Are we wasting our time here? [Archive I] - Page 2

Cross Examiner

May 17, 2005, 03:22 PM

1. With respect to post 236, why should I point you to atheists here who say life is meaningless? Do you think I think atheism entails meaninglessness upon atheist say-so? Atheism is indeed incompatible with a meaning to life but this is not because of an opinion poll or majority vote. But why should I tell you, why not see for yourself? So I ask, assuming atheism for the sake of argument, can there be a cosmic purpose to life and, if so, is it knowable and, if so, what is it? I think you’ll find by following the trail that if atheism, no purpose. Note here I am not asking you if we can make up purposes for ourselves to pass the time. I’ll grant that we can do this much whether or not God exists. This private, subjective sort of purpose is not what I’m talking about at all. I’m talking about a cosmic, universal, objective purpose. The kind that exists ‘above’ in a sort of Platonic sense, if you will, the kind that is real whether or not any of us believe it be real. I speak of Purpose, not purpose. Meaning, not meaning. Can there be a Purpose or Meaning to life if atheism is true? Don’t worry. I saw your other question. We’ll get to the link from Purpose to ethics right after.

2. I ask you to help me understand what something means and the only response I get is ‘well, what do you think it means?’ If I knew that, would I ask? OK. Maybe I’m just being dense so let me help you help me. When someone simply says a story is ‘myth’, they can mean any number of things by this. They can mean anything from the story is (1) flatly and utterly false to the story is (2) true but the significance of it is not in the details. For example, I would say the story of Jacob’s struggle with the Angel of the Lord is a myth of the second sort. Not because I think the details untrue but because they are not the point of the story. Now, I would deny that the resurrection story is a myth in any sense of the word I’m familiar with but I still need to know what was meant in order to target the right idea. I’d rather not waste my time building castles in the air.

Likewise, I’m baffled to read the claim that the Hercules and resurrection stories share the same quality and quantity of support. Do any two stories match up in these areas? The same number of writers attested to both stories? The same amount of time passed between the events and the recording of the events? The writers of each story shared the same relation to the events they wrote about? The writers of each story wrote the same way, with the same intent, to the same sort of audience etc.? No? That’s not what you meant by saying the evidence for each is equal? Then what did you mean? If these ideas are good ones then why hide them in murky muck and shadow? Why not light ‘em up? So in the interest of clarity, and having explained myself a little, I ask again: what is meant by calling the resurrection story a ‘myth’? What is meant by saying the Hercules story and the resurrection story share the same ‘evidential level of support’? The meaning is anything but clear.

On an aside, speaking of clear meaning and in the spirit of this thread, I’d like to clarify what I mean by meaning. I see that I use the term ‘mean’ and it’s forms in many distinct ways throughout my writings. The first sense of mean or meaning is synonymous to the word ‘referent’. When I ask ‘what does that mean?’ I am asking to what does that refer. The second sense is synonymous to the words ‘value’ or ‘significance’. When Mr. Wright ponders the question ‘what is the meaning of the resurrection?’ he is thinking about the value or significance of the event. The third sense is synonymous to the words ‘purpose’ or ‘intent’. When the singer from Switchfoot sings ‘we were meant to live for so much more’ he agonizes over our blindness to the purpose of life, what the Intender intended for us. The last sense is synonymous to ‘entail’ or ‘necessitate’. When Mr. Plantinga says ‘atheism means moral anti-realism’ he is saying atheism entails or rationally necessitates a certain sort of thinking on morality. So how do you know which meaning of mean I mean? The immediate context should make it plain but, failing that, you can always just ask me. You know. Questions.

3. Yes, I’d say that the belief Jesus arose is foundational to the belief that He is the Son of God rather than the other way ‘round. You’ll note that, historically speaking, the first was said before the second. And this is to be expected as the event itself naturally precedes one’s understanding of the meaning or significance of the event. For example, I knew the World Trade Towers fell (I saw it live on TV) years before I grasped the significance of the event (and this understanding grows, it is not static). Quite similarly, it seems the disciples and other witnesses knew Jesus arose years before they grasped in the slightest what this event means. And I’d say that what the resurrection means still puzzles millions today. Maybe you’re in that crowd.

4. So why then haven’t I argued yet that the link the first Christians made between ‘Jesus arose’ and ‘so is the Son of God’ is a good one? Two reasons. First, that is a lengthy discussion for those singing from the same page, much more so for those singing from totally different songbooks. Guess which metaphor applies to us here? Second, and in the service of the first reason, I’ve committed from the start to first settle problems of clarity, relevance and significance – this before running headlong into the stickier matters of truth and meaning. I see it as a horse-and-cart kind of thing. What? Yes, you can choose to see this as a false excuse if you like. It is still a free country after all. Until we mindless Christian zombies turn it into a theocratic-totalitarian-police-state, that is. Boo!

5. About the Abraham and Isaac thing. Is it wrong or evil for God, either directly of by way of human agency, to take life? This was assumed so in a question put to me but should it be? If so, why? I think this topic might actually turn out to be interesting after all.

6. Is it sound to say that because someone doesn’t defend a position that he can’t? Is it possible he has other reasons? Perhaps other reasons he’s even mentioned already? Think about it, folks.

7. I disagree. I think this thread is far more focused than the other one I opened. Neither do I think that the posts you linked us to address what I am asking for here. Going through them, your first (http://www.iidb.org/vbb/showthread.php?p=2275301#post2275301) hints at a naturalistic ground for moral realism. Your third (http://www.iidb.org/vbb/showthread.php?p=2269739#post2269739) says morality is driven by emotion/empathy, reflects what works and is known intuitively by most. And by the ninth, well, I grow weary of wading through the muck by the ninth. What I read I found largely unclear, irrelevant or insignificant to morality in general and to the questions I put to relativism in particular. How many of these should I slog through? Why not just answer my questions directly rather than point to the window to say ‘the truth is out there!’. Oy vey.

8. You’re right. I do beg the question. I assume some things are really wrong in my argument from moral law/purpose for God (yes, those italics are important hints). I do this because to deny that some things are really wrong, all human belief aside, puts the denier in a jam. For if the denier’s denial is true, if nothing is really wrong, then all value judgments are human opinion and preference at best and so trivial and non-binding upon the hearer and reader. This means statements like ‘child torture is wrong’, ‘the Holocaust was evil’, ‘the God of the Bible is immoral’ and ‘chocolate is better than vanilla’ are all equally trivial and non-binding opinion and preference. But if the denier’s denial is false, if some things really are wrong, then the denier unwittingly stands on the wrong side of the fence -- which also serves to undercut his judgment. So whether the denier’s denial of this moral realism is true or false, the denier makes his own value judgments trivial and non-binding by virtue of the position he’s taken.

I might also put the problem like this. If true value exists (i.e., right and wrong are real, independent of human belief) and is knowable (i.e., we can know some things to be really right and wrong), then any given value judgment may very well be true and so significant and binding (i.e., containing a moral ‘ought’). But if true value does not exist or is unknowable, then no value judgment may be known true and so none can be significant or binding. I think the heavy cost of this latter option all but forces the atheist to try to argue that moral realism and atheism are compatible with one another. That none have so far leads me to believe few if any understand what I’ve been saying. Maybe I need to reframe the issue.

The question was raised earlier, ‘what does God have to do with ethics?’. I think now it is an especially relevant question the answer to which I think is nothing. Or something. If there is no moral standard above men then the question of God is indeed irrelevant to the question of morality. For He is only useful as a possible (or from most plausible to only possible) source of such a moral standard that, supposing He exists, would be real no matter what men may believe, which would make for real right and wrong (this is the bottom of the chain). Which is to say, tying us back to the line above, that whether He has nothing or something to do with morality depends upon whether or not moral realism is true, whether or not there is a real right and wrong. This is why my question: ‘is child torture really wrong?’ is so important. It gives us a concrete place to start moving from the bottom-up, in a certain sense, to either Something or nothing. And where we end up on this makes all the difference in the world.

9. Hm. No, this is not about me imposing my values on you. Nor is it not about what I do or don’t desire. It is about what denying real, objective, universal value does to our value judgments (among other things). And since value judgment litters both our writings in here and everyday speech out there, I think it is an important and relevant discussion to have.

10. Sure. Some of my positions are presently unsupported. But that is a far cry from saying I can’t support them. In any case, this waiting is intentional. I need to clear the brush before moving too far forward. There is apparently a lot of brush left to clear. Want to help?

11. Is it sound to say that because our moral codes disagree at points that there is no true, authoritative moral code or law, no standard above each of us by which our disagreeing codes and behaviors are either in right or wrong relation to? Does the mere fact that there are many answers to the question mean there is no right answer? Why draw this inference?

12. Does God need an explanation as much as the universe does? Well, if both were self-existent and eternal then I’d agree. Or if both were contingently existent (i.e., their existence is caused by something else) and finite then I’d agree. But what if one were self-existent and eternal while the other contingently existent and finite; wouldn’t only one of these need explaining in this case? You see where I’m going. So I wonder: is the universe self-existent and eternal? What does reason say? What does the evidence say? What do you say?

13. To say that what is really ethical, that what is really right or wrong does in fact depend solely upon the speaker speaking begs the question at hand. This is the very thing we’re inquiring about; whether or not right and wrong is independent of what a person or a people happen to believe is right or wrong. We want to know if there is a real moral law or standard that rises above and stands in judgment of the beliefs of men. I’m not asking for your descriptive thesis of morality. I am not asking you what people believe to be moral or how you think our moral beliefs came about, I am asking you whether or not some things are really right or wrong, all human belief on the matter aside. So when I ask if child torture is right or wrong, I’m not asking you what you/we believe to be the case or what cultural and evolutionary factors influence/determine our belief, I am asking you whether or not this act is wrong no matter what people happen to believe, as a matter of objective fact. More broadly, I am asking for your prescriptive thesis of morality. I want to know what, if anything, makes things right or wrong. I want to I want to know why we should be moral.

You can answer my questions in a number of ways. You can say, ‘ The advancement of one’s genetic code is the moral standard, the greatest good. Something is right if it lines up with one’s genes getting passed on to the next generation. So it would be morally equivalent for me to sacrifice myself to save two brothers or eight cousins, all else being equal.’ Or you can say, ’There is no moral standard, no greatest good. There are just conflicting human opinions with no authoritative resolution in sight so what is right and wrong is left up to the individual to decide’. You can even say, ‘I don’t know. I have no idea what makes things right or wrong. I don’t know if such a standard and such categories as right and wrong are real or man-made and made-up. I’ve hardly given it a moment’s thought.’ But what you can’t say is ‘our moral beliefs are shaped by culture and evolution’ as this is an answer to a question I didn’t ask instead of an answer to a question I did ask. I don’t call it a duck, but if it quacks, waddles and water rolls right off the back …

14. He said we don’t know what the millionth part of the millionth part of what ‘truth’ is. If that were true, then how would he know it to be true? Is this saying significantly different from the self-contradicting clichés ‘there is no truth’ and ‘no one knows anything for sure’?

15. What does it matter that chemical reactions are not ‘equivalent’? That is not an answer to my question at all. I wanted to know why we should call some reactions true (e.g., the thoughts in our heads) yet call others neither true nor false (e.g., fizzing Pepsi)? What’s so special about thought that it warrants a special category?

16. So to this question above you answer that some reactions, like those in our head that we call thoughts, have some emergent property that, unlike other reactions, allows them to be categorized as true or false. Splendid. What is this emergent property called? When and how and from what does it emerge? Is it merely an effect or does it also cause? Is this emergent property material, or immaterial? Can you point to it? Can you weight it? If not, then how do you know it is real? I’ll save some questions for later but suffice it to say that this discussion will no doubt come down to what can be real on an atheistic view.

17. Granted, it is what the thought is about that stands in either true or false, right or wrong relation to what is real. But more to the point, how do I equivocate by saying that, when assuming atheism, thoughts reduce to chemical reactions? Are thoughts also ‘concepts’ and not just chemical reactions, as you seem to suggest? But what then is a concept? Is a concept not a thought? And if it is a thought, then wouldn’t it also reduce to chemical reaction? Or are there concepts that are not thoughts and so irreducible in this way? Do concepts exist apart from whether or not any think them? If there were no thoughts, would there still be concepts? You see the problem? You can say concepts are just thoughts but then these reduce to chemical reactions and take us back to the original problem of truth with nothing solved. You can say instead that concepts are not just thoughts but then you admit to an immaterial reality that I’ll wager will not likely fit well with your atheism. Don’t get me wrong though. I’m all for such a big step towards a theistic worldview.

18. Do I understand your point of view, you ask? I’m trying to. See all the question marks? Where’s yours? Or do you already understand my point of view so well that asking me questions about it is needless? When I say you can’t rightly disbelieve or lack belief in what you don’t understand, I mean this as an oblique answer to the thread’s title-question. Do you deny or doubt, disbelieve or lack belief in my point of view? How can you if you don’t know what it is? I’m skeptical that you do know but I’d like to propose a test of this idea: sketch out my worldview. Write, say, 25 major points that you think I hold to. If I join you in rejecting these points then we’ll know you’ve been aiming at the wrong target. We’ll even have an answer to our thread title-question. But as a show of good faith, and as a model for what I’m looking for, I’d like to sketch out your worldview first. I’ll do this in a following post as this one looks to be already long and getting longer.

19. If the Hercules and resurrection stories are beside the point, as you say, then why bring them up at all? If the plausibility of the supernatural is the issue to you then why muddy the waters with talk of how two stories both sport supernatural elements? Why not say forthrightly that you don’t want to talk about the resurrection story until we first talk of God, the supernatural and all that? Well. Not a big deal. Not worth blowing a gasket over at least. Onward and upward.

20. So relativism says we believe child torture is wrong because of evolution and culture? Great. Well, not so great, really. I’d care to dispute this response but, firstly and more importantly, it is an answer a question no one asked. If I asked you why you think we believe child torture to be wrong then your evolution + culture as belief-shaper idea might be germane. But I did not ask you this. I am asking you if child torture is wrong and why or why not. You can answer this question by saying ‘yes, because of such and such’, ‘no, because of this or that’, ‘it is unknowable’, ‘there is no such thing as wrong’, ‘I don’t know’ etc. but telling me why you think we believe what we do misses the point.

21. Oh man. Here we go. A long post about how I post. Three separate complaints in one long butt-kicker of a post. Let’s cut straight to the chase. First, you don’t need to take ‘mostly serious’ to mean insincere. There are any number of other ways to take it, why this of all ways? How about taking it to mean, oh, I don’t know, that I’m trying to make this serious stuff as light as I can? Second, I said you can’t rightly disbelieve or lack belief in what you don’t understand. You then said you can’t have belief in what you don’t understand. I read this as agreement, as either a statement complimentary to my own or as a restatement of sorts -- which is why I didn’t respond. Who responds to agreement? Now, if you mean to disagree with the above then please clarify what your disagreement is, exactly. I’m simply not seeing it. Help me help you. Third, I read and respond as I go. And I’m way behind. This means I’ll no doubt write something that ignores a lot of the more recent stuff. This post, for example, will ignore sharon45’s post, among a number of others. Does this mean I dislike her? Am I ‘obtuse’? Am I ‘insincere’? Or am I just way behind? What say we don’t rush to judgment? I thought we did the tolerance thing here. If I can’t get the benefit of the doubt from the doubter's club I’m in trouble.

Speak of the devil; I’m out of time and space. For those now following at home, we began with post 236 and ended with 241. 5 posts covered in a day's writing. Now that’s progress. For those with cataracts, the take-home comments and questions from the above are basically:

a. Is atheism compatible with a Purpose to life?

b. Is it wrong for God to take life?

c. I want to know if child torture is wrong and why or why not. I’m not looking for your descriptive thesis on morality. Don’t tell me how or why we came to believe what we believe. If you respond to this simple, clear question with evolution or culture again I’m going to smack you in a very loving and downright Christian way. C’mon, lighten up.

d. So it is concepts that are true or false? But what are concepts? If they are just thoughts then as such they reduce to chemical reactions, neither true nor false; the problem remains. But if they are something else, then what are they? Are they then material, or immaterial? If you say concepts are material, then where are they and how much do they weigh? If you say they are immaterial, then what sort of atheist are you? Do the others know you believe in immaterial entities?

John A. Broussard

May 17, 2005, 03:43 PM

Your last post is replete with questions. Before I even look at them, I'd like to have you pose your original question again, with some clarification.

"first offer up your chief objection to Christianity"

Do you mean Christian theism, or do you man a Christian belief in biblical inerrancy--or both?

Or do you mean some other variety of Christian?

Once you've clarified your quesiton, I'll give you an answer.

Angrillori

May 17, 2005, 06:31 PM

So I ask, assuming atheism for the sake of argument, can there be a cosmic purpose to life and, if so, is it knowable and, if so, what is it? I think you’ll find by following the trail that if atheism, no purpose.Bzzt. No cosmic purpose != no purpose at all.

2. I ask you to help me understand what something means and the only response I get is ‘well, what do you think it means?’ If I knew that, would I ask? Based on your history, yes.

3. Yes, I’d say that the belief Jesus arose is foundational to the belief that He is the Son of God rather than the other way ‘round.Really, let's see which one we can disprove to eliminate all xianity around the globe:
#1) Prove there is no god.
#2) Prove the ressurection didn't happen.

Guess what. People will still be xians if #2 happens. Not if #1 happens.

Claim all you want. it won't change the fact that xianity is still around without the ressurection, but is all gone w/o god.

4. So why then haven’t I argued yet that the link the first Christians made between ‘Jesus arose’ and ‘so is the Son of God’ is a good one? Two reasons. First, that is a lengthy discussion for those singing from the same page, much more so for those singing from totally different songbooks. Guess which metaphor applies to us here?Neither, actually.

5. About the Abraham and Isaac thing. Is it wrong or evil for God, either directly of by way of human agency, to take life? This was assumed so in a question put to me but should it be? If so, why? I think this topic might actually turn out to be interesting after all.Is child torture objectively or just subjectively wrong?

6. Is it sound to say that because someone doesn’t defend a position that he can’t? Is it possible he has other reasons? Perhaps other reasons he’s even mentioned already? Think about it, folks.I thought about it. The reasons are BS, ergo, the conclusion "can't" is justified.

8. You’re right. I do beg the question. Thanks for admitting it.

But if true value does not exist or is unknowable, then no value judgment may be known true and so none can be significant or binding.
Unless of course a group of people get together and decide amongst themselves to share a common purpose and goal. Then all sorts of intersubjectively agreed-to 'oughts' come into play, don't they?

You'd think that after like a MILLION times of saying this you'd be hard pressed to pretend not to have heard it before.

I think the heavy cost of this latter option all but forces the atheist to try to argue that moral realism and atheism are compatible with one another. That none have so far leads me to believe few if any understand what I’ve been saying. I think you meant: "That everyone has shown me why moral realism is absurd and merely a reflection of my ego leads me to conclude that maybe moral realism is merely a reflection of my ego and a rather absurd proposition at that." Of course no one disagrees that morals really exist, in that people really do believe things to be moral or immoral. That's very different from saying that objective moral truth exists.

9. Hm. No, this is not about me imposing my values on you. Nor is it not about what I do or don’t desire.
That would only be true if your support for real objective value wasn't solely predicated on:

"I really really want to be able to say my morals are right!"

Since your support for real objective value IS soleley predicated on:

"I really really want to be able to say my morals are right!"

it's safe to say that your statement above is false.

10. Sure. Some of my positions are presently unsupported.
I think you meant "all."

But that is a far cry from saying I can’t support them. In any case, this waiting is intentional. I need to clear the brush before moving too far forward. There is apparently a lot of brush left to clear. Want to help?Tried. For every bush I cut down you clone it and re-plant it 5 times. Now I'm just having fun. :wave:

11. Why draw this inference?
Let's see:
BGiC wants to claim his morality is superior to everyone elses.
BGiC would have a different morality if his history was different.
BGiC would still believe his altered morals were superior to everyone else's, including people who think as he does with this history.
BGiC would make an equally strong argument for the objectivity of his morals in this altered-history world as he does in this current world.
Hmm. As you say, think about it.

12. Does God need an explanation as much as the universe does?

More, since the universe doesn't claim to be an intelligent, active entity.

13. So when I ask if child torture is right or wrong,
You're asking an incoherent question.

Let's illustrate. 5 is the "right" answer to 2+3, but the "wrong" answer to 6+7. So is 5 right or wrong?

Child torture is an act.
5 is a number.

Is five right or wrong?

Which is it Billy, right or wrong?
C'mon, answer Billy!
Answer! I don't want anything other than a 'right' or 'wrong' answer. Is '5' right or wrong?

Think about it.

When you tell me whether '5' is right or wrong, I'll tell you whether child torture is right or wrong. I promise.

15. What does it matter that chemical reactions are not ‘equivalent’? That is not an answer to my question at all.
Actually it is. Do we call one reaction endothermic and one exothermic because their results differ? So different reactions can have different results and we label the results differently. Of course, as pointed out it is not the rection/thought we call true, but the concept/result of the chemical reaction we call true. A reaction is not it's product. If a reaction produces a mental image of a true concept, we call that concept true. But we don't call the thoughts true or false, but we call the subject of the result of the chemical reaction that is the thought true or false. As has been pointed out, you're equivocating. Stop it.

17. Granted, it is what the thought is about that stands in either true or false, right or wrong relation to what is real. There you go. It's not the 'thought' that is true or false but the content of the result of the reaction/thought that is true or false, so to keep asking why we call the thought true or false is simply equivocating. And now you've admitted you know why.

Stop it.

18. Or do you already understand my point of view so well that asking me questions about it is needless?
I did ask several questions in this thread. Is '5' wrong?

20. So relativism says we believe child torture is wrong because of evolution and culture? Great. Well, not so great, really. I’d care to dispute this response but, firstly and more importantly, it is an answer a question no one asked. If I asked you why you think we believe child torture to be wrong then your evolution + culture as belief-shaper idea might be germane. But I did not ask you this. I am asking you if child torture is wrong and why or why not. You can answer this question by saying ‘yes, because of such and such’, ‘no, because of this or that’, ‘it is unknowable’, ‘there is no such thing as wrong’, ‘I don’t know’ etc. but telling me why you think we believe what we do misses the point.

Why is '5' wrong BGiC?

a. Is atheism compatible with a Purpose to life? You capitalized the P, assuming that was a typo, then yes it is.

b. Is it wrong for God to take life?Is it wrong for god to torture a child? Is child torture wrong? Is '5' wrong?

c. I want to know if child torture is wrong and why or why not.
I want to know why '5' is wrong and why or why not. I’m not looking for your descriptive thesis on number theory. Don’t tell me how or why we came to believe what we believe. If you respond to this simple, clear question with anything other than whether '5' is wrong and why or why not, I’m going to smack you in a very loving and downright atheist way.

Hobbs

May 17, 2005, 11:10 PM

a. Is atheism compatible with a Purpose to life?
Given what you most likely mean by capitalizing Purpose, of course not. But I don't need the universe to give me any purposes for my life, I have plenty of my own. If it wants to give me some good ones, I'll see if I have room to add them and I'll appreciatively take them if so, but if not then I won't be lacking for purposes.

b. Is it wrong for God to take life?
Which specific life, in what circumstances, for what purpose ... ? You know, all the standard sorts of questions that police and lawyers and judges and juries would want to know in a case like this.

c. I want to know if child torture is wrong and why or why not. I’m not looking for your descriptive thesis on morality. Don’t tell me how or why we came to believe what we believe. If you respond to this simple, clear question with evolution or culture again I’m going to smack you in a very loving and downright Christian way. C’mon, lighten up.
I want to know if it is wrong to sacrifice a rook for a knight, but don't refer to the rules of chess or try to tie your answer to different possible circumstances in a game or I'll smack you upside the head. [Note: I'm not equating torturing a child with sacrificing a rook for a knight; I'm pointing out the difficulty of answering a question if the questioner refuses to listen to points the answerer thinks are necessary for understanding the answer (not to mention the absurdity of asking such a question with such restrictions in the first place).]

d. So it is concepts that are true or false? But what are concepts? If they are just thoughts then as such they reduce to chemical reactions, neither true nor false; the problem remains. But if they are something else, then what are they? Are they then material, or immaterial? If you say concepts are material, then where are they and how much do they weigh? If you say they are immaterial, then what sort of atheist are you? Do the others know you believe in immaterial entities?
Is water wet? Can it boil? But water is just a bunch of hydrogen and oxygen atoms, none of which is wet on its own, and they don't boil. So where did this ghostly "wetness" or "boiling" come from? What sort of entity is wetness, or boiling? Or, are they not entities, but the results of the actions of entities and how those entities interact with each other and other entities? Is a baseball game an immaterial entity? Or is it, rather than being an entity of any sort, an activity of a group of physical entities, namely players, coaches, umpires, etc? Even a materialist can believe in activities, that matter can do stuff, right? Might a thought, rather than being an entity of any sort, be an activity that a specific entity (a brain) does? Perhaps if you begin to think of thought along those lines, some of what seems to be intractable confusions will just dissolve into irrelevancy, perhaps you will find that these questions are barking up the wrong tree.

Anat

May 18, 2005, 01:24 AM

You know what, BGIC? I have concluded there is nothing WRONG about child torture. Most of us are child torturers, by some standard or other, anyway. Force infants to sleep alone, in their own rooms all night? Force infants to sleep with their parents? Vaccinate? Risk dangerous disease? Wean? Spank? Place in time-out? Take on long car trips? Force to go to school? Can all of these be WRONG? Yet all but psychopaths have some standard for things they won't do to a child unless circumstances were extreme. And no, the standards are not the same. But as long as there are enough people who include children other than their own in their 'moral circle' people will find ways to intervene in what they perceive to be the most extreme forms of child torture by their neighbors, regardless of whether their line of reasoning satisfies you.

Stephen T-B

May 18, 2005, 07:57 AM

BGic - your very long posts reveal that you have absolutely no insight into why people are atheists, and this despite everything available for you to read at IIDFs.
You insist on being bewildered, demanding we address the same issues over and over again. What are you trying to do - exhaust us so we retreat into a corner, hands over our heads, shouting "YOU WIN! YOU WIN!"?

Let's see if we can't get some things clear:

You need to believe in the objective reality of an invisible supernatural entity because:
you believe it's existence explains our existence. (We think it's a figment of the human imagination, and therefore that our existence is as much dependent upon it as Zeus or Isis or the IPU);

you believe it gives meaning to our existence. (We think our existence has the same meaning as that of any other creature, with this difference: our powerful brains enable us to mess with things other creatures can't, so if we respect our fellow creatures and our fellow human beings, we need to act responsibly. Why do we respect our fellow creatures and our fellow human beings? Why not? We are perfectly entitled to, and for no other reason than because mutual respect among humans has a better out-come for us all than mutual antagonism, and respecting other creatures is part of respecting our "environment" which we need to do if our children and grand children and great grandchildren are going to have a half-decent life);

You believe an invisible supernatural entity referred to in very ancient texts crammed with contradictions and inconsistencies provides us with moral guidance. (We think that after several million years as an intelligent, social animal, we have developed moral frameworks within which the societies we live may function);

you believe this invisible supernatural entity can intervene in our day-to-day lives and over-rule the laws which govern the universe and make it viable. (We don't);

you believe the universe is contingent upon our existence. (We believe we are contingent upon the existence of the universe; that it existed donkey years before we appeared, and will continue for donkey years after we've vanished from the scene - taking all our gods with us).

Can we all go home now?

Classical

May 18, 2005, 09:10 AM

Dear BGic:

You just don't seem to get it, do you? You overcomplicate the simple.

You know what? A lot of atheists wish you were right. I, for one, wish to stay young forever and enjoy life as I do now, or perhaps be reincarnated and still remember who I am now, or even go on to another form of existence and be reunited with my loved ones or live forever in bliss with my partner and our dog. I would love to have a god to pray to when I need something. I wish I would have been able to heal my friend who recently died of cancer.

Now you may say "But, Classical, you can have these things. This is real. Miracles happen. Prayers are answered. God loves you. Jesus died for your sins."

No, BGic. This religion you feel you are forced to cling to is based on nothing. The complicated web of question and issues you bring up are an exercise in futility. Mankind has created thousands of religions to explain the unexplainable and none of them are based on anything but imagination.

No one can possibly explain a purpose for what is going on without simply making it up at some point to psychologically satiate the human desire to hold on to something. This may sound bleak, this purposeless universe, but I find great joy and purpose to my human life that I know I am living now. When I die, that's it. I will no more know that I am dead when I'm dead than I realized I would be alive before I was born.

I just don't buy this religion thing. I studied the question far too much. I see no choice but atheism.

Naked Ape

May 18, 2005, 09:40 AM

Still fishing Billy?
This is the very thing we’re inquiring about; whether or not right and wrong is independent of what a person or a people happen to believe is right or wrong.
<snip>
So when I ask if child torture is right or wrong,
<snip>
I am asking you whether or not this act is wrong no matter what people happen to believe, as a matter of objective fact.
Riddle me this batman, do you consider sacrificing children (by strapping them to an altar and killing them with a knife) to be moral or immoral?
Does the answer depend on whether or not you happen to believe that an invisible man in the sky ordered you to do it?
What would you call it if you trussed your kid up and placed them on the altar while you sharpen the sacrifcial knife? (It sure sounds like torture to me.) If god calls the slaughter of your child off at the last minute, does that mean it is right or wrong to go through the rest of the sacrificial ritual as long as you don't consummate the act? Did you play the "sacrifice you child to god" game with your dad when you were a little tyke? It's a charming little bible story. (http://bible.gospelcom.net/passage/?book_id=1&chapter=22&version=31&context=chapter) God demands innocent blood for a burnt offering from Abraham. The source is to be his son Isaac, so Abe-y baby prepares to muder his child at the suggestion of the voices in his head. At the last minute, another substitute innocent victim (the ram in the bushes) is found, and the voices get the innocent blood that they crave so much. (yum yum) What an excellent story to base three whole religions on. The patriarch's willingness to kill his own child is actually praised as a good thing and the reason for the special blessing of the almighty. Genesis 22:
15 The angel of the LORD called to Abraham from heaven a second time 16 and said, "I swear by myself, declares the LORD, that because you have done this and have not withheld your son, your only son, 17 I will surely bless you and make your descendants as numerous as the stars in the sky and as the sand on the seashore. Your descendants will take possession of the cities of their enemies, 18 and through your offspring [b] all nations on earth will be blessed, because you have obeyed me."Can you tell us if Abraham's behavior would qualify as wrong in your book Billy? Is it wrong today when parents today hear voices that tell them to kill their children, and they act on them? Even if they really believe that they are only following god's orders?So then, is preparing your child for sacrifice, and stopping just before you bring down the blade to end their life torture?
If it is torture, then from your magical book perspective it must be OK to torture children as long as the voices tell you to, and you believe that the voices are coming from god. If it is not torture, then I would like to know what you think that sort of behavior should be typified as?
5. About the Abraham and Isaac thing. Is it wrong or evil for God, either directly of by way of human agency, to take life?If you don't have an answer for any of the questions around the Abraham/Isaac/child torture thing, just say so.

Your pathetic attempt to divert attention away from your complete inability to answer a single question directed to you on this topic is just sad. :(

To answer your question: "Is it wrong or evil for God, either directly of by way of human agency, to take life?"
Since god does not exist in any demonstrable way, and any direct action in reality by a fictional character is unlikely at best, the question devolves to: "Should people be held responsible for taking lives if they claim they were prompted by voices in their heads?" In an attempt to communicate in the BGIC way, I have chosen to answer your question with another question. Helpfull, isn't it?

Cheers,

Naked Ape

Cross Examiner

May 18, 2005, 10:43 AM

About post 241 ...

1. Was I unfair to call your objection too vague? If the shoe were on the other foot, if you had asked me for my big objection to atheism and I said ‘atheism is characterized by missing the forest for the trees and has caused bad things’, wouldn’t you think this one’s got fur on it and in need of a shave? Right you would. So when you say the ‘NT is a lie and has caused bad things’, and I put it in the ‘in need of a trim’ box, then I’m just doing the healthy thing, I’m doing what you would do. And you apparently agree with me because, lo and behold, of your own initiative you shear ‘NT is a lie’ down to ‘NT not really connected to OT’. This is progress. Things gets more hygienic as you pare that down further to ‘no resurrection concept in the OT’ trimming all the way to ‘NT writers misread Is. 49-55’ and voila! A brand new sentence, a bit of clarity and an attitude that says ‘look out world!’. It’s like an idea makeover. More importantly though, we all learned something today: that there’s no shame in admitting to vagary because it’s not your fault – and, with a little courage, with a little help from your friends, you’ll find it’s never too late to make a change for the better.

2. But all silliness aside, your new objection(s) are much clearer and relevant to the resurrection and it’s meaning, the center of Christianity. So, onward and upward to still greater understanding (I’m such an optimist). When you say there is ‘no resurrection concept in the OT’, to which notion of resurrection do you refer? Do you mean the OT does not convey any sense of bodily resurrection, resurrection as metaphor for national restoration, both, neither? If you think it mentions bodily resurrection, do you think this is in the general/universal sense, the particular/individual sense, both, neither? You suggest the NT writers misread (or didn’t read at all!) Isaiah 49-55, and 53 in particular, which means you must know what the right reading is. So you, thousands of years and miles removed, far removed in terms of culture and worldview, have better read the scroll than the NT writers, 1st century Palestinian Jews steeped in second-Temple Jewish thought and ways? Aren’t these better witnesses (prima facie) to the meaning of the scroll of Isaiah than you are? Why should we think they’ve misread their own sacred writings but you, an outsider in many ways, have read them rightly? Why should we trust you rather than them?

3. Yes. Faith matters. But is this unique to Christianity, as you suggest? Does it all come down to faith, as you say? Or is there more to it than that? Does it matter how faith comes about, upon what and whom it is founded? Faith, most broadly, is simply trust. Who do you trust when it comes to knowing? Can your own experiences and reasoning therefrom be all you need to paint reality fully and rightly? Can any worldview be built in isolation from others? Surely, whether or not we have faith or place our trust is not the question. We all do this of necessity, not just the Christians. Whether or not our trust is well placed is the question. Christians are commended for searching the Scriptures, for reasoning, for living consistently and for thereby attaining a faith so well placed that it amounts to assurance (cf. Heb. 11.1). If Christianity really were about a blind, fideistic, ‘leap out of the lion’s mouth’ type of faith would we bother reasoning with you? Would Paul have reasoned with the Stoics and Epicureans on Mars Hill? What hath Athens to do with Jerusalem? What the foundation hath to do with the house.

Angrillori

May 18, 2005, 12:07 PM

Is water wet? Can it boil? But water is just a bunch of hydrogen and oxygen atoms, none of which is wet on its own, and they don't boil. So where did this ghostly "wetness" or "boiling" come from? What sort of entity is wetness, or boiling? Or, are they not entities, but the results of the actions of entities and how those entities interact with each other and other entities? Is a baseball game an immaterial entity? Or is it, rather than being an entity of any sort, an activity of a group of physical entities, namely players, coaches, umpires, etc? Even a materialist can believe in activities, that matter can do stuff, right? Might a thought, rather than being an entity of any sort, be an activity that a specific entity (a brain) does? Perhaps if you begin to think of thought along those lines, some of what seems to be intractable confusions will just dissolve into irrelevancy, perhaps you will find that these questions are barking up the wrong tree.

:thumbs: Thank you Hobbs! (That's why I love this place, some people are just straight-up better thinkers than I am!)

Rational BAC

May 18, 2005, 01:30 PM

Amazingly long thread. Read through some of it.

Only problem I have is in the title---

"Are we wasting our time here?"

What is this "we" stuff?

Surely you don't think you represent all Christians and all Christian viewpoints.

Stephen T-B

May 18, 2005, 01:41 PM

Rational - I like you more and more

Scorpion

May 18, 2005, 02:55 PM

Could be a mistake to jump into a thread like this, but the blissfully naive part-time lurker that I am:

c. I want to know if child torture is wrong and why or why not.

Yes, it's wrong, and it's wrong since causing harm to innocent beings (I believe "child" is chosen in the question to denote an innocent being) for no purpose (again, I'm assuming that the torture in the question is just for casual entertainment) is wrong.

Clear enough?

-S-

J-D

May 19, 2005, 12:38 AM

1. I’m not entirely sure I understand what is being said in post 195. I say that the primary contention of the first Christians was: Jesus arose and so is the Son of God. You seem to be saying in response to this that whether or not Jesus arose and whether or not He is the Son of God may have nothing to do with one another. Do I understand you correctly?Correctly but not completely.

My point is basically a methodological one, in response to your methodological objections.

If your claim is that Jesus 'arose' (that is, from the dead), then you are quite correct in demurring to my objection that God can't exist on the grounds that my objection has no bearing on that particular claim. However, if your claim is that Jesus arose and so is the Son of God (which is a different claim--that's the point), then my objection that God can't exist goes to the heart of the matter.

If you only want to argue for the claim that Jesus 'arose', then you are justified in dismissing--as beside the point--any objection to the other claims of Christianity. But if you want to argue for larger claims authenticated by the supposed resurrection, then you are not so justified.

In short, if your original question at the beginning of this thread is interpreted as, 'Why do atheists fail to respond--in their objections to Christianity--to the essential claim of Christianity that Jesus died and came back to life?', then the answer to the question is, 'Because that definition of the essential claim of Christianity is inaccurate (because too narrow)'.

(Note well: the claim that Jesus is the Son of God is not a simple logical corollary of the claim that he 'arose'. It's an additional claim. If you say it's not possible for somebody to die and come back to life unless that somebody is the Son of God, then that's an additional claim.)

2. With respect to the problem of suffering, if you what I wrote in post 212 is already crystal clear to you then please do respond to it whenever you like. But if anything is fuzzy, please do ask for clarification first. Oh, and for what it’s worth, I think we can manage two talks at once.I can manage two talks at once--so long as you don't interject into this one the objection that what I'm saying is irrelevant to the essence of Christianity. 'What is the essence of Christianity?' is the topic of the other talk--let's see how far we can get keeping them separate.

I think I understand what you're saying about the 'problem of suffering', and I think it's in two parts, of which it's the general one that's the essence of your position. But I'd like to clear away the specific one first.

You suggest as a possibility only (if I've read you correctly) that God's reason for suffering might (only might) be that suffering can improve or refine the nature or moral character of human beings. Apart from the other difficulties with this line of thinking (which I will defer for the moment), I specifically included, in my example of the suffering, disability, and death caused by disease viruses, the suffering, disability, and death inflicted on non-human animals, who are not capable of learning from the experience. I didn't make specific reference to, but my wording did not exclude, the suffering, disability, and death inflicted on babies and people with severe intellectual disabilities, who may also not be capable of learning from the experience.

Now I'm going to rephrase and expand on part of my general position. I said that it is part of the position of monotheists, including Christians, that God is good. Sometimes similar words are used as well or instead, like just, kind, loving, merciful, righteous, beneficent, benevolent, or compassionate. Now, if it was an ordinary human being who had created and disseminated all the disease viruses that afflict the world (to speak only of that kind of suffering and say nothing of the other kinds), would you describe that action as good, just, kind, loving, merciful, righteous, beneficent, benevolent, or compassionate? I wouldn't. And it wouldn't make any difference if the person who did it said: 'I have a reason for doing it which I'm not going to explain'. That's not just, loving, or righteous. When you say that God must have had some adequate reason for disease, it seems to me that it amounts to this: you are saying that when you apply words like 'good', 'merciful', or 'benevolent' to God, they mean something quite different from what they mean when you apply them to anybody or anything else. If you mean the same thing by 'beneficence' that it means in any other context, it's appropriate to judge whether the word applies by the same standard that would apply in any other context. But if you don't mean the same things, then what's your justification for using the same words?

John A. Broussard

May 19, 2005, 01:04 AM

If Christianity really were about a blind, fideistic, ‘leap out of the lion’s mouth’ type of faith would we bother reasoning with you?

I've been reasoned at by JWs, Mormons, Hare Krishnas, Moslems and a few others. None thought their beliefs were merely blind faith.

So let's move on to your entire method of "arguing". You litter your statements with rhetorical questions, which is hardly the way to establish a point. (try counting the question marks some day) You continually refer to yourself as "we", implying that you somehow respresent all christians. I would guess you represent a minority of them--if any.

If you have a substantive point to make--without tedious quoting from a book I regard as a work of fiction--make it, and we can move into a discussion of it. Keep it short. Don't bury it in verbiage.

That advice is offered in the hope that you do seriously want to discuss what you feel are important issues.

Classical

May 19, 2005, 07:53 AM

Whether or not our trust is well placed is the question.

This is the most important thing you have said BGic.

After years of very careful consideration and reasearch, I became absolutely convinced that I could not trust the bible, the holy church fathers, or christian doctrine.

The scriptures begin with events stated as fact that we now know with utter certainly are entirely false. And from there, it just gets worse and worse (world-wide flood, sun standing still). With such a bad track record of false information in the OT, how could any reasonable, intelligent person trust a document that claims someone rose from the dead? Falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus. If there is a god, then I am sure that god would not want me to place my trust in a flawed document, let alone leave it for the world as "his word."

No court of law would trust a testimony or document which contains so much verifiably false information. Try presenting such a document before any court and see what happens.

I have much more trust in science because it can be tested and re-tested and with new data and experiments, conclusions are open for re-examination. How, BGic, please explain how, you can possibly expect me to base my life and morals on a religion whose sole basis for authority is devastatingly flawed? This is not reasonable IMHO.

Your comments would be appreciated.
Classical :wave:

Cross Examiner

May 19, 2005, 01:40 PM

1. When I look at post 244, which I can only presume was meant for me, I see a short list of Byzantine opinion: the Bible is bad literature, moral beliefs are just engrained pragmatism, the resurrection is a myth as equally implausible as all others (please respond to this (http://www.iidb.org/vbb/showthread.php?p=2406103#post2406103) then, point 2), Christianity is devoid of truth and goodness, CS Lewis was a sub-par thinker etc. Nowhere do I see an inquisitive tone, much less an actual question. Not even is there any argument or reasoning to take aim at; just a mess of opinion you apparently take as foregone conclusion. If this were indeed meant for me, where could I join in? The only thing to do with this is to respond in kind: I disagree with all your opinions. And the Yankees are, like, totally better than the Red Sox. Oh, and atheism is neurosis that results quite often from an abusive or absentee father. Now, on those points we disagree, which one of us is right and, more importantly, why?

2. In 245, you say we invented answers to the questions of death and the purpose of life. You say we don’t know these answers, no one does. But how do you know no one knows the answers? Wouldn’t you have to know the right answers yourself in order to know all others don’t have them? But if you have the right answers then it is false that no one has them. Maybe instead you mean to say the answers to these big questions are unknowable and nothing more. But even so, how would you know that?

3. About 246. You suggest the probability that life self-assembles goes up as the number of planets and eons go up. But why assume that life is the sort of thing that self-assembles in the first place? Isn’t that the very question we’re not to beg? Analogously, you say the emergence of life is like the lottery. How so? At the start of the lottery, the winning ticket exists; it is sitting out there waiting to be found. But at the start of the universe, the ‘winning ticket’, the emergence of life, is exactly what is yet to be if it is to be at all. See the problem? Like nearly all other issues raised here, the matter turns on an ‘if’ the answer to which cannot be presupposed yet most often is, unfortunately.

