fast decided. It was what Fast wanted. It was the only possible choice-- specific to the time, the place, and to Fast. What makes something a choice is when it is dependent on a knowledgeable chooser.Notice the bolding. Notice that although I had 18 boxes of cereal to choose from, it was never to be that I would choose any other than the one I did. This lends credence to the idea of perfect predictability.

You really did want that cereal. That's why you chose it. If you didn't want it, you wouldn't have chosen it. That's why it's a choice. Because you're part of the equation.I had no choice but to choose it. That's the sad part I'm trying to get everyone to see. That's superficial volition.

What you're asking is for Fast to make a choice that Fast wouldn't make. Or for Fast to want something that Fast doesn't want. Fast can't want something Fast doesn't want, and Fast can't choose a choice that Fast wouldn't choose. If he did, he would hardly be very Fast.I'll think about that. ;)

[fast]

This I simply deny. Yes, so do I, but I cannot support the conclusion I wish was so.

You are a reasoning being. True, but that's not good enough. The scenario that I have put forth doesn't allow for reasoning to negate what I have said. All the contemplation I bring to the decision is already factored in.

Not the "F" word you're thinking of.You're fine. I just put it the way I did as a 'funny'. At home, when we make a joke, we call it a funny. :)

[fast]

Why are you so bothered that you would make the same choice again?

We throw the term "choice" around like it means what we think it does.

If free will is true, then we have choices, but if free will is not true, then we have 'choices'; therefore, whether we have choices or 'choices' depends on whether or not free will is true.

A choice is a choice with alternatives whereas a 'choice' is choice without alternatives; thus, a choice is not a 'choice'.

When you say, "why are you so bothered that you would make the same choice again," I recognize that what you mean to say is, "why are you so bothered that you would make the same 'choice' again, and the answer to that is because it's not a choice but instead a 'choice'.

[sweetiepie]

You are starting to get through to me, but I'm so so so resistant.
yay. too bad i'm out of much else to say.


I had no choice but to choose it. That's the sad part I'm trying to get everyone to see. That's superficial volition.
You must choose what you choose. You must be what you are. Is that so sad?

[Canard DuJour]

This kind of Cartesian-esque dualism is usually the culprit for why people cling to free will (compatabilism or otherwise).

It's also the culprit for denial.

I think most people with a basic education assume, at least tacitly, that they are their brains - that the self is neural activity wherein choices are made according to a mixed bag of innate and acquired proclivities. Nothing acausal.

What's bewildering is to be retold this as if it's some devastating scientific insight whereby choices are illusory because the self is dictated to by said neural activity. Well, duh. If the self is nothing more than neural activity plus proclivities - and no one's saying different - who exactly is this self to whom the self dictates?

Also, proclivities are not decisions. We are free to decide to the extent that we can anticipate and evaluate consequences which we are not prevented from realising. This enables a qualitatively different kind of behaviour from, say, a thermostat and presumes causality rather than denies it. To say that predisposition necessarily negates choice is like saying you are not free to walk because you have been untied.

Of course predisposition plays a causal role in choice - necessarily so, otherwise it wouldn't be choice but random behaviour. The extent to which predisposition is knowable in advance is (a) irrelevant and (b) ultimately a physics question to which the answer seems to be 'not absolutely.'

.

[TomJrzk]

...why are you so bothered that you would make the same 'choice' again, and the answer to that is because it's not a choice but instead a 'choice'.
I hear what you're saying. I see the distinction between 'choice' and choice, but I don't feel the distinction. Sure, my personal preferences cause me to choose orange soda over grape (most of the time), but they're MY personal preferences. They're not some puppet-master's preferences. I don't feel controlled in any way at all.

I'm ecstatic that my children turned out so marvelously. I feel that's due mostly to my genes and partly due to the way my genes caused me to treat them much like adults throughout their lives. I'm proud of the genes that I am. Hard Determinism does not remove the mystery and amazement I feel as their personalities develop.

So, I guess I'm able to separate the common sense behavior of making choices for my life from the realization that they're 'choices' (intentionally not writing 'only choices')? Still feels the same to me...

[fast]

Hard Determinism does not remove the mystery and amazement I feel as their personalities develop.You haven't seen the movie. You haven't seen the script. You aren't privy (yet) to what will come.

Earlier, I made a comment to my Sweetie about perfect predictability. I didn't go into details, but if I had, the implication would have been that the mystery of what's over the next hill is only a mystery because you haven't been over the hill (or saw that which is over the hill), but watch the movie of your life (calculate, understand, and interpret the inevitability of your future), then the mystery will dissipate. Only hard determinism allows for that. Free will ensures that the mystery will forever be.