4. In 250 you want to know about Passover. You want to know if I think it’s immoral, if it’s wrong for God to take the lives of Egyptian children as punishment for the misdeeds of their parents. But I don’t think that that was what Passover was about. I don’t think it was about punishment. Like so many other events in the Bible, there are many layers of context, purpose and meaning here that should be treated in ample depth or not at all. So in the interest of time, I think it much better to cut straight to what I think is the root: is it ever wrong of God to take life? For that matter, is it ever wrong for God to do, don’t do, allow or forbid anything? This is also the root of the Flood question. The root of the Amalekite, Elisha, Abraham and Isaac questions. Indeed, I think all questions of Biblical morality head here eventually. So why not save some time?

To this fundamental question, the root above, if we answer no, it is never wrong for God to do anything because whatever God does is right by virtue of what He is, God, then we make right and wrong arbitrary and so meaningless. If instead we say yes, some things are wrong even for God, we make the standard of right and wrong independent of Him, in which case, He then is not the source of morality and so ultimately irrelevant to it. This is, in essence, the Euthyphro dilemma applied to a monotheistic ethic: meaningless morality on the one hand, irrelevance to it on the other. What a pickle! It’s times like these I wish I had a third hand. Anyway, I’d rather not build a castle on a cloud so before I go further here, do you agree that your Passover question really does come down to this, Plato’s problem for a theistic ethic?

5. You say in post 252 that good (and so heaven) has no meaning and is even irrational apart from bad. How so? The confusion over this usually lies in thinking good and bad as equal and opposite substances, as two sides of the same coin when in fact bad is merely the privation or lack of good in the same way that cold is merely the lack of heat, dark the lack of light, false the lack of true. Unlike good, heat, light and truth -- bad, cold, dark and false are not substances in their own rite. They are relations to these substances and so as such are indeed meaningless apart from that to which they relate. Good is the thing in question; bad is simply the lack of this thing. Or, if you prefer something more poetic, one is the oak and the other the ivy, as Lewis says. So, in heading back to your original claim, good can in fact meaningfully exist apart from bad but not vice versa. And so heaven, where so much good is, is meaningful even without any bad.

But even if this weren’t the case, even if good and bad were equal and opposite substances, I don’t think heaven would be an ‘irrational existence’, as you say, for hell would serve to make sense of heaven. One would be right, the other left, one up, the other down, to use your imagery. So, in consideration of hell, I think your complaint against heaven is a non-starter no matter what good means. But in saying this I hasten here to add that the Christian view, the orthodox view of good and bad is indeed the ‘substance and lack’ model, not the ‘substance-substance’ model, if you will. The latter model is characteristic of dualistic views like Zoroastrianism, Norse and Greek mythology (these models and views will come into play in our impending talk on Plato’s Euthyphro) but not Christianity. Anyway, because of what Christians mean by good, hell is best conceived of as a lack or acute absence of God and His goodness, rather than something substantive as it is often described to be.

Naked Ape

May 19, 2005, 04:08 PM

Hey Billy, when did you decide to stop responding to people posting here and only respond in round about paraphrased ways to disembodied post numbers. Is that what you think jesus would do?
So in the interest of time, I think it much better to cut straight to what I think is the root: is it ever wrong of God to take life? For that matter, is it ever wrong for God to do, don’t do, allow or forbid anything? This is also the root of the Flood question. The root of the Amalekite, Elisha, Abraham and Isaac questions. Indeed, I think all questions of Biblical morality head here eventually. So why not save some time?
In the interests of answering actual questions, you might consider, oh, I don't know...answering the actual questions.
Here is an actual question now: Is it wrong for people to sacrifice children to a voice in their heads if the sacrificer is convinced that an invisible man in the sky wishes this and is the source of the voice?

A simple yes or no will suffice.

Cheers,

Naked Ape

sharon45

May 19, 2005, 04:52 PM

Dear BGic:

You just don't seem to get it, do you? You overcomplicate the simple.Yes, my sentiments as well. You can also easily add the christian bible into this.

Man. All this for one post. I am so behind.I am honored.

About post 241 ...Sorry, but it was post #242.

1. Was I unfair to call your objection too vague? If the shoe were on the other foot, if you had asked me for my big objection to atheism and I said ‘atheism is characterized by missing the forest for the trees and has caused bad things’, wouldn’t you think this one’s got fur on it and in need of a shave? Right you would. So when you say the ‘NT is a lie and has caused bad things’, and I put it in the ‘in need of a trim’ box, then I’m just doing the healthy thing, I’m doing what you would do.Firstly, you are making great assumptions here. If you had said that atheism was really missing out on the 'big picture' of life, I would not dismiss this on content. Since I supposedly started this thread now in this demonstration, I would be very curious as to why this was and would ask later if they would please further expound on the idea. A thread is many times quite pointless without those eager to take part in and support, so I would want as many serious contenders as possible. I would also realize I do not have to be correct in my judgements, so I would have to give some more benefit of doubt as I would also hope from others in their perceptions of me.

Now I do admire yet also sympathize with anyone who takes up the challenge to start a thread and makes enough time available to also manage it as well. Then with adding in time constraints and with such a number of diverse opinions in play, one can not of course be expected to serve and satisfy everyone.

As was pointed out much eariler though, this thread should have been made more clear as to its real main concern and purpose. It was a concealed experiment with people participating in what they thought there were suppose to be really no wrong statements if answered honestly. Not too many like being used as 'lab rats' especially without their knowledge or consent.
And you apparently agree with me because, lo and behold, of your own initiative you shear ‘NT is a lie’ down to ‘NT not really connected to OT’. This is progress. Things gets more hygienic as you pare that down further to ‘no resurrection concept in the OT’ trimming all the way to ‘NT writers misread Is. 49-55’ and voila! A brand new sentence, a bit of clarity and an attitude that says ‘look out world!’.It was unfair because as I had already figured well beforehand, that even though this thread's perceived main purpose was to supposedly address one's chief objection to christianity, I knew this was too much of a broad and monumental task for anyone to reasonably think to tackle. Even though I kept my answer short, so it might have seemed vague, it was correctly stated anyway. That the NT is an absolute blatant lie. It is your own opinion of christianity that it is based on the dying and resurrection of jesus, which is also some of paul's view as well. Both are not true though because not all the NT's writers agree with that statement, and even more importantly, neither does jesus. Jesus as written would hardly agree with a lot of the NT and he doesn't even agree with himself.

I say that the NT is an absolute blatant lie because it is a book founded on, surrounded by, saturated in, and concealing lies. That is far from a vague statement and it still doesn't really alter much of my original one. So I posted and I waited to see what really the thread was all about.

Once it was made clear enough that you wanted the subject to actually be about the resurrection, that is when I stepped in and reiterated my point because of course mine was still valid. Afterall, since this was yet another in a long list of lies from the NT being incorporated into the belief system and I only mentioned just a very small part of that one illogical premise.

2. But all silliness aside, your new objection(s) are much clearer and relevant to the resurrection and it’s meaning, the center of Christianity. So, onward and upward to still greater understanding (I’m such an optimist).Again, so you say.When you say there is ‘no resurrection concept in the OT’, to which notion of resurrection do you refer? Do you mean the OT does not convey any sense of bodily resurrection, resurrection as metaphor for national restoration, both, neither? If you think it mentions bodily resurrection, do you think this is in the general/universal sense, the particular/individual sense, both, neither?I mean there is nothing about a man in the OT, presented like jesus is in the NT, whi would be supposedly the Messiah, beat and brought to death, but to rise again to life because of and to forgive everyone's sins.

You suggest the NT writers misread (or didn’t read at all!) Isaiah 49-55, and 53 in particular, which means you must know what the right reading is.I didn't suggest, I stated that the NT's writers should have really read these passages. Whether out of intended deceit or from their own ignorance, the statement still stands. These are not just mere words one can just pick and choose for the purposes of their own selfish beliefs wants and desires. This is one of the most powerful passages from Isaiah and it easily reflects and consisently reveals the real sentiments of numerous others from within the OT.

So you, thousands of years and miles removed, far removed in terms of culture and worldview, have better read the scroll than the NT writers, 1st century Palestinian Jews steeped in second-Temple Jewish thought and ways? Aren’t these better witnesses (prima facie) to the meaning of the scroll of Isaiah than you are? Why should we think they’ve misread their own sacred writings but you, an outsider in many ways, have read them rightly? Why should we trust you rather than them?Besides being loaded with fallacies, you also make some very brash assumptions. I am not asking anyone to trust me. I am not saying to trust in Isaiah or even the OT. I am just stating that one only needs to really read from the OT or Tanach to understand enough of its consistency towards a central message: sincere and proper acknowledgement, love, obedience, and praise of G-d, while Israel is being used as a beacon for the world to the understanding of this message.

3. Yes. Faith matters. But is this unique to Christianity, as you suggest? Does it all come down to faith, as you say? Or is there more to it than that? Does it matter how faith comes about, upon what and whom it is founded? Faith, most broadly, is simply trust. Who do you trust when it comes to knowing? Can your own experiences and reasoning therefrom be all you need to paint reality fully and rightly? Can any worldview be built in isolation from others? Surely, whether or not we have faith or place our trust is not the question. We all do this of necessity, not just the Christians. Whether or not our trust is well placed is the question.Christianity definitely depends on faith as it is also stated throughout the work.

Some things just stand out more than others and those remain enough as reality. Now reality is constantly expanded and more properly defined as people dare to venture out into the unknowns bringing back reliable information. No one is asking for you to face the same as the more certain. We are encouraged to experiment as a people in order to further our understanding as a whole. Be warned though, because the further one tries to lead off in their own chosen directions, the much more vague, untrustworthy, conflicted, and complicated things can become.

Christians are commended for searching the Scriptures, for reasoning, for living consistently and for thereby attaining a faith so well placed that it amounts to assurance (cf. Heb. 11.1).The NT's book of hebrews is about the largest offender of trying to create rights from wrongs. Here it states its own created idea of faith and one that differs greatly compared to jesus' version.
If Christianity really were about a blind, fideistic, ‘leap out of the lion’s mouth’ type of faith would we bother reasoning with you? Would Paul have reasoned with the Stoics and Epicureans on Mars Hill? What hath Athens to do with Jerusalem? What the foundation hath to do with the house.It is really about blind faith and that is its main strength as it is told in the NT. There is absolutely no way to be certain of the NT's supposed real message because of its own severe internal conflicts and this is even more especially true now as we are all so far removed as you said so about me.

You 'bother with me' or anyone else because your own NT commands you to do so. Even if you should easily know that dealing with me personally is futile, you should also still be very much aware that we are not the only ones on this forum. Whether you realize it or not, you are witnessing for christianity, while I am trying to witness for reason.

What does christianity have to do with Jerusalem? More stumbling blocks for Israel to have to overcome.

Christianity built its house on a foundation of sand.

Classical

May 20, 2005, 07:04 AM

Christianity built its house on a foundation of sand.

Yeah, more like quick sand if you really look at it.

You know this "conversation" with BGic is just further proof that christianity is built really on nothing at all. All of our most intense arguments are ignored. But what else is an educated believer to do? They don't have much choice but to spout off a bunch of names and info out of their meticulously constructed dogma. It's hogwash for all to see.

Just look at the comparison: here is our well thought-out worldview vs. talking snakes, gods slaughtering themselves and blind faith in fables.

What's the deal? Are people really this gullible or is the threat of hellfire just this powerful in blocking common sense and reason?

Christianity in theory collapses at every single turn. Too bad there are so many uneducated people buying into it around the world.

(I'm not trying to be nasty, but honestly, there are so many stupid and superstitious people everywhere that it makes me sick.) :rolleyes:

Good thing there are people like sharon45 witnessing for reason. :notworthy

Have a great day everyone!
Classical

JLK

May 20, 2005, 04:14 PM

what are concepts? If they are just thoughts then as such they reduce to chemical reactions, neither true nor falseThe concepts' referents may be true or false.
Just read a neurology article where the latest technology has allowed the determination that a single special neuron's state always corresponds to the woman recognizing either a line drawing or a laughing image of Bill Clinton. And apparently this special neuron does little else.
OTOH, BGiC favors either:
http://www.consciousentities.com/pictures/homunculus.gif<- homunculi or dualism ->http://www.consciousentities.com/pictures/dualist.gif
BGiC's explanation for Libet's demonstrations of a delay between decision and consciousness of the decision; the split brain commisurotomy experiments of Sperry and others, and the phenomenon of blindsight. etc. will be forthcoming shortly. Or perhaps the last century of neurobiology never happened.
Cartoons are much easier to accept.

John A. Broussard

May 21, 2005, 02:33 AM

Anyway, because of what Christians mean by good, hell is best conceived of as a lack or acute absence of God and His goodness, rather than something substantive as it is often described to be
Since you know about hell, is that where unborn babies--the ones anti-abortionists call "innocent"--go? Or do they go to heaven?

Cross Examiner

May 25, 2005, 09:23 AM

It’s been awhile. Sorry. I’m in and out.

1. You ask in post 255 what I mean by Christianity. No, I don’t mean a particular Christian sect like the Lutherans or a particular doctrine like Biblical inerrancy. I mean what was first believed and practiced by the first Christians. Depending on the context, I may also mean modern mere Christianity; the basics of the faith still believed, practiced and shared today by somewhere between the vast majority to all Christians worldwide. The Nicene (http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/11049a.htm), Athanasian (http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/02033b.htm) and Apostles’ (http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/01629a.htm) creeds contain these basics well enough and will work for our purposes here. But for simplicity’s sake, and if you don’t mind, let’s just work from the Nicene. Does this answer your question?

2. I alluded to the idea that our respective epistemic, metaphysic, axiological, ethical, aesthetic, political etc. starting points could hardly be further apart. That is, I was saying by way of metaphor that our worldviews are on opposite ends of the spectrum (and so this can make dialogue difficult). But you now seem to suggest in post 256 that this is untrue. Do you mean to suggest this, or were you trying to say something else? Are we really on the same side of the fence unawares? Anyway, on to the meat of the matter.

3. In 254 and prior, we were talking about how the belief (a) ‘Jesus arose’ and the belief (b) ‘and so is the Son of God’ compare with and relate to one another historically and logically. That is, I previously countered the idea that belief (b) either did or could come before belief (a). Now you suggest in response to this, in your post 256, that (c) bare belief in God, mere theism, is more important to Christians and Christianity than belief that (a) Jesus arose. I see two problems with this response. First, you’re no longer working with the same set of beliefs. You’re no longer comparing (a) to (b), but (a) to (c). Maybe (c) is more interesting to you than (b). Second, you’re saying entirely different things about the beliefs. For I was saying one belief did and only ever could come before the other but you’re now saying some new belief is more important than another. Together, you’re saying different things about different things. Yikes. I can’t imagine what prompted the change of topics midstream and without warning but in the doing we’re at once provided with an object lesson in irrelevance and a demonstration of the relevance of a thread that aims to highlight the problem of irrelevance. So, thanks. I guess.

4. You want to know if I think child torture is subjectively or objectively wrong? Do I say the act is objectively wrong? In a word, yes. Why? Let me frame the issue again with a minor bit of discursive. If you or I only happen to dislike child torture and nothing more, then we may say it is simply and only a subjective wrong. If instead it is wrong no matter what you or I dislike, then we may rightly call it an objective wrong. This is what the words mean. We see the first understanding makes the act wrong as a matter of weak, subjective fact, while the second as a matter of strong, objective fact. It is probably plain to see how something is subjectively true but how is an act wrong in an objective sense? What is an act in wrong relation to if not one’s opinion of the act? Is there a law or standard above human opinion? I believe there is and that this law forbids us to deliberately cause harm to innocents for our own amusement and the like (e.g., child torture). I believe this law is written on the hearts of men (though it can be ignored, damaged etc.) such that we intuitively know child torture is wrong in the strong, objective sense of the word. I should add that any view that would reduce what we know to be the case to merely what some happen to feel at the present rightly deserves its place in history’s dustbin of bad ideas.

5. About that prescriptive thesis. You want to know if ‘intersubjective’ (i.e., group) agreement can make a value like ‘child torture is wrong’ both true and binding? How could it? Isn’t this just largest-group-morality or majority morality at best? And what if the largest group or the majority is mistaken? What if two groups disagree over the truth of a value, which is right? Even if group agreement did make values true and false, could the group’s true values be binding upon the individual? If the group agreed that it is true that child torture is good, and this made it true, would you then have a moral duty to do it? What if the group said killing Jews was good, would that make it so? Would you really be obliged to take part? If you say it is the agreement that makes the value binding, mustn’t you presuppose the true and binding nature of agreement? But what then would make agreement itself a true and binding value? More agreement, or something even more shadowy? Anyway, we’ve many more such problems to raise but suffice it to say this ‘intersubjective’ or, as I prefer to call it, this consensus view of morality will no doubt create far more questions than answers. So with fair warning given, do you want to proceed to defend the idea or drop it?

6. My moral realism is ‘absurd’? How so? You don’t say. You do say, however, that there are moral beliefs but that either none are true in fact or, at least, none can be known as such. I certainly agree that there are moral beliefs but disagree that none can be known true. I say that some are known true. And don’t our intuitions tell us that there are these known, objective moral truths? Don’t we know real right and wrong when we see it? Or are we fooled by illusion? Don’t we know, for example, that child torture, the Holocaust, and the Stalinist purges are unjustifiable, objectively real moral wrongs, no matter how the torturers, Nazis and Communists may protest? No matter what some philosophers say about moral language and the like? Would you really say with these that such atrocities are only believed to be wrong, and not truly, objectively and universally wrong? Yes? Then which view again is the absurd one?

7. No, I do not need these moral facts in my world. It is not that I want them to be in the world that I think they are in the world. It is, in part, what I see in the world that leads me to believe they are a real part of it. I see that this world is not only fact-laden but value-laden as well. I see that men know torturing children for fun is flatly immoral. I see that they codify many and such other intuitions as public statute. I see them instinctively recoil in horror at the sight of prison camps and mass graves. I see that they will move worlds to preserve the basic rights of the human person, as a being inherently deserving of dignity and justly judged as having great intrinsic worth. Etc. These and other such things speak to me, again, of a law written on the heart that proclaims the human being to be more than mere blood and dust, as the Nazis said. Atheism likewise makes only matter out of men -- and this entirely against our true thoughts on the matter. For if all we are is matter, then do we really have inherent worth, value, dignity or rights as the humanists say? If all we are is matter, then how did we ever get the notion we are more than this? As with our view of the meaning of life, our view of man is tied tightly to our thoughts on ethics such that if you deny the knowable moral fact, you also deny human rights and the very basis for law and order (and vice versa). Down goes morality into opinion. Down goes man into matter. Down goes civilization into dust.

8. Later on you say my question ‘is child torture wrong?’ is as incoherent as is the question ‘is 5 wrong?’. Granted, the second question, your parody of mine, is indeed incoherent because I admit the number 5 has no moral value (i.e., it is amoral). But does a child likewise have no moral value, as you seem to suggest? If a child has no moral value, then, yes, the first question, my question, is indeed incoherent. But if a child has moral value, then, no, the question is not incoherent. To that I say a child (or any human person), unlike the number 5, does have moral value; what do you say? If a child has no moral value, then is there any real, true and binding value anywhere at all? I take it from your comparison of the number 5 to a child you mean to say there is no value anywhere, neither in numbers nor in persons, that the world is a place of brute fact with no real value, that at the root this is an amoral world. OK. So you’re a moral anti-realist of some sort then. But if so, why did you suggest earlier that consensus morality could make values true and binding? One of your views says value is illusory, the other says the agreement of groups make values real and binding. Which is it? The two views you advance are not compatible with one another so which did you want to go with? We need something firm and stationary to take aim at.

9. You asked me earlier if it is objectively wrong to torture children. Now you turn the question to God. Is it wrong for God to torture children? Well, if by torture we mean one causing pain to another for one’s own pleasure and the like, then, yes, it would be wrong for God to torture anyone, whatever their stage of biological development. But since God is not under the moral law, this act would not be wrong in the same sense of the word that I discuss above. Rather, it would be wrong as disagreement with His purposes and person, which the moral law is a reflection of. A minor nuance. We can talk about it some more if you like.

10. So the universe needs less explanation than God because it does not claim to be an intelligent, active entity? What does that mean? Whatever it means, it doesn’t even sound like answer to the questions I asked you. Maybe you didn’t see them? No matter. I can just ask them again. Does God need an explanation as much as the universe does? Well, if both were self-existent and eternal then I’d agree. Or if both were contingently existent (i.e., their existence is caused by something else) and finite then I’d agree. But what if one were self-existent and eternal while the other contingently existent and finite; wouldn’t only one of these need explaining in this case? You see where I’m going. So I wonder: is the universe self-existent and eternal? What does reason say? What does the evidence say? What do you say?

10. You tell me a concept (e.g., an idea) is the product or result of the thought, the chemical reaction. You say the concept is not identical to the reaction and it is the concept and not the reaction that is either true or false. Fair enough. So this concept, this thing that is not the same thing as the reaction that creates it, this thing that may be true or false, where is it? If it is real and all that is real is matter and matter is spatial, then where are these concepts? You can locate chemical reactions no doubt, but can you locate concepts, or are these immaterial? I take you to mean that concepts are real and not the same thing as the reactions that produce them but can something be real and not exist anywhere? See the problem? I don’t think you’ve dealt with it, I think you’ve only pushed it back a step.

11. Lastly, you say purpose with a capital P, Purpose, a real, universal objective purpose to life is actually compatible with atheism. Is it? You don’t say how. I will point out that the one you call the better thinker disagrees with you; he says Purpose is incompatible with atheism. But all that’s neither here nor there. What I want to know is, which of you do you say is right and, more importantly, why? On to post 257.

12. So you can give yourself purposes? Great. But why tell me? I said we could do this much whether or not God exists. The question I asked is if atheism is compatible with a Purpose or Meaning of Life, not purposes or meanings. But as just mentioned, you do say atheism is not compatible with Purpose. But more to the point, do you think that Purposelessness is what drives your ethical view? Or do you think the two detached from one another?

13. Is it wrong of God to flood the earth? Is it wrong of God to have Israel destroy Amalek? Is it wrong for God to take the lives of Egyptian children? These and others like them are what I call questions for Biblical morality, and they get asked here all the time. It’s like a mantra. But the question at the heart of each of these is, is it wrong for God to take human life? That is what is happening in each of the stories and is what I think folks here bristle at the thought of. But are our lives our own? If God is our creator, then clearly our lives are not own, they are on loan and the loan may be recalled at a moment’s notice with or without our say-so. But if He is not our creator, then in what sense would it be wrong of God or anyone else to take life? What would this supposed wrongdoing be wrong in relation to? My opinion of what is right? Yours? Something else? See the problem? Whether or not God is our creator, can we have a real right to life? I don’t see how and so these questions for Biblical morality (which depend upon a right to our own lives) seem to go nowhere fast.

14. Is it morally wrong to sacrifice a rook for a knight? I’d say that this like the question about the number 5 is an amoral matter. I understand anti-realists paint all the world in amoral strokes such that everything from board games to numbers to the well-being of children are amoral matters that humans may or may not choose to attach moral value to. I agree that some things are amoral but dissent from the idea that all things are really amoral at the bottom. Let me get to the point. Are you an anti-realist? Are you saying by this rook-for-knight question that child torture is an amoral matter?

15. If, as an atheist might say, matter-energy in motion is what is ultimately real then, yes, it stands to reason that not only entities, things of matter, but activities, entities in motion, are real. Matter and motion are real. Right. Stuff composed of matter (i.e., an entity) can move (i.e. an activity). Water can boil. Kids can play ball. Etc. And so you say a thought is not an entity but an activity that an entity does; it is what the entity ‘brain’ makes or does as it’s activity. Fair enough. But the problem remains, doesn’t it? Propositions can be true or false, surely, but if propositions reflect thoughts which reduce to chemical reactions that brains make or do which reduce further and ultimately to matter, motion, and/or matter in motion, none of which are true or false, then, no, propositions likewise can be neither true nor false. And so without true propositions in the picture, the proposition ‘atheism is true’ cannot be true, can it? If that weren’t enough, there’s still the mind/body problem and the problem of knowing that loom out there untouched in the distance. But all that is a lot to digest before breakfast so back to the problem of truth for the time being.

Here’s the thing. We have matter. We have motion. We have matter in motion. Everything that is real must come down to one or a combo of these things. These things are not true or false themselves; matter is not true and false, motion is not true and false, yet if this is all there is then this is the stuff our propositions must be made of. So we may add a layer (i.e., motion/activity) to this, our materialist metaphysic, but that layer doesn’t solve the problem of where truth comes from for how is it that our basic parts (i.e. motion/activity, matter/entity) are neither true nor false yet the whole (i.e. thought/concept/idea/mental image) is? Where in the process of building up from the ground floor do these propositions acquire the ability to be either true or false? Do we say that this truth-bearing property emerges from a certain material conjunction as the boiling property emerges from a certain conjunction of hydrogen and oxygen? But this emergent property, if we say it is real, must itself reduce to matter, motion, or matter in motion and so we’re back to the original problem. Maybe instead we mean to say that true/false is a relationship between the thought/image/idea/concept (which reduces to matter, motion and/or matter in motion) to what is real. But, again, what is this relationship? If we say it is real then it too must reduce to our non-truth-bearing entities and activities. So how do we escape this vicious ‘there is no spoon’ reductionism? This is what I’d like to discuss with you, if you don’t mind.

That’s enough for now.

Sultanist

May 25, 2005, 10:14 AM

"Child torture"?

Treat others as you would have them treat you.

"Is there a purpose in life"?

Treat others as you would have them treat you.

That also is enough for now.

Wallener

May 25, 2005, 10:39 AM

I mean what was first believed and practiced by the first Christians.

You mean keeping Kosher, like the Apostles?

John A. Broussard

May 25, 2005, 12:00 PM

To: Billy Graham is cool

You state that: "God is not under the moral law"

Please explain. I take it you mean that whatever god does is OK. That this is the best of all possible worlds. That we can't measure god by a human yardstick. That we should just accept whatever god does to us. That suffereing is really good. That there is no evil in the world, that it just looks that way. That..

Sorry. I was answering my own question. I'd rather have you answer it.

Thanks.

Angrillori

May 25, 2005, 01:04 PM

[FONT=Arial]4. You want to know if I think child torture is subjectively or objectively wrong? Do I say the act is objectively wrong? In a word, yes.But that's not true Billy. You've agreed that for a certain class of subjects child torture is not wrong--those ordered by god to do it, or when god is the subject. The fact that there is a class of subjects for whom the act is not wrong, means the wrongness is not inherent to the act itself, but to the subject. That, my friend, is the very definition of subjective.
We see the first understanding makes the act wrong as a matter of weak, subjective fact, while the second as a matter of strong, objective fact. It's interesting that you insert your subjective opinion into the strength of these truths. It's like saying an apple is stronger than an orange. WTF sense does that make? A subjective truth is no weaker than an objective truth. Despite your desiree to use loaded language to the contrary. It is probably plain to see how something is subjectively true but how is an act wrong in an objective sense? What is an act in wrong relation to if not one’s opinion of the act? Is there a law or standard above human opinion? Great question, let's see how you answer. I believe there is and that this law forbids us to deliberately cause harm to innocents for our own amusement and the like (e.g., child torture). Oh. Just because you think so. That's not a good argument! I believe this law is written on the hearts of men (though it can be ignored, damaged etc.) such that we intuitively know child torture is wrong in the strong, objective sense of the word. I should add that any view that would reduce what we know to be the case to merely what some happen to feel at the present rightly deserves its place in history’s dustbin of bad ideas. Hmm, do you think the argument 'because BGiC thinks so' is compelling? You don't do well with the Joshua challenge, do you? What exactly do we 'know to be the case'? That some people believe certain things about certain acts? Uhm, that's kind of what subjective means BGiC.

5. About that prescriptive thesis. You want to know if ‘intersubjective’ (i.e., group) agreement can make a value like ‘child torture is wrong’ both true and binding? How could it? How do laws work? You're really asking that? Aren't you like studying to be a lawyer? Isn’t this just largest-group-morality or majority morality at best? And what if the largest group or the majority is mistaken? What if two groups disagree over the truth of a value, which is right? Let's look at what happens in real life, shall we. When two groups disagree, how do we decide who is right? #1) By siding with the group that agrees with us.

Well, that was easy. And didn't even appeal to an objective source.

How do the two groups decide who's right? They conflict. verbally, politically, physically. Afterwards, if one side changed their belief, then they both agree that the new belief was right. If neither side did, then they both go on believing they were both right. And at the end of the day, we, as judges, decide who was right based on which one more closely agrees with our personal stand.
Factually:
How do the two groups decide who's right? Conflict.
How do we decide who's right? Whoever agrees with us.

Even if group agreement did make values true and false, could the group’s true values be binding upon the individual? That obviously depends on what the individual agreed to. If the group agreed that it is true that child torture is good, and this made it true, would you then have a moral duty to do it? Depends on what you agreed to. What if the group said killing Jews was good, would that make it so? What if a group agreed that 12:30 tasted sweet. Would that make it so? Figure out why that is a meaningless question, and you'll know why yours is too.
Would you really be obliged to take part? Depends what you agreed to. If you say it is the agreement that makes the value binding, mustn’t you presuppose the true and binding nature of agreement? Actually, that's kind of the definition of an agreement. When we agree on something, we, well, agree on it. If a bunch of us decide to form a social group, and one of the rules we agree to is that, for the good of the group we'll prevent child torture by members, then, well, we agreed to that. But what then would make agreement itself a true and binding value? You're using 'value' inappropriately here. More agreement, or something even more shadowy? I repeat, look up the definition of agreement. Then think about it.
Anyway, we’ve many more such problems to raise but suffice it to say this ‘intersubjective’ or, as I prefer to call it, this consensus view of morality If you called it that, you'd be wrong, you know. will no doubt create far more questions than answers. So with fair warning given, do you want to proceed to defend the idea or drop it? No one's going to defend your strawman version BGiC, if that's what you're asking. Which isn't to say that intersubjective social agreements aren't a key aspect of human interaction that you're ignoring.

6. My moral realism is ‘absurd’? How so? You don’t say. You do say, however, that there are moral beliefs but that either none are true in fact or, at least, none can be known as such. Subjectively true is not equal to false. Say that a billion times BGiC. I don't expect to hear you repeat that falsehood again. I certainly agree that there are moral beliefs but disagree that none can be known true. I say that some are known true. So does everyone, remember subjectively true=true. It equals subjectively true. And don’t our intuitions tell us that there are these known, objective moral truths? Don’t we know real right and wrong when we see it? Don't we believe certain things to be right and wrong when we see them? Or are we fooled by illusion? Don’t we know, for example, that child torture, the Holocaust, and the Stalinist purges are unjustifiable, objectively real moral wrongs, no matter how the torturers, Nazis and Communists may protest? Funny thing though. If BGiC had been born in Germany around 1930 or so, and had an Internet existed, he would be right here talking about how objectively moral it is to kill all Jews. How immoral it is to suffer a Jew to live. If he had been in Joshua's army, and had there been in Internet, he'd be telling us how objectively moral it was to force a child to watch as his mother, father, brother and sisters were slain by him. Were he ordered by god to torture a baby, he'd be heating the irons with a grin on his face. Yet he has the audacity to claim that these acts are somehow intrinsically evil. Absurd.
No matter what some philosophers say about moral language and the like? Would you really say with these that such atrocities are only believed to be wrong, and not truly, objectively and universally wrong? Yes? Then which view again is the absurd one? But they are only believed to be wrong. If I didn't exist, I wouldn't believe them to be wrong. If no judgers existed, there would be no judgement. BGiC, as long as an act must be judged wrong or right, then there needs be a judge. If there needs to be a judge, (a subject) then they're subjective.

7. No, I do not need these moral facts in my world. It is not that I want them to be in the world that I think they are in the world. Oh, BGiC thinks. Wel that seals the deal! Oh wait. No it doesn't. It is, in part, what I see in the world that leads me to believe they are a real part of it. I see that this world is not only fact-laden but value-laden as well. I see that men know torturing children for fun is flatly immoral. Some men. Even you don't think so, since for certain classes of subjects you agree that it wouldn't be. When god did it. When god ordered it. Therefore it is not flatly immoral, as an act, but it is subject dependent. I see that they codify many and such other intuitions as public statute. I see them instinctively recoil in horror at the sight of prison camps and mass graves. Who made those prison camps and mass graves? I see that they will move worlds to preserve the basic rights of the human person, as a being inherently deserving of dignity and justly judged as having great intrinsic worth. Who's stealing the rights of individuals? Etc. Yes, etc. These and other such things speak to me, again, of a law written on the heart that proclaims the human being to be more than mere blood and dust, as the Nazis said. Learning from Nazi's eh BGiC? Well, they thought god was with them too. Of course, I mixed a bunch of dust and blood together once. Nothing much happened. Just kind of sat there. Looks like people are a bit different than that then. Atheism likewise makes only matter out of men -- and this entirely against our true thoughts on the matter. For if all we are is matter, then do we really have inherent worth, value, dignity or rights as the humanists say? If all water is is H2O molecules, then how in the world is it wet? If all a car is is metal and rubber and plastic, how does it drive? If all we are is matter, then how did we ever get the notion we are more than this? If all water is is H20 molecules, how did it get so wet? As with our view of the meaning of life, our view of man is tied tightly to our thoughts on ethics such that if you deny the knowable moral fact, you also deny human rights and the very basis for law and order (and vice versa). Down goes morality into opinion. Down goes man into matter. Down goes civilization into dust. Wait a minute, half you theists say that atheism raises man to a god like state. Now you're saying it drives us down?

How about this:
Man is the ultimate arbiter of morality. Man is raised from mere dirt to the level of the ultimate source of our own survival on this planet. If it is to be, it's up to me. Man is no longer lowered to the level of a deity's plaything. Man is now suprememly in control of his own destiny. To live as we see fit. And, as Carnegie said: The more I helped other people get what they wanted, the more I got what I wanted. Reciprocity! Wow! Monkeys act fairly. Vampire bats share their very life blood. Atheism gives a regality to humanity you just can't find in xianity.

Xianity? Down goes morality into the whims of a dictator. Down goes man into a plaything of a dictator. Down goes civilization into dust. Look! Two can play the loaded pontification game!

8. Later on you say my question ‘is child torture wrong?’ is as incoherent as is the question ‘is 5 wrong?’. Granted, the second question, your parody of mine, is indeed incoherent because I admit the number 5 has no moral value (i.e., it is amoral). But does a child likewise have no moral value, Dorothy, the lion, and the tinman were walking down the yellow brick road. Who was missing?

The strawman.

Your restatement would only be true if 5 mapped to child. It doesn't. It maps to an act. Child torture.

(BTW, should I be giving you the christian head-smack you promised, since you didn't answer with a 'yes' or 'no'?)

as you seem to suggest? If a child has no moral value, then, yes, the first question, my question, is indeed incoherent. But if a child has moral value, then, no, the question is not incoherent. To that I say a child (or any human person), unlike the number 5, does have moral value; what do you say? I say irrelevant. I say the act 'child torture' is merely an act, and outside a judge (a subject) it is incoherent to label the act one thing or another. However, present a judge, (a subject) and you can. That however, makes it subjective. Not objective. Is eating ice cream wrong or right? Is wearing poly-blend clothes? Eating shellfish? Outside a subject to decide, based on that subject's beliefs, the questions are incoherent.

So, save your straw for a mattress BGiC.

If a child has no moral value, then is there any real, true and binding value anywhere at all? I take it from your comparison of the number 5 to a child you mean to say there is no value anywhere, neither in numbers nor in persons, that the world is a place of brute fact with no real value, that at the root this is an amoral world. OK. So you’re a moral anti-realist of some sort then. But if so, why did you suggest earlier that consensus morality could make values true and binding? Subjectively true is not equal to false. Have you finished saying it a billion times yet?
One of your views says value is illusory, the other says the agreement of groups make values real and binding. Which is it? The two views you advance are not compatible with one another so which did you want to go with? We need something firm and stationary to take aim at.
You don't have a crow problem where you live, do you?
People (subjects) assign value to things. Groups can agree that certain things have value. At these times, these things have value. To the individual, and to the group. A gold coin has value. To me. But not to the guy in the middle of the desert dying of dehydration. The fact that it doesn't have objective value does not make it value-less.

The moment you stop equivocating subjectivity and objectivity things might make more sense BGiC.

9. You asked me earlier if it is objectively wrong to torture children. Now you turn the question to God. Is it wrong for God to torture children? Well, if by torture we mean one causing pain to another for one’s own pleasure and the like, then, yes, it would be wrong for God to torture anyone, whatever their stage of biological development. But since God is not under the moral law, this act would not be wrong in the same sense of the word that I discuss above. Rather, it would be wrong as disagreement with His purposes and person, which the moral law is a reflection of. A minor nuance. We can talk about it some more if you like. So the wrongness is not inherent to the act, but to the subject committing the act. So we agree? 'Child torture' is not objectively wrong. Just subjectively wrong for certain classes of subjects. Ok. Pack your bags and git then BGiC, you've conceded defeat. Ungraciously, but nonetheless you have.

10. So the universe needs less explanation than God because it does not claim to be an intelligent, active entity? What does that mean? Whatever it means, it doesn’t even sound like answer to the questions I asked you. Maybe you didn’t see them? No matter. I can just ask them again. Does God need an explanation as much as the universe does? Well, if both were self-existent and eternal then I’d agree. Or if both were contingently existent (i.e., their existence is caused by something else) and finite then I’d agree. But what if one were self-existent and eternal while the other contingently existent and finite; wouldn’t only one of these need explaining in this case? You see where I’m going. So I wonder: is the universe self-existent and eternal? What does reason say? What does the evidence say? What do you say? Is god? Oh wait. You'd have to demonstrate god exists in order for it to have any traits at all. A non-existant thing has no traits at all. What does the evidence say? Oh wait, the evidence points to the xian god's non-existence. I love it when xians try to appeal to evidence!

10. You tell me a concept (e.g., an idea) is the product or result of the thought, the chemical reaction. You say the concept is not identical to the reaction and it is the concept and not the reaction that is either true or false. Fair enough. So this concept, this thing that is not the same thing as the reaction that creates it, this thing that may be true or false, where is it? If it is real and all that is real is matter and matter is spatial, then where are these concepts? You can locate chemical reactions no doubt, but can you locate concepts, or are these immaterial? I take you to mean that concepts are real and not the same thing as the reactions that produce them but can something be real and not exist anywhere? See the problem? I don’t think you’ve dealt with it, I think you’ve only pushed it back a step. Your failure to understand the reification fallacy is not a problem of mine.

11. Lastly, you say purpose with a capital P, Purpose, a real, universal objective purpose to life is actually compatible with atheism. Is it? You don’t say how. I will point out that the one you call the better thinker disagrees with you; he says Purpose is incompatible with atheism. But all that’s neither here nor there. What I want to know is, which of you do you say is right and, more importantly, why? On to post 257. Have I assigned a purpose to my life? Well, looks to me like there's a purpose then. Your failure to adhere to the eglish capitalization rules is also not my problem.

12. So you can give yourself purposes? Great. But why tell me? I said we could do this much whether or not God exists. The question I asked is if atheism is compatible with a Purpose or Meaning of Life, not purposes or meanings. But as just mentioned, you do say atheism is not compatible with Purpose. But more to the point, do you think that Purposelessness is what drives your ethical view? Or do you think the two detached from one another?Methinks you're missing the point, li'l buddy. You've failed to show that there is a universal purpose for life, or that there is a universal meaning of life. Our ethical views are driven by many things. Remember evolution, introspection, culture and history? Please tell me we don't have to go through what has driven our ethical views again. That'd be like the 80th time.

13. Is it wrong of God to flood the earth? Is genocide objectively wrong? Is it wrong of God to have Israel destroy Amalek? Is genocide objectively wrong? Is it wrong for God to take the lives of Egyptian children? Is killing a baby objectively wrong? These and others like them are what I call questions for Biblical morality, and they get asked here all the time. It’s like a mantra. But the question at the heart of each of these is, is it wrong for God to take human life? Nope. Not at all. That's another strawman. Where do you get so much stuffing? The question is whether these acts are objectively wrong, or just wrong for a specific class of subjects.
That is what is happening in each of the stories and is what I think folks here bristle at the thought of. But are our lives our own? If God is our creator, then clearly our lives are not own, they are on loan and the loan may be recalled at a moment’s notice with or without our say-so. How does this follow? Creating life gives you a responsibility to it, not a right to destroy it. As the teen said: I didn't ask to be born! God accepted an obligation in creating us. The creator has obligations to his creation, not rights over it. Our children are not our slaves. Are not ours to abuse, molest, or even put into early labor. They are ours to teach and care for, not to kill. Bringing life into this world carries great responsibilities. Not the right to destroy it. This 'I brought you into the world so I'm in my rights to take you out' logic alone is a reason xianity is absurd.

But if He is not our creator, then in what sense would it be wrong of God or anyone else to take life? What would this supposed wrongdoing be wrong in relation to? My opinion of what is right? Yup. Yours?Yup. Something else?Yup. See the problem? Nope. Whether or not God is our creator, can we have a real right to life? Only that right we agree to give each other. That's kind of why governments were formed, early on--to help a bunch of people defend themselves from others who wanted to take things they personally and subjectively valued. I value my life=> I'll do things to protect it. If I find a bunch of people who also value their lives, and we agree to do certain things to protect each others' lives, then guess what? We've just intersubjectively agreed to a value, and agreed to a ruler/metric we can use to evaluate different actions--their usefulness in protecting our lives!
I don’t see how and so these questions for Biblical morality (which depend upon a right to our own lives) seem to go nowhere fast.Outside of highlighting the fact that you agree that certain actions are NOT inherently objectively wrong, they're just wrong for certain groups of subjects.

14. Is it morally wrong to sacrifice a rook for a knight? I’d say that this like the question about the number 5 is an amoral matter.Then I'd say you didn't think very hard about it.

That's all for now.

RGD

May 25, 2005, 01:22 PM

OP: Are we wasting our time here?

Translation: are we wasting our time trying to get BGIC to coherently respond to any questions?

Answer: yup

John A. Broussard

May 25, 2005, 01:29 PM

I don’t see how and so these questions for Biblical morality (which depend upon a right to our own lives) seem to go nowhere fast.

I fully agree.

Biblical morality has absolutely nothing to do with our lives. It's little more than a gory drama.

Now, if you will agree that you are not basing anything on biblical morality, maybe we can move on to more important matters.

However, if you keep justifying god's actions in the scriptures, then continuing questions about biblical morality are not only inevitable, but absolutely essential in a discussion such as this.

So? Do you want to talk about biblical morality or not?

John A. Broussard

May 25, 2005, 01:32 PM

OP: Are we wasting our time here?

Translation: are we wasting our time trying to get BGIC to coherently respond to any questions?

Answer: yup

Sure, but we could be doing worse things--like building hydrogen bombs. And, who knows, the time BGIC spends here is probably keeping him from similar activities.

RGD

May 25, 2005, 02:04 PM

Sure, but we could be doing worse things--like building hydrogen bombs. And, who knows, the time BGIC spends here is probably keeping him from similar activities. Oh, I wasn't necessarily complaining - wasting time can be extremely enjoyable.... I just wanted to be clear that I expect no actual answers from BGIC - based on his track record.

Angrillori

May 25, 2005, 02:42 PM

We do have BGiC though, finally, admitting that the act of child torture is not inherently wrong--that the wrongness depends on who does it and why.

Now all we have to do is keep reminding him that morality dependent on subject is subjective, and his morality is dependent on subject.

I look forward to his obfuscation on that.

Wads4

May 25, 2005, 03:28 PM

Oh yeah, validity before soundness …

Would you disagree that our talks here tend to generate more heat than light? I don't mean to come off as overly cynical but this place presents a problem to my eyes that I'd like to point out for yours. In the darker moments, this all looks to me to be an exercise in futility -- an endless parade of punch and parry with no end in sight, no real progress to be made. Do you ever tire of this? A thousand thousands of words; some angry, others mild, some foolish, others insightful, yet hardly a soul moved to one side or the other. I wonder: are we really so stagnant in our ways, so set in our views or is something else going on? Given that we are each reasonable and honest, charitably, I'll go with the latter. So let me then call out the real problem as I see it: we tend skip some important steps that meaningful dialogue depends upon. That is, we'll look at an argument and rush to the question of merit without duly considering the more basic questions of clarity, relevance and significance.

I hope this doesn't look like finger wagging since I'm probably the worst offender. Really. Mea culpa. And I mean by this to emphasize the 'me' in the 'we' in the rebuke above. In fact, it is my own historical penchant for skipping steps that prompts this tirade. In the past, when someone posed an objection to something I said I would often respond directly, without question as though I understood what the objector meant with perfect clarity only to find out later, after some wasted time and effort, that I had missed the point from the start. Or maybe I would understand the meaning of the objection well enough but in my eagerness to reply, would wrongly assume it relevant to and significant for my own position, thereby driving both of us off the highway and down a rabbit trail. I'm pretty sure others have tried to clue me in about this habit, but how does the saying go about teaching pigs to whistle?

And this brings me to my point. No, I don't really think we're doomed to forever talking past one another without hope of understanding, much less agreement. I think our talks need not be a waste of time at all; it simply comes down to breaking bad dialogue habits and replacing them with good ones, like practicing a right order of operations. Sounds easy enough, doesn't it? Except that old habits die hard. If I'm going to make a new habit out of this due process thing, this right order of operations, I'll need some practice. And that's where you come in. Here I'd like to propose that you, the unbeliever, first offer up your chief objection to Christianity. Yes, just one to start with so make it your favorite. Put your best foot forward. This might require a bit of introspection on your part. Once I get a few good ones to choose from, I'll then ask the objectors a few questions in order to make sure everything is clear, relevant and non-trivial. After these matters are settled, we can perhaps move on to the question of merit. That said, fire when ready.

I have a hugh list, but you asked for only one,-so I will mention the first one chronologically; For entirely religious, not medical reasons, I was circumcised as a baby (the usual time). This I regard as grievous bodily harm, an assault, and a personal affront, done when I was unable to either choose or object. It may have affected my sex life,- and as a man and a Doctor, I consider it probably has, since I have always had (suffered?) delayed ejaculation. The prepuce is a natural feature. Its removal may sometimes be necessary as a result of balanitis possibly aggravated by living in a sandy environment, as in Egypt ( the Egyptians invented it) or Israel, but not in suburban England. I consider I was set upon by priests and Rabbis for theological reasons. How's that just for starters?

Tom Sawyer

May 25, 2005, 03:47 PM

I have a hugh list, but you asked for only one,-so I will mention the first one chronologically; For entirely religious, not medical reasons, I was circumcised as a baby (the usual time). This I regard as grievous bodily harm, an assault, and a personal affront, done when I was unable to either choose or object. It may have affected my sex life,- and as a man and a Doctor, I consider it probably has, since I have always had (suffered?) delayed ejaculation. The prepuce is a natural feature. Its removal may sometimes be necessary as a result of balanitis possibly aggravated by living in a sandy environment, as in Egypt ( the Egyptians invented it) or Israel, but not in suburban England. I consider I was set upon by priests and Rabbis for theological reasons. How's that just for starters?

Well, how about all the countless millions of people who've had circumcisions and not had their sex lives affected? Which, according to what you said, probably includes you. I don't like arguing on the side of the Xians, but this seems like a bit of a silly argument. :huh:

Hobbs

May 25, 2005, 05:24 PM

do you think that Purposelessness is what drives your ethical view?
Of course not.

Or do you think the two detached from one another?
Of course.

Is it the case that there are things we can do that enhance our chances of living longer, healthier, happier lives? And things we can do that impede our chances of living good lives? Is it the case that our actions affect others as well as ourselves? Why would we need anything else to come up with a system of morality, i.e. guidelines to how to live good human lives, other than looking at how in fact we are able to live good human lives? We may disagree on what sorts of actions benefit or harm us and the society on which we all depend for our own well-being, we may even disagree in some cases on what specifically constitutes benefit or harm, but that does nothing to change the fact that there are things that really do benefit or harm us and that our actions really can result in beneficial or harmful consequences.

Is it wrong of God to flood the earth? Is it wrong of God to have Israel destroy Amalek? Is it wrong for God to take the lives of Egyptian children? These and others like them are what I call questions for Biblical morality, and they get asked here all the time. It’s like a mantra.
Or, like a point that many theists don't want to have to deal with and so they keep avoiding the issue, so we have to keep bringing it up.

So I'll ask again: Was it wrong for God to flood the earth and kill almost all the animals and also lots of baby humans? Was it wrong for God to order his people to kill all the Amalekites, including their infants, because their ancestors had done something to piss him off a few hundred years ealier? Was it wrong for God to take the lives of Egyptian children?

I suppose I should add: Please respond to these simple, clear questions with simple, direct answers. No sidestepping the issue by asking rhetorical questions about God's power or sovereignty.

But the question at the heart of each of these is, is it wrong for God to take human life? That is what is happening in each of the stories and is what I think folks here bristle at the thought of. But are our lives our own? If God is our creator, then clearly our lives are not own, they are on loan and the loan may be recalled at a moment’s notice with or without our say-so.
This, "might makes right," is the sort of "morality" (and I use that term very loosely) you get from God and Purpose?! Well then, I'm sure glad there isn't a god.

If morality and the bases for making and critiquing moral judgments are real, and I think they are (after all, as I pointed out above, what we do has real consequences for our lives, and our lives really can be more or less long, healthy, and happy), then it transcends individual persons (since our actions affect not only ourselves but also others and the society of which we are inescapably a part), including any personal gods that may exist.

But if He is not our creator, then in what sense would it be wrong of God or anyone else to take life?
Is "might makes right" (or, God's arbitrary whims, which seems to me to amount to pretty much the same thing) the only possible basis you think there is for morality? Does God have any basis at all for his moral judgments and actions? Does he have any reasons for doing some things and not others, and for giving us the commands he gives us? If so, what are those reasons, and why can't we just bypass God and appeal to them to make our own moral judgments? If not, then what, besides his superior power, makes his arbitrary preferences any better than ours?

What would this supposed wrongdoing be wrong in relation to? My opinion of what is right? Yours? Something else?
Something else. Right- and wrongdoing is judged in relation to the sorts of creatures we are (whether God created us this way or we evolved to be this way) and what sorts of things contribute to better or worse (e.g. more or less long, healthy, happy, etc) lives.

See the problem? Whether or not God is our creator, can we have a real right to life? I don’t see how and so these questions for Biblical morality (which depend upon a right to our own lives) seem to go nowhere fast.
See the solution? It's not based on any alleged "right" to life. It's based on what sorts of creatures we happen to be and what sorts of things in fact benefit or harm us.

14. Is it morally wrong to sacrifice a rook for a knight? I’d say that this like the question about the number 5 is an amoral matter.
Oh, come on. Did you really miss my point here? Do you really think I asked whether it was morally wrong to sacrifice a rook for a knight? I did clearly say that "I'm not equating torturing a child with sacrificing a rook for a knight," and then went on to explain that "I'm pointing out the difficulty of answering a question if the questioner refuses to listen to points the answerer thinks are necessary for understanding the answer."

I'll try again to explain what my analogy was attempting to point out. You asked whether torturing children was wrong, and then said that you wanted a clear, simple answer and didn't want to hear anything about evolution or culture. My point was that if someone thinks that a clear and simple answer to that question requires appealing to evolution or culture, then your question can't be answered.

Maybe if I try another analogy. What if I asked you why I had to submit to Jesus as my lord and invite his holy spirit into my heart, but I want just a clear and simple answer to that question, I don't want to hear any blather about sin and attonement and death and resurrection. Or, tell us whether it is wrong for God to kill infants, but don't drone on and on about God's alleged sovereignty. You see what placing those sorts of restrictions on the sort of answers you will accept can do to a conversation, and to understanding what others think? We'll end up just wasting our time here.

I understand anti-realists paint all the world in amoral strokes such that everything from board games to numbers to the well-being of children are amoral matters that humans may or may not choose to attach moral value to. I agree that some things are amoral but dissent from the idea that all things are really amoral at the bottom. Let me get to the point. Are you an anti-realist? Are you saying by this rook-for-knight question that child torture is an amoral matter?
Since I clearly said in my previous post that "I'm not equating torturing a child with sacrificing a rook for a knight," the answer to your last question here should have been obvious already. As for being an anti-realist, it should be obvious from what I say above about the fact that humans really are certain sorts of creatures and that some things really do contribute to or detract from living lives that really are longer, healthier, and happier, lives really can be better or worse, that I am not an anti-realist.

Now, you tell me, are you really an amoralist? Do you think it is all just a matter of God's sovereignty, i.e. of "might makes right"?

I'm out of time now, I'll try to get back later to respond to the rest of your response to me.

Hobbs

May 25, 2005, 10:06 PM

15. ... And so you say a thought is not an entity but an activity that an entity does; it is what the entity ‘brain’ makes or does as it’s activity. Fair enough. But the problem remains, doesn’t it? Propositions can be true or false, surely, but if propositions reflect thoughts which reduce to chemical reactions that brains make or do which reduce further and ultimately to matter, motion, and/or matter in motion, none of which are true or false, then, no, propositions likewise can be neither true nor false. ...
Water reduces to hydrogen and oxygen atoms, none of which is wet on its own, so then water likewise cannot be wet. The shortstop's movements, or the right fielder's movements, on their own do not constitute a baseball game, so then two teams and umpires and coaches all doing their stuff together cannot constitute a baseball game.

Here’s the thing. We have matter. We have motion. We have matter in motion. Everything that is real must come down to one or a combo of these things. These things are not true or false themselves; matter is not true and false, motion is not true and false, yet if this is all there is then this is the stuff our propositions must be made of. So we may add a layer (i.e., motion/activity) to this, our materialist metaphysic, but that layer doesn’t solve the problem of where truth comes from for how is it that our basic parts (i.e. motion/activity, matter/entity) are neither true nor false yet the whole (i.e. thought/concept/idea/mental image) is? Where in the process of building up from the ground floor do these propositions acquire the ability to be either true or false? Do we say that this truth-bearing property emerges from a certain material conjunction as the boiling property emerges from a certain conjunction of hydrogen and oxygen? But this emergent property, if we say it is real, must itself reduce to matter, motion, or matter in motion and so we’re back to the original problem.
So, water isn't wet, and what I watched for a bit on the television a week or so ago was not a baseball game?

Maybe instead we mean to say that true/false is a relationship between the thought/image/idea/concept (which reduces to matter, motion and/or matter in motion) to what is real. But, again, what is this relationship? If we say it is real then it too must reduce to our non-truth-bearing entities and activities. So how do we escape this vicious ‘there is no spoon’ reductionism? This is what I’d like to discuss with you, if you don’t mind.
Sure, I'll discuss this with you, as long as you promise not to keep committing the part/whole fallacy (otherwise known as the fallacies of composition and division), and try to understand what an emergent property or emergent reality is.

Consider:
Approximately one third of the people currently on earth are Christians, and about one fifth are Muslims.
Billy Graham Is Cool is a person currently on earth.
Therefore, Billy Graham Is Cool is one-third Christian and one-fifth Muslim.

Or this:
Everyone in this hospital room has malaria.
Therefore, this hospital room has malaria.

Or this:
You can't live in a brick or a piece of wood.
Therefore you can't live in a house made of brick and wood.

Or this:
No hydrogen atom or oxygen atom is wet.
Water is made up of nothing but hydrogen and oxygen atoms.
Therefore, water is not wet.

Or this:
No individual neuron can think.
Therefore, a brain, which is made up of neurons, cannot think.

Do you see the problem? Do you see why this method of drawing a conclusion from a set of premises is fallacious?

Now, I don't know, in fact nobody knows, precisely how brains produce minds. But the evidence from all the relevant cognitive sciences (neurology, psychiatry, etc) points way beyond any reasonable doubt to the conclusion that to at least a large extent, brains do in fact produce minds. Alter the chemical composition of a brain (as with a drug such as Prozac) and you thereby alter the mind that brain produces. Brain scans on people performing specific tasks show correspondingly specific activity in their brains. And on and on. And, as far as I'm aware, there is no reliable, verifiable evidence of mental activity or results of mental activity that takes place independently of brains. The fact that we don't know everything about how brains produce minds does not mean that we can conclude that they therefore do not and cannot.

Sure, no individual H20 molecule is wet. But water is. Sure, no individual neuron can think. But a brain obviously can. This is precisely what is meant by an emergent property: it is a function of the whole system itself, and thus not something that can be divided into its component parts, and thus not something you will find or should expect to find in its individual component parts.

So now, on to the discussion, and some of my thoughts on the matter:

I am not an anti-realist. There is a real world out there. In addition, there is our perceptions of, our experiences of, that real world. And then on top of that there is our understanding of those perceptions and experiences.

The world really is there. We have real experiences of it: we see, feel, smell, taste, and hear things, we really do perceive the world out there. And those experiences, those perceptions, are real. Sound waves really do strike our eardrums, light really does enter our eyes, etc, and it really is registered in nerves that send real electrochemical signals to the brain, and the brain really does in some way process that input. Being real, those experiences themselves, the processes of experiencing, are at least potentially experienceable. I think of conscious thought as being perception perceiving itself. Some animals, and robots, can receive inputs (sounds vibrations, etc), but not be aware of that activity. They are in a sense "aware" of the sound, but 'aware' in a nonconscious sense: they perceive the sounds and react to them, without being consciously aware of the sounds or their reactions. Other animals, including humans, can, to one degree or another, perceive this activity of perception itself. To the best I can figure it now, that is how and where consciousness arises, or what consciousness is: perception perceiving itself.

So, what is truth? The world is what it is, regardless of what we experience of or think about it. But we do experience it. However, our experiences are limited to what we can sense through our five senses. That means that any experience we have of the world is from a particular perspective, a specific selective part of reality experienced from a specific perspective. Now, those experiences themselves must at this point be understood, they must be interpreted. We see a whole mess of colors and shades and hues and shapes and movements. And we perceive these acts of perception, we are aware of having perceptions. And we respond: we process all that and try to figure out what it is. We abstract out of this whole mess some parts that seem to be integrated with each other in ways they aren't integrated with other parts. We interpret them as being some individual integrated objects, which are separate from other individual integrated objects. We notice that some of these objects are similar in many ways to other objects. We come up with categories to put them in, and names to give the categories: trees, dogs, etc.

In other words, we construct an understanding of the world we perceive. And we test those constructions. But we can't get outside our experiences to test those understandings. So we have more experiences, and see if the constructed understandings help us manage those experiences: for example, are those understandings helpful in or efforts to get food, or to avoid something that seems to be trying to eat us. The understandings that, to the best we can verify, accurately map onto that real world out there are true, or at least we believe them to be true. They may not be: perhaps what we think of as an individual integrated object we call a 'dog' is not one integrated object but many that only seem from our limited experiences of them to be integrated; or perhaps it is only part of a larger integrated object and we are missing the rest. Perhaps some the individual integrated objects we put in the category 'dog' are relevantly different enough not to belong in the same category. But most of us have had more than enough experience of dogs to be very certain, beyond any reasonable doubt, that each thing we call a 'dog' is in fact an integrated object, and that it is reasonable to put them in one category of objects called 'dogs.'

If we're smart about it, rather than passively wait for more experiences to come our way or just assume that the understandings we have received from our teachers are true, we can actively and systematically construct experiences, i.e. we can perform experiments on reality and see what experiences result from our actions. If we do it well, we can control for nonrelevant factors and test just one or a few specific points of our constructed understanding of the world to see whether we experience what our understanding leads us to expect we will experience or whether we end up experiencing something unexpected. If the former, we have additional support for our conclusion that our constructed understanding is true, i.e. that it is an accurate reflection of reality. If the latter we need to reconstruct our understanding to make it more adequate.

For a more personal and biographical note, I used to think that Billy Graham is cool. I even did some volunteer work for one of his crusades. I agreed with his born-again evangelical Christian understanding of the world. But I continued to test that understanding, not out of doubt but out of a desire to understand it better. What I found, however, eventually and entirely unexpectedly convinced me that this constructed understanding of the world was inadequate, it did not truthfully encompass the whole world. I could use it to make sense of my own experiences, interpreting them as experiences of the True and Living God whose Holy Spirit resided in me. But it could not make sense of the fact that people I knew who were other types of Christians, or non-Christian Muslims and Hindus, or even nonreligious, could live good, meaningful, happy, fulfilling lives. It could not make sense of a planet that according to undeniable scientific evidence was far older (billions of years rather than thousands) than the Bible claimed, that there are hundreds of billions of galaxies each with hundreds of billions of stars and all the different life forms on just this one planet and all the subatomic particles and how they work, and all of this was just a stage for the gospel story with us as central characters in the whole universe. That god, that story, that constructed understanding of the world, is just too small to encompass the world I got to know. [that part was paraphrased from memory from a comment by a physicist whose name I cannot recall now but who did a great job of summing up what I had concluded.] I could not honestly reconcile that constructed understanding with all it was supposed to be able to understand. When I saw all that, I had a choice: I could ignore all this conflicting evidence, I could try to find intellectually dishonest ways to reconcile the conflicts, or I could reconstruct my understanding of the world. I could not in good conscience do anything but work on reconstructing my understanding of the world and move beyond the born-again evangelical Christian understanding, or indeed any theistic understanding, of reality.

As I recall, Billy Graham himself has run across things that at least temporarily forced him to revise his understanding of the world. If my memory is accurate, he made some statements for a while that suggested at least the possibility that at least some non-Christian religious people were genuinely saved and in a right relationship with God even if that relationship was not through Jesus. After close dealings with some good friends who were Jewish, he apparently had a hard time reconciling his experiences with those good, happy, moral people with his religion's doctrines that they were bound for eternal damnation. But after the horrified reaction from many in his flock, he chose to back away from the issue and not attempt to reconcile his constructed understanding of reality with reality itself. I suppose that for him, his constructed understanding of reality was more important than reality itself and an accurate knowledge of it. Now, I'm not saying here that he is necessarily wrong, and I'm certainly not saying that I am necessarily right. What I am saying is that if indeed there is a conflict between his religion and truth, I suspect that he would not want to know; he would rather stick with his religion, even if it is wrong.

I can say that if I am wrong now, I sincerely want to know that and to be corrected. Billy Graham Is Cool, can you say the same thing? What if it turns out that your religion is in fact false, that your understanding of the world is in fact incorrect? Would you want to know? Or would you rather not know, would you rather stick with your religion whether it is right or wrong? If you truly believe that your life would be inescapably meaningless and horrifying without your religion, I can understand if you would choose not to want to know if it is false. But if you would choose that, then we truly are wasting our time here, because if you prefer comfortable beliefs to true beliefs then even if your beliefs are in fact true, it would only be by accident that you happened to get it right, and if you got it wrong then you wouldn't allow anything to tell you that.

Hobbs

May 25, 2005, 11:06 PM

However, our experiences are limited to what we can sense through our five senses.
Actually, I shouldn't make this sound like such a dogmatic statement. Yes, it is possible that we sense things outside our own minds through other means, perhaps through some sort of telepathy, or a direct non-sensory purely mental experience of God or the gods. But, to my knowledge, we have no way of testing the accuracy of those experiences, much less the truth of our understandings of them. People from a variety of religious or cultural backgrounds can perform various tests and come to the same conclusions about such things as dogs and trees and our physical experiences of them. But they come to radically and irreconcilably different conclusions about alleged gods and experiences of them. It seems to me that the most reasonable conclusion is that these experiences are only in their heads. "God" is the way a believer experiences some things in reality rather than something in reality that a believer experiences. At best, even if they really are experiences of realities external to our minds, we have (as of yet, anyway) not figured out any reliable way of interpreting and understanding them. So, pending any reliable verification of alleged knowledge of external reality based on other sorts of experiences, I'll say that we can reasonably conclude that our experiences and knowledge of reality are limited to what we can sense through our five senses.

Wads4

May 26, 2005, 02:14 AM

Well, how about all the countless millions of people who've had circumcisions and not had their sex lives affected? Which, according to what you said, probably includes you. I don't like arguing on the side of the Xians, but this seems like a bit of a silly argument. :huh:

The point is that one is submitted to a procedure compulsorily for entirely the wrong reasons, as I explained. Also people who have had it done cannot compare their performance with the uncut state as they have never experienced it, so they are easily persuaded that it is a good thing;- but delayed ejaculation is a definite side-effect which cannot be remedied,-whereas premature ejaculation can be treated and evntually cures itself anyway. The ancient Egyptians as far as I know only circumcised consenting adults, they did not assault helpless babies.

premjan

May 26, 2005, 02:29 AM

I would guess that most women prefer men who ejaculate slowly.

Wads4

May 26, 2005, 06:17 AM

I would guess that most women prefer men who ejaculate slowly.

True, unless you go on all night!

Wallener

May 26, 2005, 11:12 AM

Well, how about all the countless millions of people who've had circumcisions and not had their sex lives affected?

One cannot compare to that which one cannot experience. There is a long line of Jewish reasoning that includes (too) many illuminaries explaining that dulling of the sex drive IS a reason G-d wanted this for his people.

None of the activities necessary for the preservation of the individual is harmed thereby, nor is procreation rendered impossible, but violent concupiscence and lust that goes beyond what is needed are diminished.

In another famous passage, he even warned against letting their women ever be with an uncut men as they would never go back.

The Sages, may their memory be blessed, have explicitly stated: It is hard for a woman with whom an uncircumcised man has had sexual intercourse to separate from him.

I presume Maimonides did not expect Jewish women to ever read his books. ;)

Hobbs

May 26, 2005, 11:23 AM

Is it the case that there are things we can do that enhance our chances of living longer, healthier, happier lives? And things we can do that impede our chances of living good lives? Is it the case that our actions affect others as well as ourselves? Why would we need anything else to come up with a system of morality, i.e. guidelines to how to live good human lives, other than looking at how in fact we are able to live good human lives? We may disagree on what sorts of actions benefit or harm us and the society on which we all depend for our own well-being, we may even disagree in some cases on what specifically constitutes benefit or harm, but that does nothing to change the fact that there are things that really do benefit or harm us and that our actions really can result in beneficial or harmful consequences.
In my haste to dash off a quick response yesterday, I neglected to include an important point here. There is a wide range of circumstances, activities, etc, that can benefit people and contribute to living good lives, and an even wider range of harmful things, and a wide and fuzzy border between them. Also, some things that really do benefit some people in some situations really will harm others. And any moral system that does not allow for and account for this broadness and variability is an inadequate moral system. It is incorrect, inadequate, to say, for example, that to lead a good human life one must have one and only one heterosexual marriage, have exactly 2.4 children, a dog, and a white picket fence. That is one way for many people to live a good human life. But most, and probably all, of those people could lead very good lives in other ways. And for some people, it would in fact be harmful to try to live this way.

Morality is not subject to mathematical precision. Any moral system that attempts to make judgments with mathematical precision is inadequate for dealing with the real world and real morality.

Cross Examiner

May 27, 2005, 02:25 PM

I should be getting paid for this …

In 258 you question what I mean by child torture. You say torture means different things to different folks. In the interest of one standard, why don’t we just go with how I spoke of it recently? That torture means one causing pain to another for one’s own pleasure and the like. So whatever the act, if the goal in the doing is to, say, make another suffer for suffering’s sake, or for one’s own amusement or some such, then that’s what I mean by torture. Torture is in the intent of the actor (as opposed to the act or the acted upon) as far as I’m concerned. Of course, you may choose to go with another meaning of the term but in that case we’ll end up talking about two different things and, as I forewarned, we’ll talk right past one another on to Judgement Day.

In 259 you sketch out a picture of theism. Now, if people were cartoon characters, if you really could condense a theist’s deepest thoughts on the biggest questions into just a few cloud-like bubbles floating overhead I might have something to say about the sketch. But as it stands, this caricature is not worth putting up on the fridge much less seriously remarking upon. I will note, however, that you say we respect and act kindly towards one another because doing so makes for a better life for the group. You suggest moral behavior works for most and so we do tend to do it etc. Charitably, we could call this a descriptive and perhaps normative thesis of moral pragmatism in the making. But I was and have been asking for a prescriptive thesis so this offering of yours, even if it were accurate, is not an answer to my question. Perhaps I’m not getting relevant responses due to some imprecision on my part. So let me start again with two revealing questions about moral language: are moral utterances (e.g., ‘child torture is wrong’) true and false? If so, what are they true and false in relation to?

I ask because how you (you referring to every reader, not just the writer of post 259) answer these questions tells tales about where you folks stand on what, if anything, makes for right and wrong, which is what I’m after. You may say you’ve already answered them, and perhaps you have -- implicitly at least. For if you’ve already revealed yourself to be an anti-realist and an emotivist, for example, then you will no doubt answer the two questions above by saying something like, ‘No, moral utterances are meaningless; they are neither true nor false because they refer to nothing external to the utterer. Such statements are merely expressive of the utterer’s internal emotions, which are non-cognitive in nature.’ Or if instead you’re a self-avowed subjectivist you’ll chime in with something along the lines of, ‘Yes, moral utterances are cognitive claims, they are true and false. They are true and false in relation to the speaker’s and/or speaker’s culture’s likes and dislikes.’ But even so, even if you think you’ve already laid your cards flat, please just answer the questions as though no prior talk of morality has yet taken place. If you would be so kind.

In 260 you say I complicate the simple. But what is so simple about any of this? You say I cling to religion because of a felt need, because of psychological insecurities (can you psychoanalyze people you haven’t met? That’s amazing!). But last I introspected, Christian theism simply made the most sense of the world and being, in addition to my once and continuing experience of the reality of the risen Christ. Granted, I haven’t searched my heart for my true feelings on the matter in at least a few hours or so but I suppose it’s in roughly the same shape I last saw it in. You say man makes up religion. But how do you know he creates rather than discovers religious truths? To top off the Sundae of extraordinary claims you say you don’t buy the religion thing because you’ve simply studied the matter too much! But if depth and breadth of study really does lead to irreligion then shouldn’t Augustine, Aquinas and Newton (to name a few of the many greats) all have been raging atheists? I’ve met crusty ol’ ign’ant farmer-types and highbrow university professors alike who swear off God. I’ve known blind-leap Holy Ghost-ers and ivory tower intellectuals alike who were more certain of the Almighty than their momma’s love. Surely you must know that smarts has little if anything to do with how one answers the question of God.

In 261 you say I don’t have an answer to the Abraham and Isaac question. I do. And I thought I did answer already but I’ll do it again, just for you -- this time with greater attention and care so none miss it. Here’s the starting question: was it wrong of Abraham to prepare to kill his son Isaac on the order of God? Wrong in the sense I’ve been recently speaking of, wrong as in a break with the presiding moral law? No. I’d say this event doesn’t fit into any category of normal morality as the moral law which normally divides the acts and intents of men into such categories was specially suspended by the Lawmaker. This story was not about right or wrong as we normally understand these things but about a divine command as a test of one man’s trust in God and His faithfulness to keep a promise. I’ll explain with an analogy. It is neither legal nor illegal for a full-grown man to wear American-Flag-MC-Hammer-style-parachute-pants as there’s no law on the books for that sort of thing, not in California much less in Idaho. Though maybe there should be. Well, no, that probably doesn’t help. What I’m getting at here is marking out the distinction between a specific, divine command and the broader moral law. That is, the two sorts of laws may differ in terms of scope, power, purpose, extent, how each is known, when each becomes effective, for how long, in what circumstances etc. Let’s make a quick contrast.

First, a bit on the moral law. It is a reflection of and in keeping with God’s person (i.e., His character, nature) and purposes. It is from God to man for man’s ultimate well being. Some of this law is intuited, some of it is revealed. The part known intuitively has guided and judged all men from the beginning; the parts revealed have guided and judged or even freed some men since the time of their revelation. In addition to the innate or intuitive part of the moral law, there have been two additional revelations in the course of human events such that there are three parts to the law in total and at the present, each part fulfilling the last and exceeding the last in terms of precision, extent, demand, reward and so forth. These respective parts of the moral law are sometimes known individually as: the law of conscience, the law of works and the law of grace, respectively. In more covenantal terms, the first part corresponds to the law written on the heart, the second to the Law of and revealed to Moses, the third to the Law of and revealed by Christ. All living are under the first, the general moral law, many today are under one of the latter two, the special moral law (these also overlap with the general/special revelation of natural theology). We haven’t touched on the matters of mediation of, satisfaction of, or justification before the law, amongst other important things, but I’ll stop here anyway so we can move on to divine command.

As for divine command, like the one given to Abraham, this is a different sort of thing (I’ll try to be brief with the contrast). It differs from the moral law most significantly in terms of scope, power and how it is known. Unlike the moral law, a divine command is issued from God to a person or a relatively few people. If in seeming conflict with the general or special moral law, its power compels over and even against the moral law. It is not intuited or revealed but apparently experienced directly in some way I am personally unfamiliar with. And I should say a quick word on a related matter. The obvious danger of a thing so compelling as a unique and special divine command is in mistaking a divine command for something else and something else for a divine command. Since the times of the prophets, apostles and up to the modern Church Age, this danger has been successively mitigated. But this mitigation is uneven as the danger of mistaking a divine command is less for some than it is for others. This is, for example, less of a problem for the Roman Church than it is for the decentralized, highly individualistic protestant and evangelical churches. But I digress too far. Back to Abraham and Isaac.

So was it that there was no moral law for Abraham to break? Is that why I say Abraham’s act was not wrong in the normal sense? No, for even though Abraham was historically prior to the special revelations of the moral law, he still had access to the general, basic moral law of conscience which, when functional, certainly forbids one from killing one’s own child. Abraham had received a divine command that seemed to break with who he knew God to be but rather than trust his own moral compass, he trusted the compass-Maker to be true to His word. So am I then saying Abraham did moral right? No. For right is a positive relation to the moral law, which was temporarily and uniquely set aside by the Lawmaker. This was not about right or wrong, it was about obedience or disobedience, faithfulness or faithlessness. Abraham was obedient in relation to God’s divine command, the only sort of command that can temporarily and uniquely set aside the moral law and the normal categories of right and wrong. Conforming or not conforming to the moral law is a matter of right and wrong whereas conforming or not conforming to divine command is a matter of obedience or disobedience. But divine command is not quite the issue today as it was in the remote past. For those of us befriended by God today, as the words of a famous hymn ask, ‘what more can He say than to you He hath said, you, who unto Jesus for refuge hath fled’?

Am I saying that whatever is ultimately right is tied to whatever God commands? Not quite. For God’s moral law and divine commands are not free-floating, they are not arbitrarily or randomly or irrationally or haphazardly decided. They are informed by and even delimited within His purposes and so, ultimately, His person. As mentioned before, His law and commands are merely reflective of these things, His purposes and His person. That is, His law and commands are reflective of what is right, not singularly determinative of what is right. In the final analysis, right is ultimately tied to God’s person. It might be asked what then makes God’s person right? I’d say nothing. It is what it is. This is what right means, the ground floor. To posit something else as the right-making ground only begs yet another ground and another so on and so froth. Which is to say, if there is an objectively real right, then there is either a ground floor to what makes right or there is an infinite regress to what makes right. And, in short, the former is simply better than the latter. Anyway, thinking of the matter in this way seems, to me at least, to free morality from the arbitrariness and autonomy horns of Plato’s dilemma. But you ask a more practical question.

You ask, still in post 261, if people should be held accountable for taking lives if prompted by a voice in their heads. I assume you mean held accountable by their government. Should they be held accountable? Yes. By all means. The government has a legitimate interest and even a God-given right in ‘wielding the sword’ and in seeing to it that the citizens obey the laws of the land. Which is not to say all laws made by government are just. That’s another thing entirely. I can think of a certain communist country whose laws are anything but just. Still, government is to do what government was made to do. And I think we generally get the government we deserve so when government and God collide, the Christian has a duty to both buck the government and to bear the punishment in so doing. If, for example, the government forbids naming the name of Christ, a Christian is right to disobey the government whatever may come for, as the apostles said, it is better to obey God rather than man. But that whatever may come part should greatly motivate the Christian to shape the laws of the land towards religious freedom wherever and whenever it is possible for him to do so. But I’ve probably digressed from where you wanted to go with this question so let me head back.

Looking again at what you ask, this time more closely, I see you say that because God does not exist in any demonstrable way you suggest He is therefore fictional such that God doesn’t command but a psychologically suspect ‘voice’ inside the head is what commands. It is unclear what you mean by demonstrable here but if you mean God’s existence is not demonstrable in any way at all, then you beg the biggest question in the worst way. If you mean He is not empirically verifiable, which is what I take you to mean, then, granted, God is not demonstrable in this way. But in that case neither are numbers, the laws of logic, thoughts, as are a host of other things that are not empirically verifiable yet must exist lest existence itself be completely unintelligible. So needless to say it is quite the jump from God is not empirically verifiable to He is therefore fictional and so does no commanding. This positivistic ‘reasoning’ needs a lot of work. I leave that to you.

In 264 you ask what I mean by ‘we’, you ask if I think I represent all Christians. To the first, I mean we as in all the people that talk here, whatever their religious or philosophical leanings. Either that or we are referring only to our very royal selves. To the second, yes, yes I do represent all Christians worldwide. We had a vote last meeting. Didn’t you see the minutes? It was printed on a blue insert in the monthly newsletter and stuffed between the toy drive bulletin and a pinkish potluck reminder. Don’t you people read these things?

And lastly in 266 someone actually answers a question I asked. I asked if it is wrong to torture children and why. The brave soul tells me it is because causing harm to innocents for no good reason is wrong. Great. That’s a start. Now why is it wrong to cause harm to innocents? Don’t worry. There is a point to the questioning. I’m trying to get folks to follow the trail where it leads, Wherever it leads. Who knew this would be like pulling teeth? Here is a good place to stop for the day since the next post changes topics from morality to the problem of suffering. If I don’t write before Monday, have a great Memorial Day.

Scorpion

May 27, 2005, 02:41 PM

Hi,

And lastly in 266 someone actually answers a question I asked. I asked if it is wrong to torture children and why. The brave soul tells me it is because causing harm to innocents for no good reason is wrong. Great. That’s a start. Now why is it wrong to cause harm to innocents?

By all means, do refer to me by my username rather than just "someone" :D

This could have made a long answer, but luckily you save a lot of my trouble by saying this:

For God’s moral law and divine commands are not free-floating, they are not arbitrarily or randomly or irrationally or haphazardly decided. They are informed by and even delimited within His purposes and so, ultimately, His person. As mentioned before, His law and commands are merely reflective of these things, His purposes and His person. That is, His law and commands are reflective of what is right, not singularly determinative of what is right. In the final analysis, right is ultimately tied to God’s person. It might be asked what then makes God’s person right? I’d say nothing. It is what it is. This is what right means, the ground floor.

...so, why is causing harm to innocents wrong? I might conjure up another, more fundamental moral reason and perhaps yet another under that, but eventually the buck has to stop. When it stops, there's only "because I say so" left. That's it. I am the ground floor.

Edited to add: In other words, if you replace "God" in the above quote with "me" or "I", it pretty much describes my position.

-S-

Enlighten Me

May 27, 2005, 02:49 PM

Now why is it wrong to cause harm to innocents?

This seems like such a no-brainer. It is wrong to harm innocents because, if allowed, anyone could become a victim, and I can think of few people who would volunteer to be victimized.

In order for life to be perpetuated, wanton killing must be avoided.

Didn't you hear once or twice when you were growing up: "Now, Billy---don't hit Jimmy. How would YOU like it if Jimmy hit YOU?" ...or maybe you heard: "Now, Billy---you know God doesn't like you to hit Jimmy..."

But why would the second version of Mommy's admonition be better than the first? The first one teaches compassion; the second one contains an implied threat...

Scorpion

May 27, 2005, 02:56 PM

Oh, I should probably answer this as well:

So let me start again with two revealing questions about moral language: are moral utterances (e.g., ‘child torture is wrong’) true and false? If so, what are they true and false in relation to?

This may seem a trivial answer (which may indicate that I'm not answering what you really asked), but moral utterances are true or false in the context of (that is, in relation to) the moral systems that people hold.

-S-

Naked Ape

May 27, 2005, 03:19 PM

To answer your question: "Is it wrong or evil for God, either directly of by way of human agency, to take life?"
Since god does not exist in any demonstrable way, and any direct action in reality by a fictional character is unlikely at best, the question devolves to: "Should people be held responsible for taking lives if they claim they were prompted by voices in their heads?"
In 261 you say I don’t have an answer to the Abraham and Isaac question. I do. And I thought I did answer already but I’ll do it again, just for you -- this time with greater attention and care so none miss it. Here’s the starting question: was it wrong of Abraham to prepare to kill his son Isaac on the order of God? Wrong in the sense I’ve been recently speaking of, wrong as in a break with the presiding moral law? No. I’d say this event doesn’t fit into any category of normal morality as the moral law which normally divides the acts and intents of men into such categories was specially suspended by the Lawmaker. This story was not about right or wrong as we normally understand these things but about a divine command as a test of one man’s trust in God and His faithfulness to keep a promise. I’ll explain with an analogy. It is neither legal nor illegal for a full-grown man to wear American-Flag-MC-Hammer-style-parachute-pants as there’s no law on the books for that sort of thing, not in California much less in Idaho. Though maybe there should be. Well, no, that probably doesn’t help. What I’m getting at here is marking out the distinction between a specific, divine command and the broader moral law. That is, the two sorts of laws may differ in terms of scope, power, purpose, extent, how each is known, when each becomes effective, for how long, in what circumstances etc. Let’s make a quick contrast.

First, a bit on the moral law. It is a reflection of and in keeping with God’s person (i.e., His character, nature) and purposes. It is from God to man for man’s ultimate well being. Some of this law is intuited, some of it is revealed. The part known intuitively has guided and judged all men from the beginning; the parts revealed have guided and judged or even freed some men since the time of their revelation. In addition to the innate or intuitive part of the moral law, there have been two additional revelations in the course of human events such that there are three parts to the law in total and at the present, each part fulfilling the last and exceeding the last in terms of precision, extent, demand, reward and so forth. These respective parts of the moral law are sometimes known individually as: the law of conscience, the law of works and the law of grace, respectively. In more covenantal terms, the first part corresponds to the law written on the heart, the second to the Law of and revealed to Moses, the third to the Law of and revealed by Christ. All living are under the first, the general moral law, many today are under one of the latter two, the special moral law (these also overlap with the general/special revelation of natural theology). We haven’t touched on the matters of mediation of, satisfaction of, or justification before the law, amongst other important things, but I’ll stop here anyway so we can move on to divine command.

As for divine command, like the one given to Abraham, this is a different sort of thing (I’ll try to be brief with the contrast). It differs from the moral law most significantly in terms of scope, power and how it is known. Unlike the moral law, a divine command is issued from God to a person or a relatively few people. If in seeming conflict with the general or special moral law, its power compels over and even against the moral law. It is not intuited or revealed but apparently experienced directly in some way I am personally unfamiliar with. And I should say a quick word on a related matter. The obvious danger of a thing so compelling as a unique and special divine command is in mistaking a divine command for something else and something else for a divine command. Since the times of the prophets, apostles and up to the modern Church Age, this danger has been successively mitigated. But this mitigation is uneven as the danger of mistaking a divine command is less for some than it is for others. This is, for example, less of a problem for the Roman Church than it is for the decentralized, highly individualistic protestant and evangelical churches. But I digress too far. Back to Abraham and Isaac.

So was it that there was no moral law for Abraham to break? Is that why I say Abraham’s act was not wrong in the normal sense? No, for even though Abraham was historically prior to the special revelations of the moral law, he still had access to the general, basic moral law of conscience which, when functional, certainly forbids one from killing one’s own child. Abraham had received a divine command that seemed to break with who he knew God to be but rather than trust his own moral compass, he trusted the compass-Maker to be true to His word. So am I then saying Abraham did moral right? No. For right is a positive relation to the moral law, which was temporarily and uniquely set aside by the Lawmaker. This was not about right or wrong, it was about obedience or disobedience, faithfulness or faithlessness. Abraham was obedient in relation to God’s divine command, the only sort of command that can temporarily and uniquely set aside the moral law and the normal categories of right and wrong. Conforming or not conforming to the moral law is a matter of right and wrong whereas conforming or not conforming to divine command is a matter of obedience or disobedience. But divine command is not quite the issue today as it was in the remote past. For those of us befriended by God today, as the words of a famous hymn ask, ‘what more can He say than to you He hath said, you, who unto Jesus for refuge hath fled’?

Am I saying that whatever is ultimately right is tied to whatever God commands? Not quite. For God’s moral law and divine commands are not free-floating, they are not arbitrarily or randomly or irrationally or haphazardly decided. They are informed by and even delimited within His purposes and so, ultimately, His person. As mentioned before, His law and commands are merely reflective of these things, His purposes and His person. That is, His law and commands are reflective of what is right, not singularly determinative of what is right. In the final analysis, right is ultimately tied to God’s person. It might be asked what then makes God’s person right? I’d say nothing. It is what it is. This is what right means, the ground floor. To posit something else as the right-making ground only begs yet another ground and another so on and so froth. Which is to say, if there is an objectively real right, then there is either a ground floor to what makes right or there is an infinite regress to what makes right. And, in short, the former is simply better than the latter. Anyway, thinking of the matter in this way seems, to me at least, to free morality from the arbitrariness and autonomy horns of Plato’s dilemma. But you ask a more practical question.

You ask, still in post 261, if people should be held accountable for taking lives if prompted by a voice in their heads. I assume you mean held accountable by their government. Should they be held accountable? Yes. By all means. The government has a legitimate interest and even a God-given right in ‘wielding the sword’ and in seeing to it that the citizens obey the laws of the land. Which is not to say all laws made by government are just. That’s another thing entirely. I can think of a certain communist country whose laws are anything but just. Still, government is to do what government was made to do. And I think we generally get the government we deserve so when government and God collide, the Christian has a duty to both buck the government and to bear the punishment in so doing. If, for example, the government forbids naming the name of Christ, a Christian is right to disobey the government whatever may come for, as the apostles said, it is better to obey God rather than man. But that whatever may come part should greatly motivate the Christian to shape the laws of the land towards religious freedom wherever and whenever it is possible for him to do so. But I’ve probably digressed from where you wanted to go with this question so let me head back.