[TomJrzk]

Free will ensures that the mystery will forever be.
So you'd trade something that won't happen for something you can't explain?

I can't go there. I can't take something on faith. People took it on faith that the sun was dragged by chariot every day across the sky; common sense says it had to be dragged somehow. Certainly the Earth is not moving because we would feel it if it were...

If the particles turn out to be black and white with sharp teeth, you could call them FreeWillions. ;)

[Hoodoo Ulove]

fast : . . if it must become the choice, then it's not truly a choice at all and instead an illusion--it's a choice between non-alternatives; hence, not a choice at all.
Hoodoo: This I simply deny.
fast: Yes, so do I, but I cannot support the conclusion I wish was so,

We're off the track here. You're denying your own assertion.

[kennethamy]

I hear what you're saying. I see the distinction between 'choice' and choice, but I don't feel the distinction. Sure, my personal preferences cause me to choose orange soda over grape (most of the time), but they're MY personal preferences. They're not some puppet-master's preferences. I don't feel controlled in any way at all.

I'm ecstatic that my children turned out so marvelously. I feel that's due mostly to my genes and partly due to the way my genes caused me to treat them much like adults throughout their lives. I'm proud of the genes that I am. Hard Determinism does not remove the mystery and amazement I feel as their personalities develop.

So, I guess I'm able to separate the common sense behavior of making choices for my life from the realization that they're 'choices' (intentionally not writing 'only choices')? Still feels the same to me...

From what you write here, I am puzzled as to why to say you are a "hard determinist". The only answer I can think of is that you think that the notion of "acting freely" implies something it does not imply, so that you say you are a "hard determinist" in order to indicated that you don't think there is "freedom of the will" in that sense. I think much the same as you do, but I think I am a compatibilist ("soft determinist")

[TomJrzk]

From what you write here, I am puzzled as to why to say you are a "hard determinist".
I don't understand exactly what you're saying, so I'll clarify (?) my philosophy:

My genes and neurons (I'll call these 'personality') weigh evidence and make choices. My personality is burned into my genes and is affected by my experiences, both of which are deterministic. So, the choices are determined and, as Fast says, not 'really' choices.

The will we have is not truly free (if free is the 4th in my list of tied up, coerced, most people's idea of free, and free from the deterministic brain).

[fast]

[...]We're off the track here. You're denying your own assertion.
Welcome to my world :D

I am saying all that I say from a particular vantage point. I don't agree with the hard determinist view, but I'm trying to walk a mile in her shoes. While I walk and think like a hard determinist ought, I start to notice certain implications of the view that I've temporarily taken in as my own; hence, what I say is only what I say while I wear the hard determinist's hat.

In other words, it's not what I'm saying ... it's the implications of what a hard determinist is saying [and that’s what I’m saying].

You have brought back to my attention that I had said, "[...]if it must become the choice, then it's not truly a choice at all and instead an illusion--it's a choice between non-alternatives; hence, not a choice at all."

Your response was "This I simply deny."

What exactly is it that you deny? It's a very complex statement.

I had said, "Yes, so do I, but I cannot support the conclusion I wish was so[.]" Perhaps I was a little quick to say such a thing. Let me rephrase. I deny the hard determinist view--at least I want to (and thus have not completely abandoned it as impossible). I can passionately support the free will theory, but I cannot prove conclusively that what I support is actually how things are.

Metaphorically, I loyally sit behind the defense team as they argue away, but I have this uneasy feeling in my heart when the prosecution cries out some of their claims.

Do you deny that I am correct when I say that your choice of cereal isn’t between alternatives? Support yourself by taking Don up on his challenge. Explain where in the sequence of cause and effect things would have been different.

[TomJrzk]

From what you write here, I am puzzled as to why to say you are a "hard determinist". The only answer I can think of is that you think that the notion of "acting freely" implies something it does not imply, so that you say you are a "hard determinist" in order to indicated that you don't think there is "freedom of the will" in that sense. I think much the same as you do, but I think I am a compatibilist ("soft determinist")
Ah, I think I understand what you're saying now. If your "in that sense" is free from the deterministic brain, then I ask what does compatibilism add? Freedom from being tied up or coerced?

[Hoodoo Ulove]

. . . you are a "hard determinist" in order to indicated that you don't think there is "freedom of the will" in that sense. I think much the same as you do, but I think I am a compatibilist ("soft determinist")You recognize that determinism is compatible with the commonsense meaning of "free will" and that it is incompatible with the philosophese meaning of same. To say that you are a soft determinist is to reject the philosophese usage. On what principle do you do so?