Looking again at what you ask, this time more closely, I see you say that because God does not exist in any demonstrable way you suggest He is therefore fictional such that God doesn’t command but a psychologically suspect ‘voice’ inside the head is what commands. It is unclear what you mean by demonstrable here but if you mean God’s existence is not demonstrable in any way at all, then you beg the biggest question in the worst way. If you mean He is not empirically verifiable, which is what I take you to mean, then, granted, God is not demonstrable in this way. But in that case neither are numbers, the laws of logic, thoughts, as are a host of other things that are not empirically verifiable yet must exist lest existence itself be completely unintelligible. So needless to say it is quite the jump from God is not empirically verifiable to He is therefore fictional and so does no commanding. This positivistic ‘reasoning’ needs a lot of work. I leave that to you.Wow, that was really long. Nice detour into a load of piffle about moral law, but I just asked a simple question.

Are you still confused by what anyone here might mean when they say you complicate the simple?

The question was: Should people be held responsible for taking lives if they claim they were prompted by voices in their heads?

Are you confused by what the phrase "prompted by voices in their heads" means? Perhaps it was the "Should people be held responsible" part that threw you for a loop. To bring this query closer to your formulation try this version:Is it wrong or evil for people to take other proples lives if they claim (and sincerely believe) they were prompted by voices in their heads? That should clear things up, if you answer.

In your opinion, how did god communicate with Abraham? Telegram? Text Messaging? How can you tell divine commands from garden variety mental illness?

Is you answer to the reformulated question different if the perpetrator is convinced that the voice that they hear telling them to do harm is comming from god?

If so, why, and how can you tell whether or not they were really hearing god or just barking mad?

If you talk to god, it is called prayer (http://dictionary.reference.com/search?q=prayer) .
If god talks to you, it is called schizophrenia (http://dictionary.reference.com/search?q=schizophrenia) .

Cheers,

Naked Ape

BadBadBad

May 27, 2005, 03:51 PM

In 258 you question what I mean by child torture. You say torture means different things to different folks. In the interest of one standard, why don’t we just go with how I spoke of it recently? That torture means one causing pain to another for one’s own pleasure and the like. So whatever the act, if the goal in the doing is to, say, make another suffer for suffering’s sake, or for one’s own amusement or some such, then that’s what I mean by torture. Torture is in the intent of the actor (as opposed to the act or the acted upon) as far as I’m concerned. Of course, you may choose to go with another meaning of the term but in that case we’ll end up talking about two different things and, as I forewarned, we’ll talk right past one another on to Judgement Day.

Then I think we're talking past each other BGiC. In fact, this is the second thread where you haven't responded to me on this issue. So, that would be the ultimate in talking past each other. Still though, I can see you talking past those that you are actually attempting to engage here.

Torture is not just the intent of the one doing the torturing. It's also the impact on the victim, and the intent of the one doing the torturing is much more broad than what you've conveniently narrowed your definition to.

Torture: 1 a : anguish of body or mind : AGONY b : something that causes agony or pain
2 : the infliction of intense pain (as from burning, crushing, or wounding) to punish, coerce, or afford sadistic pleasure

Why don't we avoid talking past each other and just stick with common definition of the words we use and not cloud the issue with narrow use of the words to suit your purpose.

So, for example, if a person is to punish another with a cat of nine tails whip as a just sentence for crimes committed, and he takes no sadistic pleasure in it fits the definition above 1a, 1b, and 2.

Now can we agree to use the complete definition of the word, or will you continue to re-define the plain words in our language to suit your purposes. If the latter, then I will conclude we are wasting our time here. If the former, then please use the full and accepted definition of the word torture and answer the question I've been asking across two threads:

Is it tortuous to a child to butcher his father and mother before him with a sword? Is it tortuous to a child to butcher his brothers one by one with a sword directly in front of him while he begs and pleads? Is it tortuous to a child to then finally come for him with your sword dripping in the blood of his family? Is it tortuous to a child to hack him to death with your bloody sword with sufficient brutality to satisfy God's vengeance? Is it wrong to torture a child even if God commands you to?

Hobbs

May 27, 2005, 04:47 PM

And lastly in 266 someone actually answers a question I asked. I asked if it is wrong to torture children and why. The brave soul tells me it is because causing harm to innocents for no good reason is wrong. Great. That’s a start. Now why is it wrong to cause harm to innocents? Don’t worry. There is a point to the questioning. I’m trying to get folks to follow the trail where it leads, Wherever it leads. Who knew this would be like pulling teeth? [emphasis added]

You might save yourself and us a lot of time if you would just get to your point.

Hobbs

May 27, 2005, 04:53 PM

I should be getting paid for this …
I, for one, appreciate and thank you for your efforts here. You have obviously put a lot of thought into this.

But, it looks to me like there are some flaws and errors in your thinking, or at least some potential problems which I'd like to hear you address.

Am I saying that whatever is ultimately right is tied to whatever God commands? Not quite. For God’s moral law and divine commands are not free-floating, they are not arbitrarily or randomly or irrationally or haphazardly decided. They are informed by and even delimited within His purposes and so, ultimately, His person. As mentioned before, His law and commands are merely reflective of these things, His purposes and His person. That is, His law and commands are reflective of what is right, not singularly determinative of what is right. In the final analysis, right is ultimately tied to God’s person. It might be asked what then makes God’s person right? I’d say nothing. It is what it is. This is what right means, the ground floor. To posit something else as the right-making ground only begs yet another ground and another so on and so froth. Which is to say, if there is an objectively real right, then there is either a ground floor to what makes right or there is an infinite regress to what makes right. And, in short, the former is simply better than the latter. Anyway, thinking of the matter in this way seems, to me at least, to free morality from the arbitrariness and autonomy horns of Plato’s dilemma. But you ask a more practical question.

So, we get all our moral standards from God and his nature, some of it intuitively and some of it by revelation. OK, at least with the revelation we have something to go on, but even there people have radically different interpretations of what those revelations mean and which ones we should follow (e.g. kosher laws) and in which ways (do you give to everyone who asks, as Jesus commands? Or was that not really a command?). (Not to mention the question of which alleged set of revelations are truly revealed from God.) But what do we do in the case of contemporary moral issues about which the Bible says nothing? Organ transplants? Cloning, of animals or humans? Stem cell research? Sincere, honest believers have radically different intuitions about these issues. How do you propose we decide them?

You say morality is rooted in God's nature. Why wouldn't it make sense to say it is rooted in our nature, in what sorts of things benefit or harm us, in the sorts of ways we can live good human lives, "good" being measured by such things as how long, healthy, and happy our lives are? Wouldn't that be a better ground for our moral deliberations? After all, we have direct, verifiable access to ourselves, and we can see the results of our actions. Given all the different interpretations people have of God or the gods, even if we have some sort of access to the divine realm we obviously don't have any reliable way of determining what it is, certainly not anything like the sort of access we have to ourselves and our own objective and subjective realities right here in this world. That seems to me to be a much better ground floor on which to build a moral system. And, after all, it is us we are talking about, and it is our nature and our good; why would working for the good of God's nature and God's good necessarily be applicable to or moral for us? Our nature is essential to us; God's nature, from the perspective of our nature and our good, is ultimately arbitrary: what is good for God and his nature may or may not be in accord with what is good for us and our nature.

funinspace

May 27, 2005, 05:52 PM

In your opinion, how did god communicate with Abraham? Telegram? Text Messaging? How can you tell divine commands from garden variety mental illness?
Now I know why I hate broccoli…it talks to me.

Why don't we avoid talking past each other and just stick with common definition of the words we use and not cloud the issue with narrow use of the words to suit your purpose.
ROTFLMAO…maybe when there's ice skating in hell.

So, we get all our moral standards from God and his nature, some of it intuitively and some of it by revelation. OK, at least with the revelation we have something to go on, but even there people have radically different interpretations of what those revelations mean and which ones we should follow (e.g. kosher laws) and in which ways (do you give to everyone who asks, as Jesus commands? Or was that not really a command?). (Not to mention the question of which alleged set of revelations are truly revealed from God.) But what do we do in the case of contemporary moral issues about which the Bible says nothing? Organ transplants? Cloning, of animals or humans? Stem cell research? Sincere, honest believers have radically different intuitions about these issues. How do you propose we decide them?
:thumbs: If these prescriptions (moral laws) are not fully definable, then it goes right back to human understanding either way.

John A. Broussard

May 27, 2005, 06:20 PM

the next post changes topics from morality to the problem of suffering. [/FONT]

You have a truly amazing view of the world. You imply here that the problem of suffering somehow is unrelated to morality.

Please explain.

A brief paragraph rather than a rambling essay would be appreciated.

Lilyofthevalley

May 27, 2005, 06:31 PM

Here I'd like to propose that you, the unbeliever, first offer up your chief objection to Christianity.

Sorry if this is breaking into interesting discussions but I just wanted to answer the original question. My chief objection to Christianity is that it turns 'brother against brother' and has scriptural back-up proving this is a good thing.

Thus, it turns out IN PRACTICE to be a religion of hatred and division - not one of love at all - that's why I hate and fear it. Especially I abhor the existence of horrible biblical texts that endorse such division.

My own family - once as loving and as close-knit as you could possibly get - is in danger of such terrible division because one of us is a fundamentalist Christian and the rest of us are not. I ask myself, how can a religion of 'love' turn out in practice to be the cause of dissension? Even within loving families?

Tentative answer: it encourages people to forget their basic humanity. They forget their humble similarity to other humans - instead they think they are God's instrument. And their hearts swell with a sort of evil pride. The Christian belief therefore changes a previously nice person and makes them ready to write off their fellow human being 'for Christ'.

The worst thing is that a Christian can even quote 'Scripture' to validate this dreadful outcome eg. 'A man's worst enemies will be those of his own household... I come to set mother against daughter' etc etc. If a person takes this too literally - as true Christians are supposed to do, aren't they? - it means the members of a loving family may stop talking to one another. Jesus wants this, doesn't he?

Well, what could be more devilish? So that's my chief objection to Christianity. In practice it looks too much like this: :devil1:

mirage

May 27, 2005, 07:03 PM

^^^^
Nice post. I hope your family survives this assault.

Lilyofthevalley

May 27, 2005, 07:11 PM

Thank you, mirage. I hope so too.

JLK

May 27, 2005, 10:14 PM

if there is an objectively real right, then there is either a ground floor to what makes right or there is an infinite regress to what makes right. ..the former is simply better than the latter. Thinking of the matter in this way seems, to me at least, to free morality from the arbitrariness and autonomy horns of Plato’s dilemma.??? "the Autonomy horn?" Hmmm, I see.
The horns of Plato's dilemma are Divine arbitrariness vs. a Nature of Good/Virtue independent of a personal god(s) whim or desire. BGiC's "ground floor" is Plato's second horn itself. BGiC hasn't escaped the Euthyphro at all (and indeed you never can, which is why it persists for 2.5 millennnia). Locating the NatureOfVirtue inside God as part of his character etc. is completely superfluous. If there is such a thing as WhatOughtToBe, adding a God around it doesn't do anything for it at all.

Because this "ground floor horn" which BGiC desires and accepts makes personal god(s) superfluous morally, he instead terms it "the autonomy horn".
The idea that humans can "autonomously" do anything, including arrive at consensus ideas of virtue without gods, really just annoys him no end. Perhaps he should enter the extreme Calvinist threads?

Naked Ape

May 27, 2005, 11:43 PM

Now I know why I hate broccoli…it talks to me.
Well talking broccoli sure sounds like garden variety mental illness. [hi-hat] ;) ... or would it be a divine command? Would issuing divine commands make broccoli a god, or would it be serving as some sort of vegatable metatron (http://www.crystalinks.com/metatron.html)? Metatron became the foremost intermediary between the divine and the human, possessing experiences both of the Earthly and the Heavenly.

It's in a book, it must be true.

Cheers,

Naked Ape

Angrillori

May 28, 2005, 10:54 AM

I should be getting paid for this …
There isn't a ROFL smiley in the entire universe big enough to respond to that.

are moral utterances (e.g., ‘child torture is wrong’) true and false? If so, what are they true and false in relation to?

Except BGiC, you've already admitted a double standard on that. You've admitted that these statements are only true or false for certain classes of subjects. I.E. They're subjective.

You've pointed out that the action of child torture is both wrong and right depending on who is performing or ordering it.

So, dig the humongous (gigantic?) plank out of your own eye before pointing at a perceived plank in others. I think, when you're able to see clearly, that you'll see we don't have so many motes in our eyes as you are currently imagining.

I ask because how you (you referring to every reader, not just the writer of post 259) answer these questions tells tales about where you folks stand on what, if anything, makes for right and wrong, which is what I’m after. I think we've pretty explicitly stated what makes something right or wrong. Only a billion times. We know, factually what makes us believe things are right or wrong. Evolution, culture, history, and introspection. That's it. There's not a thing you can point to Billy, that some human beings call wrong or right, that we can't point to exactly why they believe that. So why is X wrong to me? Evolution, culture, history, and introspection. It couldn't be clearer.

Your primary problem is to admit that you too are the product of evolution, culture, history, and introspection. That everything you hold to be wrong or right "objectively" would be entirely different if your evolutionary, cultural, historical, and introspective paths were different. It's really not hard. You really are complicating the simple.

You may say you’ve already answered them, and perhaps you have -- implicitly at least. You won't find understanding by asking loaded questions, whose answers you've predetermined Billy.

(can you psychoanalyze people you haven’t met? That’s amazing!). You've given us amny pages of material. (Charitably) assuming them to be true, it's not a big leap to make some guesses as to your motivations. If everything you type is sincere, and not an elaborate prank, I'd stake a lot of money on the ability to psychoanalyze you based on the post content.

In 261 you say I don’t have an answer to the Abraham and Isaac question. I do. And I thought I did answer already but I’ll do it again, just for you -- this time with greater attention and care so none miss it. Here’s the starting question: was it wrong of Abraham to prepare to kill his son Isaac on the order of God? Wrong in the sense I’ve been recently speaking of, wrong as in a break with the presiding moral law? No. Well there you go, BGiC does NOT think child torture is objectively wrong. He does not think the utterance 'child torture is wrong' is a true utterance.

Well there you go, BGiC does NOT think child torture is objectively wrong. He does not think the utterance 'child torture is wrong' is a true utterance.

One more time, in italics!

Well there you go, BGiC does NOT think child torture is objectively wrong. He does not think the utterance 'child torture is wrong' is a true utterance.

No. For right is a positive relation to the moral law, which was temporarily and uniquely set aside by the Lawmaker.

There it is again! Child torture, not always wrong,according to BGiC! I'm glad he finally admitted it!

In bold and italics!

Well there you go, BGiC does NOT think child torture is objectively wrong. He does not think the utterance 'child torture is wrong' is a true utterance.

And underline!

Well there you go, BGiC does NOT think child torture is objectively wrong. He does not think the utterance 'child torture is wrong' is a true utterance.

Looking again at what you ask, this time more closely, I see you say that because God does not exist in any demonstrable way you suggest He is therefore fictional such that God doesn’t command but a psychologically suspect ‘voice’ inside the head is what commands. It is unclear what you mean by demonstrable here but if you mean God’s existence is not demonstrable in any way at all, then you beg the biggest question in the worst way. If you mean He is not empirically verifiable, which is what I take you to mean, then, granted, God is not demonstrable in this way. But in that case neither are numbers, the laws of logic, thoughts, as are a host of other things that are not empirically verifiable yet must exist lest existence itself be completely unintelligible. There's actually a specific, named, fallacy for what you're doing here. But to be clear, let's point out that no one disagrees that a concept 'god' exists, that's a far cry from saying 'god exists'. (Well, maybe people do, how does one conceptualize omnipresence? omnipotence? Omnibenevolence? Omni-anything? There's some work for ya Billy. If you can't even show a coherent concept-god exists, I imagine it'll be tough for you to show a coherent entity-god exists.) 3 exists as a concept, and using that concept we can lump objects into groups of 3. Similarly, laws of logic, thoughts, and those other hosts of things you are equivocating to god-like status. If you think god exists only as a concept, then rock and roll. That doesn't actually help your case. You're hoping we'll miss the equivocation between god as concept, and god as entity.

Anat

May 28, 2005, 12:45 PM

In 258 you question what I mean by child torture. You say torture means different things to different folks. In the interest of one standard, why don’t we just go with how I spoke of it recently? That torture means one causing pain to another for one’s own pleasure and the like. So whatever the act, if the goal in the doing is to, say, make another suffer for suffering’s sake, or for one’s own amusement or some such, then that’s what I mean by torture. Torture is in the intent of the actor (as opposed to the act or the acted upon) as far as I’m concerned. Of course, you may choose to go with another meaning of the term but in that case we’ll end up talking about two different things and, as I forewarned, we’ll talk right past one another on to Judgement Day.

I post a short reply and you still don't read more than half of it. How are we going to get anywhere? I disagree that intent has much to do with the definition of torture. The victim will feel tortured nonetheless, regardless of the pure intentions of the perpetrator. My point was that it didn't matter if anything was 'objectively wrong'. People determine to themselves what they feel to be right or wrong for themselves and judge their own actions by those rules. People with similar ideas of right and wrong assemble as a group and decide to follow these rules that they agree upon among themselves and to enforce them on others that join them. People may show up with different ideas of right and wrong and try to convince others to see things their way. And so on. That's what people have been doing for several tens of thousands of years, at least.

There are people who think ideas about right and wrong can be derived from their interpretation of one book or another, others who derive right and wrong from trying to figure out who feels suffering in the short and long term as a result of a certain action and who is benefited by it, both in the short and long term - and then different people balance these outcomes in different ways. People have been persuaded to change some aspects of their ideas. They will change many times in the future.

Also, consider that the very same act can lead to different outcomes under different circumstances. The same act would be considered right or wrong under different circumstances by the very same people. So what would be covered under your supposed objective standards anyway?

Hobbs

May 30, 2005, 08:29 AM

are moral utterances (e.g., ‘child torture is wrong’) true and false? If so, what are they true and false in relation to?
Except BGiC, you've already admitted a double standard on that. You've admitted that these statements are only true or false for certain classes of subjects. I.E. They're subjective.

You've pointed out that the action of child torture is both wrong and right depending on who is performing or ordering it.
Good point, but I would use a different term than 'subjective' here. I would say that these statements being true or false for certain classes of subjects is an example of being 'relative' rather than 'subjective.' For an analogy, the statement "grass is nutritious" is a statement about something objective, but it is true only relative to some animals, such as cows. It is not true for humans and many other animals. It would be absolute if it were true for everything (or at least all things that require nutrition). So, BGIC has admitted that morality is relative rather than absolute: it depends on the situation, the actors, the intents, the results, etc. But is it subjective? And if so, in what sense? ...

"Torture is harmful" is an objectively true statement, or rather a true statement about an objective reality: a physical body is harmed. It is also a subjectively true statement, or rather a true statement about a subjective reality: the torture victim is angry, fearful, and distrustful as a result, i.e. the victim suffers real mental (subjective) harm. These harms are no less real for being subjective.

The statement "torture is wrong" cannot be said to be "true" in the same sense that "torture is harmful" is a true statement about objective and subjective realities, because it is not the same sort of statement, it is not a direct truth statement about the factual status of something real. Rather, it is a judgment about the merit or worth or desirability or value of a situation, circumstance, or action in relation to its real effects on real beings that can be benefited or harmed by those situations etc, which cannot be determined outside of or without reference to a specific context. The moral judgment "torture is wrong" is, since it is a judgment (a product of thought), a subjective statement. But that judgment is not arbitrary: it is grounded in, and can be defended in reference to, those objective and subjective facts.

In a broader sense, I think you could say that "torture is wrong" can be a true statement, or at least a rationally defensible statement, if by "true" you do not mean just a direct factual statement about an objective or subjective reality, but a rationally defensible subjective judgment about objective and subjective realities in a specific context. But rather than being "true or false," or "right or wrong," I think it is more accurate to say moral judgments are "better or worse," more or less reasonable judgments of what would be appropriate to do in certain situations. And, of course, there can be reasonable debate about what is more or less reasonable (there can be unreasonable debate, too; some moral claims are just ridiculous), and we have no single objectively verifiable test to figure out which is "right" (or ridiculous).

Perhaps an analogy with science would help illustrate. (Note that I say this is an [i]analogy, BGIC. An analogy uses similarities to illustrate a point; it is not a claim that the analogs are the same; only that they are similar enough in some relevant way for one to illustrate something about the other.) In science, facts are directly testable statements about the world. Theories are explanations of those facts, and they are tested or verified in a different way. You can do one specific test to verify whether, for example, light is in fact bent by gravity. But you cannot do just one test to verify the general theory of relativity because that theory is not a statement about a specific objective or subjective fact, but an explanation of a bunch of facts and how those facts all hang together. The theory of relativity, as a product of the mind, something the mind comes up with as a coherent explanation of a bunch of facts, is subjective. But it can be rationally defended, and even increasingly supported by tests of the facts it is meant to account for.

I think of morality as theorizing about how to live a good human life: taking all the objective and subjective facts about humans and trying to figure out what constitutes good functioning for these creatures, what sorts of actions by what sorts of individuals in what sorts of situations contribute to or detract from our well-being. A moral judgment is a claim that in this particular case, or in general in cases of this sort, acting in certain ways is better than acting in other ways. Moral claims are not true or false, at least not in the way that statements such as "gravity bends light" or "grass is nutritious" or "torture is harmful" are true. But they can be rationally defended as reasonable judgments of what are better ways to act in specific situations, or more generally how to live a good human life.

If there is a god, and that god has actually given us a list of moral standards, I suppose morality for us could be just a matter of following those standards, or of figuring out how those standards apply to specific individuals in specific situations. But that leaves open the question of how this god came up with his moral standards in the first place. Did he just pull them out of his head (or some other part of his anatomy)? Or did he have good reasons to justify his standards? I contend that if there is a god, this is the way he would come up with his moral standards. In the absense of a god, or at least in the absense of a god who makes his standards clear to everyone, then it is up to us to come up with rationally defensible standards.

Hobbs

May 30, 2005, 08:41 AM

My chief objection to Christianity is that it turns 'brother against brother' and has scriptural back-up proving this is a good thing.

Thus, it turns out IN PRACTICE to be a religion of hatred and division - not one of love at all - that's why I hate and fear it. Especially I abhor the existence of horrible biblical texts that endorse such division.

... 'A man's worst enemies will be those of his own household... I come to set mother against daughter' etc etc. ...
Excellent point. That has happened in my wife's family.

BGIC, if you have a chance to get around to it, I'd be interested in seeing how you deal with these scriptures.

sharon45

May 30, 2005, 02:42 PM

Sorry if this is breaking into interesting discussions but I just wanted to answer the original question. My chief objection to Christianity is that it turns 'brother against brother' and has scriptural back-up proving this is a good thing.

Thus, it turns out IN PRACTICE to be a religion of hatred and division - not one of love at all - that's why I hate and fear it. Especially I abhor the existence of horrible biblical texts that endorse such division.

My own family - once as loving and as close-knit as you could possibly get - is in danger of such terrible division because one of us is a fundamentalist Christian and the rest of us are not. I ask myself, how can a religion of 'love' turn out in practice to be the cause of dissension? Even within loving families?

Tentative answer: it encourages people to forget their basic humanity. They forget their humble similarity to other humans - instead they think they are God's instrument. And their hearts swell with a sort of evil pride. The Christian belief therefore changes a previously nice person and makes them ready to write off their fellow human being 'for Christ'.

The worst thing is that a Christian can even quote 'Scripture' to validate this dreadful outcome eg. 'A man's worst enemies will be those of his own household... I come to set mother against daughter' etc etc. If a person takes this too literally - as true Christians are supposed to do, aren't they? - it means the members of a loving family may stop talking to one another. Jesus wants this, doesn't he?

Well, what could be more devilish? So that's my chief objection to Christianity. In practice it looks too much like this:Jesus has people picked out for a very specific and special purpose. Something of such an utmost importance that they will not only be persecuted by just about anybody, their own family will also be against them. They have to be able to believe in him thus being better to believe in themselves. They have to deny themselves and where they came from. It is nothing that is important anymore and it wasn't even near practice for what is to come. One has to completely give up of themselves to be made strong and stay in focus on what jesus wants to happen. What everyone should want to and has to happen for all the world's sake.

This is what a cult does. The Us against Them aspect.

A stranger tells you that you are loved and selected from the many because you hold certain unique and valuable attributes that they want used to help in a righteously grand plan. One on such a scale that it will be like the whole world is at odds with you. If you don't believe in yourself, you will be told that they honestly believe in you. They continue to tell that you are easily strong enough to accomplish this task, but everyone will take it slow so that you also will in time come to realize this.

You are not understood by your family. They make rules you must follow that you do not accept and agree with. They want to limit and control you. To keep you down from really ever knowing or pursuing your true potential. They want what is best for them, not for you. They are really only interested in pleasing themselves and society.

They don't love you and they don't believe in you. I really love you though and I very much believe in you. There are many just like you and I have brought us all together. We all live, love and help each other. We are all equals under one household. You don't choose your family, but you can freely choose us. Don't listen to your family, they don't want to help you and they don't share in your goals. All of us will be your real family and we will help each other attain our goals. We all together living as one, in the pursuit for one objective, will make right all the past wrongs. Together we will build a more true society. In time, we will be able to repair this thoroughly broken world. True harmony and paradise is within reach. We all need to keep our sights and minds clearly connected to firmly grasp this perfect future.

Jesus puts forth such a great challenge and just that alone excites people. He stirs up passions. People evaluate a possible destiny because they never thought of themselves as that important. They never thought they could actually make a difference.

Everyone else is blind and deaf to this though. They are ignorant and content with confusion. They not only accept the cage they live in, they don't want anyone else to be free. They want everyone to suffer together.

He shows an obvious reason for mistrust. So anyone who thought that they loved their family, will start now to question certain moments that were considered quite trivial at the time. They might have dwelled upon those longer, but instead blocked it out. Those members of a family that had already set a degree of animosity between each other, this will further be exacerbated.

All this because of a mere personal suggestion. An ungrounded assertion. A misunderstanding and corruption from a passage of another's belief. A lie.

This is from Micah 7:1-7, but it is not about dividing, they were already well apart as it was. The division was because of unfaithfulness to god and that led to the chaos. Not obeying god's laws brought about a desperate spiraling downward. So much so, that no one could trust really anyone anymore, not even those that they thought once were their closest allies. The greater purpose is to always remain united with god and thus all will remain united with each other. This is all mentioned numerous times throughout the OT. All must follow god's laws and teachings, because what seems like little pieces that fall away, eventually starts breaking down the whole until it all lies in crumbs to be blown by the wind.

The Messiah is suppose to bring unity and everyone firmly together. He is suppose to have it accomplished that everyone follows god's laws, not do away with or overshadow them by making up brand new ones. All nations will be a peace and there will be no more wars.

Jesus claims to be the Jewish Messiah, but he clearly wasn't. Jesus was instead a false prophet from out of Deuteronomy 13 sent to test and try to divide. Jesus didn't help as much as he opened up much more serious events to come. A long brutal march across hundreds of years. Christianity not only broke up others, but they also thoroughly broke up themselves with massive religious wars and into thousands of different sects.

Jobar

May 30, 2005, 02:44 PM

That is, His law and commands are reflective of what is right, not singularly determinative of what is right. In the final analysis, right is ultimately tied to God’s person.

That looks contradictory to me. If his law is not "singularly determinative" of right, how can you say then that right is "ultimately tied to his person"? Can God give laws and commands that somehow aren't "tied to his person"? Wouldn't those laws and commands then be erroneous, or even lies?

I think you're trying to straddle the horns of the dilemma, and not succeeding.

Jobar

May 30, 2005, 05:56 PM

Oh yes- Hobbs, I want to say that your posts over the past couple of pages, particularly #289, have been breath-takingly, scintillatingly brilliant. :notworthy

I thought that Billy was indeed wasting his time, and ours; but since he inspired those posts, I have to say he's not wasting our time after all. Billy, you owe Hobbs big-time, whether you realize it or not; his deep, gentle and generous answers to your oft-repeated (and oft-answered) questions are to be read repeatedly; wisdom like that is rare and precious, and you should appreciate his efforts. I certainly do. :thumbs:

Cross Examiner

May 31, 2005, 02:03 PM

About 267. I thought I’ve already said this but, yes, an objection to God’s existence is relevant to a claim that Jesus is the Son of God and, yes, the claim that He is the Son of God is neither identical to nor necessitated by the claim that He arose. My claim is that the first Christians said both Jesus arose and is the Son of God and so, were I to get the time, I’d examine what this claim meant in it’s appropriate contexts and then I’d argue that the bodily resurrection of Jesus of Nazareth is the best explanation of this claim, among a number other peculiar things needing explanation. So I’m not entirely sure what your two points above have to do with any argument I might make. Where are you going with this?

You then ask about how to interpret my original question. My original question can simply be read as a means to see if historical, orthodox Christianity is understood here or not, for you cannot rightly disbelieve or lack belief in what you don’t understand. I think you suggest that the answers I got to my question do not tell me whether or not Christianity is understood because the answer I didn’t get, the resurrection, is too narrow to be what Christianity is primarily about. Now, I disagree but don’t really care to contest the matter right now as it appears moot anyway. We’re off to other things.

Apparently, what you really want to talk about is the problem of suffering. More precisely, you say you want to put the idea of suffering-as-human-refinement aside for now in order to focus on those particular types and causes of suffering not seemingly useful for this purpose. Things like viruses and animal pain etc. So what of the pain of those unable to learn or grow from it -- or otherwise unable to be refined and changed by it? What purpose does their pain serve? You say you can’t use words like good, righteous and loving of a Being ultimately responsible for disease and the like, whether or not this Being claims to have a redeeming purpose (i.e., a morally sufficient reason). You say if I speak of God in this way then I must use these words in a non-standard sense, for I wouldn’t speak this way of a human were a human ultimately responsible for the suffering attributable to God. Your claim seems to come down to ‘God can have no morally sufficient reason for [certain sorts of] suffering that might justify any calling Him good in the normal sense of the word.’ The bracketed phrase is shorthand for that type of suffering seemingly gratuitous or unredeemable. Before I respond, do I read you right?

John A. Broussard

May 31, 2005, 02:38 PM

‘God can have no morally sufficient reason for [certain sorts of] suffering that might justify any calling Him good in the normal sense of the word.’

Assumption 1. God is all powerful--can do anything.

Assumption 2. God does not enjoy having people suffer.

Assumption 3. Innocent people suffer.

Assumption 4. God could have prevented that suffering, but the consequences of his doing so would have been worse than the suffering.

Assumption 5. God couldn't have prevented that suffering and also prevented the worse suffering that would result.

Since the above is something god cannot do, he is either not all-powerful, or he in fact enjoys having people suffer.

Please! In answer to the above, don't give me a bunch of biblical quotations. I don't believe in the "divinely inspired bible." However, if you want to convince me I'm wrong in holding that view about your bible, open a separate thread and we'll debate it.

Cross Examiner

May 31, 2005, 03:49 PM

In 269 you say you cannot trust Scripture or the Church on matters of truth. You say the Bible gets it wrong from the beginning all the way through the OT and on down to the resurrection. You add that if it’s false in part (or one) then it’s false in whole (or all). You say it’s a flawed document inadmissible as evidence in a court of law; it’s writers clearly unqualified to testify and a lousy place to rest one’s everlasting trust. In the hands of human science is a better place to rest, you say, as it’s conclusions, unlike those of Scripture and the Church, are open to inquiry, falsifiable and reasoned out inductively (well, you don’t quite say this last line, but I think that’s where you aim to go). This is quite a mouthful of rather straightforward and interesting assertions. Unlike the prior post, I don’t think it very likely I’ve misread this one so I’ll go ahead and offer a bit of analysis.

The first thing I notice is the sweeping generalization. False from cover to cover? Not likely. Why don’t we set a more modest, realistic goal? You say the Bible gets it wrong at the beginning. The Bible says in the beginning God created the world. Is this false? You say it is. Did the world then spring into existence from nothing? Or has it always been in existence in one form or another? I next notice a doozy of a non sequitur. How would it follow that one error in a book, any book, means the whole book is utterly erroneous? For what it’s worth, I do believe in Biblical inerrancy but, unlike many, do not think the Christian faith hinges upon it. Not by any means. Since you next bring up a courtroom metaphor, saying, rather ironically, that the Bible wouldn’t stand up to legal scrutiny, let me remind you that Simon Greenleaf, a principle founder of Harvard Law and formulator of the rules of evidence, and so an expert rebuttal witness to your own opinion, concluded his own inquiry into the admissibility of the Gospel narratives and the credibility of the evangelists as witnesses finding them each beyond satisfactory to stand up to scrutiny. That just a taste though. We can look seriously at this issue if you like.

Lastly you say human science goes about its business in a better way, suggesting theology is done only from the top down, offering only unquestionable dogmas and unchanging, Cartesian-esque propositions. Here I’m reminded that Sir John Polkinghorne, both a scientist and a theologian, does both disciplines from the bottom up, as may any Christian. I humbly suggest that science and theology are not necessarily at odds with one another nor must they take opposite approaches to their respective subject matters. Goodness, so much to say about this post. Let me give a cursory opinion on what I think is the root problem: a modern, Western literalism that tends to condense the possibly myriad layers of meaning residing in each Biblical line into one or two impoverished understandings that must fit a Procrustean Bed or be cut at the ends. I find that unbelievers (and many sorts of Christians too!) are often well read in the Bible, but do not often read the Bible well. I reiterate that you can’t rightly disbelieve what you don’t understand. Posts like this only strengthen my conviction that many of you folks don’t understand what you say you don’t believe.

John A. Broussard

May 31, 2005, 06:00 PM

I reiterate that you can’t rightly disbelieve what you don’t understand. Posts like this only strengthen my conviction that many of you folks don’t understand what you say you don’t believe.[/FONT]
You could help me to understand by answering the following--which I posted earlier:

Your statement: ‘God can have no morally sufficient reason for [certain sorts of] suffering that might justify any calling Him good in the normal sense of the word.’

Assumption 1. God is all powerful--can do anything.

Assumption 2. God does not enjoy having people suffer.

Assumption 3. Innocent people suffer.

Assumption 4. God could have prevented that suffering, but the consequences of his doing so would have been worse than the suffering.

Assumption 5. God couldn't have prevented that suffering and also prevented the worse suffering that would result.

Since the above is something god cannot do, he is either not all-powerful, or he in fact enjoys having people suffer.

Please! In answer to the above, don't give me a bunch of biblical quotations. I don't believe in the "divinely inspired bible." However, if you want to convince me I'm wrong in holding that view about your bible, open a separate thread and we'll debate it.

Jobar

May 31, 2005, 06:49 PM

...you cannot rightly disbelieve or lack belief in what you don’t understand.

Most people are bothered by those passages of scripture they do not understand, but the passages that bother me are those I DO understand.

{Huh. Never realised quotes didn't count as characters in a quick reply post...}

J-D

May 31, 2005, 07:33 PM

Cross Examiner

June 1, 2005, 10:22 AM

John A. Broussard

June 1, 2005, 04:40 PM

I note your persistence so I’ll break from the normal order of response to briefly address your concern. In posts 319 and 321, you apparently mean to pose some deductive form of the problem of evil (or suffering or pain). You offer me five lines of argument, the three standard premises of the PoE and then two conclusions you draw from these premises. I take it you think these two conclusions exhaust all possible inference and that, when taken together, constitute the horns of a dilemma that forces the theist to sacrifice either divine power or benevolence (and so call into question divine existence). You then warn me not to respond from the Bible. Do I read you right?

I thought it was all very simple and forthright. I'll repeat it again.

***
You could help me to understand by answering the following--which I posted earlier:

Your statement: ‘God can have no morally sufficient reason for [certain sorts of] suffering that might justify any calling Him good in the normal sense of the word.’

Assumption 1. God is all powerful--can do anything.

Assumption 2. God does not enjoy having people suffer.

Assumption 3. Innocent people suffer.

Assumption 4. God could have prevented that suffering, but the consequences of his doing so would have been worse than the suffering.

Assumption 5. God couldn't have prevented that suffering and also prevented the worse suffering that would result.

Since the above is something god cannot do, he is either not all-powerful, or he in fact enjoys having people suffer.

Please! In answer to the above, don't give me a bunch of biblical quotations. I don't believe in the "divinely inspired bible." However, if you want to convince me I'm wrong in holding that view about your bible, open a separate thread and we'll debate it.

***

I don't see how I could make it any simpler, but I'm open to suggestions. Perhaps the easiest thing for you to do is to take each of my assumptions and answer yes or no. Or, if you want to qualify each answer, that's OK too. Just please keep it brief.

Cross Examiner

June 2, 2005, 12:37 PM

In 271 you astutely observe that I reply to post numbers rather than poster’s names and that I sum up what the previous post says. You then suggest that this is the wrong way to go and ask me to appeal to Jesus. Sadly, you don’t say why this is the wrong way and don’t offer me a better one. However, I'm not without my disclosable reasons for posting this way so I’ll share a few of them with you:

1. Oh, the headache. I don’t want to track and match a bunch of names to a bunch of posts. Names in particular are just more things for me to mix up or forget altogether. Which is to say less about your memorable names than it is to say about my memory.

2. Names just kill the mood. I like to think of this as a dialogue between you and me -- the word ‘you’ meant here in the general rather than particular sense as in 'vous' rather than 'tu', if you will. That way I can label all of you even if only one of you gets out of line.

3. What confusion? Between the written context and the cited post number, I think it is sufficiently clear to whom I’m speaking. At least I think the one to whom I speak knows to whom I speak. Know what I mean?

3. Off point. I want to focus on ideas; whether true or not, probable or not, clear or not, relevant or not, significant or not, good or not, useful or not, beautiful or not etc. I don’t want to focus on names or anything else that might distract from the ideas and these respective categories.

5. One exception. Kids like flashy stickers but don't like getting their names on the board. If in the rare circumstance I do have some criticism I’d still rather not draw too much attention to the criticized so I'll not likely call that person out by name. They'll know who they are. On the other hand, If I have praise, I may very well call out the name as that is a horse of a different color. Hobbs, for example, has indeed written some intriguing posts that I look forward to getting to. While I’m at it, I should also mention that I’ve found J-D’s manner to date respectful, straightforward and otherwise conducive to meaningful discussion. These guys deserve stickers.

6. No, there's not an echo in here. I sum up what you say to show that I understand what you say. If I don’t understand, if my summation misses the mark, then you can correct it then I’ can thank you for it and we can all avoid a lot of frustration in the process. This is discovery before argument; it is a sort of handshaking method practiced in some business circles that paves the way for a more meaningful discussion. It is also in keeping with the aim of this thread and so something I recommend we all do. If you got the general idea, let me know in some verifiable way.

So now I’ve given you reasons for why I post the way I do. If you still think this is the wrong way and/or that there’s a better way to go about it, don’t just tell me, show me. Give me some reasons to share your opinion. I like reasons even more than kids like stickers.

Speaking of kids, you next ask that I say whether or not it is wrong of someone to kill a child if God really does (?) command it. Aside from other difficulties, I think you’re question is a bit like asking whether or not the number 5 is blue so, in the spirit of the one-word-answers you apparently crave, I’d answer both questions with ‘N/A’. Which is to say, as I said before, I don’t think unmistakable divine commands sort into the normal moral categorization you're after (mistakable divine commands are another matter, mind you). Plato’s Euthyphro dilemma, which is where I think this might ultimately head, likewise asks whether God is above (or perhaps identical to) the moral law or below it when neither category applies. That aside for now, and speaking again of the moral law, moral categories and divine commands, the moral law, or the relevant portions of it at least, divides the independent acts and intents of men into the normal moral categories of right and wrong. But divine commands and the moral law are neither always identical to nor coextensive with one another so if we try to label compliance or non-compliance with divine command using the categories of the moral law we only confuse things unnecessarily.

And now in thinking of two other important terms of moral language, I note that what is ‘right’ (in a more legal sense) and what is ‘good’ (in the sense of benevolence or love) are also neither always identical to nor coextensive with one another. For an example in keeping with the theme of this topic, if God has the right to all life then He is right to give it or take it as He sees fit but whether or not He is good in so doing is another matter entirely. And one perhaps better suited for another time. Heading back more towards the source, if you read the story in Gen. 22.1-19 and think it is about the prescriptive and universal moral law, then you’ve not only missed many rich layers of meaning (e.g., the theological, soteriological, christological etc.) but have read into the story something that is simply not there. Which is akin to not only missing the forest for the trees, but also mistaking the trees themselves for concrete buildings. So here I am again reminded that it is one thing to be well read in the Bible and quite another to read the Bible well. But if it is true that all you’re really after is a simple, one-word-answer to your question, then please disregard the above and just put me down for ‘N/A’.

J-D

June 2, 2005, 07:47 PM

And now in thinking of two other important terms of moral language, I note that what is ‘right’ (in a more legal sense) and what is ‘good’ (in the sense of benevolence or love) are also neither always identical to nor coextensive with one another. For an example in keeping with the theme of this topic, if God has the right to all life then He is right to give it or take it as He sees fit but whether or not He is good in so doing is another matter entirely.Maybe. But I think you are mixing up two senses of 'right'. To illustrate: I think the questions 'Is that the right thing to do?' and 'Do you have a right to do that?' have different meanings and may also have different answers.

Cross Examiner

June 3, 2005, 02:12 PM

In post 272,

You say:
The New Testament (hereafter, NT) writers disagree with one another on what Christianity is about. But you don’t say who the disputants are, what exactly they dispute, or how you know any of this.

You say:
Jesus would disagree with much of the NT. But you don’t say with what He would disagree or how you know this.

You say:
Jesus disagrees with Himself. But you don’t say over what or how you know this.

You say:
The NT is shot through with deception and that this statement is itself sufficiently clear and precise. This one committs suicide.

You say:
The NT writers didn’t even read Isaiah much less did they understand it. But you don’t say how you know any of this.

You say:
My previous post to you is full of logical fallacies. But you are apparently unwilling or unable to name much less evince a single fallacy.

You say:
The portrait of faith painted in the NT book of Hebrews differs from the one Jesus paints. But you don’t say how these two visions differ and how you know they differ.

You say:
The message of the NT is unknowable. But you don’t say how you know it is unknowable.

You say:
The NT is internally conflicted. But you don’t spot the conflict for us and you don't say how you know this.

You say:
The NT encourages blind faith rather than reasonable faith. But you do not say how you know this.

You say:
You witness for reason ...

But what you’ve actually offered above is a laundry list of vague and unsupported opinion. No questions asked. No word study. No reference to the original language or any of the various contexts. No appeal to expert testimony. No inference to best explanation. No falsifiable thesis. No ideas clarified, linked, supported or argued in any way, shape or form. In short, you’ve given nothing approaching a reasoned response yet you say to testify on the behalf of reason nonetheless. That another later echoes you in praising this post as a witness to the light of reason strikes me as the height of irony -- whether of the tragic or comedic sort I cannot tell. Now, I don’t normally quote directly but this one begs to be outed as both an object lesson in how not to write and as vindication of our efforts here to clear the air:

Some things just stand out more than others and those remain enough as reality. Now reality is constantly expanded and more properly defined as people dare to venture out into the unknowns bringing back reliable information. No one is asking for you to face the same as the more certain. We are encouraged to experiment as a people in order to further our understanding as a whole. Be warned though, because the further one tries to lead off in their own chosen directions, the much more vague, untrustworthy, conflicted, and complicated things can become.

Reality itself doesn’t grow with our exploration of it. I think you mean to say our knowledge of reality grows with our exploration of it. As to the rest of this quixotic discursive, I am at a loss to understand or explain it yet I do find it useful to serve as a reminder of the truth that behind such muck and mire lurk the most dubious of ideas. Which is not to say the entire post is without value for you do offer two promising albeit similar claims:

1. You say the Old Testament or Tanakh (hereafter, OT) does not foreshadow anyone resembling the picture of Jesus Christ that the NT paints.

2. You say the OT says nothing of a Messiah or Christ who suffers, dies or rises as satisfaction for sin.

So let’s try this position with a few starter questions. What do you say? Is there a concept of Messiah at all in the OT? If so, what does the OT say who and what Messiah is to be? More concretely, who do you say is the subject of Isaiah 9.6 (http://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=Isaiah%209.6;&version=49;) and Micah 5.2 (http://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=Mic%205.2;&version=49;)? Here are the texts themselves if you’d rather not follow the links:

Isaiah 9.6
For a child will be born to us, a son will be given to us;
And the government will rest on His shoulders;
And His name will be called Wonderful Counselor, Mighty God,
Eternal Father, Prince of Peace.

Micah 5.2
But as for you, Bethlehem Ephrathah,
Too little to be among the clans of Judah,
From you One will go forth for Me to be ruler in Israel
His goings forth are from long ago,
From the days of eternity.

Who is this child with names reserved for God? Who is this one born in time and space yet ultimately from days eternal? You may wish to say ‘it is not Jesus’ but then that means you know who it is for you must know who it is in order to know who it is not. So who is it these passages speak of?

Cross Examiner

June 3, 2005, 03:08 PM

In 274 you say we’ve mapped the sole function of a certain neuron in a certain woman’s brain to distinguishing between a line and a certain picture. After that, you suggest with a cartoon that I have a cartoonish view of the mind. You then say neurobiology has somehow discredited substance dualism. Yawn. To your first claim I ask, so? To your second I ask, how do you know? To your third I ask, why do think that? Connect the dots.

In 275 you ask whether unborn babies go to heaven or hell if they die. I don’t know. I haven’t really looked at the issue. Next.

In 277 you say the answer to both the question of child torture and the purpose of life is to treat others as you wish to be treated. This answer misses the points of both questions but I tire of correcting this and the many, many other sorts of mistakes. Change of method. I’ve assumed everyone who writes gets written to. No more. Going forward, I’m going to only write to those deserving to be written to. Aim for Hobbs-like quality in your writing and someone will surely want to write back.

John A. Broussard

June 3, 2005, 04:45 PM

Change of method. I’ve assumed everyone who writes gets written to. No more. Going forward, I’m going to only write to those deserving to be written to. Aim for Hobbs-like quality in your writing and someone will surely want to write back.[/FONT]

Translation: I'll only answer those questions I want to answer.

But,BGIC, how is that different from what you've been doing right along?

judanne

June 5, 2005, 12:43 AM

DID most other posters here used to be theists? I never have been. I didn't realise that I was in the company of a bunch of ex theists :D
I've never been a theist. I enjoy IIDB quite a lot. It's a social place as much as it is a place to debate, deconvert or whatever. It's a little oasis of reason and rationality - a place we non-believers can share thoughts, frustrations and opinions that would cause us grief or harm if shared openly in our respective theistic societies. It's a place we can talk freely to other non-believers in our attempt to understand and coexist within societies we often consider quite irrational and primitive.

judanne

June 5, 2005, 01:00 AM

Yeah, us life-long atheists are few and far between. But so it goes. :D
I think it's often more difficult for us (moreso than ex-theists) to comprehend how anyone could believe in such things as supernatural beings. For us, believing in a god is no different in kind or degree than is believing in leprechan's at the end of rainbows, tooth fairies, santa clause or the evil eye. It's a fantasy world we don't buy into but are forced to live in nevertheless.

Bright Life

June 5, 2005, 08:04 AM

Judanne,

Imagine how I felt! I was an atheist child with a christian dad & an uberfundy mom.

Yikes!

BL

Hopeful Monsters

June 5, 2005, 02:34 PM

So who is it these passages speak of?So who does this passage speak of―He who will not eat of my body and drink of my blood, so that he will be made one with me and I with him, the same shall not know salvationWho was believed to be―… the sower of the wordand said to preach―the establishment of a kingdom of righteousnessand be―Savior of the World
Light of the WorldWho was called―the Good Shepherdand―Infinite and EverlastingWho was referred to as―Shepherd God
Lord of Lords
the Redeemer
Sin Bearer
Liberator
Universal WordWho was called― Lord of Lords
King of Kings
God of Godsand was―the Resurrection and the Life
the Good Shepherd
Eternity and Everlastingness
the god who 'made men and women to be born again'Of whom was it written in scripture that―they drank from that spiritual rock and that rock was (six letter name here)Who is attributed these words―�?I have come to be thy protection … I have taken away the veil above thee, from him who acted against thee�?

then

“[he] has gathered for thee thy bones, he has restored thy limbs to health, he has removed all evil, he has caused all sorrow to depart. Thou shalt not decay�?

sharon45

June 6, 2005, 12:50 AM

In post 272,

You say:
The New Testament (hereafter, NT) writers disagree with one another on what Christianity is about. But you don’t say who the disputants are, what exactly they dispute, or how you know any of this.Look through the gospels, the differences are clear enough just with them alone.

As to how I know this, I can firmly ask the same of you as well and for about every other dispute you have listed below.

Show why every writer in the NT is in agreement with everything each writer presents in the NT and also how you know this.

You say:
Jesus would disagree with much of the NT. But you don’t say with what He would disagree or how you know this.So then one I can give has to do with the true purpose to the sermon on the mount as opposed to the dying/resurrection concept. These deserve respect for whole threads by thenselves at least, not for just one person to think they somehow hold 'all the answers'.

Show why everything that jesus says would be in agreement with the other writers and also how you know this.

You say:
Jesus disagrees with Himself. But you don’t say over what or how you know this.Because I am not interested in writing a book on the subject, I was giving examples already.

With your questions so far, one would have to give an example, then an example of that, followed by an example of that, etc. I don't see you doing much to this extent on your end besides just listing a series of questions instead of actually thinking enough about the statements given well beforehand.

Once again I can give the true purpose to the sermon on the mount as opposed to the dying/resurrection concept.

You say:
The NT is shot through with deception and that this statement is itself sufficiently clear and precise. This one committs suicide.No, your NT committed suicide many times over. Many thoroughly realize this and they gave it a burial. As I've said enough times, the NT uses itself as its only defense for its multiple assertions and fails deeply in this regard.

You say:
The NT writers didn’t even read Isaiah much less did they understand it. But you don’t say how you know any of this.Second time through. I did not say this, I said "that the NT's writers should have really read these passages." The NT's writers have to provide why they think jesus somehow fits in here, or christians should, because they truly haven't up till now. Since I am not making the first assertion, but you are, you should at least provide a real reason for this. Practice what you preach.

You say:
My previous post to you is full of logical fallacies. But you are apparently unwilling or unable to name much less evince a single fallacy.Again, pointing this out should have been well enough, but for you, apparently it is not. Read it through a few more times, afterall, it was your example.

I will give you a hint about one of your fallacies though: I am not the one providing the evidence and neither are the NT writers.

You say:
The portrait of faith painted in the NT book of Hebrews differs from the one Jesus paints. But you don’t say how these two visions differ and how you know they differ.I didn't say it because it is clear for anyone to read. You are the one who first quoted hebrews 11:1, not I. You had the first unsupported assertion using it as an example, yet you failed to give reasons for its purpose and why you know this. Again, practice what you preach.

Show enough passages that provide jesus stating faith along the same lines of hebrews 11:1. Show any evidence revealing that without any doubt, the NT is a book of absolute fact. Show any evidence that christianity is a complete fact, not a belief. Show any evidence revealing that jesus is without a doubt, the real expected Jewish Messiah, and/or god or the real son of god.

The christian belief does relies on blind faith. None of it can be completely certain. Jesus wants people to have faith and believe that he is someone that they know for certain that he is not.

You say:
The message of the NT is unknowable. But you don’t say how you know it is unknowable.Because there is no central agreement. Jesus passes himself as the Messiah, but fullfills none of the requirements, one being is to bring peace to the whole world and not die before that is accomplished.

Once again back to the sermon on the mount and the dying/resurrection concept.

You say:
The NT is internally conflicted. But you don’t spot the conflict for us and you don't say how you know this.Really read through the gospels then, along with paul and james to name just a few and you would actually know it as well.

State every event, idea, quotation, and concept written in the NT and explain why it does not conflict with any other event, idea, quotation, and concept written in the NT, and say why you know this.

You say:
The NT encourages blind faith rather than reasonable faith. But you do not say how you know this.If you don't also know this yourself, then you are the one that has to present a counter for this belief and why you know this, not I.

You say:
You witness for reason ...I said that "I am trying to witness for reason", not that I am reason incarnate.

But what you’ve actually offered above is a laundry list of vague and unsupported opinion.No, I gave some clear statements concerning a much larger list of groundless and unsupported assertions made by the NT itself. These are also not my opinion though.

No questions asked. No word study. No reference to the original language or any of the various contexts. No appeal to expert testimony. No inference to best explanation. No falsifiable thesis. No ideas clarified, linked, supported or argued in any way, shape or form. In short, you’ve given nothing approaching a reasoned response yet you say to testify on the behalf of reason nonetheless. That another later echoes you in praising this post as a witness to the light of reason strikes me as the height of irony -- whether of the tragic or comedic sort I cannot tell.I made clear statements, some you responded to while others you did not. Now you already tried to belittle me, but don't try also to make light of someone else because you fail to see a need for a person's appreciation of my effort.

I present things mostly as I do, because I don't see much of anyone christian willing to take the time to actually discuss these important subjects as they truly deserve. Even though you have taken obviously a great deal of time to try to respond to questions in this thread, you are still not really making any impact on defending yourself. Especially with concern to the OP and with even the originally hidden agenda about the resurrection.

Now, I don’t normally quote directly but this one begs to be outed as both an object lesson in how not to write and as vindication of our efforts here to clear the air:

Reality itself doesn’t grow with our exploration of it.I didn't say that it did.
I think you mean to say our knowledge of reality grows with our exploration of it.[/quout] Again, I didn't say that either.
[quote=Billy Graham is cool]As to the rest of this quixotic discursive, I am at a loss to understand or explain it yet I do find it useful to serve as a reminder of the truth that behind such muck and mire lurk the most dubious of ideas. Which is not to say the entire post is without value for you do offer two promising albeit similar claims:Just because you don't understand what I wrote, does not mean you can make such ignorant personal attacks. You either don't want to take the time to understand,(which I can respect), or just willfully refuse to understand, and that is your own problem while it bears no ill reflection on me.

...they may look but not see, and listen but not understand.

1. You say the Old Testament or Tanakh (hereafter, OT) does not foreshadow anyone resembling the picture of Jesus Christ that the NT paints.

2. You say the OT says nothing of a Messiah or Christ who suffers, dies or rises as satisfaction for sin.So let’s try this position with a few starter questions. What do you say? Is there a concept of Messiah at all in the OT?Of course.If so, what does the OT say who and what Messiah is to be?The Messiah will be just a very gifted fully human leader from the actual line of David through Solomon. He will not be a god or part of a god. With his first and only coming, he will bring about peace across the world. He will bring all the Jews from other countries back to Israel. He will rebuild the Temple and also everyone in all nations will realize G-d as the only true god and that Judaism is the only true religion. Everyone on earth on will follow the Laws of Moses and give praise and glory to G-d. The Messiah can not die until he has done all that was prophesied.

More concretely, who do you say is the subject of Isaiah 9.6 and Micah 5.2? Here are the texts themselves if you’d rather not follow the links:

Isaiah 9.6
For a child will be born to us, a son will be given to us;
And the government will rest on His shoulders;
And His name will be called Wonderful Counselor, Mighty God,
Eternal Father, Prince of Peace.

Micah 5.2
But as for you, Bethlehem Ephrathah,
Too little to be among the clans of Judah,
From you One will go forth for Me to be ruler in Israel
His goings forth are from long ago,
From the days of eternity.

Who is this child with names reserved for God? Who is this one born in time and space yet ultimately from days eternal? You may wish to say ‘it is not Jesus’ but then that means you know who it is for you must know who it is in order to know who it is not. So who is it these passages speak of?Both Isaiah and Micah are talking about the coming Messiah. The names are just that, a name, respectful of G-d and descriptive of purpose. Something akin to the names in Isaiah 7:14 and Isaiah 8:3.

Of course there are no people in present times named jesus, because if there were, wouldn't these people be confused with being god?

Micah's example talks about the Messiah coming from a birthline of ancient times.

And yes of course, these are not talking about jesus. These two still don't even hint at one like jesus.

Change of method. I’ve assumed everyone who writes gets written to. No more. Going forward, I’m going to only write to those deserving to be written to. Aim for Hobbs-like quality in your writing and someone will surely want to write back.You can choose to answer anyone you see fit, just don't think this is going to pass off as the excuse though, because such a statement works both ways. I too would like answers coming from people like Hobbs that are sincere in giving their answers instead of a response of insults and of asking even more questions.

judanne

June 6, 2005, 07:40 PM

Judanne,

Imagine how I felt! I was an atheist child with a christian dad & an uberfundy mom.

Yikes!

BL
It must have been an ultra difficult childhood. I was fortunate in that my parents probably had only some vague Christian beliefs way back then. They would probably best be described now as agnostic, maybe even veering toward atheist. Do you maintain a relationship with your parents? Not my business I guess, so don't answer if it's too personal. I just wondered. My Grandmother was raised a Baptist and we certainly did our share of arguing, none of it bitter, (I spent a lot of time with my grandparents as a child) but regardless of the vast chasm between our respective worldviews I loved her dearly and actually went to live with her and care for her during the last two years of her life. I'm really glad I did that.

JLK

June 6, 2005, 11:23 PM

In 274 you say we’ve mapped the sole function of a certain neuron in a certain woman’s brain to distinguishing between a line and a certain picture. So?It illustrates the absurdity of your claim that brain states cannot be correlated to accurate concepts/percepts.
If the spooky half of dualism is not a cartoon, what is it exactly?
You then say neurobiology has somehow discredited substance dualism. Why do you think that? After you reveal why substance triplism and substance quintuplism are discredited, you'll know.
If you feel they aren't, why don't you hold them?

Bright Life

June 6, 2005, 11:47 PM

It must have been an ultra difficult childhood.

You...have...no...idea.

Do you maintain a relationship with your parents?

Haven't had anything to say to my "dad's first wife" for over 20 years. This, however, is not entirely due to ideological differences.

I have a very close relationship with my grandparents, both of whom attend a Baptist church regularly. We have discussions on the topic occassionally, but they are quickly frustrated, and thus, soon move on.

Jobar

June 7, 2005, 12:13 AM

Billy, and GRD mods- the discussion seems to have gone into BC&H territory. Billy, if you wish to claim that we don't understand the Bible, I suggest you ask the mods here to split off the last several posts and send them to our Biblical specialists. Just a suggestion; and truly I think you are barking up the wrong tree trying to claim that.

Cross Examiner

June 7, 2005, 03:54 PM

In 279 you ask what I mean by saying that God is not under the moral law. You also want to know how man can judge God. To the first I mean God is not under the jurisdiction of the moral law in a way similar to how you, presumably an American on American soil, are not under the jurisdiction of British law (or vice versa, if I got your nationality wrong). To the second, I know men may wish at times to judge God’s recorded acts and intents against their knowledge of the moral law (whether innate or revealed) but even were God under the moral law, any such judgment men might make will be too shortsighted to be of any worth. For men must be able to see the end from the beginning and the beginning from the end, must be able to peer into the very heart of God and must know what the greatest good is in order to even begin to know whether or not God’s acts achieve His intents ... and if His intents are for the greatest good (or are at least morally sufficient) in the first place! So, no, God is not a valid target of man’s moral judgments due to man’s lack of vision, wisdom and an applicable standard by which to judge.

Though man can’t judge God in any knowing or rightful sense, I should add that God does make covenants with man which He Himself guarantees; for there is none greater that might act as guarantor than He. Which is to say that God does stake His glory before His creation upon whether or not He is faithful to keep covenant with creation.

In 280 you lead off by saying I say child torture is ‘not wrong’ (or right?) for a class of subjects (i.e., the divine Commander and divinely commanded) which you then say is what makes child torture only subjectively wrong. Two problems. First, I don’t say moral wrongness turns on who acts but whether or not the moral law is involved and, if so, then if an actor’s acts and intents are in right or wrong relation to the law. Second, even if I were to say this, child torture still wouldn’t be a subjective wrong for moral subjective theses tie wrongness to the beliefs and preferences of the utterer of the moral statement in question, and not the class to which the subject/utterer belongs, as you suggest. Certain forms of moral relativism tie wrongness to the beliefs and preferences of this societal or cultural group/class or that, which is perhaps closer to this idea of wrongness being dependent upon which class of subject acts. But I suppose that is neither here nor there. My position on the matter is that child torture is in wrong relation to the objectively existent moral law and so objectively immoral for those under the moral law (i.e., generally, all men for all time). The wrongness doesn’t become subjective in the case that the moral law doesn’t apply; wrongness becomes inapplicable altogether. Please note this subtle but important nuance. And please do also note the difference between objective and absolute in your next response.

You next say I cannot compare subjective truths to objective truths in terms of relative strength and weakness. You then compare one to the other by saying a subjective truth is no weaker than an objective truth. So an objective truth like ‘Los Angeles is the most populous city in California’ is no stronger than a subjective truth like ‘The Los Angeles Dodgers are the best team in baseball’? Anyway, I’m surprised you take issue with my comparing the strength of objective truth to the strength subjective truth since I've hinged nothing on the comparison being a good one, which isn’t to say it isn’t.

Then you say I argue for the existence of the moral law upon my own say-so. Now I see that the unbridled fury and raw power of my assertions have no effect on you. Let me then forsake my irrational ways and say instead that I mean to argue for the objective existence of the moral law as the best explanation of objective moral facts such as ‘the Holocaust was evil’, ‘child torture is wrong’ and ‘the Stalinist purge of millions was immoral’ etc. Granted, such an argument can only ever be forceful with those that affirm the the truth/existence of such objective moral facts in the first place (i.e., most to virtually all), which I take you to expressly deny. Which, if true, is all well and good anyway for then I am apt to point out that by your own view, the Holocaust wasn’t really evil, it is only believed to be evil, which is just plain silly to so many.

Next you say conflict decides beliefs over right and wrong when there is dispute. But this is an answer to a question I did not ask. I did not ask how you think moral beliefs get decided in ‘real life’, as you say, but whether or not group agreement is sufficient to make group values true and binding. I wanted to know, for example, if I have a moral obligation or duty to kill Jews if the group agrees this is a good. Because if I don’t, if group say-so does not impute moral duty upon the individual members of the group, then any moral thesis which posits group agreement as value-maker comes up short. I’ll say it again. I am not merely asking for your descriptive thesis. I am asking for your prescriptive thesis. If this is confusing to you, then please just answer this:

Are moral utterances capable of being true and false? If so, are any actually true? If so, what are they true in relation to?

I ask for how you answer these will tell me all I need to know about your view of morality without having to go through this confounding process, which is not unlike trying to nail Jello to a wall.

After that you say agreement between people is the true and binding value upon which your ‘intersubjectivity’ (i.e., group-agreement) thesis of morality rests. You say agreement is by definition binding. You tell me to look it up in the dictionary as proof of this. I see the dictionary says an agreement may be legally binding but I see nothing about it being prescriptive, imputing any moral obligation or being an otherwise morally binding sort of thing, which is what I was asking about. Oh, never mind. Please just answer the three questions above in bold type.

Moving on, you next say God cannot do what He wants with the life He creates (e.g., man) just as a man cannot do what he wants with the life he creates (i.e., his children). You say a creator has responsibilities to creation rather than rights over and against creation. Though I understand an analogy cannot be and is not meant to be perfect (not usually, at least), I think your chosen analogy is imperfect in at least one fatal respect: man doesn’t create life. God creates life from non-life, from nothing at all really. Man merely begets man. Life from life. Kind from kind. So saying God has responsibilities to rather than rights over life on the basis of man’s situation falls flat as a response to my challenge, which I reiterate: are our lives our own? For if God creates life, then can He not give it and take it as He sees fit? I look forward to your new answer.

I then ask: or supposing God is not our creator, then in what sense is it wrong for any to take human life? What would so doing be wrong in relation to? You reply by saying taking life would be wrong in relation to one's own belief that one oughtn't take life -- and you see no problem with this. So let me pose a couple of problems to this idea, one epistemic the other metaphysical. You say it is wrong to take life because you believe it to be. But what if another disagrees with you -- are you right and the other wrong and how do you know? Even if your belief were the right one, even if you had the true value and the other had the false, how does this true value impute a real moral duty upon the other to do as you do with respect to it?

You then say government is the creator, sustainer and guarantor of our right to life, among our other rights. I think this answer suffers the same sort of problems as does the moral subjectivism you posit above but in the interest of putting first-things-first, let me re-direct attention to the three questions in bold type several paragraphs above. In fact, don’t even answer the problems I raised in the paragraph immediately above until you go on record with the bold three, if you’d be so kind. On to 281. Today or tomorrow. Well, Friday at the latest. I think.

John A. Broussard

June 7, 2005, 04:47 PM

For if God creates life, then can He not give it and take it as He sees fit?

God certainly can and does. Many newborn children die a few moments after birth in shrieking agony. Others die lingering, painful deaths from dysentery, starvation or from malarial fevers. How thankful they must be to the god who created them for the privilege of suffering.

Lucky kids. Lucky you for believing in such an all-powerful, all-merciful god.

sharon45

June 7, 2005, 09:44 PM

In 275 you ask whether unborn babies go to heaven or hell if they die. I don’t know. I haven’t really looked at the issue. Next.Emphasis mine.

It would have been much more helpful and faster if the responses were sent like this one, repeatedly stamped out like a form letter. Short, sweet, and more importantly, to the point.

quasi-sapien

June 7, 2005, 10:07 PM

I have a very close relationship with my grandparents, both of whom attend a Baptist church regularly. We have discussions on the topic occassionally, but they are quickly frustrated, and thus, soon move on.

If I may ask, is the aim of your discourse to point out the fallacious nature of their belief because you find some aspect of their application of it harmful, or are they more general....simply academic discussions?

Bright Life

June 7, 2005, 10:34 PM

My end tends to be academic. For example, they make a claim and look to me for agreement, I disagree and point out the contradiction of their particular point in their own reference--that reference being the bible, KJV.

The point of their discussions is purely emotional. They don't want me to go to hell, so they try to persuade me with emotional arguments. That I do not get emotional about the subject frustrates their only means of persuation.

quasi-sapien

June 7, 2005, 11:44 PM

I take it that you're tolerant of their earnest, well-meaning efforts to save you from yourself. ;) I'm glad you don't attempt to deconstruct their belief and the comfort it offers, but it's also admirable that you remain true to your convictions. I maintain that the objective truth of a belief system is irrelevant, insofar as the personal application of that system does no harm to anyone, and offers the practitioner some benefit. In such cases, "discretion is the better part of valor" IMO.

Sven

June 8, 2005, 07:07 AM

For if God creates life, then can He not give it and take it as He sees fit?
Of course not.
If one creates a being which is aware of itself - if it's a kid "the natural way" or a robot with AI - one immediately looses the right to decide on its right to live.

Stephen T-B

June 8, 2005, 07:12 AM

Re. that Billy Graham is Cool quote: presumably, then, a woman has the right to decide if the embryo in her womb should live or die?

Naked Ape

June 8, 2005, 11:03 AM

Re. that Billy Graham is Cool quote: presumably, then, a woman has the right to decide if the embryo in her womb should live or die?
That would be the logical conclusion, but I am betting that it won't be billy's.

Cheers,

Naked Ape

sharon45

June 8, 2005, 12:43 PM

For if God creates life, then can He not give it and take it as He sees fit?Re. that Billy Graham is Cool quote: presumably, then, a woman has the right to decide if the embryo in her womb should live or die?That would be the logical conclusion, but I am betting that it won't be billy's.Right, and it should be. As a christian, he knows only god is the actual creator of every life and every life is ultimately his to use as he sees fit. A woman can try to become pregnant by her own choice, but she only actually becomes so because god wishes this to take place.

Naked Ape

June 8, 2005, 01:01 PM

I guess that would be the old "I brought you into the world, I can take you out of it!" school of parenting. Nice to know the invisible sky-daddy has the moral sense of an alcoholic child beater.

Cheers,

Naked Ape

Kilgore Trout

June 8, 2005, 04:55 PM

[QUALITY=Hobbs-like]

Who is this child with names reserved for God? Who is this one born in time and space yet ultimately from days eternal? You may wish to say ‘it is not Jesus’ but then that means you know who it is for you must know who it is in order to know who it is not. So who is it these passages speak of?The fact you can write fallacies like this doesn't speak too highly of your ability to recognize the constant fallacies of the NT. Where do you get this idea that you have to know who someone is in order to know who it is not? If I am mugged by a 7 ft. tall man who speaks with a heavy french accent, I don't have to know who it is in order to know that it sure wasn't Stephen Hawking!

There's another problem with your statement. By asking who it is, you are assuming the person has already lived in history. This isn't a multiple choice test. Was the Messiah....(a) Stephen King, (b) Queen Elizabeth (c) Jesus or (d) somebody else? You left out (e) he hasn't come yet and also (f) he is never going to come because the OT is not written by god. I haven't seen any lions and lambs lying down together so the answer is either (e) or (f). I personally vote for (f).

The NT is so full of evidence that Jesus is not the Messiah that it's not even funny. Matthew quotes this passage and claims jesus fulfills it....

Isaiah 42

The Servant of the Lord

1 "Here is my servant, whom I uphold,
my chosen one in whom I delight;
I will put my Spirit on him
and he will bring justice to the nations.
2 He will not shout or cry out,
or raise his voice in the streets.

3 A bruised reed he will not break,
and a smoldering wick he will not snuff out.
In faithfulness he will bring forth justice;

4 he will not falter or be discouraged
till he establishes justice on earth.
In his law the islands will put their hope."This is clearly not jesus. There are plenty of times when he raises his voice to talk to the crowds. In Matthew it says no one will hear his voice in the streets which also does not fit jesus. Verse three is ruled out by the money-changers incident and destroying the fig tree. Verse four is ruled out by the Gethsemane incident. If "My soul is overwhelmed with sorrow to the point of death" is not considered discouragement, then I don't know what is. Asking for the cup to be taken away from him was faltering. Jesus and god allegedly had this plan for billions years, so asking to be left out of it is crazy. Matthew omitted "he will not falter or be discouraged." Probably because the writer knew it doesn't fit Gethsemane. Leaving it out doesn't make the line disappear.

[/QUALITY=Hobbs-like]

sharon45

June 8, 2005, 05:26 PM

The situation that christians can't seem to be able to grasp is the fact that god is already suppose to be in total control of the whole universe. Nothing should be able to take place without his specific knowledge, forethought, and approval.

One protects themselves from stratches while pruning roses by simply wearing gloves.

So a woman protects herself from unneeded pregnancy by using contraception. Just like gloves are a tool for protection, so is it the same with birth control.

If god was so insistent for a certain woman to become pregnant, he could always have the method of contraception fail.

If god was so against abortion, he could have made it impossible to kill the baby without that also killing the mother as well. God already cheapens life as it is with the high number of pregnancy related deaths, miscarriages, stillborns, and cases of SIDS within only days after birth.

Hopeful Monsters

June 12, 2005, 04:48 PM

Please note that the answers to Thread Post #334 are provided HERE.

Stephen T-B

June 13, 2005, 06:06 AM

Noted for the archive.
Thanks

Naked Ape

June 13, 2005, 09:38 AM

Who is this child with names reserved for God?Reserved? By whom? And what makes you think that those lines correspond to a living human at any point in history?
Who is this one born in time and space yet ultimately from days eternal?Speaking personally, I was born in time and space but I have no idea what you mean by "ultimately from days eternal", would you like to try that in english?
You may wish to say ‘it is not Jesus’ but then that means you know who it is for you must know who it is in order to know who it is not.OK genius, who is sitting in the office next to mine? "You may wish to say ‘it is not Jesus’ but then that means you know who it is for you must know who it is in order to know who it is not." Anyone...? Anyone...? Bueller...?
So who is it these passages speak of?
What makes you think that those passages refer to anyone? Why would anyone in their right mind assume that they did?

Cheers,

Naked Ape

Cross Examiner

June 13, 2005, 10:28 AM

What are we doing here now? For those just joining the thread, or for those that have forgotten, or never quite knew in the first place, I will be and/or already am making a moral argument, an argument from mind and an inference from extant resurrection reports (and the like) to the best explanation of them (i.e., an argument for the bodily resurrection of Jesus of Nazareth). We are also discussing the problem of suffering, Biblical morality, the Euthyphro dilemma (though obliquely to date) and what the Hebrew Scriptures say about Messiah, among other subject matters at least remotely relevant to my three aforementioned arguments. But I didn't start off with these ends in mind.

For those with longer memories, you'll recall I began by asking for you chief objection to Christianity. I did this because I wanted to see if your objections were precise, clear, related to what Christianity is about and might matter to whether or not Christianity is true. I wanted to see if you were taking aim at the right target, could hit it and knock it down so I stressed the qualities of clarity, relevance and significance. I decided to test for these as an answer to the title question. The objections I actually got have helped in that for … suppose you really were circumcised for traditional or religious reasons rather than medical reasons, or of your own volition? Would this have any bearing whatever on whether or not Jesus arose and is the Son of God? Would it matter to the truth of Christianity in any way at all? Objections like these, even granting they are clear and relevant for argument's sake, such and like could only ever be trivially true and so fail the test of significance. But more to the point, I find that nearly all objections offered to date fail at least one of the three aforementioned and basic tests for meaningfulness.

Now in speaking again of clarity, relevance and significance, the thread on the whole is dedicated to these ideas. I began all this in the hope that we'd first articulate and clarify our views on the various important matters and then we'd work to identify the questions on which our views turn, sorting for relevance and significance and the like; all this before moving on to argumentation. This is discovery-before-argument and it is much needed here. For when I look at the state of discourse between believers and unbelievers, I find a great deal of confusion; much of it apparently caused by the methodological mistake of putting argument before discovery. So I'd say getting the order of operations right matters. To recover the archery metaphor, can you aim at much less hit, much less knock down a target neither firm nor stationary? Or can you rightly and rationally disbelieve what you don't understand? Of course not, which is why I ask questions of you. My practical challenge to you has been 'go and do likewise'.

And even though I've been continually calling for commitment to discovery-before-argument, I find I'm still inundated with arguments against views I'm mistakenly assumed to hold. In post 351, our most recent example of the problem, you say that if you are mugged by 7ft. Frenchman (mon Dieu!) you know it isn't Stephen Hawking. You hasten to add that knowing who it isn't doesn't mean you know who it is. Of course, I say, but if the one in question is of divine nomenclature and timelessness then you know you ought not be looking for a mere man in the first place, d'accord? Which is to say that, in a bivalent situation, when facing a choice between only two options, to know one option as false is to know the other as true and to know one as true is to know the other as false, necessarily. Comprenez-vous ca? Non? I'll explain.

The problem I posed to my interlocutor was not about which mortal fits Isaiah and Micah's description of Messiah, but whether or not Messiah could be a mere mortal at all, given the descriptions they give. When I said you must know who if you know who not, I was saying if you know Messiah to be merely human then you must somehow know He is not divine, over and against Isaiah and Micah. When I asked who, I was not asking for a name, as you apparently took me to mean, but which essence, whether human or divine, mortal or immortal; a binary matter that to rule out one option is to rule in the other by necessity. That is, Messiah is either merely mortal or He is not; to say you know He is just mortal means you must know He is not immortal, which doesn't seem to square with Isaiah and Micah, which is what I was getting at when I was asking who these passages could possibly speak of.

You also tell me that by asking for who, I assume Messiah a historical personage already come and gone. I don't need to say much to this. This criticism is off for the same reason the parody of the French mugger is off: I wasn't asking for the name of a mere mortal but whether or not Messiah is merely mortal in the first place, given Isaiah and Micah's words on the matter. I've gone over this a bunch because I want to be sure my meaning isn't missed this time ... though I should add that I thought my meaning reasonably clear at the first by the immediate and remote contexts but since you haven't been a part of the conversation, I see how you might miss such subtle nuances. Still, had you asked me about my meaning rather than assumed it, we'd have avoided all this.

Moving on, you next cite Isaiah 42 as messianic and say it can't possibly speak of Jesus. You say that Isaiah says Messiah won't speak in the street but that Jesus does. You say that Isaiah says Messiah won't break a bruised reed but Jesus withers a fig tree. You say that Isaiah says Messiah won't ever get discouraged but Jesus does at Gethsemane. I don't wish to dispute your reading of the Gospels but in reading how you read Isaiah I am reminded that it is one thing to be well read in the Bible and quite another to read the Bible well, which is fast becoming another theme of the thread. Eisegesis rather than exegesis seems to be par for the course here. Anyway, you've given me your readings of the text but you've not considered any other readings. So let me ask a few questions.

When Isaiah says 'He shall not cry, nor lift up, nor cause his voice to be heard in the street' does he mean Messiah won't talk to crowds, won't say anything audibly to anyone while standing on paved ground, as you suggest, or is Isaiah using hyperbolic and figurative expression typical of other contemporaneous ANE writers to say that Messiah won't selfishly draw attention to himself? When Isaiah says 'A bruised reed shall he not break, and the smoking flax shall he not quench' is he saying Messiah won't ever overturn tables, wither fig trees or otherwise do violence to vegetation, as you suggest, or is Isaiah saying by way of metaphor that Messiah will tend to those bent and waning souls in need of tending to? With respect to verse 4, what is the Hebrew word apparently translated as the English word 'discouraged' in the translation you quote from and are there any alternate and more accurate meanings for this word? Suppose 'discouraged' is better rendered as, say, 'crushed' or 'bruised'; how might this change your reading, especially in light of the metaphor used in the verse just prior? Yes, we may need to go to the original language, various relevant contexts and the principles of hermeneutics for it seems the skeptic's annotated Bible school of Biblical study turns out more Biblical illiterati than anything else.

Now jumping back to where I last left off in my normal order of response, you say in 288 that you see no connection between purpose and ethics, you do not see how the question of the meaning of life bears upon how one should live it. You then suggest one may reasonably and even should maximize the quantity and quality of human life, and that this suffices as an ordering principle for morality. You ask me if God was in the wrong for the Flood, the destruction of Amalek and the Egyptian firstborn. You say God’s spitefulness was the reason behind the Amalek thing. You ask that I answer these, your questions of Biblical morality, without appealing to divine power or sovereignty.

You say I advocate a ‘might makes right’ view of morality stemming from my theism and view of purpose and that you’re sure glad God doesn’t exist. You then say there is a naturalistic ground for a universal moral realism based on reason and human nature that makes no reference to God. You wonder aloud if God has any such rational justification for His moral judgments. You then suggest that if He does we could then appeal to that same rationale for our morality, no God necessary. You ask what, besides power of enforcement, could possibly make God’s arbitrary preferences better than anyone else’s. Lastly, you say I can’t reasonably place any restrictions on the answers I get in response to the questions I ask.

If I may interpret and condense further, I’d say you denied then affirmed a link between purpose and ethics. You tie the meaning of life to quality and quantity of life, as per the human nature, an end to which we may reasonably advance in our ethical decision-making, and so thereby posit a form of ethical naturalism. You pose some questions of Biblical morality and ask me to judge the acts of God as right or wrong. You say I’m committed to tying right and wrong to God’s arbitrary preferences or something else, some rationale that is autonomous to God, neither of which bodes well for theistic morality. Now, before I respond, please tell me where, if anywhere, I’ve misread you. Thanks much.

John A. Broussard

June 13, 2005, 02:26 PM

Now, before I respond, please tell me where, if anywhere, I’ve misread you.

Earlier you said:

"For if God creates life, then can He not give it and take it as He sees fit?"

My response was:

***

God certainly can and does. Many newborn children die a few moments after birth in shrieking agony. Others die lingering, painful deaths from dysentery, starvation or from malarial fevers. How thankful they must be to the god who created them for the privilege of suffering.

Lucky kids. Lucky you for believing in such an all-powerful, all-merciful god.

***

Now I would like to phrase this as a question. A simple yes or no is all that's necessary.

Do you actually, truthfully believe in such an all-powerful, all-merciful god?

I won't be surprised if you don't answer this, since you already stated you would only answer the questions you wished to answer.

In this case, I suspect you don't have an answer.

J-D

June 13, 2005, 07:28 PM

Reading post #356, I was reminded of the editorial advice of Anton Chekhov, widely recognised as one of the greatest short story writers ever: 'throw away the first three pages'. You should have dispensed with the first three paragraphs of that post. And if you'd applied the same approach to more of your other posts to this thread, it would have been greatly improved.

Cross Examiner

June 14, 2005, 10:17 AM

In 289 you say tongue-in-cheek that a whole can’t have a property not also had by its constituent parts. You then suggest mind is an emergent property of brain. You affirm the reality of the extra-mental (or external) world. You affirm the reality of sense experience of this world. You affirm the reality of the neural processing of sense experience of this world but you distinguish this perceiving from consciousness, which you say is more like perception perceiving itself. Then you explain how we construct a worldview from our experiences of self and the world, testing for things like repeatability and generally and otherwise reasoning inductively from experience to understanding. Switching gears, you tell your own story of how you went from one worldview to another because the first could not accommodate your ever-changing understanding of the world. You then challenge me to be likewise open to such a move if my understanding of the world changes significantly. You top off by posing some blue pill/red pill questions to me.

In subsequent posts 290 and 295, you make some amendment and addenda to prior posts. You back off slightly from your earlier claim about knowing and allow that private religious or paranormal experience may constitute some sort of knowledge but since these often conflict with one another, and are not scientifically verifiable, are most likely only experience of a private, inter-mental reality and so of doubtful public worth. You add to your position on morality that, given the ambiguous and often conflicting nature of what is good for man, moral judgments can never rightly have the precision or absolute-ness of mathematical statements, and should never be taken to have such. I’d say, in sum, that you mean to say that your experience of reality is too great for theism in general and Christian theism in particular to adequately explain.

Let me first thank you for your considered, sincere response. Your contribution to this thread does indeed stand out. I should also say you said a lot, and rather concisely at that. You comprehensively touched on philosophy of mind, knowing, truth, language, science, the nature of moral judgment and the veridicality of religious experience. And you did this almost three weeks ago so I wonder if you’re still around. So, before I respond to any of it, let me ask directly: are you still here? And if so, have I read you right? Have I summarized your claims fairly? If you are still here, and if I did gather, I’d like to begin with that emergent property view of the mind. Anyway, I’ll wait to hear from you.

John A. Broussard

June 14, 2005, 10:23 AM

Anyway, I’ll wait to hear from you.
You have an amazing knack for ignoring questions.

Congratulations.

Cross Examiner

June 14, 2005, 10:52 AM

You have an amazing knack for ignoring questions.

Congratulations.
I generally process posts in the order in which I receive them. I am so far behind that I can imagine that it might feel I am ignoring recent posts in favor of older ones. I do break from this process in certain circumstances so, in the interest of giving persistence it's due, I answer your simple question with, 'yes, I do believe in God and His maximal power and goodness/love/mercy/justice/holiness etc., my own suffering, the suffering of others and even the world itself (metaphorically, of course) notwithstanding.'

Stephen T-B

June 14, 2005, 10:56 AM

In 289 Hobbs asked some "blue pill/red pill questions" the answers to which some of us - apart from the inestimable Hobbs - are very interested to learn.

Will you indulge us?

Thanks

Cross Examiner

June 14, 2005, 11:31 AM

In 289 Hobbs asked some "blue pill/red pill questions" the answers to which some of us - apart from the inestimable Hobbs - are very interested to learn.

Will you indulge us?
(after, perhaps, giving an answer to John, because that's of interest too.)
Thanks
I'll get to my normal order of response later; I'm a sucker for polite requests. So will I answer Hobb's blue pill/red pill questions directly? Sure. Here they are again:
I can say that if I am wrong now, I sincerely want to know that and to be corrected. Billy Graham Is Cool, can you say the same thing? What if it turns out that your religion is in fact false, that your understanding of the world is in fact incorrect? Would you want to know? Or would you rather not know, would you rather stick with your religion whether it is right or wrong? If you truly believe that your life would be inescapably meaningless and horrifying without your religion, I can understand if you would choose not to want to know if it is false. But if you would choose that, then we truly are wasting our time here, because if you prefer comfortable beliefs to true beliefs then even if your beliefs are in fact true, it would only be by accident that you happened to get it right, and if you got it wrong then you wouldn't allow anything to tell you that.
The short answer is, yes, I too want to know if I'm in the wrong. I value true belief way, way above comfortable belief. If a true belief happens to also provide comfort or meaning or some other psychological carrot, then that's just icing on the cake. But it really is the cake I'm after. I care deeply about defeasibility, falsifiability, sufficient warrant and the like. I would drop my faith like a bad habit if I truly believed it epistemically insolvent. For example, if after due consideration I held the resurrection of Jesus of Nazareth from the dead was improbable, of dubious historicity, I simply would cease to be a Christian. And there is a number of other such issues on which my faith may turn. Of course, all this is and could ever only be personal testimony about my own mind and motives so some will take it at face value, others with a grain of salt and perhaps the most jaded will opt for an entire salt lick. But that's the nature of the human beast.

Stephen T-B

June 14, 2005, 11:39 AM

(Thanks. You probably missed the poll by jdlongmire which ask who would change their minds about their core beliefs. By-and-large the atheists who responded said they would.
Longmire, interestingly, was adamant that he would not).

John A. Broussard

June 14, 2005, 02:00 PM

I generally process posts in the order in which I receive them. I am so far behind that I can imagine that it might feel I am ignoring recent posts in favor of older ones. I do break from this process in certain circumstances so, in the interest of giving persistence it's due, I answer your simple question with, 'yes, I do believe in God and His maximal power and goodness/love/mercy/justice/holiness etc., my own suffering, the suffering of others and even the world itself (metaphorically, of course) notwithstanding.'
Thank you.

Now I know that you believe in:

A god who is responsible for the many newborn children who die a few moments after birth in shrieking agony. Others die lingering, painful deaths from dysentery, starvation or from malarial fevers. How thankful they must be to the god who created them for the privilege of suffering.

And you worship him because of his loving nature.

Amazing.

Sultanist

June 14, 2005, 02:14 PM

John A. Broussard

June 14, 2005, 02:21 PM

[QUOTE=Billy Graham is cool]For example, if after due consideration I held the resurrection of Jesus of Nazareth from the dead was improbable, of dubious historicity, I simply would cease to be a Christian. QUOTE]

Have you duly considered that Sakaya Buddha, Osiris, Krishna and some other culture heros rose from the dead? Do you think Christianity might have borrowed that idea from one of these much older cults? How about Mithra? Much more recent in time, but it indicates the popularity of this idea with the gullible, since it isn't clear whether the Christians copied it from Mithraism or vice versa.