[fast]

Free will ensures that the mystery will forever be.So you'd trade something that won't happen for something you can't explain?
I'm not sure what you meant, but I'll explain what I meant by what I said.

<oh, and I'll take my hard determinist hat off for this one>

With free will, you cannot ever guarantee which cereal I will choose. You may have an inclination and you may even happen to get it right, but you'll never be able to guarantee what my choice will be hours before it happens. I deny that perfect prediction is possible (when it's filtered through the mind)--even if privy to all the data in the world. I'm saying that somehow, our mental choices are real and true. If you were to start time over, things wouldn’t happen like they did the first time because people can make real choices (and choose differently the second go around)--choices that are between real alternatives.

I'd like to make a second point. When I say hard determinist, I may actually be talking about an entirely different thing. I think we have two discussions going at once, and I think the distinction is quite blurry.

For example, what I've described as hard determinism is far different than what Ken has described, but Don seems to arguing in favor of how I've characterized it, so I'm thinking that somehow or another, there's multiple issues going on--and I haven't been able to sort it all out yet.

[TomJrzk]

there's multiple issues going on--and I haven't been able to sort it all out yet.
I think "Ken" has some sorting out to do. We may get somewhere.

Compatibilism for some, to me, is a political statement that says the universe is deterministic but we'll add this caveat so people don't run wild in the streets. True, getting ALMOST to hard determinism opens the door to Fatalism and Nihilism, so maybe we do need a way to soften the edges until everything (all the ramifications) sinks in.

[Hoodoo Ulove]

What exactly is it that you deny? Now that's kind of a puzzling question; don't you understand your own statement? I'll paraphrase it.

If determinism is true, what we call choices are not really choices.

I deny that the consequent follows from the antecedent. If you want to show that it is a valid inference, you'll need at least to state your hidden premises and define real choices.Do you deny that I am correct when I say that your choice of cereal isn’t between alternatives?Well, this morning there was nothing in the cupboard but Grape-Nuts. But if there had been another, then it would have been an alternative.Support yourself by taking Don up on his challenge. Explain where in the sequence of cause and effect things would have been different.I'm not challenging determinism. Why should I have to do such?

[sweetiepie]

I'm not sure what you meant, but I'll explain what I meant by what I said.

<oh, and I'll take my hard determinist hat off for this one>

With free will, you cannot ever guarantee which cereal I will choose. You may have an inclination and you may even happen to get it right, but you'll never be able to guarantee what my choice will be hours before it happens. I deny that perfect prediction is possible (when it's filtered through the mind)--even if privy to all the data in the world. I'm saying that somehow, our mental choices are real and true. If you were to start time over, things wouldn’t happen like they did the first time because people can make real choices (and choose differently the second go around)--choices that are between real alternatives.

I'd like to make a second point. When I say hard determinist, I may actually be talking about an entirely different thing. I think we have two discussions going at once, and I think the distinction is quite blurry.

For example, what I've described as hard determinism is far different than what Ken has described, but Don seems to arguing in favor of how I've characterized it, so I'm thinking that somehow or another, there's multiple issues going on--and I haven't been able to sort it all out yet.
It's a problem of definitions and feelings about definitions.

Perfect prediction is more or less a result of Determinism, adn we basically all agree with that.

"Hard Determinists", like what you refer to, think this stinks because a choice is when 2 possible things can happen and thus they feel like there are no real choices.

"Soft Determinists", like Ken and I, feel like it's all good because we aren't interested in 2 possible things happening-- we feel a real choice is what happens when the external world is dependent on our desires.

Tom's a little fishy because he talks like he's using your definition of "choice", but isn't unhappy about it, thus spanning the two types.

You might take some comfort, as an incoming determinist, that as far as I can tell, there is nobody who actually has perfect knowledge.

[TomJrzk]

Perfect prediction is more or less a result of Determinism, adn we basically all agree with that.

"Hard Determinists" think this stinks because a choice is when 2 possible things can happen and thus they feel like there are no real choices.
I'm a HD but I smell nothing but roses. Do I need a new nose?

[sweetiepie]

I'm a HD but I smell nothing but roses. Do I need a new nose?

yep. real hd's are grumps. you're a softy at heart, you just don't want to admit it. ;)

[dongiovanni1976x]

It's a problem of definitions and feelings about definitions. well said. :notworthy:

we feel a real choice is what happens when the external world is dependent on our desires. What does this mean?

What is a desire? Who possesses it? And where does the external world stop and YOU begin?

[untermensche]

...we feel a real choice is what happens when the external world is dependent on our desires....
We know about the external world. And the electron does not respond to our desires. It behaves the way it behaves. We are irrelevent to it.