Far from considering Christ's rising from the dead as improbable, I would insist that--though fictional--it was inevitable.

Cross Examiner

June 14, 2005, 03:01 PM

Thank you.

Now I know that you believe in:

A god who is responsible for the many newborn children who die a few moments after birth in shrieking agony. Others die lingering, painful deaths from dysentery, starvation or from malarial fevers. How thankful they must be to the god who created them for the privilege of suffering.

And you worship him because of his loving nature.

Amazing.If God does not or cannot have a morally sufficient reason for suffering, then, granted, He is unworthy of worship. I take it from your tone that you've somehow answered that seemingly unknowable 'If' in the negative?
Have you duly considered that Sakaya Buddha, Osiris, Krishna and some other culture heros rose from the dead? Do you think Christianity might have borrowed that idea from one of these much older cults? How about Mithra? Much more recent in time, but it indicates the popularity of this idea with the gullible, since it isn't clear whether the Christians copied it from Mithraism or vice versa.
Yes, I've considered the myth of the dying and rising god at some length. No, I don't think Christianity borrowed the idea from other cultures or otherwise based the claim that Jesus arose on the idea. To badly paraphrase Lewis (and perhaps Tolkein), I think man's many myths are to the one True Myth what shadows are to the Substance. I see that what God speaks echoes through time and place. With respect to the parallels between Christianity and Mithraism, the matter of who borrowed from whom turns on the answers to a number of important questions. While I agree with you that the question of which came first is important, I disagree that it can't be answered. And I should add in passing that we're justified in our prima facie disbelief that Christianity borrowed from Mithraism absent any claim and evidence to that effect.

John A. Broussard

June 14, 2005, 04:23 PM

If God does not or cannot have a morally sufficient reason for suffering, then, granted, He is unworthy of worship. I take it from your tone that you've somehow answered that seemingly unknowable 'If' in the negative?

Please explain why an all-powerful god could not have a morally sufficient reason for suffering.

Is it that god can't prevent the suffering?

If that's correct, then he must not be all-powerful.

If god can prevent it, but doesn't do so, she/he/it most certainly can't be an all-loving god. In fact, it would imply that this strange god of yours actually enjoys seeing human beings suffer.

To repeat--"Many newborn children die a few moments after birth in shrieking agony. Others die lingering, painful deaths from dysentery, starvation or from malarial fevers. How thankful they must be to the god who created them for the privilege of suffering."

Your god must love to watch this, day after day, month after month, year after year.

Kilgore Trout

June 14, 2005, 09:43 PM

I've gone over this a bunch because I want to be sure my meaning isn't missed this time ... though I should add that I thought my meaning reasonably clear at the first by the immediate and remote contexts but since you haven't been a part of the conversation, I see how you might miss such subtle nuances. Still, had you asked me about my meaning rather than assumed it, we'd have avoided all this.Here is what you said
Who is this child with names reserved for God? Who is this one born in time and space yet ultimately from days eternal? You may wish to say ‘it is not Jesus’ but then that means you know who it is for you must know who it is in order to know who it is not. So who is it these passages speak of?Stop trying to gaslight me with this idea that I was supposed to know you were merely asking whether the guy was mortal or divine. That idea is nowhere in these sentences. As seen in post 355, Naked ape thought the same thing I did. It looks more to me that you are just covering up your mistake by pretending you made it clear that you meant something else. And about asking about your meaning insteads of assuming... If I had to ask your meaning on ideas as apparently clear as that one we would never get anything done. I would have to ask what you meant for every sentence you said, just on the off chance that I may have slightly misunderstood you.

Does "It depends on what your definition of 'is' is" ring a bell?

The problem I posed to my interlocutor was not about which mortal fits Isaiah and Micah's description of Messiah, but whether or not Messiah could be a mere mortal at all, given the descriptions they give. When I said you must know who if you know who not, I was saying if you know Messiah to be merely human then you must somehow know He is not divine, over and against Isaiah and Micah. When I asked who, I was not asking for a name, as you apparently took me to mean, but which essence, whether human or divine, mortal or immortal; a binary matter that to rule out one option is to rule in the other by necessity. That is, Messiah is either merely mortal or He is not; to say you know He is just mortal means you must know He is not immortal, which doesn't seem to square with Isaiah and Micah, which is what I was getting at when I was asking who these passages could possibly speak of.

You also tell me that by asking for who, I assume Messiah a historical personage already come and gone. I don't need to say much to this. This criticism is off for the same reason the parody of the French mugger is off: I wasn't asking for the name of a mere mortal but whether or not Messiah is merely mortal in the first place, given Isaiah and Micah's words on the matter.Here is a quote from Jews for Judaism about Isaiah 9...

Isaiah is known for the method by which he presents many of his messages through the use of prophetic names (Isaiah 7:3, 14; 8:3). In the verse under study, the prophet expounds his message by formulating a prophetic name for Hezekiah. The words of this name form a sentence expressive of God's greatness, which will become manifest in the benefits to be bestowed upon the future king in his lifetime. Thus, the name, though borne by the king, serves, in reality, as a testimonial to God.
and about Micah 5....
This verse refers to the Messiah, a descendant of David. Since David came from Bethlehem, Micah's prophecy speaks of Bethlehem as the Messiah's place of origin. Actually, the text does not necessarily mean the Messiah will be born in that town, but that his family originates from there. From the ancient family of the house of David will come forth the Messiah, whose eventual existence was known to God from the beginning of time.Of course, the NT says that anybody who doesn't like jesus is blind, so I'm sure you don't care what anybody says about these verses. Why is it that with passages like in Isaiah 42 you claim you have to look deep to find the "true" meaning, yet when someone simply has the word "god" in his name, somehow that is obvious proof to you that the person is literally god. Same with the Micah passage. God would have known for eternity who he was going to have as the messiah, so a fully human messiah would still fit your "days eternal" line. If the christian faith said that Jesus was not god, and skeptics used these verses as "proof" that the messiah was supposed to be god, you'd be saying the same things I am saying.

For the sake of argument, lets say these two passages somehow were proof that the messiah would be god. This would be what your argument would boil down to....
1. These two passages say the messiah is god.
2. Jesus says he is god.
3. Therefore these passages are astonishing prophecies of Jesus.
You first have to prove that Jesus is god and not just claimed to be god. So you can't use these verses as evidence that jesus is god because that would be a circular argument. The same problem occurs with many of the "messianic" passages that allegedly refer to jesus. Christians claim that Isaiah 53 says the messiah will die for our sins. Jesus died for our sins. Therefore Jesus is the messiah because he was predicted in Isaiah 53. This is a circular argument because we only have the NT's word on it that Jesus died for our sins and the NT would only be deemed reliable on this point if you already assume that Jesus is the messiah. I am sure you would agree that if Jesus was not the messiah, the NT would not be reliable, especially in matters of "faith" like him dying for our sins.

Moving on, you next cite Isaiah 42 as messianic and say it can't possibly speak of Jesus. I said the NT claims Jesus fulfills Isaiah 42 . I did not say it was messianic. Nowhere does it say that the servant in Isaiah is the messiah. There are, however, plenty of references that say the servant is the nation of Israel or the faithful ones of Israel.

When Isaiah says 'He shall not cry, nor lift up, nor cause his voice to be heard in the street' does he mean Messiah won't talk to crowds, won't say anything audibly to anyone while standing on paved ground, as you suggest, or is Isaiah using hyperbolic and figurative expression typical of other contemporaneous ANE writers to say that Messiah won't selfishly draw attention to himself? When Isaiah says 'A bruised reed shall he not break, and the smoking flax shall he not quench' is he saying Messiah won't ever overturn tables, wither fig trees or otherwise do violence to vegetation, as you suggest, or is Isaiah saying by way of metaphor that Messiah will tend to those bent and waning souls in need of tending to? With respect to verse 4, what is the Hebrew word apparently translated as the English word 'discouraged' in the translation you quote from and are there any alternate and more accurate meanings for this word? Suppose 'discouraged' is better rendered as, say, 'crushed' or 'bruised'; how might this change your reading, especially in light of the metaphor used in the verse just prior? Yes, we may need to go to the original language, various relevant contexts and the principles of hermeneutics for it seems the skeptic's annotated Bible school of Biblical study turns out more Biblical illiterati than anything else.I think I see the pattern here, if the plain english does not fit Jesus, just claim that all English language bibles translated it wrong. So when Jesus says "you must have faith like a child", he really means "you must learn ancient Hebrew and Greek, the principles of hermeneutics, the culture of ANE writers etc. because if you don't you are going to read the OT prophecies about me and think they don't fit me which will make you reject me".

You are using a pretty standard method of apologetics...the only people who really understand the OT prophecies about jesus are christians who know Hebrew. Apparently, Jews who know Hebrew and study the bible all their lives don't understand their own bible. Jews know that most alleged references to jesus in the OT aren't even talking about the messiah. (Psalm 41:9 anyone?) Secular scholars who know Hebrew don't understand the prophecies either, who cares if they have PhD's in biblical literature? Even christians who don't read Hebrew don't understand them because they only read the English versions of the bible. Everyone knows that all the English versions of the bible are written by graduates of the SAB school of bible study. The NIV was written by christian bible scholars but what do they know? Only Billy Graham is Cool knows the TRUE meaning of the passages. Where is your evidence these verses really mean what you say they mean? Or are you just asuming this because you are trying to make them fit jesus?

I love how bible-scholar jesus "knew" that riding into Jerusalem on a donkey was meant to be completely literal, but Isaiah 42 was meant to be completely different from what is written. If jesus didn't ride in on a donkey, christians would have said Zechariah 9:9 was not meant to be literal and anyone who thought it was literal would be bibilically illiterate.

Let's go back to Isaiah 42 a few verses later it reads...

Israel Blind and Deaf

18 "Hear, you deaf;
look, you blind, and see!
19 Who is blind but my servant,
and deaf like the messenger I send?
Who is blind like the one committed to me,
blind like the servant of the LORD ?

20 You have seen many things, but have paid no attention;
your ears are open, but you hear nothing."

Now the "servant" is blind and deaf. Does this still fit jesus? Maybe in this "context" blind means all-seeing and deaf means all-hearing. Maybe god switches servants. Whenever the servant is bad, it's not jesus. When the servant is good, it's jesus. You'll have to help me on this one. I really would like to know what you think of this passage.

I have two more questions related to OT prophecies. First, who is being referred to in Isaiah 7:14-25? The NT says it is Jesus. Without talking about whether it says virgin or not, I would like to know why Jesus fits the rest of the passage. I repeat. This is not a debate on whether the person will be born of a virgin or is named Immanuel. I just want to know about the rest of the passage.

Second, I would like to know who the "prince" is in this passage of Ezekiel.

Ezekiel 44

The Prince, the Levites, the Priests

1 Then the man brought me back to the outer gate of the sanctuary, the one facing east, and it was shut. 2 The LORD said to me, "This gate is to remain shut. It must not be opened; no one may enter through it. It is to remain shut because the LORD, the God of Israel, has entered through it. 3 The prince himself is the only one who may sit inside the gateway to eat in the presence of the LORD. He is to enter by way of the portico of the gateway and go out the same way."
4 Then the man brought me by way of the north gate to the front of the temple. I looked and saw the glory of the LORD filling the temple of the LORD, and I fell facedown.

It sounds to me like the messiah, but I want to know who you think it is.

Kilgore Trout

June 14, 2005, 09:46 PM

If God does not or cannot have a morally sufficient reason for suffering, then, granted, He is unworthy of worship. I take it from your tone that you've somehow answered that seemingly unknowable 'If' in the negative? I take it from your tone that you've somehow answered that seemingly unknowable 'If' in the positive?

Yes, I've considered the myth of the dying and rising god at some length. No, I don't think Christianity borrowed the idea from other cultures or otherwise based the claim that Jesus arose on the idea. To badly paraphrase Lewis (and perhaps Tolkein), I think man's many myths are to the one True Myth what shadows are to the Substance. I see that what God speaks echoes through time and place.This sounds like you are saying that even if a myth that has parallels to christianity came before Jesus' time, that myth is still the one that is "copying" christianity. Am I correct?

Kind of like how King Lear is a rip-off of Jane Smiley's A Thousand Acres.

Biff the unclean

June 15, 2005, 12:05 AM

Yes, I've considered the myth of the dying and rising god at some length. No, I don't think Christianity borrowed the idea from other cultures or otherwise based the claim that Jesus arose on the idea.
Then may I ask, why do they call the day Easter?
She's the Goddess of ressurection. The feast day is the day she brought Adonis back to life.

JLK

June 15, 2005, 12:40 AM

I love how bible-scholar jesus "knew" that riding into Jerusalem on a donkey was meant to be completely literal, but Isaiah 42 was meant to be completely different from what is written. If jesus didn't ride in on a donkey, christians would have said Zechariah 9:9 was not meant to be literal and anyone who thought it was literal would be bibilically illiterate.And there's the Matt 21 version of riding in simultaneously on both an ass and the colt foal of an ass. To fulfill a prophecy. No one would make that up, would they?

Naked Ape

June 15, 2005, 10:34 AM

If God does not or cannot have a morally sufficient reason for suffering, then, granted, He is unworthy of worship. I take it from your tone that you've somehow answered that seemingly unknowable 'If' in the negative?What is worship Billy?

Is it The reverent love and devotion accorded a deity, an idol, or a sacred object? If so, then a deity would have to be assumed to exist before the concept of worship made any sense.

If one was disinclined to acquiesce to such an absurd assumption, then the notion of anything being worthy of worship seems more than a little obtuse.

What you refer to as "that seemingly unknowable 'If'" would be batter described as that patently absurd 'If'.
I see that what God speaks echoes through time and place. With respect to the parallels between Christianity and Mithraism, the matter of who borrowed from whom turns on the answers to a number of important questions. While I agree with you that the question of which came first is important, I disagree that it can't be answered. And I should add in passing that we're justified in our prima facie disbelief that Christianity borrowed from Mithraism absent any claim and evidence to that effect.God speaks, does he? Have you heard this voice? Is it Bass, Baritone or Tenor?

Next you'll be telling us that your imaginary friend can write books too.
The great enemy of the truth is very often not the lie deliberate, contrived and dishonest but the myth persistent, persuasive and unrealistic.
Sometimes, with certain posters, it's a combination of both.

Cheers,

Naked Ape

Cross Examiner

June 16, 2005, 10:13 AM

Before I go too far with the newer stuff, let me make good on some of the older stuff. I'll try to do this quickly, succinctly.

In 297 you sense where this goes and so say that, at the root, morality is subjective. Is it fair to say that by your words you are a thoroughgoing subjectivist? The principle subjectivist theories, private subjectivism and cultural relativism, render moral statements of the form 'x is right' as 'I dislike x' and 'we in our culture dislike x', respectively. Which is to say that subjectivism reads moral statements as statements of psychological or sociological fact; it transforms moral statements into non-moral statements. Moral statements are normative and prescriptive. Non-moral statements are not. Is subjectivism an adequate moral thesis? Heck, is it even a moral thesis in the first place?

In 300 you ask how we can tell the difference between a genuine experience of God and mental illness. Well, there are tests/criteria/arguments for the veridicality of religious experience with which I have some familiarity. How serious are you about this subject matter?

In 303 you say different folks interpret the revealed moral law differently. You ask what I propose we do with respect to those moral matters divine revelation is silent upon (assuming there are such things; you can always abstract principles and apply them to any concrete situation). That is, you now apparently want to talk applied and/or normative ethics. But we've been talking meta-ethics to date so I don't think I'm out of line to request a justification for switching topics midstream. Let me know. You then repeat your claim that a naturalistic ground like quality and quantity of human life better serves as a ground for morality than does God's nature, about which I asked in post 356 and now await your confirmation.

In 306 you answer my original request and say your chief objection to Christianity is practical; that, with the support of Scripture, it causes division within families such as your own. But whether or not Christianity is divisive is irrelevant to whether or not it is true. The question is not whether or not Christianity is divisive. I'll grant it is. The question is whether or not this divisiveness is morally justified. For if Christianity is false then I grant it is unjustifiably divisive. However, if Christianity is true then though it is divisive, it is justified in so being.

In 309 you say my theistic view of morality impales itself on the autonomy horn of Plato's dilemma, which I find strange since others have accused my view of falling on the arbitrariness horn instead. Anyway, I see no understandable reason given for your particular interpretation but I'll say in response to what I do understand that I disagree; God is not superfluous to morality on my view. The moral law I speak of merely prescribes those acts and intents that bear the moral properties of rightness, goodness, holiness, justness etc. These moral properties are to God what image is to substance, and since image is not autonomous to substance, neither are moral properties autonomous to God. So, for example, if an act has the moral property of rightness, it is because it reflects God Himself (i.e. His moral character, nature) just as a mirror reflects the image of a substance.

In 316 you wonder aloud at why I say the moral law is not singularly determinative of what is right yet right is nonetheless tied to God's person. This was then a pre-emptive nod to the two different yet compatible and complimentary senses of right I often use: right as in an act or intent in right relation to the moral law and right as in a moral property ascribable to and directly perceived of an act or intent reflective of God's person (i.e., character, nature). Which is to say that the first is a prescriptive notion whereas the second is metaphysical. I hope this helps you better understand my meaning.

In 323 you agree that 'God can have no morally sufficient reason for [certain sorts of] suffering that might justify any calling Him good in the normal sense of the word' is a fair statement of your position. My first question is simple: how do you know this?

From what little of 335 I think I understand, you ask that I show that each NT writer is in agreement with the other NT writers. You ask that I also show Jesus agrees with the NT writers. And you ask that I show Jesus’ view of faith is in agreement with view of faith presented in the book of Hebrews. The doubtful reasonability and feasibility of your requests aside, I remind you that you said there was disagreement in these matters and so the onus of demonstration is on you, not me. What you’re doing here is burden shifting. I should add that it’s not a large burden you bear, however. You only need prove one instance of disagreement in order to validate a corresponding allegation of schism. I think you can do it.

You say Christian faith is blind. What do you mean by this? You seem to suggest it is blind because it is ‘not completely certain’ (the Calvinists may dispute this; and I can bat for them on this in a pinch). Are you saying that if one holds a belief with something less than complete certainty belief is thus held blindly? What do you mean by complete certainty here? Can you give me an example of a belief you hold with this sort of complete certainty? And just out of curiosity, do you know what solipsism is? If so, are you ready to go there? I’m not normally a doubt-monger but I’m prepared to make an exception in this case.

You say Messiah is to bring peace to the whole world and won’t die in order for it to happen. You say he will be a gifted man, though merely a man. You say he will cause the world to recognize Judaism as the true faith. How do you know these things? Where do you get these ideas? Can we go to your source for a look-see?

Isaiah 9.6
For a child will be born to us, a son will be given to us;
And the government will rest on His shoulders;
And His name will be called Wonderful Counselor, Mighty God,
Eternal Father, Prince of Peace.

Micah 5.2
But as for you, Bethlehem Ephrathah,
Too little to be among the clans of Judah,
From you One will go forth for Me to be ruler in Israel
His goings forth are from long ago,
From the days of eternity.

You apparently agree that these passages from Isaiah and Micah are messianic but apparently disagree on other respects. You say the divine names Isaiah mentions are respectful of God. Granted, they are. But whose names are they? Does not Isaiah say these are names for the child, the Messiah to come? If so, wouldn’t that mean the Messiah of Isaiah is not merely mortal, as you suggest? Perhaps you predicate the divine names of someone other than the child? If so, how so? Similarly intriguing, you read the Micah passage as speaking of Messiah’s ancient ‘birthline’. Do you read the phrase ‘His goings forth are from long ago’ as somehow meaning ‘His birthline is from long ago’? Or does this birthline idea come from somewhere else? Please share your insights with as much specificity as you can muster. If I’m reading this wrong, I really would like to know how I can read it better.

In 337 you say I said ‘brain states cannot be correlated to accurate concepts/percepts.’ Well, I’m quite confident I never said that but if you can dig up the words, I’ll eat ‘em. I have no doubt brain states can be correlated to thoughts; that alone says somewhere between precious little to nothing about the truth or falsity of substance dualism, an answer to the mind/body problem and ultimately where I plan to take this. Actually, we’re already there. I find that when you press a physicalist into a corner he comes out of it a property dualist or some such which is why I questioned how matter in motion, chemical reactions or brain states (whichever reduction you prefer) incapable of being true and false produce thoughts or concepts or propositions which are capable of being true and false. And this line of questioning has served its purpose: to lead us to the mind/body problem proper. We’re now just waiting for Hobbs to affirm/deny property dualism (i.e., epiphenomenalism, holism, emergent property view etc.) or otherwise make his position known.

While we wait, what do you say? Is mind identical to matter/body/brain? Before you respond, let me remind you of Liebniz’ law of the indiscernability of identicals: if something is true of mind (e.g., has more/less/different properties) not true of brain, or vice versa, then mind and brain (or body or matter) are not identical. Anyway, if you answer my question above in the positive, then you are some sort of a physicalist (and easily refuted). If you answer in the negative, then you are some sort of dualist (e.g., property, substance). Let me know where you stand.

You say when I know why neurobiology discredits ‘substance triplism’ I’ll know why it discredits substance dualism. What? How would I know that? I’ve never even heard of ‘substance triplism’ much less have I heard how or why it’s been discredited. Are you just making stuff up now? I believe you’re better than this. Let me ask again: why do you think neurobiology discredits substance dualism? And this time, give me your real answer.

In 346 you suggest that the creator of self-aware life, whether man or God, does not have rights over life, only responsibilities to life. You point to man’s hypothetical creation of self-aware artificial intelligence as an example of responsibility to rather than rights over life. You say once a creator creates this sort of life, the creator loses the right to it. Interesting. Why do you say that? By what standard would it be wrong for a creator to take life from the creation? Surely there must be a reason for why such things are so.

In keeping with this theme, you say in 347 that if God has a right to life He creates then a woman has a right to life she 'creates' (and so can terminate at will). You ask me if I agree. If we’re comparing apples to apples then, yes, I agree. But I think you’re trying to pass off an orange as an apple. Is God’s creation of man the same thing as a woman’s ‘creation’ of a child? God’s creation of man is life from nothing whatsoever. Does a woman do the same, or is her act of ‘creation’ a different sort of thing? For if we’re talking about two different sorts of creation then we’re talking about two different sorts of a creator’s rights with respect to created life.

There. I think that about brings me up to date on my dozen-or-so concurrent conversations (the older ones, at least). If in this process I skipped over something clear, relevant and significant, do bring it to my attention. Append to your polite notice a concise explanation of why you think the skipped-over subject matter is clear, relevant and significant and, if your reasoning is sound and compelling, I’ll address it. Otherwise, I’m on to the newer stuff.

Postscript:
I haven’t had many answers to my starting questions for a moral argument. Maybe no one saw them. I’ll ask ‘em again. Are moral utterances capable of being true and false? If so, are any actually true? If so, what are they true in relation to? This is, in essence, an inquiry into the existence of knowable and/or known objective moral truths.

Scorpion

June 16, 2005, 12:08 PM

In 297 you sense where this goes

Hey, that's mine! It was worth the wait to hang around this thread after all...

I believe you're using "you" as some sort of generic "you" here though, while this one was mine, the rest of the posts were not....

and so say that, at the root, morality is subjective. Is it fair to say that by your words you are a thoroughgoing subjectivist?

Despite the many, many threads about subjectivism on this board I'm still not quite sure what I'm actually subscribing into if I just bluntly say "yes", but I think it's pretty safe to say I'm far at the subjectivist end of the spectrum.

The principle subjectivist theories, private subjectivism and cultural relativism,

It is my loss that I haven't studied these isms deeply enough to be able to say if these are in fact my own positions, but I'll assume for now that they are and see where they take me. Note that in what follows I'm then not trying to say what these isms are all about, I'm only trying to explain what I think myself.

render moral statements of the form 'x is right' as 'I dislike x' and 'we in our culture dislike x', respectively.

There are few qualifications here: x must refer to action of an agent that we consider to be morally responsible.

Furthermore, a plain 'I dislike x' alone doesn't cut it; I, and as far as I know, my culture dislikes playing with feces. However, this doesn't yet translate into 'playing feces is wrong' - if someone likes to play with shit, by all means, let him.

So, I suppose you need something like "I dislike x and want not-x to be a general law" or something to that effect.

Which is to say that subjectivism reads moral statements as statements of psychological or sociological fact; it transforms moral statements into non-moral statements.
Moral statements are normative and prescriptive. Non-moral statements are not. Is subjectivism an adequate moral thesis? Heck, is it even a moral thesis in the first place?

Ah... curious. Since I see no problem at all with anything you say above, this brings us to an interesting question: what do you expect from subjectivism? Or from any, as you say, 'adequate moral thesis'?

-S-

Stephen T-B

June 16, 2005, 12:26 PM

J-D

June 16, 2005, 07:19 PM

In 323 you agree that 'God can have no morally sufficient reason for [certain sorts of] suffering that might justify any calling Him good in the normal sense of the word' is a fair statement of your position. My first question is simple: how do you know this?From knowing how people use the word 'good'. If a human being did things like that, the word 'good' would not be accepted as a description. Not even on the argument that there might be some undisclosed reason that provided justification.

You have to understand that, although I agreed that your summary statement of my position seems broadly accurate, the question I am posing on that basis is not: 'how can God's actions be justified?' but rather 'how can your action in calling God good be justified?'. I suppose you could say that your summary of my position seems to me to be logically equivalent to the alternative summary of my position: 'human beings have no justification for applying the word "good" to a God who causes [certain sorts of] suffering'.

(I've been waiting patiently. I could see that you'd catch up with me eventually. Now I'll wait some more.)

Naked Ape

June 16, 2005, 10:55 PM

Before I go too far with the newer stuff, let me make good on some of the older stuff. I'll try to do this quickly, succinctly.
That is a novel use of the words "quickly" & "succinctly", one that I have not encountered previously.
Is God’s creation of man the same thing as a woman’s ‘creation’ of a child?
Well, there is evidence that women are involved in the creation of a child, which is a lot more than you can say for god.
God’s creation of man is life from nothing whatsoever.
God’s creation of man is completely fictional. I don't believe in magic books.
Does a woman do the same, or is her act of ‘creation’ a different sort of thing?
No, as I mentioned, we can prove that women can "create" children, God’s creation of man OR life from nothing whatsoever is not demonstably non-fictional.
For if we’re talking about two different sorts of creation then we’re talking about two different sorts of a creator’s rights with respect to created life.
You must be talking about the ghost in the universe! Sorry, I don't believe in ghosts. I am open to evidence however.
This is, in essence, an inquiry into the existence of knowable and/or known objective moral truths.Like when it's OK to dash babies on rocks ...Isaiah 13:17-19 (King James Version)
17Behold, I will stir up the Medes against them, which shall not regard silver; and as for gold, they shall not delight in it.
18Their bows also shall dash the young men to pieces; and they shall have no pity on the fruit of the womb; their eyes shall not spare children.
19And Babylon, the glory of kingdoms, the beauty of the Chaldees' excellency, shall be as when God overthrew Sodom and Gomorrah.and when it's a bad thing ...2 Kings 8:11-13 (King James Version)
11And he settled his countenance stedfastly, until he was ashamed: and the man of God wept.
12And Hazael said, Why weepeth my lord? And he answered, Because I know the evil that thou wilt do unto the children of Israel: their strong holds wilt thou set on fire, and their young men wilt thou slay with the sword, and wilt dash their children, and rip up their women with child.
13And Hazael said, But what, is thy servant a dog, that he should do this great thing? And Elisha answered, The LORD hath shewed me that thou shalt be king over Syria. ?

Is that what you are asking?

Because I really don't think that sort of thing (smashing babies on rocks, and stabbing pregnant women) is acceptable at all. Ever. Even if the voice in your head is telling you to. Perhaps that is where we differ.

Cheers,

Naked Ape

sharon45

June 16, 2005, 11:42 PM

From what little of 335 I think I understand,Don't be so hard on yourself, because it is never too late to learn.
you ask that I show that each NT writer is in agreement with the other NT writers. You ask that I also show Jesus agrees with the NT writers. And you ask that I show Jesus’ view of faith is in agreement with view of faith presented in the book of Hebrews. The doubtful reasonability and feasibility of your requests aside, I remind you that you said there was disagreement in these matters and so the onus of demonstration is on you, not me.No, it is the NT's responsibility to stay consistent. I didn't make the assertion, the NT makes this assertion and you also support it as well.

So I ask where is this supposed compatibility in the NT?

Where are all the parables in john since these were so prominent and important in the other gospels? John and mark's gospels apparently don't care about jesus' birth, but it was so important enough to luke and matthew. Why does john leave out the important part of jesus praying in the garden before his death? Maybe he knows it is stupid for the son of god to actually have to pray to god or that it would be obviously showing doubt in something jesus supposedly would have known well ahead of time about for many many years? Why does john's gospel leave out the confrontation between jesus and the devil? Is it because it would be foolish to have the devil dueling with a part of god to try to tempt him? Why is it that matthew is the only one with the supposed most complete version of the sermon on the mount by around 1/3 over luke, while mark hardly has any of the teachings and john skips the entire highly acclaimed event? Could it be because matthew's gospel was to target Jews since they were the ones already following the Laws from god and that john didn't want to pass off really much of any rules, but to just remained focused on the supposed importance of jesus? What about matthew's 5:18-19 about how all of the Law has to be followed, yet in his other parts of the sermon, he starts breaking the Laws and also adding to them such as in the cases of divorce, vows to god, and the corrupting of the equal punishment for an offense clause. Then paul's endless rants about being finally freed from the Law and that it was like slavery and a curse. Is this because christians don't follow the Law anymore as well as not celebrating the High Holidays? The Psalms constantly praise how great and perfect the Law is and what a joy it is to follow them. God pronouces the Law will be followed for all time in the OT, so why is it that paul wants to make god out like a liar? Paul's galatians 3:11 also asserts that no one is put right with the lord by following the Law and cut off from god's grace as galatians 5:4 proclaims, so where is his evidence for these? As also mark writes in 1:1-3 that the story of jesus started in Isaiah, even though the first part quoted is from Malachi and clearly neither one has anything to do with one such as jesus.

What you’re doing here is burden shifting. I should add that it’s not a large burden you bear, however. You only need prove one instance of disagreement in order to validate a corresponding allegation of schism. I think you can do it.As I pointed out, the huge burden is on the NT and anyone who dares to defend it. You are the one shifting the burden of proof. The NT presents inself as though it agrees with itself and christians side with this belief. Well then prove it. They are the ones making the outstrageous claims. Show where is it actually shown that the NT truly connects with the OT, because they both don't even contain the same gods let alone the same purpose and consistency. The NT asserts the OT and NT contain the same gods, I didn't, so the NT should provide evidence of why this is.

I of course didn't create christianity or the NT. Christians are the ones who are making these claims that the NT was written or inspired by god. Then prove it by providing evidence. Christians are the ones saying that jesus is the Messiah and that jesus is god. Then prove it by providing evidence.

That is like me saying that god resides only in my house and anyone who doubts me has to first prove that he doesn't. Instead, it is obvious that I am making the very first claim, so I would need to provide proof first.

12 The next day as they were leaving Bethany, Jesus was hungry.
13 Seeing in the distance a fig tree in leaf, he went to find out if it had any fruit. When he reached it, he found nothing but leaves, because it was not the season for figs. 14 Then he said to the tree, "May no one ever eat fruit from you again." And his disciples heard him say it.

15 On reaching Jerusalem, Jesus entered the temple area and began driving out those who were buying and selling there. He overturned the tables of the money changers and the benches of those selling doves,
16 and would not allow anyone to carry merchandise through the temple courts.
17 And as he taught them, he said, "Is it not written:
" 'My house will be called
a house of prayer for all nations'? But you have made it 'a den of robbers.' "
18 The chief priests and the teachers of the law heard this and began looking for a way to kill him, for they feared him, because the whole crowd was amazed at his teaching.
19 When evening came, they went out of the city.

20 In the morning, as they went along, they saw the fig tree withered from the roots. 21 Peter remembered and said to Jesus, "Rabbi, look! The fig tree you cursed has withered!"
18 Early in the morning, as he was on his way back to the city, he was hungry.
19 Seeing a fig tree by the road, he went up to it but found nothing on it except leaves. Then he said to it, "May you never bear fruit again!" Immediately the tree withered.
20 When the disciples saw this, they were amazed. "How did the fig tree wither so quickly?" they asked.So which one of these, if any, actually took place?

You say Christian faith is blind. What do you mean by this? You seem to suggest it is blind because it is ‘not completely certain’ (the Calvinists may dispute this; and I can bat for them on this in a pinch). Are you saying that if one holds a belief with something less than complete certainty belief is thus held blindly? What do you mean by complete certainty here? Can you give me an example of a belief you hold with this sort of complete certainty? And just out of curiosity, do you know what solipsism is? If so, are you ready to go there? I’m not normally a doubt-monger but I’m prepared to make an exception in this case.Where did I suggest any of this? Your NT states this in hebrews 11, not I. It is the one that says that its faith is a version of certainty. I am saying that faith is not about certainty as shown by john's lesson from 20:29. By this example, this can not be explained as certain, because it is a blind faith. Christians can't provide any evidence that jesus ever existed, they can't provide any evidence that he was the Messiah, they can't provide any evidence that jesus died for everyon'e sins, and they can't provide any evidence that he resurrected after dying. This is all believed based on blind faith, it is by far not a certainty.

You say Messiah is to bring peace to the whole world and won’t die in order for it to happen. You say he will be a gifted man, though merely a man. You say he will cause the world to recognize Judaism as the true faith. How do you know these things? Where do you get these ideas? Can we go to your source for a look-see? The source is the prophecies about the Messiah from out of the OT, so maybe you should become more familiar with them yourself since you claim to believe that jesus was indeed the Messiah.Isaiah 9.6
For a child will be born to us, a son will be given to us;
And the government will rest on His shoulders;
And His name will be called Wonderful Counselor, Mighty God,
Eternal Father, Prince of Peace.

Micah 5.2
But as for you, Bethlehem Ephrathah,
Too little to be among the clans of Judah,
From you One will go forth for Me to be ruler in Israel
His goings forth are from long ago,
From the days of eternity.You apparently agree that these passages from Isaiah and Micah are messianic but apparently disagree on other respects. You say the divine names Isaiah mentions are respectful of God. Granted, they are. But whose names are they? Does not Isaiah say these are names for the child, the Messiah to come? If so, wouldn’t that mean the Messiah of Isaiah is not merely mortal, as you suggest? Perhaps you predicate the divine names of someone other than the child? If so, how so?I had already gave you the answer. It is a name in respect of god and for description of purpose. Yes it is a name for the child who will become king, the Messiah. The Messiah's purpose, knowledge, strength, and charisma all come from god. He is only a faithful servant of god, not god himself. No, it does not say anything of the sort that the child is not mortal.

Similarly intriguing, you read the Micah passage as speaking of Messiah’s ancient ‘birthline’. Do you read the phrase ‘His goings forth are from long ago’ as somehow meaning ‘His birthline is from long ago’? Or does this birthline idea come from somewhere else? Please share your insights with as much specificity as you
can muster. If I’m reading this wrong, I really would like to know how I can read it better.Because the Messiah has always been planned by god. Afterall, god does not do something without foreknowledge of the fact. As you have it, "From the days of enternity", that would go back to Adam and the creation of man. God has all of it for his own purpose.

Classical

June 17, 2005, 10:23 AM

sharon45

June 17, 2005, 12:37 PM

If I had it my way, I would go back to some sort of faith - not the angry god slaughtering his own son setup - but something truly great to believe in.Did I want to learn this about the bible? Hell, no, but when studying the subject it became very evident.I've gotten this impression from various atheists that they once thought they had a very faithful and sincere relationship with god and then slowly this started falling away at a time that they honestly really needed much more than just a perceived belief of comfort and assurance. It must have been very heartbreaking and draining to realize it all to be an illusion, and as you said, it would be great if somehow one could take it all back to the way it was and move forward from there.

I on the other hand, was never really a christian even though I was originally raised in the belief. Right away as still only a child, I could not accept both god and jesus as anymore than mere ego driven irresponsible power hungry snobs. Certainly nothing worth my love or attention, but they did keep me in line out of fear for awhile though, like being afraid of any bully. Except these figures and their threat were just suggestions from out of a book though and there is nothing to back up any of it in real life.

That of course does not in any way stop otherwise highly intellient people from somehow choosing to believe in this book's multiple declarations and concepts no matter how illogical or fatally flawed they may be.

In many ways I don't blame them because there isn't much to offer on the atheist's side for great promise and guarantee. Even if it is just a hope they rely on, this can easily be taken as better than nothing. For that little bit of hope though, many christians are going to hold onto that with as tight a grip as possible, building it into something they want firmly to understand as solid. While I think others that find the reasons for coming to and staying with this forum, are slowly in the process of realizing they are trying hard to grasp hold of just only hope itself and nothing at all besides that.

I don't at all think anyone is wasting their time in actually honestly questioning their world view and beliefs. This forum can offer a christian a sorely needed 'trial by fire' to either further strengthen their faith or finally give them some tools and support to more honestly and precisely reevaluate it instead.

Kilgore Trout

June 17, 2005, 06:30 PM

In 300 you ask how we can tell the difference between a genuine experience of God and mental illness. Well, there are tests/criteria/arguments for the veridicality of religious experience with which I have some familiarity. How serious are you about this subject matter?Let me guess... when they perform these tests on christians it shows the person had a genuine experience. If they perform these tests on say a Hindu or a Jew, it shows that the person did not have a genuine religious experience. What are these tests you talk about? They should be more well known, since they apparently are proof that jesus is god.

Or you you just talking about the apologetic type of "test" where if someone has an experience that doesn't go against the christian faith, then the experience is genuine, otherwise it's false? Examples: If god tells you to strangle your kids, or tells you he's not a trinity, that's not genuine. If the holy spirit tells you where you left your car keys, that's genuine.

In 306 you answer my original request and say your chief objection to Christianity is practical; that, with the support of Scripture, it causes division within families such as your own. But whether or not Christianity is divisive is irrelevant to whether or not it is true. The question is not whether or not Christianity is divisive. I'll grant it is. The question is whether or not this divisiveness is morally justified. For if Christianity is false then I grant it is unjustifiably divisive. However, if Christianity is true then though it is divisive, it is justified in so being.Begging the question. You are assuming that something that is true is also good and justified. Slavery was true. It was divisive. Does that make it justified? Even if somehow christianity was true, it would not be justified. Let's see....A megalomaniac god got tired of the Jews ruining his good name by disobeying his laws, so he sends one-third of himself down to earth disguised as a Deuteronomy 13 false prophet and changes his own laws that he told the Jews to never change. He is well aware the Jews who are well-versed in Torah will be pissed off at him and want to kill him because he himself told them to do this to anyone who messed with his laws. But that's OK, because he wanted to commit suicide-by-cop. Then he rises from the dead knowing again that the faithful ones will ignore this because he already told them in Deuteronomy 13 that he would have false prophets perform miracles in order to test them. He now says that anyone who doesn't believe he rose from the dead will go to hell for eternity even though he never used the threat of souls going to hell in all 39 books of his bible. Although he did all this because the Jews were not obeying his law, he now says his laws are dead and were just there to make men slaves. He doesn't care that the ones who love his Torah don't believe this, instead he now says he is purposely blinding those people. How can this be justified?

In 279 you ask what I mean by saying that God is not under the moral law. You also want to know how man can judge God. To the first I mean God is not under the jurisdiction of the moral law in a way similar to how you, presumably an American on American soil, are not under the jurisdiction of British law (or vice versa, if I got your nationality wrong). To the second, I know men may wish at times to judge God’s recorded acts and intents against their knowledge of the moral law (whether innate or revealed) but even were God under the moral law, any such judgment men might make will be too shortsighted to be of any worth. For men must be able to see the end from the beginning and the beginning from the end, must be able to peer into the very heart of God and must know what the greatest good is in order to even begin to know whether or not God’s acts achieve His intents ... and if His intents are for the greatest good (or are at least morally sufficient) in the first place! So, no, God is not a valid target of man’s moral judgments due to man’s lack of vision, wisdom and an applicable standard by which to judge. Christians love messing with our heads with arguments like this.

Christian: "Look at this great book! It's written by the all-loving perfectly moral god."
Bystander: (using the wisdom and logic the alleged god gave her) "But this god is ordering mass genocides and sending billions of people to hell! This can't be written by a just and moral god!"
Christian: "How dare you question god's morals! We can never understand his ways or judge his perfect morality."
Bystander: "Have you seen the holy book of my religion?"
Christian: "Yes, but the god in your book orders people to kill other people and god would never do that!"

Using arguments like this every religion would be able to have any atrocity in their holy book and if you complain about it they will just say you can't judge the morals of their god. Jerry Falwell said a couple of years ago that Muhammed was a terrorist because he was a conqueror. So if Joshua commits genocide we are told not to judge god's morals, but when Muhammed allegedly does similar things, that is somehow proof that he can't be following god's orders? Muhammed is supposed to be god's prophet just like Joshua is. Islam would say that Muhammed is carrying out god's wishes, so you can't judge his actions. Just another example that chistians will use normal human logic and morals when it comes to judging every god but their own.

Based on the idea that humans can't judge god's morals and logic, the religion that you perceive to be the sickest and stupidest could be the one true religion. The one true religion could have been some religion that only 30 people followed 700 years ago. After all, who are we to judge if god doesn't want many followers. We are too stupid to know what god would want.

From what little of 335 I think I understand, you ask that I show that each NT writer is in agreement with the other NT writers. You ask that I also show Jesus agrees with the NT writers.
here's some...

Matthew 22:36-40

36"Teacher, which is the greatest commandment in the Law?" 37Jesus replied: " 'Love the Lord your God with all your heart and with all your soul and with all your mind.' 38This is the first and greatest commandment. 39And the second is like it: 'Love your neighbor as yourself.' 40All the Law and the Prophets hang on these two commandments."

Galatians 5:14

14The entire law is summed up in a single command: "Love your neighbor as yourself."

This is a clear contradiction. Having Paul not mention the "greatest commandment" and instead saying the law is only summed up by the "second greatest" is inexcuseable. For one thing, even simple logic would tell you that of the 10 commandments, the first four only have to do with loving god, they have nothing to do with loving your neighbor.

Romans 13

Submission to the Authorities

1Everyone must submit himself to the governing authorities, for there is no authority except that which God has established. The authorities that exist have been established by God. 2Consequently, he who rebels against the authority is rebelling against what God has instituted, and those who do so will bring judgment on themselves. 3For rulers hold no terror for those who do right, but for those who do wrong. Do you want to be free from fear of the one in authority? Then do what is right and he will commend you. 4For he is God's servant to do you good. But if you do wrong, be afraid, for he does not bear the sword for nothing. He is God's servant, an agent of wrath to bring punishment on the wrongdoer. 5Therefore, it is necessary to submit to the authorities, not only because of possible punishment but also because of conscience.

Jesus allegedly did no wrong yet he was punished by authorities. Paul disagrees with the gospels on this one. The high priests as well as Pilate would count as authorities, so whoever you think is to blame for jesus' death, it's still contradicted by this passage.