[Hoodoo Ulove]

We know about the external world. And the electron does not respond to our desires. It behaves the way it behaves. We are irrelevent to it.You never get what you want? I'm so sorry!

[kennethamy]

We do see a representation of it. A mental image. We do not see the actual thing. We see what our brain has evolved to make out of the light that reflects off the actual thing.

So what the hell ran over Hoodoo?

[Canard DuJour]

we feel a real choice is what happens when the external world is dependent on our desires.

What does this mean?

What is a desire? Who possesses it? And where does the external world stop and YOU begin?

Nugatory. A desire is not a choice. A choice - or the exercise of what is commonly referred to as free will - is the realisation of a desire via anticpation and evaluation of the consequences of possible courses of action.

Whether the desire has antecedent causes and whether desires are absolutely predictable from antecedent causes are different questions. Unless, of course, you predefine free will as a supernatural ability to want what we don't want. There is, by definition, no such thing.

[Hoodoo Ulove]

What is a desire?Haven't you ever wanted anything? What kind of question is that?Who possesses it?Haven't you ever wanted anything? What kind of question is that? And where does the external world stop and YOU begin?Given a little fuzziness around the edges (a scab on your knee, say), you know the answer to that one, too. Now if you think the commonsense answers are wrong, make your case.

[kennethamy]

Ah, I think I understand what you're saying now. If your "in that sense" is free from the deterministic brain, then I ask what does compatibilism add? Freedom from being tied up or coerced?

That's abrupt, but yes. But that's a lot to add. After all, what does determinism subtract? The action or choice being uncaused? The Bible says, "Ye shall know the Truth, and the Truth will make you free". Well, I'm not so sure about that. But, forgetting whether the Bible is right or not, I bet that the Bible isn't saying that the Truth will make what you do random. David Hume writes that some people (he means philosophers) think there is a problem where there is only a difficulty. An illustration of what he means is this: Suppose you are chagrined (for some reason) that a triangle has only three sides. That is a difficulty for you. But there is certainly no problem which you can solve. It isn't as if you can find a way out and somehow reconcile being a triangle with being a four sided figure. The same goes for free will. Love it or hate it, if, "free will" is defined as being uncaused, there is no problem of free will. Someone may find it a difficulty who yearns for free will, but no problem. It is settled.

The question is, of course, why we should think that to say that an action, or a choice is free, is to say that it is uncaused when that is not what it means to say that a person acted of his own free-will in any ordinary conversation? Of course, we live in a free (ordinary sense) country, and there is no law against using "free" as a synonym for "uncaused". But, nevertheless, what is the motivation for doing so? You might say, perhaps, that the "true" meaning of free action is uncaused action. But why?

Now, I could understand why a person might want to say that the "true" meaning of the metal, "gold" is that gold is an element with an atomic number: 79, and an atomic weight of: 196.96655. Something completely foreign to the ordinary definition of "gold". The ordinary concept of gold is defined by, as you would expect, the "surface" features of gold as it appears to us. But suppose a chemist were to say that he didn't care about those surface features of gold, for example its color, and that, in fact, even if we found a substance without those surface features so that the substance was not recognizable as gold, as long as that substance was an element with an atomic number or 79, and an atomic weight of 196.96655, it would be gold, and that the chemical definition of "gold" is not merely the best definition, it is the true definition of gold.

But would this analogy work with "free action"? Could we plausibly say that although on the surface, "free action" means uncompelled action (as you put it, not tied up, or uncoerced) the true meaning of it is, "uncaused". It's implausible since philosophy is not chemistry. The chemist can drill down under the surface appearances of things, and get to the reality which lies beneath. But can the philosopher. How. And with what kind of justification can the philosopher discard our ordinary concepts?

Wittgenstein writes that philosophers tend to think that concepts like "truth" or "knowledge", or (I suppose) free action are "superconcepts". Whereas, Wittgenstein says, if these concepts have a use, they must have as "humble" a use as "table" or "lamp".

Scientists have earned the right to tell us that often what appears is not what is real. The Sun doesn't really move: the Earth is not really flat; and so on. But, of course, scientists have a tried and true method, called the empirical method for discovering the reality under the appearances. Philosophers (although they have tried to emulate scientists) have not come up with any plausible method for getting beneath appearances. Why suppose that free action is really uncaused action, when it really isn't?

[kennethamy]

You recognize that determinism is compatible with the commonsense meaning of "free will" and that it is incompatible with the philosophese meaning of same. To say that you are a soft determinist is to reject the philosophese usage. On what principle do you do so?

Good question. Take a look at my post #499.