Hobbs

June 18, 2005, 09:31 PM

Hi BGIC, thanks for your responses, and sorry for my delay. I've been busy with other things recently.

you say in 288
Before I begin responding, may I ask a favor? Would you please add a single word to the beginning of your responses to indicate to whom you are responding? (e.g. "Hobbs, you say in 288") Many of us have said similar things, so I find it difficult sometimes to know whether or not a response is to me or someone else. So I've had to write down all my post numbers in this thread. And I often have no clue to whom you are responding when it is not to one of my posts I've noted. I do appreciate you adding the post number, that makes it easier to go back to it, but I'd also appreciate a name so I know when I should go back to see what I said when, and also to relate your response to a name and personality I can recognize when you aren't responding to me.

that you see no connection between purpose and ethics, you do not see how the question of the meaning of life bears upon how one should live it.
No, that's not what I said, because that's not what you asked, or at least that's not how I understood your question. You asked whether there was a connection between Purpose and ethics, and I interpreted there to be a significance in your capitalizing 'Purpose,' meaning that it is in some sense essentially related to a fixed and absolute purpose of God. I don't think there is such a thing, and I'm quite confident that even if there is a God then we are incapable of determining with any reliability what if any Purpose it has for us (primarily since the people who believe that there is a Purpose have so many and such different beliefs about what this Purpose is). As for lower case purposes and meanings that we have, yes I think they are related to ethics.

You then suggest one may reasonably and even should maximize the quantity and quality of human life, and that this suffices as an ordering principle for morality.
Well, that's not quite it, I think you missed the point. It sounds to me like that is still seeing things from the viewpoint of us being essentially and inescapably servants to some end or purpose, or End or Purpose, outside us and imposed on us, some Reason for us to be here, in this case the Purpose being to maximize the quantity and quality of life. It is a viewpoint that sees us a property of something, or Someone, else. But all I'm saying is that we're all just trying to figure out how to lead good lives, and to figure out just what a "good life" is in the first place. If you see us as the property of some other rightful owner, as servants to some external Purpose imposed on us, that takes you in one direction to attempt to answer these sorts of questions. If you see us as a certain sort of creature that happens to be here whatever the cause, then it makes sense to go in another direction and to a different type of answer: we do what we can to figure out what sorts of creatures we are and how we can act in ways that result in the sorts of consequences that are beneficial rather than harmful. Our lives are their own meanings, they are producers of meanings, they don't need to have any Meaning imposed on them to be meaningful. It's not that there is any burden imposed on us that we "should" maximize the quality and quantity of life. It's just that if we do the sorts of things that tend to increase the quality and quantity of our lives, our lives will be better and more enjoyable, more worth living for their own sakes. The "shoulds" are not imposed from the outside; rather, they are generated from within the lives we live as the sorts of creatures we are. It's the sort of view that believes, and takes seriously, the idea that virtue is its own reward: a good life is worth living for its own sake; it doesn't need some Purpose to make it worth living, it is its own purpose. And what constitutes a "good" life depends on the sorts of creatures we are and the situations in which we find ourselves.

You ask me if God was in the wrong for the Flood, the destruction of Amalek and the Egyptian firstborn. You say God’s spitefulness was the reason behind the Amalek thing. You ask that I answer these, your questions of Biblical morality, without appealing to divine power or sovereignty.
That last part was tongue-in-cheek, meant in jest, putting in the sorts of restrictions on "acceptable" answers that I had just chided you for putting on some of your questions. But the questions themselves were serious. And I note that you made no attempt to answer them.

Oh, and by the way, I didn't say God's spitefulness was the reason behind the Amalek thing. I pointed out that this is what the Bible says is the reason behind the Amalek thing.

You say I advocate a ‘might makes right’ view of morality stemming from my theism and view of purpose and that you’re sure glad God doesn’t exist. You then say there is a naturalistic ground for a universal moral realism based on reason and human nature that makes no reference to God. You wonder aloud if God has any such rational justification for His moral judgments. You then suggest that if He does we could then appeal to that same rationale for our morality, no God necessary. You ask what, besides power of enforcement, could possibly make God’s arbitrary preferences better than anyone else’s. Lastly, you say I can’t reasonably place any restrictions on the answers I get in response to the questions I ask.
Yea, that looks like pretty much what I said. And again, you made no response.

But I didn't just "wonder aloud" whether God has any reasons for his moral judgments. I directly asked you "Does God have any basis at all for his moral judgments and actions? Does he have any reasons for doing some things and not others, and for giving us the commands he gives us? If so, what are those reasons, and why can't we just bypass God and appeal to them to make our own moral judgments? If not, then what, besides his superior power, makes his arbitrary preferences any better than ours?" I would appreciate an answer.

I'd also, if you don't mind, like to add another question. You may correct me if I'm wrong, but I presume that you believe that if we live according to generally accepted moral precepts (I know there is plenty of disagreement among many specifics, but there's also plenty of agreement about the generalities such as the golden rule, be kind to others, pay what you owe, that sort of thing) then we will more likely live more enjoyable, better lives. If you agree, I would like to ask: do you think there is something significant to that, or do you think that it is just a fortuitous coincidence for us?

If I may interpret and condense further, I’d say you denied then affirmed a link between purpose and ethics.
I hope it's a little more clear what I meant now.

You tie the meaning of life to quality and quantity of life, as per the human nature, an end to which we may reasonably advance in our ethical decision-making, and so thereby posit a form of ethical naturalism.
Or, maybe not quite. I don't think there is a "the" meaning of life. Lots of things mean various things to me, and to you and others, we share some of those meanings, others are individual, but I don't see the existence of or the need for any "the" meaning of life, or a Meaning of life.

You pose some questions of Biblical morality and ask me to judge the acts of God as right or wrong.
Yes, I posed lots of questions, none of which you even attempted to answer.

You say I’m committed to tying right and wrong to God’s arbitrary preferences or something else, some rationale that is autonomous to God, neither of which bodes well for theistic morality. Now, before I respond, please tell me where, if anywhere, I’ve misread you. Thanks much.
I appreciate your attempts to make sure you understand what I and others have said concerning our beliefs about ethics before you risk wasting your time and ours by giving a response to a misunderstanding. But, just as we have been responding to your questions, I would appreciate responses to my questions (as I'm sure others would also to theirs).

Hobbs

June 18, 2005, 09:38 PM

In 289 you say ....

And you did this almost three weeks ago so I wonder if you’re still around. So, before I respond to any of it, let me ask directly: are you still here? And if so, have I read you right? Have I summarized your claims fairly? If you are still here, and if I did gather, I’d like to begin with that emergent property view of the mind. Anyway, I’ll wait to hear from you.
Yep, I'm here. And, yea, that sounds like an accurate enough summary of my claims.

Hobbs

June 18, 2005, 10:07 PM

Hobbs

June 18, 2005, 10:35 PM

[QUALITY=Hobbs-like]
Yea, you wish ... :p

[/lame attempt at humor]

[MODE=apologetic] Sorry about that, I didn't mean any insult, I was just making a pathetic attempt at humor [/MODE=apologetic]

Hobbs

June 18, 2005, 10:47 PM

In 303 you say different folks interpret the revealed moral law differently. You ask what I propose we do with respect to those moral matters divine revelation is silent upon (assuming there are such things; you can always abstract principles and apply them to any concrete situation).
My point is that sincere believers in the same religion often get very different results when they abstract principles and apply them to the same concrete situations.

Not that there's anything wrong with that. In fact, I don't think there is necessarily anything wrong with that, but at least most divine command or divine origin theories of ethics, at least as I understand them, would think there is something wrong with that, so by their own standards they have a potentially serious problem here. I'd like to know how you get around this problem.

That is, you now apparently want to talk applied and/or normative ethics. But we've been talking meta-ethics to date so I don't think I'm out of line to request a justification for switching topics midstream. Let me know.
I'm not really interested so much in your specific answers to those issues, I'm more interested in how you propose coming up with your answers. But if this is moving to applied or normative ethics, my justification is that seeing the sorts of actual judgments, or actual procedures for making judgments, in applied or normative ethics that result from a certain meta-ethical position is a good way to evaluate that position. It's sort of analogous to running an empirical experiment to test a scientific theory or hypothesis. If, for example, a meta-ethical position allowed for one to conclude in an applied situation that wanton raping and pillaging is not just good but in fact required, one could rightly question the coherence of that meta-ethical position and ask for more work to be done either to clarify why it is not a problem for this meta-ethical position to have this sort of practical result or to modify or perhaps even dispose of the meta-ethical position.

Hobbs

June 18, 2005, 10:54 PM

I haven’t had many answers to my starting questions for a moral argument. Maybe no one saw them. I’ll ask ‘em again. Are moral utterances capable of being true and false? If so, are any actually true? If so, what are they true in relation to? This is, in essence, an inquiry into the existence of knowable and/or known objective moral truths.
In post 313, I said that "rather than being 'true or false,' or 'right or wrong,' I think it is more accurate to say moral judgments are 'better or worse,' more or less reasonable judgments of what would be appropriate to do in certain situations," and I attempted to explain what I meant by that.

Hobbs

June 18, 2005, 10:56 PM

Well, golly, look at that, I'm just post slutting here tonight. Sorry about that, I'll try to behave better.

Stephen T-B

June 20, 2005, 08:04 AM

Yes.
But class post slutting.

Cross Examiner

June 21, 2005, 10:49 AM

In 355 you wonder why I think the Isaiah and Micah passage speak of someone or some subject rather than no one or no subject. Well, words like 'His' and 'child' more often than not key the reader that the author is speaking of someone rather than no one. I think you mean to suggest that Isaiah and Micah's words refer to a fictional subject, not that they refer to no subject, which is just silly if words mean anything at all. Gimme that ol' time grammar ... I always say.

In 366 you have some nice words for me. You suppose we'd get along famously as neighbors. I bet we would. I can see it in my mind. I'd stop by to invite you to church; you'd say get lost Flanders. I'd say okily-dokily neighborino. Yeah. Good times. Actually, if you're in the market, the family two doors down is putting their place up. Great neighborhood. Mostly original owners. 10 minutes from the beach. Call me.

In 370 you say I'm trying to gaslight you. But this charge is simply false for even if I knew which streetlamp you were, I'd still not try to light you with gas since that is bad for the environment. There are cleaner, more efficient alternatives to gas. More seriously though, you suggest the divine names Isaiah apparently ascribes to the 'child' are actually prophetic names meant for Hezekiah. But you curiously fail to mention how you get this meaning from the passage. Here again is that passage:

Isaiah 9.6
For a child will be born to us, a son will be given to us;
And the government will rest on His shoulders;
And His name will be called Wonderful Counselor, Mighty God,
Eternal Father, Prince of Peace.

And while I'm at it, here's Micah:

Micah 5.2
But as for you, Bethlehem Ephrathah,
Too little to be among the clans of Judah,
From you One will go forth for Me to be ruler in Israel
His goings forth are from long ago,
From the days of eternity.

You say Bethlehem is Messiah's origin. Check. You then say His family is from Bethlehem. Check. Lastly, you say Messiah will come from David's ancient line, an event God sees from the beginning of time. Check. As I understand it, I can't say I disagree with any of it. I just wonder how you get this from Micah 5.2. I mean, I just don't see how you get ancestral line from 'goings forth.' Care to share?

You say I am trying to argue that:

1. These two passages say the messiah is God.
2. Jesus says he is God.
3. Therefore these passages are astonishing prophecies of Jesus.

Let me first say that I do agree with the spirit of the two premises and the conclusion. I would even argue for the truth of each of these lines, separately. But I wouldn't argue the third as a valid inference from the first two. Which is to say that while I would normally back each statement individually, I wouldn't put these meager three together and claim it as my own. I think you sell my view short. As to the rest of the haggling over the meaning of words, I'm willing if you are to put it all into stasis for the time being in order to focus on those areas where we have more common epistemic ground. Let me know. Gosh, I wonder if the transcendental argument for God as a sort of apologetical 'nuclear option' was largely borne out of the frustration in trying to get atheists to read text the same way Christians do. It's like the old Mars and Venus adage but applied to worldviews rather than genders.

Kilgore Trout

June 21, 2005, 10:03 PM

The short answer is, yes, I too want to know if I'm in the wrong. I value true belief way, way above comfortable belief. If a true belief happens to also provide comfort or meaning or some other psychological carrot, then that's just icing on the cake. But it really is the cake I'm after. I care deeply about defeasibility, falsifiability, sufficient warrant and the like. I would drop my faith like a bad habit if I truly believed it epistemically insolvent. For example, if after due consideration I held the resurrection of Jesus of Nazareth from the dead was improbable, of dubious historicity, I simply would cease to be a Christian.I find it hard to believe anyone who values true belief could study the resurrection and not think it was dubious. You don't find it odd that no authorities see him resurrected? It's just his friends, people who from the first day they knew him had already decided he was the messiah. There's some real reliable witnesses. Of course, Paul says 500 people saw him but that's just taking his word for it. Also he lumps his visions of jesus along with everybody else's even though his was just spiritual and the others were allegedly physical. Then you'll say "would they die for a lie?" but the deaths of the disciples are all just legends probably created with just that idea in mind. Then there's the idea that the disciples radically changed their lives, but that again is assuming that the NT is super reliable in the first place, so its circular reasoning. Am I leaving anything out that makes you think the resurrection is not dubious?

More seriously though, you suggest the divine names Isaiah apparently ascribes to the 'child' are actually prophetic names meant for Hezekiah. But you curiously fail to mention how you get this meaning from the passage.

I said Jews for Judaism says that. Here is the link that explains it (http://www.jewsforjudaism.org/web/faq/faq070.html). There may be other interpretations including obviously that he is the messiah. There is however, no evidence that the person will be god. You showed me the passage and underline key words. You underline "child" and "son". I don't know why these are supposed to be relevant. Perhaps you believe Hezekiah was never a child nor was he anyone's son? It also has nothing to do with him being god. So what's your point? Then you underline "His" twice. I assume here you are pointing out they are capitalized therefore he is god. The NIV, KJV, RSV,TEV and JPS 1917 versions of the bible all do not capitalize the pronouns referring to this person. The original Hebrew is not going to capitalize the pronouns. The versions that capitalize them are going to be the ones translated by people who have a preconceived notion that this person is god. You may say the other versions have a preconceived notion that he isn't, but clearly the NIV is biased toward making jesus appear in the OT since they have "virgin" in Isaiah 7:14. Even if they were biased away from OT prophecies of jesus, the best you could say is that this is a push, so the capitals are meaningless.

So all we are left with is some guy that has "god" in his name, and I am supposed to somehow believe that is amazing. Somehow all the Jewish scholars that have studied this passage never noticed that the guy has names "reserved for god" as you put it. The only people who noticed this are the christians, who have a vested interest in finding jesus in as many passages of the OT as possible, so they can convince others that their Deut 13 false prophet is actually god. Here is another link from Jews for Judaism that explains the idea of the names reserved for god (http://www.jewsforjudaism.org/web/faq/faq071.html).

now for the Micah 5

You capitalize "One" and "His" these I disregard as in the Isaiah 9.

Here is the NIV version

2 "But you, Bethlehem Ephrathah,
though you are small among the clans of Judah,
out of you will come for me
one who will be ruler over Israel,
whose origins are from of old,
from ancient times."
So the NIV uses origins instead of goings forth. The context is consistent with the idea that they are talking about his family line or as they put it in Jews for Judaism the idea that god knew about the messiah from the beginning of time. I'm the one who needs to ask you why "goings forth" absolutely cannot mean what I say it means. Somehow a simple phrase like "goings forth" is proof that the guy is god. Give me a break. Also I didn't say the messiah will be born in Bethlehem. David was from Bethlehem, so all this verse says is that he will be from the line of David. Micah 5:3 shows that they are not talking about jesus because it talks about the Israelites returning home. That did not happen during his lifetime. Now you are going to say that he'll do it later, but that's a cop out. Since he hasn't done it yet, that means there is no visible evidence that this passage is talking about jesus. There is also no evidence that he was or will be ruler of Israel. Again, this is just a claim by christians. Here is what Jews for Judaism says about Micah (http://www.jewsforjudaism.org/web/faq/faq073.html) if you are interested

You say I am trying to argue that:

1. These two passages say the messiah is God.
2. Jesus says he is God.
3. Therefore these passages are astonishing prophecies of Jesus.

Let me first say that I do agree with the spirit of the two premises and the conclusion. I would even argue for the truth of each of these lines, separately. But I wouldn't argue the third as a valid inference from the first two. Which is to say that while I would normally back each statement individually, I wouldn't put these meager three together and claim it as my own. I think you sell my view short.Fair enough, then why did you bring up, and keep bringing up these passages? If these are not supposed to be such great prophecies why not focus on what you do think is the most important?

As to the rest of the haggling over the meaning of words, I'm willing if you are to put it all into stasis for the time being in order to focus on those areas where we have more common epistemic ground. Let me know.OK. Here is where I am coming from, I lack faith in a god. I know the god depicted in the OT has about as much chance being real as the IPU being real. There may or may not be lots of real history in it, but the parts that talk about god are just talk. For example saying Solomon was king of Israel may have been history, but the part where the say he was picked by god from among David's sons is just fiction to give Solomon legitimacy.

Now when it comes to the NT, that I approach differently. Because it is tied together with the OT, as a kind of "sequel," I treat the OT and the god in it as assumed to be true. Obviously, if I assume the OT god does not exist, then it would follow that the NT is false. That is too easy. So from there I ask does the NT fit together with the OT? I know that even if I assume that god exists and miracles are possible the NT is still a complete mess. Although I know the NT is fiction in the same way the OT is fictional, I know that even if the NT is "true" I still know that jesus is going against the god of the OT, therefore he is a false prophet. By "true" I mean the physical things they report, e.g. walknig on water, rising from the dead, etc. The things they say that go on in heaven, like that jesus died for our sins, he's sitting at the right hand of god etc, are not verifiable, so those don't count.

You say that the resurrection is the most important thing in christianity, yet I know because of Deut 13, the resurrection is irrelevant. God already said he would send false prophets who will perform great wonders in order to test the faith of the Hebrews. Once you have that in the Torah, no miracle is acceptable until you prove you are not a false prophet. The burden of proof is on the prophet. You can't just say "you will die in your sins you wicked people if you don't believe me." The whole idea that jesus does not know this is further evidence that he is a false prophet. The whole point of christian apologetics is they always assume that jesus is god and the NT is perfect and work from there. You can't do that. The burden of proof is on the NT to show that it fits the OT. Deuteronomy says no one can change the law. Jesus changes the law. Therefore jesus is a false prophet. Christians say that jesus is god and god can change his own law therefore its OK for jesus to change it. First of all, that's a circular argument. The reason why you know he's god is because he's not a false prophet and the reason why he's not a false prophet is because he's god. Secondly even god can't change his laws and remain consistant. If god thought you were supposed to be killed for picking up wood on the sabbath, he's not going to change his mind later. Also, jesus doesn't even act like god was the one who made up the laws. He acts like people were crazy to have ever thought any food was "unclean."

Here's where you say that jesus said he was sent by god therefore he's not a Deut 13. Just saying you are sent by god is meaningless. Deut 13:2 says "gods you have not known." Jesus was not previously known to be god. They did not know god was a trinity. This makes it a god they did not know. If somebody said "I was sent by the christian god to tell you he is not a trinity but quadrinty and I'm the fourth part," you'd know the guy was a false prophet. Yet you can't figure out how a god that is known as one that suddenly becomes a trinity is not a different god? Maybe because jesus gave his own version of Deut 13 where he tells people false prophets will come in his name and perform miracles. Sounds familiar. So jesus can say false prophets will do miracles, but if god says it more than a thousand years earlier, everyone ignores it? As I said jesus does not even know about Deut 13 because he said his miracles were proof that he was from god.

I could go on all day, but I won't bother. I've hardly even started. I know the NT lies about the OT all the time, and christians are always going to "answer" that with the circular reasoning that since the NT is written by god and therefore perfect, non-christians just don't understand it. Since you claim that christianity stands or falls on the truth of the resurrection, here is how I view all apologetic reasoning:

Skeptic: How do you explain the fact that the Torah says no one is to change the laws, yet jesus changes the laws?
Apologetic: Well the resurrection is true, therefore jesus is god, therefore he can change the laws.
Skeptic: How about the when jesus destroyed a fig tree just because it was out of season isn't that kind of crazy and/or destroying property?
Apologetic: Well the resurrection is true, therefore jesus is god, therefore he created the universe, therefore he can do what he wants to his property.
Skeptic: How about all the OT quotes in the NT that are mangled or taken out of context?
Apologetic: Well the resurrection is true, therefore.....

I think you can see the pattern. Of course Christians say that it stands or falls on the resurrection. If they realized that the burden of proof was on the prophet to prove he wasn't a false prophet, they would have a hard time answering the objections against christianity. I'm yet to see a christian that didn't take it as a given that jesus was god when he answered objections to christianity.

So if you want to know our common ground, it's probably in the idea that at least for the purposes of judging the NT, I assume the OT and it's god are true. I want to see someone explain things without assuming jesus is god first.

I'd also still appreciate answers to my last questions in post 370. Especially: why is the servant blind and deaf in Isaiah 42:18-20 and who is the "prince" in Ezekiel 44:1-3? Is it the messiah?

Cross Examiner

June 22, 2005, 02:27 PM

I sat down to write but got swamped with more work. Maybe tomorrow.

luvluv

June 22, 2005, 09:15 PM

As to the question posed in the title of the thread?

The answer is yes.

Eldarion Lathria

June 23, 2005, 10:22 AM

As to the question posed in the title of the thread?

The answer is yes.

What are the posters trying to accomplish? If it is to make converts, the answer is a definite 'yes'.

Eldarion Lathria

Cross Examiner

June 24, 2005, 01:51 PM

Here’s my response to the problem of evil, as I recently put it to another:

I think you mean to say suffering exists, not evil. Evil is the privation of good and the term 'good' seems to be a very sticky one for the naturalist (e.g. metaphysical, methodological etc.). So what say we stick with suffering as the operative term? I'll grant without argument that a naturalist need not justify that before swinging it around like a sword. Anyway, my response is simple and reiterative but I think it highlights the epistemic challenge the atheologian faces. If God cannot or is unlikely to have a morally sufficient reason for permitting _____ (e.g., painful deaths) then we are reasonably justified in doubting His existence.

Now, in 371 you ask if I’ve answered the challenge in bold above. Well, I don’t need to; that would be beside the point. For the question itself serves as a stopping point and thus defeater to the problem of evil/suffering. Or, if you prefer, this is to the prosecution a challenge of sorts that asks whether there are enough relevant, non-trivial facts in evidence and enough wisdom in the box (or on the bench) to return a legitimate verdict one way or the other. I think you’ll find it difficult to justify answering the challenge with ‘yes, God cannot (or is unlikely to) have a morally sufficient reason for permitting suffering’, but please don’t let that stop you from giving it a go. I like hearing new ideas.

Still in 371, you ask if pagan myths chronologically prior and thematically parallel to Christianity (allegedly) could've copied Christianity. Those are the questions, aren’t they? Are the parallels genuine or superficial? Are they indeed prior? And are all supposed parallels prior, or just one, two, a few? And are those irrelevant to the foundational beliefs of Christianity? Is it likely that the first Christians, second-Temple Palestinian Jews, gleaned their beliefs from pagan cultures? Etc. I can surely frame the upcoming debate but absent any specific claim on your part, I’m hard pressed to give you a specific response.

In 372 you say that in pagan mythology Easter (Ishtar-Inanna actually, but perhaps pronounced as Easter) is the name of the goddess that raises a pagan god, Adonis, from the dead. I think the intimation here is that Christians celebrate Easter because they borrowed the idea of resurrection from pagan mythology. But I'm not entirely sure what you mean to say so I'll let you say what you mean yourself. I certainly don’t want to respond to a position you don’t actually hold. If you can mark your position out more precisely, it'd be much appreciated. While we wait, let me try to frame the upcoming discussion:

1. What is/are the source text(s)/inscription(s) for the story of Adonis?
2. Does the story change over time? If so, when does it change and in what way?
3. Is the sense of the term ‘resurrection’ used with respect to the Jesus and Adonis traditions univocal, or are two different senses of term used?
4. Does the resurrection tradition for Adonis pre-date or post-date the resurrection tradition for Jesus?

In 376 you express some hesitation in saying you subscribe to moral subjectivism, a certain meta-ethical view. Perhaps it is unclear to you what it is, exactly? Sometimes it is easier to understand what something is when it is contrasted against what it is not so let me draw the major distinction between moral subjectivism and objectivism.

When someone expresses the moral sentiment ‘murder is wrong’, is the person telling you something true about reality? Is such an expression possibly true and thus meaningful (or cognitive), even if it happens to be mistaken (i.e. false)? Moral subjectivists and objectivists agree that moral statements are true or false (i.e., meaningful, cognitive) but they disagree over what moral statements are about. That is, both agree that moral statements refer to a moral reality; they just disagree where/what that morality is, whether internal (i.e., subjective; e.g., the subject’s preferences) or external (i.e., objective; e.g. the object’s properties) to the speaker. So when someone says ‘murder is wrong’ are they talking about themselves, the subject, or murder, the object? What do you say? Do you at least see how the names of the two views tell you a lot about how each reads the meaning of moral statements?

Stated otherwise, if moral statements are indicative then they are propositions; they are true or false, their relations one to another are governed by the rules of inference. Each has intentionality or about-ness; a proposition is always about one real (as opposed to unreal, or imagined) existent thing or another. Moral subjectivists and objectivists agree that moral statements are propositions, they agree that they are indeed about something, but they disagree on what that something is, exactly. Subjectivists say, unsurprisingly, that moral propositions describe the subject whereas objectivists say they describe the object. Objectivists leave moral propositions alone but subjectivists translate or reduce moral propositions into non-moral propositions. Subjectivism renders the proposition of the form ‘x is wrong’ to mean ‘I dislike x’ whereas objectivism allows the straightforward sense to stand as is; that the speaker is saying something true or false about x, and not himself.

Is the difference clear? Do you now feel confident to say you subscribe to moral subjectivism? It still may not be easy for you to say, especially if you don’t know what other views are available, what they say about all this and how they are distinguished one from another. So below I present an eight-point inquiry or test: six questions (not including restatements) and two tasks meant to draw the borders and sharpen up our understanding a bit. They are as follows:

(1) Are moral statements moral propositions? Are they true andfalse? (2) If not, then what are they? (3) If so, then what are they about? What are they true and false in relation to? (4) More practically, are any of the moral propositions people propose actually true? (5) If so, are any actually known to be true? (6) If so, how are these known to be true? (7) If applicable, please translate the moral statement of the form ‘x is wrong’ into its proper meaning. (8) If applicable, please translate the concrete moral statements ‘child torture is wrong’ and ‘Hitler’s Final Solution was evil’ into their respective proper meanings.

The first point divides folks into cognitivist and non-cognitivist camps. The second lets the non-cognitivists explain themselves and to thereby, perhaps, declare themselves as emotivists or imperativalists or some such. The third divides the cognitivists into broadly subjectivist and objectivist camps with further division possible depending upon the answer given. The fourth and fifth let the moral skeptics and error theorists out of the bag thus serving to separate the moral realists from the anti-realists. The sixth begins the epistemic portion of the talk. The seventh and eighth points are requests that serve test-of-consistency and proof-of-concept purposes.

What does it all mean? Well, the typical emotivist would likely answer in some way similar to:

1. No.
2. Expressions of pure, irrational, non-cognitive emotion.
3. N/A
4. N/A; they are meaningless.
5. N/A
6. N/A
7. ‘x is wrong’ means ‘uunngh! x!’
8. The expressions heard/read as ‘child torture is wrong’ and ‘Hitler’s Final Solution was evil’ are, analytically speaking, actually equivalent to pitched grunts though masked in the trappings of intelligible language.

Whereas the typical subjectivist might answer as follows:

1. Yes.
2. N/A
3. Moral propositions are true or false in relation to and ultimately about the subject’s likes and dislikes.
4. Yes.
5. Yes.
6. Biological (evolutionary) and cultural determination of the subject’s personal preferences.
7. ‘x is wrong’ means ‘I dislike x’
8. The propositions ‘child torture is wrong’ and ‘Hitler’s Final Solution was evil’ describe the subject’s biologically and culturally determined dislike for child torture and the Holocaust. If the subject is not lying or somehow mistaken about his own preferences and non-preferences, then these propositions express subjective moral truth.

So how about now? Does the above sound like your take on things? Do you feel comfortable saying you subscribe to moral subjectivism? If not, just go through the gauntlet as you will in your next post. We’ll then go over your answers to see where you fit in. And to be fair, let me first reveal my answers:

1. Yes.
2. N/A
3. Moral propositions are true or false in relation to and ultimately about moral properties (e.g., goodness, unrighteousness, worth, dignity, evil etc.) inherent in objects like persons, characters, acts, intents/motives etc.
4. Yes.
5. Yes.
6. Moral intuition.
7. ‘x is wrong’ need not be translated or reduced; it literally means ‘x has the property of wrongness’
8. The propositions ‘child torture is wrong’ and ‘Hitler’s Final Solution was evil’ ascribe moral properties to the acts themselves, as is plainly indicated. If such properties exist and inhere in said objects, then the propositions in question express objective moral truth.

Like most Christian theists, I am a moral objectivist and, more precisely, an ethical non-naturalist (ethical and moral used interchangeably). Now you know where I stand. So where do we go from here? Well, I just need to know where you stand. I need to know if you do indeed subscribe to moral subjectivism. Failing that, then, as mentioned, just respond to the eight-point survey thing above and we’ll be in good shape. After that much, I suppose this discussion will be free to go to any number of places. To perhaps the is/ought problem. More on the moral law and conscience. Deontology vs. teleology. The practical question: why be moral? The meaning of life. Axiology/value-theory. Even aesthetics. Wherever. I look forward to your response.

John A. Broussard

June 24, 2005, 05:31 PM

Here’s my response to the problem of evil, as I recently put it to another:

I look forward to your response.

I don't know who your responding to, but I would like answers to a few simple questions. No need for a lenghty response.

Was the recent Indian Ocean tsunami an example of evil?

Thank you.

Cross Examiner

June 25, 2005, 12:12 AM

What is absolute moral law, as laid down by God?

Performing a sin offering before going into the Temple because I ate a prawn?

Loving my neighbour as myself?

(Which neighbour: Mrs on-the-edge-of-a-nervous-breakdown Helen Jones or the foetus in her womb? Mrs Jones will almost certainly be sent into a catastrophic depression should the baby be born, and her children taken into the "care" of the local authority. So is my love for her (yes, have the abortion) or for the foetus (no, don't have the abortion, and go mad)?

Loving God?

That's tricky. Whose God are we talkiing about?
Hang on. I've been talking about objective morality, not absolute morality. That is a complimentary yet nonetheless different subject matter. But I defer to you. Let's talk a bit about the supposed difficulties with the idea of absolute morality. With respect to two competing and mutually exclusive goods, I say do the greater. Yeah, it happens. Sometimes in life we really must decide which course of action leads to the greater good or which of two sacrifices is the lesser evil. I take it that your 'which neighbor?' dilemma above is meant to highlight such difficulties in rightly applying a moral law? So what do we do? We are between a rock and a hard place here. Do we opt for the supposedly probable insanity of one, or the indisputably certain death of another? Mental illness can be treated and perhaps cured. Death, no. So the decision is an easy one in my mind: we choose life at the cost of illness rather than health at the cost of death. Now, if we deny personhood to the fetus then this decision becomes even easier, though doing so opens a Pandora's box. Anyway, if you are an atheist, then what moral duty have you to love another as you love yourself? Or do you mean all this as a question only for the Christian?

Biff the unclean

June 25, 2005, 12:53 AM

Hang on. I've been talking about objective morality, not absolute morality.
But for morality to be objective then each act must have a moral value of it's own (the object). So the same scale would be used for everyone if morals were objective.
That would mean that the actions of God would be judged by the moral values of the individual actions and he could be judged by the same standards that you and I are. Do you really want to go down that route? Or do you prefer that the morality of an action be subjective to who is acting?

Anyway, if you are an atheist, then what moral duty have you to love another as you love yourself? Or do you mean all this as a question only for the Christian?
Moral duties are not supernatural in nature. They come from the human society we are a part of. Last time I looked Atheists were humans.
Christians are taught that they themselves are born sinners who have a sin nature who need to be "saved." When your religion requires self loathing loving others as you love your contemptable depraved self is not doing others any favor.
Christians can only be moral if they will rise about what their religion teaches and embrace and value their humanity.

Cross Examiner

June 25, 2005, 11:13 AM

From knowing how people use the word 'good'. If a human being did things like that, the word 'good' would not be accepted as a description. Not even on the argument that there might be some undisclosed reason that provided justification.

You have to understand that, although I agreed that your summary statement of my position seems broadly accurate, the question I am posing on that basis is not: 'how can God's actions be justified?' but rather 'how can your action in calling God good be justified?'. I suppose you could say that your summary of my position seems to me to be logically equivalent to the alternative summary of my position: 'human beings have no justification for applying the word "good" to a God who causes [certain sorts of] suffering'.
So how can my 'action in calling God good be justified'? That's what you want to talk about? Well, I suppose I should first ask then what you mean exactly by 'good'? If you use one sense and I use another, we'll end talking past each other.
(I've been waiting patiently. I could see that you'd catch up with me eventually. Now I'll wait some more.)
Your patience is appreciated.

Biff the unclean

June 25, 2005, 11:54 AM

Well, I suppose I should first ask then what you mean exactly by 'good'? If you use one sense and I use another, we'll end talking past each other.

Ahh, there we go. Exactly what I was talking about in #400. How Christian "morals" are subjective.
Suddenly "good" has become an unknown. What happened Billy? Did the knowledge of good & evil from that magic fruit in Eden wear off?

Cross Examiner

June 26, 2005, 12:08 AM

In 380 and 383, the two of you, sharon45 and Kilgore Trout, make a great number of explicit and implicit claims -- too many for me to count much less to address. So I must consider our talks in stasis for the time being. If you still want to have a discussion, please advance one claim in your next post. Thanks.

BadBadBad

June 26, 2005, 11:15 AM

Well, I suppose I should first ask then what you mean exactly by 'good'? If you use one sense and I use another, we'll end talking past each other.

In 258 you question what I mean by child torture. You say torture means different things to different folks. In the interest of one standard, why don’t we just go with how I spoke of it recently? That torture means one causing pain to another for one’s own pleasure and the like. So whatever the act, if the goal in the doing is to, say, make another suffer for suffering’s sake, or for one’s own amusement or some such, then that’s what I mean by torture. Torture is in the intent of the actor (as opposed to the act or the acted upon) as far as I’m concerned. Of course, you may choose to go with another meaning of the term but in that case we’ll end up talking about two different things and, as I forewarned, we’ll talk right past one another on to Judgement Day.

In your definition of the words good Billy, is it good to hack and butcher children with swords for God? In your definition of the word torture Billy, is it tortuous to hack and butcher children with swords for God?

Stephen T-B

June 26, 2005, 12:56 PM

John A. Broussard

June 26, 2005, 04:35 PM

I just don't understand how BGic and his ilk can continue to insist on objective morality.

So three questions:

is slavery objectively moral or objectively immoral?

Is usury objectively moral or objectively immoral?

Is childhood betrothal and sex with a minor objectively moral or objectively immoral?
You should have kept it down to one question. BGIC's favorite answer to the unanswerable is to say he's too busy. And then he'll give a three page, rambling discussion of something he thinks he has the answer to.

See? Here's one of his evasions:

"So I must consider our talks in stasis for the time being. If you still want to have a discussion, please advance one claim in your next post. Thanks."

J-D

June 26, 2005, 10:05 PM

So how can my 'action in calling God good be justified'? That's what you want to talk about? Well, I suppose I should first ask then what you mean exactly by 'good'? If you use one sense and I use another, we'll end talking past each other.I'm asking how you justify asserting that 'God is good'. So I think I should first ask you exactly what you mean by 'good'. I suggested that I took it to mean the same as what people mean when they use the word 'good' to describe humans and human actions. I foresee that you may object that it's not exact enough for you. But it's exact enough for what I want to say. Whatever good means, it's clear to me that nobody would describe it as 'good' if a human being engineered and released into the environment all the disease viruses in existence. Do you doubt that? And if what I've said isn't exact enough for you, what exactly do you mean by 'good' when you say 'God is good'?

Rational BAC

June 26, 2005, 10:56 PM

Amazing---

Looks like this thread will hit 10,000 views pretty soon.

Amazing how atheists can nit pick Christian fundies to death and vice versa.

And both seem to enjoy it.

(I assume people do what they enjoy)

Cross Examiner

June 27, 2005, 09:05 AM

BadBadBad

June 27, 2005, 11:04 AM

Stephen T-B

June 27, 2005, 11:08 AM

Muddy the waters futher?

How is that possible following this:
"...is moral goodness/badness always in the human mind (i.e., the subject) or is moral goodness/badness in the act/intent/agent (i.e., object)? Or, restated, in what does moral value inhere, the mind of the subject or as a property of the object?"

I think the statement that moral goodness/badness is always in the human mind would find little support - but this is not what I mean by subjective moral values.
I mean that they are subject to what society deems them to be: thus is some societies it is moral for a 50-year old man to marry and have sex with a 13-year old girl. In some societies it is not.
In some societies it was moral to burn heretics alive. It was moral to own slaves. It was immoral to indulge in usury.

I understand by "objective" morality, one which over-arches temporary and changing social fashions or norms and derives from some source to which every human being can access - such as a god (if there were such a thing)

Scorpion

June 27, 2005, 11:32 AM

In 376 you express some hesitation in saying you subscribe to moral subjectivism, a certain meta-ethical view. Perhaps it is unclear to you what it is, exactly?

I've found there are a lot of nuances under that umbrella (some of which I don't agree with), and I wasn't sure which strand you were referring to - hence the cautious answer.

So when someone says ‘murder is wrong’ are they talking about themselves, the subject, or murder, the object? What do you say?

I feel like saying they're talking about the murder, yet the veracity of the statement can not be verified without referring to the moral system of the speaker... so where does that leave me?

Stated otherwise, if moral statements are indicative then they are propositions; they are true or false, their relations one to another are governed by the rules of inference. Each has intentionality or about-ness; a proposition is always about one real (as opposed to unreal, or imagined) existent thing or another. Moral subjectivists and objectivists agree that moral statements are propositions, they agree that they are indeed about something, but they disagree on what that something is, exactly. Subjectivists say, unsurprisingly, that moral propositions describe the subject whereas objectivists say they describe the object. Objectivists leave moral propositions alone but subjectivists translate or reduce moral propositions into non-moral propositions.

Funny, this here seems to take me closer to the objectivist position. Basically I think that moral language can be translated into talk about goals and means to achieve those goals, but that still contains an intentional and normative component that can not be reduced further in my opinion.

Is the difference clear? Do you now feel confident to say you subscribe to moral subjectivism?

I'm afraid one can read from my responses above that the difference didn't come entirely clear, and I'm not confident about subscribing to moral subjectivism as you described it...

(1) Are moral statements moral propositions? Are they true and false?

True or false, yes.

(3) If so, then what are they about? What are they true and false in relation to?

They have truth values in relation to the moral systems that people subscribe to.

(4) More practically, are any of the moral propositions people propose actually true?

Having a truth value in relation to a moral system is as actual as it gets. If you mean "does it have a truth value independent of a moral system", then no.

(5) If so, are any actually known to be true?

Yep. I know for certain that smoking in my living room is the wrongest thing anyone can do.

(6) If so, how are these known to be true?

'Cause that's how I defined it. It is true by my definition. Finding out that I'm mistaken about it is conceptually (logically, if you will) impossible.

It is possible to find out that moral statements are mistaken - however, that can only happen by realizing that some not-so-fundamental moral statement is in conflict with some more fundamental statement of a moral system that the speaker subscribes to. In order for my above example to be valid, "Smoking in my living room is wrong" obviously must be the most fundamental cornerstone of my moral system or I could find out to be mistaken about it.

What kind of cornerstones get to be chosen by different people and why is of course one major can of worms, but I suppose we're not going there yet?

(7) If applicable, please translate the moral statement of the form ‘x is wrong’ into its proper meaning.

"X is wrong" is proper - however, I consider it to be a shorthand for something like "I have a goal of having a state of affairs P, I think P should be a goal for everyone, and doing X is somehow counterproductive for achieving P".

You might note though that this still includes a "should" in a critical spot, so it isn't really a reduction.

(8) If applicable, please translate the concrete moral statements ‘child torture is wrong’ and ‘Hitler’s Final Solution was evil’ into their respective proper meanings.

Probably not applicable, since they put the point most concisely as they are, but I could say

"I have a goal of not causing unnecessary harm to anyone, I think this goal should be a general law, and child torture/killing people because of their ethnicity hinders that goal"

...but as said, there's the critical "I think this should be a general law" which means that moral component of the statement hasn't really been reduced out.

Ok then, let's take a look at the correct answers :)

Whereas the typical subjectivist might answer as follows:

1. Yes.
2. N/A
3. Moral propositions are true or false in relation to and ultimately about the subject’s likes and dislikes.
4. Yes.
5. Yes.
6. Biological (evolutionary) and cultural determination of the subject’s personal preferences.

I got them all correctly up until this point, put here I part ways either with the subjectivists or your understanding of subjectivism (doesn't really matter which). What ultimately determines the truth value of a moral proposition are the cornerstones of a moral system. How those cornerstones get chosen (well, I wasn't going into this yet, but seems you're already there) are determined are indeed determined by biological and cultural influences, but that's not where the buck stops. The buck has already stopped above these - i.e. at the cornerstones.

7. ‘x is wrong’ means ‘I dislike x’

I got this wrong too...

8. The propositions ‘child torture is wrong’ and ‘Hitler’s Final Solution was evil’ describe the subject’s biologically and culturally determined dislike for child torture and the Holocaust.
If the subject is not lying or somehow mistaken about his own preferences and non-preferences, then these propositions express subjective moral truth.

Hmm... a discussion about what precisely is meant by "expressing" is waiting around the corner. Gotta run for some football now, but I suppose there's enough to chew on in the meantime,

-S-

Scorpion

June 27, 2005, 01:52 PM

J-D

June 27, 2005, 07:08 PM

Cross Examiner

June 28, 2005, 02:36 AM

Hi BGIC, thanks for your responses, and sorry for my delay. I've been busy with other things recently.
No problem. I understand.
Before I begin responding, may I ask a favor? Would you please add a single word to the beginning of your responses to indicate to whom you are responding? (e.g. "Hobbs, you say in 288") Many of us have said similar things, so I find it difficult sometimes to know whether or not a response is to me or someone else. So I've had to write down all my post numbers in this thread. And I often have no clue to whom you are responding when it is not to one of my posts I've noted. I do appreciate you adding the post number, that makes it easier to go back to it, but I'd also appreciate a name so I know when I should go back to see what I said when, and also to relate your response to a name and personality I can recognize when you aren't responding to me.
Sure, Hobbs. I'll keep that in mind going forward.
No, that's not what I said, because that's not what you asked, or at least that's not how I understood your question. You asked whether there was a connection between Purpose and ethics, and I interpreted there to be a significance in your capitalizing 'Purpose,' meaning that it is in some sense essentially related to a fixed and absolute purpose of God. I don't think there is such a thing, and I'm quite confident that even if there is a God then we are incapable of determining with any reliability what if any Purpose it has for us (primarily since the people who believe that there is a Purpose have so many and such different beliefs about what this Purpose is). As for lower case purposes and meanings that we have, yes I think they are related to ethics.
I was just trying to get at your opinion on the link, if any, between objective, cosmic purpose (i.e., Purpose rather than purpose(s)) and objective morality. If the former obtains does this necessarily or probably imply the latter, by your lights? With respect to the latter, I merely mean the bare existence of the moral fact, not the knowability of such a thing. That is a separate issue as I'm sure you're aware.
Well, that's not quite it, I think you missed the point. It sounds to me like that is still seeing things from the viewpoint of us being essentially and inescapably servants to some end or purpose, or End or Purpose, outside us and imposed on us, some Reason for us to be here, in this case the Purpose being to maximize the quantity and quality of life. It is a viewpoint that sees us a property of something, or Someone, else. But all I'm saying is that we're all just trying to figure out how to lead good lives, and to figure out just what a "good life" is in the first place.
OK.
If you see us as the property of some other rightful owner, as servants to some external Purpose imposed on us, that takes you in one direction to attempt to answer these sorts of questions. If you see us as a certain sort of creature that happens to be here whatever the cause, then it makes sense to go in another direction and to a different type of answer: we do what we can to figure out what sorts of creatures we are and how we can act in ways that result in the sorts of consequences that are beneficial rather than harmful.
So one's view of man bears on how one answers questions of purpose and morality? OK.
Our lives are their own meanings, they are producers of meanings, they don't need to have any Meaning imposed on them to be meaningful. It's not that there is any burden imposed on us that we "should" maximize the quality and quantity of life. It's just that if we do the sorts of things that tend to increase the quality and quantity of our lives, our lives will be better and more enjoyable, more worth living for their own sakes.
So we can give ourselves little objectives while we wait for the clock to tick off? OK. This is uncontroversial.
The "shoulds" are not imposed from the outside; rather, they are generated from within the lives we live as the sorts of creatures we are. It's the sort of view that believes, and takes seriously, the idea that virtue is its own reward: a good life is worth living for its own sake; it doesn't need some Purpose to make it worth living, it is its own purpose. And what constitutes a "good" life depends on the sorts of creatures we are and the situations in which we find ourselves.
I'm sorry if any ambiguity on my part led you down this path, but I don't see how this relates to what I've been talking about. Let me get straight to the point: do objective moral facts exist, on your view? Do moral properties exist objectively, subjectively or not at all? Do we have real moral duties? Do we, for example, have a real moral and binding duty to refrain from killing Jews? If so, what is the nature of this duty? Where does it come from? What makes it binding?
That last part was tongue-in-cheek, meant in jest, putting in the sorts of restrictions on "acceptable" answers that I had just chided you for putting on some of your questions. But the questions themselves were serious. And I note that you made no attempt to answer them.
It is and was then unclear what you mean(t) by those questions of Biblical morality. Do you mean them now as a serious challenge?
Oh, and by the way, I didn't say God's spitefulness was the reason behind the Amalek thing. I pointed out that this is what the Bible says is the reason behind the Amalek thing.
Interesting. If your reading were to become pertinent to anything I've been talking about at all, I'd likely challenge it.
Yea, that looks like pretty much what I said. And again, you made no response.
Right. I don't want to respond to a view you don't hold.
But I didn't just "wonder aloud" whether God has any reasons for his moral judgments. I directly asked you "Does God have any basis at all for his moral judgments and actions? Does he have any reasons for doing some things and not others, and for giving us the commands he gives us? If so, what are those reasons, and why can't we just bypass God and appeal to them to make our own moral judgments? If not, then what, besides his superior power, makes his arbitrary preferences any better than ours?" I would appreciate an answer.
From an axiological/teleological perspective, I'd say God commands what He commands so as to increase value. Deontologically, He commands what He commands because it is right to do so. More colloquially, God is in the business of reflecting His Truth, Goodness and Beauty in, through and upon us, His image bearers. His commands are both right in and of themselves and as means to His ultimate end. The objectively real moral properties that we reflect in our intents, acts and characters are grounded in God; He is sine qua non to goodness. So, as you might imagine, I deny the so-called fact/value dichotomy; the world is real and value-laden. All this is broad overview. We can delve into specifics as you like.
I'd also, if you don't mind, like to add another question. You may correct me if I'm wrong, but I presume that you believe that if we live according to generally accepted moral precepts (I know there is plenty of disagreement among many specifics, but there's also plenty of agreement about the generalities such as the golden rule, be kind to others, pay what you owe, that sort of thing) then we will more likely live more enjoyable, better lives. If you agree, I would like to ask: do you think there is something significant to that, or do you think that it is just a fortuitous coincidence for us?
Yes. I agree with you that there is a basic kernel of universal morality (cf. Lewis). I believe that one should (i.e., rational sense, not moral) adopt the moral point of view because such likely leads to a well-lived life, in both the classical and modern sense of the idea. I think there is no coincidence or accident of any sort in this world, the intersection of moral living and eudemonia included. No, this doesn't present a problem for me with respect to the supposed existence of gratuitous suffering. But feel free to press the matter if you like.
I hope it's a little more clear what I meant now.
Yes, a little. Thanks.
Or, maybe not quite. I don't think there is a "the" meaning of life. Lots of things mean various things to me, and to you and others, we share some of those meanings, others are individual, but I don't see the existence of or the need for any "the" meaning of life, or a Meaning of life.
Noted. We might revisit some of these ideas.
Yes, I posed lots of questions, none of which you even attempted to answer.
Right. If you mean the questions of Biblical morality to be taken seriously, please say so.
I appreciate your attempts to make sure you understand what I and others have said concerning our beliefs about ethics before you risk wasting your time and ours by giving a response to a misunderstanding. But, just as we have been responding to your questions, I would appreciate responses to my questions (as I'm sure others would also to theirs).
Then I hope you find some of my answers a good start. I'm off to bed.

mmmmm

June 28, 2005, 05:29 AM

chief objection to christianity:

much the same as per all organized religion - the politics.

Stephen T-B

June 28, 2005, 07:02 AM

I'm merely commenting here on a remark by BGic and don't expect a response.

He wrote: "I'd say God commands what He commands so as to increase value. Deontologically..."

This compeletely ignores the "natural" world of which we are part.

Does God command the tse fly to bite the animals that live on the African savannah? Does an impala being bitten by tse flies "increase value. Deontologically..."?
Does the African baby, being bitten by tse flies, "increase value. Deontologically.."?

This sounds grand: "God is in the business of reflecting His Truth, Goodness and Beauty.
So where are his Truth, Goodness and Beauty to be found in the human race, which, we note, was corrupted from the word go by Adam and Eve's disobedience (which he invited by putting them in a garden with the Serpent and that Tree).

Did the profoundly-religious Queen Mary I of England reflect his Truth, Goodness and Beauty when she ordered Protestants to burn at the stake?
Did Pope John Paul II reflect his Truth, Goodness and Beauty when he commanded Roman Catholics not to use contraceptives, thus condemning large numbers of people to death via the AIDS virus?

Who does, or ever did, reflect God's Truth, Goodness and Beauty?

(Looks very much to me as though God has signally failed to accomplish this mission, whether among those who worship him or the rest of mankind.)

John A. Broussard

June 28, 2005, 03:27 PM

Do we, for example, have a real moral and binding duty to refrain from killing Jews?
Not according to Christians. Quite the contrary, pogroms have been condoned and encouraged by just about every breed of Christian. Even Hitler's minions capitalized on the Christian view that Jews are "Christ Killers."

Only recently have some of the fundamentalists begun to change their minds, but only because they're convinced that Jews will see the light, become converts and join in the Rapture.

Even the Mormons have taken to posthumously baptizing Jews. I have to admit that that's an improvement over killing them, but it harldy serves as a moral basis for not doing so.

You are quite correct. Christianity is inherently anti-Semitic.

Arctish

June 28, 2005, 04:44 PM

Originally Posted by Billy Graham is cool
Do we, for example, have a real moral and binding duty to refrain from killing Jews?

This line in BGIC's response also struck me as being odd.

Do we have a real and binding duty to refrain from killing Germans? If so then our participation in WWII was immoral, and the Jews in the concentration camps would surely have died there.

Do we have a real and binding duty to refrain from killing Iraqis? Or Afgans? Or Koreans? Or anyone? If so then our wars and war preparations are immoral as well.

If our duty is both real and binding then we are morally obligated to refrain from killing human beings in all circumstances as the Quakers and a few other sects do. Try telling that to all those christians in our Armed Forces. I am certain their various froms of christianity allow them to kill Jews and non-Jews alike.

If OTOH our duty is real but not entirely binding we may then kill as we feel is necessary or as we believe our god wants (as Moses and Joshua supposedly did).

Is this moral duty real and binding? Or are there circumstances under which the bindings are loosed and we may kill while retaining our moral standing?

Hobbs

June 28, 2005, 10:05 PM

(1) Are moral statements moral propositions? Are they true andfalse? (2) If not, then what are they? (3) If so, then what are they about? What are they true and false in relation to? (4) More practically, are any of the moral propositions people propose actually true? (5) If so, are any actually known to be true? (6) If so, how are these known to be true? (7) If applicable, please translate the moral statement of the form ‘x is wrong’ into its proper meaning. (8) If applicable, please translate the concrete moral statements ‘child torture is wrong’ and ‘Hitler’s Final Solution was evil’ into their respective proper meanings. ....

And to be fair, let me first reveal my answers:

1. Yes.
2. N/A
3. Moral propositions are true or false in relation to and ultimately about moral properties (e.g., goodness, unrighteousness, worth, dignity, evil etc.) inherent in objects like persons, characters, acts, intents/motives etc.
4. Yes.
5. Yes.
6. Moral intuition.
7. ‘x is wrong’ need not be translated or reduced; it literally means ‘x has the property of wrongness’
8. The propositions ‘child torture is wrong’ and ‘Hitler’s Final Solution was evil’ ascribe moral properties to the acts themselves, as is plainly indicated. If such properties exist and inhere in said objects, then the propositions in question express objective moral truth.
Even granting that there are objective moral properties that inhere in acts and/or objects, I have to object to your answers to questions 5 and 6, that these can be known with any degree of certainty by moral intuition. As I have pointed out before, believers in the same religion often have opposing intuitions. How do we decide between them?

If I see an elephant in front of me but doubt the accuracy of my vision, I can check my perception with other senses. I can smell an elephant. I can hear it. I can step up to it and feel it. If I'm really careful in my checking, I can lick it to taste it. (Then again, never having licked an elephant before I don't have anything in my memory to check against licking it now to conclude that "yep, this tastes like an elephant.") If my other senses are consistent with what my eyes tell me, I can conclude that it's an elephant in front of me.

If I see a stick poking up out of the water and it looks like it is sharply bent right at the water line, but when I feel it it feels straight (i.e. my senses are not consistent with one another), I can go about checking things out: I can pull the stick out of the water and see that it is not bent, and I can learn things about how water bends light to make such sticks appear bent. So I can know, even when I am looking at a stick that appears bent, that it is not really bent.

If grass looks green to me, and leaves look green, but tree trunks and branches look brown, I can use various instruments to measure light waves and see that certain waves correspond to certain colors. The greenness I experience when I look at grass may only be in my mind (i.e. the "greenness" may be subjective), but it verifiably corresponds to something real in the external world. So, if someone looks at leaves and the branches they are on and sees the same color, we can reasonably conclude that there is something faulty with his perception of color and label him as color blind. Further, we can convince him that he is misperceiving reality (both by appealing to the vast majority of people who independently agree that they are different colors, and by using spectrometers and other instruments to measure the actual physical properties), even if he can never see the difference himself.

What do we have to verify the accuracy of these moral intuitions you are talking about? Suppose one Billy Graham-type born-again evangelical Christian looks at stem cell research and intuits that it is a bad thing, and that it is morally wrong to pursue it. Then another BG-type born-againer looks at stem cell research and intuits that it is a good thing, in fact it is so good that it would be morally wrong not to pursue stem cell research. (And, in fact, there are BG-type Christians on both sides of this issue.) Granting for now that there even is a definitive "the right answer," how, according to your system of moral intuition, do we tell who's right? Appealing to the Bible? They both do that to support their opposite conclusions. So, even granting that there is a definitive "the right interpretation" of the Bible, how do we determine which it is?

Is it possible to convince a person who perceives stem cell research as immoral that he is misperceiving it, such that he will agree that his perception must be incorrect even if he continues perceiving it as immoral, in the way that a color blind person can be convinced that his perception is incorrect even though he continues not to be able to see the difference between green and brown? How can one or the other be convinced he is misperceiving the alleged moral properties without him changing the way he (subjectively) perceives it? How can one or the other be convinced he is misinterpreting the relevant Bible passages without him changing the way he (subjectively) interprets it? Is it possible for a BG-type Christian (or anyone else) to say, "yes, I see that my moral intuition on this issue is false. I still intuit it as morally wrong, but I see that it is in fact morally right." Or, to say "yes, I see that my interpretation of this Bible passage is in fact incorrect. I still interpret it the same way, but I see that my interpretation is inaccurate."

I've asked this before, and now I'm asking it again:
My point is that sincere believers in the same religion often get very different results when they abstract principles and apply them to the same concrete situations.

Not that there's anything wrong with that. In fact, I don't think there is necessarily anything wrong with that, but at least most divine command or divine origin theories of ethics, at least as I understand them, would think there is something wrong with that, so by their own standards they have a potentially serious problem here. I'd like to know how you get around this problem.Please do answer, I'm interested in what you have to say about this.

Hobbs

June 28, 2005, 10:58 PM

let me first reveal my answers:

...
3. Moral propositions are true or false in relation to and ultimately about moral properties (e.g., goodness, unrighteousness, worth, dignity, evil etc.) inherent in objects like persons, characters, acts, intents/motives etc.
...
7. ‘x is wrong’ need not be translated or reduced; it literally means ‘x has the property of wrongness’
8. The propositions ‘child torture is wrong’ and ‘Hitler’s Final Solution was evil’ ascribe moral properties to the acts themselves, as is plainly indicated. If such properties exist and inhere in said objects, then the propositions in question express objective moral truth.
I think (at least) one of us is confused here. You say that these moral properties inhere in 'objects', a term which you define quite broadly to include subjective things like intents and motives. Are you defining everything that is real as an 'object' and thus saying that morality is therefore objective? Minds, feelings, motives, ideas, etc are subjective, but they are no less real for being subjective. A human body is an object. A human person is a subject. It seems to me that if a property inheres in a subject such as a person or a motive, it is a subjective property. Or, can subjective entities have objective properties? Actually, I'm not sure in what sense an act, a verb rather than a thing, can have a property.

Hobbs

June 28, 2005, 11:29 PM

Whereas the typical subjectivist might answer as follows:

1. Yes.
2. N/A
3. Moral propositions are true or false in relation to and ultimately about the subject’s likes and dislikes.
4. Yes.
5. Yes.
6. Biological (evolutionary) and cultural determination of the subject’s personal preferences.
7. ‘x is wrong’ means ‘I dislike x’
8. The propositions ‘child torture is wrong’ and ‘Hitler’s Final Solution was evil’ describe the subject’s biologically and culturally determined dislike for child torture and the Holocaust. If the subject is not lying or somehow mistaken about his own preferences and non-preferences, then these propositions express subjective moral truth.
Or, maybe you don't understand the subjectivist position. Well, I shouldn't say "the" subjectivist position as if there were only one. I have heard some people say something along these lines, but it is a rather unsophisticated, and I think inadequate, understanding of what subjectivism in morality is about.

How about this for a subjectivist position:
1 and 2. Moral statements are not truth propositions, they are judgments. Thus, they are not factually "true or false," but they can be reasonably judged as being "better or worse."
3. n/a
4. n/a
5. n/a
6. n/a (But in any case, they are not biologically or culturally "determined," nor are they "preferences." "Influenced," yes, but not "determined." That again is taking your passive route of just receiving "the right answers" to moral issues, whether by intuition, culture, preference that one happens to just have, or whatever. They are not passively received and "known to be true"; rather, they are actively created and judged to be good, useful, reliable, appropriate.)
(That's four 'n/a's. That reflects the fact that I think your whole approach to this issue is coming from the wrong direction.)
7. "x is wrong" does not mean that "I dislike x." It means that in my judgment, I believe that doing x is a bad way for a person to act, or at least for this specific person in this specific situation. In other words, I believe that to do x rather than y would cause real harm whereas y would result at least in less harm and perhaps in many benefits. I believe, then, that a person in that situation should do y and should not do x. The "should" is not from any external obligation, it is, as I said before, generated from within the lives we live as the sorts of creatures we are. Now, I may have made a poor judgment, and I could be corrected if someone convinces me that in fact doing x will lead to lots of benefits and few or no harms; if so, I will alter my judgment accordingly.
8. "Child torture is wrong" is my judgment that causing pain to others with no resulting benefit that significantly outweighs the pain (taking a child to a dentist may involve some pain, but the benefits are well worth it) is a bad way to live a human life. We are social creatures who depend on getting along with others to live well. We do a better job of that if we care for others rather than use others solely for our own benefit (if they detect we are doing the latter, we are likely to get kicked out of that society). Thus, we live better lives, more appropriate lives given the sorts of creatures we are, if we not only refrain from torturing children but also have desires to help and to refrain from harming them.

This is "subjectivity" in a far different sense than you are using it. To illustrate, I'll use another analogy with science:

As far as we can tell, a scientific "law" is a law only in a metaphorical sense. As far as any scientist has been able to determine, there are no actual independently objectively existing "laws" of motion which objects must "obey." Rather, objects just do in fact behave in a strictly regular fashion, and that fashion can be described. A scientific "law" is a description of an invarying regularity. In other words, a scientific law is produced by the minds of scientists, i.e. it is a subjective product. That doesn't mean that it can be any damn fool thing a scientist wants it to be. Well, it can, but it does not follow that it will be an accurate description of reality. If our subjectively produced descriptions don't match reality, we have to alter the descriptions.

Now, there may indeed be an independently objectively existing law out there somewhere for, say, gravity, but even if there is, we do not have direct access to it. For all practical purposes, they might as well not exist, because we don't have reliable direct access to them. We can only observe and test the regularities we see, and then come up with a description of them. So even if there are some sort of objectively existing laws out there, we are still stuck with our subjectively produced descriptions of them.

Likewise with scientific theories. A theory is a subjectively produced constructed understanding of some related group of facts and regularities we experience. So, for example, the theory of relativity is an explanation of, among other things, the law of gravity. It is explaining something real: bodies of matter really do exert forces on one another, various objects really do interact in various ways. But there is no "law" or "theory" that exists somewhere "out there" that we are trying to approximate. Rather, they are our constructions. But we can't construct just any old theory and say that they are all equally valid, because they in testable, verifiable fact are not all equally good at explaining and accounting for reality. They are subjectively produced, but they are about objective realities.

I think morality is analogous: there are no moral laws out there for us to find. Even if there are independently objectively existing moral properties out there as you claim, we don't have direct reliable access to them so for all practical purposes they might as well not exist. Rather, we must construct them. But they are not all equally valid, because they are testable and verifiable by seeing the results of following the various moral precepts: does doing x rather than y in situation z in fact lead to beneficial results, or to harmful results? Moral laws, moral precepts, moral judgments, are subjective, they are subjectively produced, but they refer to actual realities: objective and subjective benefit, objective and subjective harm, real objective and subjective consequences of actions. Reality imposes itself on us. Reality "out there" does not include moral laws and moral duties any more than reality "out there" includes scientific laws and scientific theories. There is no "answer key" to give us "the right answer." We must construct them. But the laws, duties, and theories, are all about, they are all generated in response to, the real world out there that really does impose on us and gives us real standards for judging our subjectively produced understandings of it and our subjectively produced judgments of how best to live in it.

Hobbs

June 28, 2005, 11:47 PM

Before I resume my normal order of response, I should simplify my prior inquiry for the sake of those that wish to join the talk on what makes things morally good/bad but perhaps find the language still too dense to pierce. So, if you prefer, simply answer this: is moral goodness/badness always in the human mind (i.e., the subject) or is moral goodness/badness in the act/intent/agent (i.e., object)? Or, restated, in what does moral value inhere, the mind of the subject or as a property of the object? What do you say? No need to say 'why', yet. In fact, I prefer that you don't as that'll likely muddy the waters unnecessarily.
This is not a simple question, as it looks to me like it has conflated separate matters, and thus muddied the waters already. To attempt a simple answer, though, I will say that moral goodness/badness, moral values, are in the subject. But they are about real situations, consequences, etc in the real world, and there is real value outside the mind: those situations etc can be in fact good or bad, beneficial or harmful, valuable or not. But as for the moral part of it? I agree with C.S. Lewis: it is subjective. As he says in "Mere Christianity," the 'oughtness' that is at the essence of morality is something "urging me to do right and making me feel responsible and uncomfortable when I do wrong. I think we have to assume it is more like a mind than it is like anything else we know." Like "mind," he says: i.e., it is something subjective. (He of course goes on to say that it is objective because it is from the mind of God, though I don't see why it couldn't be from our own minds. And even if it is from the mind of God, that would still be subjective; absolute, perhaps, since God is supposed to be powerful enough to enforce his moral preferences on everyone, but, as a product of his mind, still subjective. I think what Lewis meant by 'objective' would be better labelled as 'absolute.')

To illustrate: nutritious food really is in fact valuable, objectively valuable; thus, for someone not to value it, to value only the taste of harmful or poisonous foods is to have an inappropriate value. You are valuing something that is not in fact valuable, and failing to value something that is in fact valuable. Friendship is, for at least the vast majority of people, in fact valuable. So if you value doing things that drive any and all potential friends away, you have an inappropriate value. Moral values inhere in the mind of the subject, but they are about, they refer to, real situations and consequences in the real world out there, and thus they can be critiqued by appealing to that external reality.

Hobbs

June 29, 2005, 12:15 AM

But the questions themselves were serious. And I note that you made no attempt to answer them.

It is and was then unclear what you mean(t) by those questions of Biblical morality. Do you mean them now as a serious challenge? Since, as someone who call's himself "Billy Graham is cool," I think I can safely assume that you believe that morality is in some essential sense related to the god described in the Bible, yes, I think that these questions of Biblical morality are pertinent to our discussion of metaethics.

Oh, and by the way, I didn't say God's spitefulness was the reason behind the Amalek thing. I pointed out that this is what the Bible says is the reason behind the Amalek thing.
Interesting. If your reading were to become pertinent to anything I've been talking about at all, I'd likely challenge it. I hope my comment above helps to clear things up. The Bible and the God of the Bible are your source of morality, are they not? Or, are you saying that morality is independent of God and that moral standards transcend God, that these moral properties which inhere in objects do so independently of God and God is obligated to obey them just as we do? Well, even in that case this is still pertinent to our discussion: is the god of the Bible good, and worthy of worship? (Besides, you did begin this thread by asking for our primary objections to Christianity, and this is my primary objection: too many of the teachings, and too much of the character of Yahweh, the god of the Bible, are immoral. Not all of it, but certainly too much of it to accept it as a whole.)

So, let's look at that passage again:

1 Sam 15: 1-3
Samuel said to Saul, "I am the one the LORD sent to anoint you king over his people Israel; so listen now to the message from the LORD. This is what the LORD Almighty says: 'I will punish the Amalekites for what they did to Israel when they waylaid them as they came up from Egypt. Now go, attack the Amalekites and totally destroy everything that belongs to them. Do not spare them; put to death men and women, children and infants, cattle and sheep, camels and donkeys.' "

Two questions:

1) What does the Bible say is the reason God gave for killing all the Amalekites?

2) Do you, Billy Graham Is Cool, believe that it is morally good to execute a child for something his remote ancestors did several hundred years ago? A simple yes or no answer will suffice, though feel free to expound on your answer to explain and/or justify it.

Hobbs

June 29, 2005, 01:24 AM

The "shoulds" are not imposed from the outside; rather, they are generated from within the lives we live as the sorts of creatures we are. It's the sort of view that believes, and takes seriously, the idea that virtue is its own reward: a good life is worth living for its own sake; it doesn't need some Purpose to make it worth living, it is its own purpose. And what constitutes a "good" life depends on the sorts of creatures we are and the situations in which we find ourselves.
I'm sorry if any ambiguity on my part led you down this path, but I don't see how this relates to what I've been talking about. If you can't see how this relates to what you have been talking about (metaethics, right?), then I don't see how I can explain it any better. If I am being unclear, I apologize, and maybe there is someone else who sees what I am trying to get at and can help me be more clear about it. But perhaps it is just that you aren't able to grasp what I'm trying to get at, which is possible, as it is pretty evident to me that we are coming at this from very different angles. Perhaps, from the angle you are viewing this, your vision is blocked and you can't see what I'm trying to point out here.

If I can't figure out a way to explain myself clearer, and if no one else can come along and help me, perhaps it will help you at this point to focus on what I see as the problem with your theory of metaethics. Please carefully consider the questions I ask in post 420 above, and please explain to me how you handle the difficulty of different members of the same denomination of the same religion having incompatible moral intuitions. You claim that you can know, through moral intuition, that some moral propositions are actually true. How does that work, and especially how does it work when two different people have conflicting moral intuitions?

It was not until I saw how that view breaks down and is inadequate (or, at least, what looks to me like a breakdown) that I was forced to figure out something else and then was able to see things as I see them now.

Let me get straight to the point: do objective moral facts exist, on your view? Do moral properties exist objectively, subjectively or not at all? Do we have real moral duties? Do we, for example, have a real moral and binding duty to refrain from killing Jews? If so, what is the nature of this duty? Where does it come from? What makes it binding?I hesitate to give quick answers to these questions because I am afraid that either I will not express myself clearly or you will misunderstand a quick answer. Besides, I thought I already answered these questions, in the passage just above to which you responded that you don't see how it relates to what you have been talking about.

But, keeping in mind what I said above to explain these answers:

Objective moral facts, moral properties (in the sense you have been using 'objective'), do not exist. Or, if they do, we do not have reliable access to them, so for all practical purposes they might as well not exist. Reality, however, does exist, and it exists in one way and not in any others. Situations, consequences, etc, are real and really are beneficial or harmful to ourselves, others, and the society on which we all depend for our well being. So there really are better or worse ways to live a human life. There is nothing out there binding us to moral duties. But there is reality that is what it is and cannot be changed just by our preferences or wishful thinking, and living in certain ways really are better, more appropriate for the sorts of creatures we are than living in other ways. There is no "best" way to live, nor is there a distinct and definitive line between good and bad ways to live. There is legitimate and real and unavoidable uncertainty. But some specific ways of acting are clearly better than other specific ways.

There is no external, objective, binding, moral duty not to kill Jews. If you get away with it, you get away with it. But there are real, unavoidable consequences of doing so: for one thing, others are likely to do all they can to stop you (if not because they care about your victims, then perhaps at least because they are afraid you will come after them next), so you probably won't get away with it. For another, many people really are in fact harmed, regardless of whether you or anyone else cares about that. And it has real affects on the sort of person you are and the sort of life you live. Do you think, all things considered, you will be a happier, healthier person, living a better life, if you care for others and seek to live in harmony with them than if you hate them and try to kill them? There's nothing out there that says you have to be good. But reality will likely see to it that if you are bad, you are, well, bad. Isn't it better to be good than bad? Not for any external rewards or punishments, not from any objectively binding duties, but just because it is good?

So, though there is no external, objective, binding, moral duty not to kill Jews, I can still quite reasonably, and rationally defensibly, judge that killing Jews just because they are Jews is a very bad way for a human to behave, and mean that in much more than just "I don't like it." Rather, I mean it in the sense that I believe it is actually a bad, an inappropriate way for a human to behave, and someone who behaves in such a way has, in my judgment, made a very poor judgment of how to live his life, and he is worthy of my and everyone else's moral scorn, of our judging him to be a bad person, and we are justified in doing what we can to stop him.

I hesitate to say this because I think it will be confusing, but I do think it would be accurate for me to say that such a person is wrong, that it is wrong to kill Jews just because they are Jews, though I would need to point out that I mean not factually wrong but morally wrong. I hope that all I have said in this thread at least points to what I mean by this distinction between factually right and wrong verses morally right and wrong, but I suspect that it won't. At least perhaps not until you try to deal with the problem of the inadequacy of moral intuition as a basis for making moral judgments.

Hobbs

June 29, 2005, 01:27 AM

All right, enough of my post slutting for now. I need some sleep.

Also, I am about to head out on vacation for a few weeks, during which time I will have little or no Internet access. I may be able to drop in on rare occasions, but I will probably have to wait until I get back and catch up then. BGIC, I hope by then you have tried to explain how moral intuition works, and especially what to do in cases where people have conflicting intuitions.

Cross Examiner

June 29, 2005, 03:02 PM

My point is that sincere believers in the same religion often get very different results when they abstract principles and apply them to the same concrete situations.

Not that there's anything wrong with that. In fact, I don't think there is necessarily anything wrong with that, but at least most divine command or divine origin theories of ethics, at least as I understand them, would think there is something wrong with that, so by their own standards they have a potentially serious problem here. I'd like to know how you get around this problem.
What problem? I can't imagine how the mere existence of moral disagreement amongst Christians militates against divine command theory (not that I'm a divine command theorist). But maybe you are more imaginative than I am.
I'm not really interested so much in your specific answers to those issues, I'm more interested in how you propose coming up with your answers.
So how should we go about answering, say, the practical questions in bioethics? Well, if there is a God and if He has spoken then the wisest thing we could do would be to consult His word on such matters. If His word were unclear on some particular issue, we'd likely want to do something like we're doing here now.
But if this is moving to applied or normative ethics, my justification is that seeing the sorts of actual judgments, or actual procedures for making judgments, in applied or normative ethics that result from a certain meta-ethical position is a good way to evaluate that position. It's sort of analogous to running an empirical experiment to test a scientific theory or hypothesis. If, for example, a meta-ethical position allowed for one to conclude in an applied situation that wanton raping and pillaging is not just good but in fact required, one could rightly question the coherence of that meta-ethical position and ask for more work to be done either to clarify why it is not a problem for this meta-ethical position to have this sort of practical result or to modify or perhaps even dispose of the meta-ethical position.
I think this is problematic. If an applied meta-ethic leads to rampant robbery and rape then why modify or dispense with it? Because rape and robbery are morally bad? If so, then what do we mean by 'bad' here? That such things cause more human pain than pleasure (or some such)? If so, then why is that bad? And so on. Infinitely. Are you familiar with G.E. Moore?

Cross Examiner

June 29, 2005, 03:13 PM

In post 313, I said that "rather than being 'true or false,' or 'right or wrong,' I think it is more accurate to say moral judgments are 'better or worse,' more or less reasonable judgments of what would be appropriate to do in certain situations," and I attempted to explain what I meant by that.
Better or worse in relation to what? How do you define the good? Also, if, as you seem to suggest, moral statements are neither true nor false then they are non-cognitive or meaningless. This is a difficult position to take. Do you indeed wish to take it?

Buffman

June 29, 2005, 06:30 PM

How do you define the good?

No pain...either physical or mental.

Hopeful Monsters

June 29, 2005, 06:50 PM

Before I pose some questions below, I am going to attempt to summarise my own meta-ethical viewpoint.

Where do morals come from?

Our evolutionary biology provides us a 'raw material' and a psychology: the most crucial being the ability to empathise but also mental traits, propensities, abilities, capacities - which enable us to possess and to develop moral sense & moral faculty.

This 'raw material' consequently interacts with―

the cultural realm
Societal development
History (experience)
Social struggle
Social 'progress'

…To not only provide moral codes, moral doctrines, moral beliefs and notions but further provide the dynamic by which we develop that (originally somewhat unformed) moral sense, moral faculty, moral capacity, into: moral beliefs, conscientiousness, responsibility, a conscience, moral discernment, moral judgement etc.

The driver for such evolution is that without moral sense or faculty, social groups would be chaotic, hard earned energy would be expended and wasted, murder might have free reign, social cohesion poor in face of adversity etc and so survival and thriving a would have poorer chance by a statistically significant margin.

Hominids with superior moral capacity and a desire to live in social harmony would look after their young better and co-operate and have a better reproductive success and be happier and live longer (more time to reproduce etc).

My personal meta-ethical position

Not an emotivist – because this description denies that our other faculties are engaged. Morality must involve emotion mediated by rationality, logic, analytic thought etc. You only have to see (say) a late teens struggle with an ethical question to know it is not purely a matter of 'Boo!' 'Hooray!'

Deontology – No. Duty & obligation simply fails to adequately describe how we act in behaving ethically.

Rule utilitarianism & Act utilitarianism – No. These are too crude as ethical systems and do not adequately describe our ethical experience.

So my position is―

A non-cognitivist position – moral judgements are not ‘true’ or ‘false’ statements about moral facts. Moral judgements do not lie within the realm of fact because moral judgements derive from values not facts.

Moral non-realist.

Not a consequentionist – intention & the consequence of its related action have to be considered together.

Virtue ethicist; situation ethicist; and possibly an ethical constructivist.

NOW―

If there are no moral facts, no moral absolutes, no real moral properties, no moral realism in the sense that philosophers and theologians might mean, this means that ethics for humankind is―

- an area of constant struggle, challenge, complexity and difficulty
- sometimes an area where there are no definitive answers and black or white positions (my personal examples might be: euthanasia, stem-cell research, abortion)

The question is―

Does such challenge, struggle, complexity, difficulty and lack of definitive position for humankind mean that a ‘God’ derived morality, ethics, meta-ethics etc is inescapable?

Is it that when faced with challenge, struggle, complexity, difficulty, some are responding by inventing ‘God’ to make themselves imagine that the challenge and difficulty is solved and they are comforted?

Further things to consider―

Is every street, office, home, neighbourhood, in the entire world in moral chaos? If not, why not?

Before every corner of the world had received ‘The Word of God’ was it in moral chaos? If not, why not?

Before every corner of the world had received ‘The Word of God’ were there some very sophisticated, finessed notions about how we should live and behave (honest answers only)?

Hal gets home to find his trusted next-door neighbour-buddy Harry has chosen chocolate over mint ice-cream. What are the consequences, feelings, thoughts, rational experiences, affect on map of the world: (a) for Hal and (b) for Harry?

Hal gets home to find his trusted next-door neighbour-buddy Harry has murdered Hal’s 4 daughters and wife. What are the consequences, feelings, thoughts, rational experiences, affect on map of the world: (a) for Hal and (b) for Harry?

Can these two scenarios be identical under any possible argument? Is any attempt to equate them shallow, glib and fallacious?

Is a God-derived meta-ethics established as inescapable?

Ratel

June 29, 2005, 06:57 PM

BGiC, understanding that this thread already has its share of able participants, I just wanted to address this question of objective morality you continue to raise because I think my particular angle on it hasn't really been put forward, although I have a lot of agreement with Hobbs' explanation about how doing good is good for us, so I won't go over that point again.

In my view, what causes me to wish to act morally- I should say, the highest motivation for acting morally, because surely I am motivated to act morally for lower reasons-such as fear of social ostracisation, for example- is my ability, the human ability, to empathize with the experiences of others.

Because I can understand that I would not wish to be murdered, or assaulted, or raped, or ripped off in a scam, or made fun of, I don't wish to do this to other people. I can feel how terrible it would be. I have the ability, call it imagination or perhaps something more spiritual sounding- to put myself in the other fellows shoes. And this is what burns me when I fail to act according to this principle- I know that my actions are causing pain to someone else who feels pain the same way I do. And of course I'm not the only person who operates this way, I think 90% of folks do, and that it's a normal human thing for mentally healthy adults. (There are of course people who don't or cannot think this way-they are either motivated by belief in a certain concrete code, or by fear of reprisal. Then there are those who are entirely unable to empathize with others, and are so lacking in forethought that dread of punishment in the future does not dissuade them from horrible actions in the present.)

Now, is this fact of human existence an objective truth? In a sense, I suppose one could say so, since, it's a real phenomenon most people experience. But on the other hand, it doesn't really exist in the world of the measurable and quantifiable, but rather within each of us, and the human race collectively, so I think I must finally place this reality of human empathy into the subjective category, bearing in mind that simply because something exists in the subjective internal realm does not mean it is unreal.

IMHO, there are, as I alluded to earlier in this post, "lesser" motives for moral behavior. Fear of authority, fear of social opprobrium, fear, dare I say it, of Hell. Those are all fear and punishment based motives for morality, and since they are all based on external factors, don't have the same power as internally based morality. Witness the proverbial PK run amok when parental controls are out of reach. I'm sure we can all supply examples from our own lives of people who, when external restraints were lifted, lost all self control.

I think these moral systems are ideally compatible, because ideally the individuals imposing the external constraints are trying to create a system based on the highest benefit for all, which blends in with the internally-based moral system's motives very nicely. But in reality conflicts between the external and internal system exist. Bad Bad Bad's "Joshua Challenge" type scenarios are a great example of this. On the one hand the external moral AUTHORITY, Yahweh, declares (supposedly) that all the male Midianite infants be slaughtered. From the perspective within the culture of the Israelites, the ultimate evil was to disobey Yahweh, and the ultimate good was to obey him. The resultant massacre, therefore, was "good" within the cultural context of ancient Israel- Yahweh was happy, the outsiders were killed. But from the perspective of those with a conscience, we know that WE would not like to be ambushed and slaughtered, and have our families raped and killed before our eyes, so we cannot abide the thought of obeying the authority-figure ordering such an abomination. The higher moral source, human empathy, overrides the lower moral source, fear of the Authority and mere adherence to its laws, which are after all pathological in nature.

Does this make any sense to you BGiC? I'm sure my perspective is flawed and lacking in areas, but do you see any common ground here?

Hobbs

June 29, 2005, 09:10 PM

Better or worse in relation to what? Better or worse in relation to each other, and to the contexts within which we find ourselves living.

There is no absolute standard (or, if there is, then we have no demonstrably reliable access to it and thus it is of no use to us, so for all practical purposes there is no absolute standard). But there are relative standards, and they are real.

How do you define the good? "The good" what? It makes sense to talk about "the" tree or "the" forest, or "the" any other noun, but 'good' is an adjective, it is a description or evaluation of a noun. There are good trees, there are good meals, there are good computers, but it doesn't make any more sense to talk about "the good" than it does to talk about "the blue" or "the fast." The fast what, the blue what, the good what? (Plato based his entire philosophy on the fallacy of reification, of treating adjectives as if they were nouns.)

Another analogy to attempt to illustrate: Suppose I ask you to describe the tall. "How do you define the tall?" Then you sit and wait for me to say the tall what, but I never do. So you ask, "the tall what?" And I say, "oh, not the tall anything, just the tall." My question wouldn't make sense.

But suppose I point to a tree and ask you whether the tree is tall. You may say "yes, it is tall." But then I say, "oh, but it is only eighty feet tall, and Mount Everest is nearly thirty thousand feet tall! How can you call this tree 'tall'?" And you say, "well, relative to a mountain, sure, the tree isn't tall, but that is a ridiculous context, a ridiculous standard for tallness when it comes to trees. I meant that it is much taller than me." And I counter by saying that you are not as ridiculous a standard for tallness in trees as is a mountain, since you are you, after all, and you are the one making the judgment, but still you are not a tree." Okay then, you say, it is tall for a tree. But I point out that for its species, it is somewhat short: most of its species get to be a hundred feet tall.

What if the only thing that existed in the universe was a tree? Would it be tall? Short? Of course not. Those would be meaningless terms, because 'tall' and 'short' are relative terms, it depends on the context and what the object is related to. And, some contexts are more appropriate than others. There is no absolute standard for 'tall', but there doesn't need to be to make sense of calling something 'tall'.

Ditto an athelete. What is a good baseball player? Who was the best baseball player in the history of the game? Do we need an absolute standard of the best possible player to make such judgments about who are good, not so good, and downright bad players, or who was the best ever? Of course not. And that's good, because an "absolute best possible baseball player" does not even make sense, it is conceptually incoherent. How fast would he have to run, how hard would he have to throw, how much beer would he have to be able to drink? (Oh, wait, that last standard doesn't make sense within the context of the game of baseball. So I guess we don't use that as a standard.) Would it be the fastest runner, the hardest thrower, etc, that is physically possible, or the fastest, hardest, etc that is logically possible? And how would we determine either one? It is logically possible to run faster than the speed of light, there is no logical contradiction in saying that, but it is of course physically impossible. If you think about it, the concept of "the absolute best possible baseball player" is incoherent. Nor is there an absolute scale to appeal to for making such judgments. But not having an absolute standard or an absolute scale does not mean that we can't make reasonable relative, contextual judgments about which players are better than which others, or to make reasonable arguments about who is the best ever. You probably wouldn't get unanimous agreement that Babe Ruth was the best player ever, but no one who knows much about baseball would argue that he is not at least a reasonable candidate. And no one would argue that Pepe Frias is a reasonable candidate for best player ever. We don't determine who are better or worse baseball players in relation to some external, absolute standard; rather, we determine who are better or worse players in relation to each other within the context of the game.

Likewise, 'good' is an adjective used contextually to describe nouns. A good tree is one that is healthy, well shaped, in a position where it gets a good combination of sunlight and water, etc etc. A good act is one that leads to beneficial consequences. A good human is one who functions well as a human, who gets along with others, intentionally and effectively acts in ways to benefit himself and others and to mitigate harm, etc etc. A good moral judgment is one that accurately picks a better way to act in a situation, a way that in fact will lead to benefits. A better moral judgment is one that does a relatively better job of that, within and relative to that context. There is not, nor does there need to be, any absolute standard of goodness to make such judgments about trees, people, or moral judgments: the standards are found there in the context, they are relative to the context.

Also, if, as you seem to suggest, moral statements are neither true nor false then they are non-cognitive or meaningless. That is too simplistic. Statements are not either absolutely definitively true or false on the one hand or meaningless on the other. You seem to think that if we don't have "the right answer" or some absolute standard to measure a claim against then it just anything goes and all opinions are equally valid (or equally invalid). I hope it is clear that and why this is not the case. If it is not, then please do try to wrestle with the problem of how to determine which of two or more conflicting moral intuitions is a "true" intuition of an objective moral property.

This is a difficult position to take. Not nearly as difficult as a position that claims that Yahweh of the Bible is morally perfect, and that has to defend killing babies because their ancestors did something bad several centuries ago.

I wouldn't say it is a difficult position to take. I would say that it is a difficult positon to be in. But, as far as I can tell, that is in fact the position we are in: we don't have absolute standards given to us, we don't have absolutely right or wrong answers. We have to work to learn contextual standards and to use them effectively. It is much more difficult than it would be if we really could just directly intuit the right answers to moral questions, if we could just passively receive the answers. But since we cannot reliably directly intuit the right answers to moral questions (even if there indeed are such answers), we're stuck with having to construct them, and then to test and measure them against the appropriate contexts (and it is also up to us to figure out which contexts are most appropriate) and then to use those contextual standards as a basis for constructing judgments about the validity of our claims.

Do you indeed wish to take it?Sure, why not? It seems to me to be far more rationally defensible than your claim that morality depends on Yahweh.